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Centralization and Elite Circulation in a Soviet Republic

MICHAEL E. URBAN



Central control over personnel placement in the Soviet Union (the *nomenklatura* system) is widely regarded as the complement to the centralization of substantive policy making and implementation. Some recent studies, however, argue that the central authorities have used their appointments powers to ratify rather than alter the results of the circulation process specific to localities. In order to advance the terms of this discussion, the present study employs a systemic model of circulation. Here, circulation is regarded as a Markov process involving the movement of vacancies across a stratified hierarchy of 2,034 positions in the Belorussian Republic, and all-union jobs occupied by Belorussian politicians, over the period 1966-86. The model's predictions are reasonably accurate for the full data set but fit the data especially well when all-union positions are excluded, indicating a marginal centralizing influence on elite circulation that results more from the interaction between national and republic personnel systems than from centrally co-ordinated cadres policies in either Moscow or Minsk. Three auxiliary tests also support the conclusions derived from the Markov analysis.

The movement of actors across the array of political offices provides a particularly important index of power and policy in any political system. In the Soviet case, where effectively all social activity transpires through the medium of the party-state, the importance of this proposition is especially pronounced. On the one hand, such activity is not so much regulated as it is (in principle) consciously planned, organized and directed by the central authorities whose formal lines of command run from Moscow to republic and provincial capitals whence they radiate outward to, ultimately, the basic units of political, economic and social organization. In the official parlance of the Soviet regime, there is a 'monolithic party', which directs a 'unified state structure', which in turn superintends a 'single economic mechanism'.

On the other hand, however, this grand attempt at central direction is fraught with a number of difficulties embedded in the very structures that appear to privilege the role of the political centre.¹ In the absence of both political democracy and a market economy, the centre is woefully short of both accurate information and effective control devices with which it might constrain and direct the behaviour of subordinates.² Accordingly, the holders of subordinate

Department of Political Science, Auburn University, Alabama. This study was supported by funds from The National Science Foundation and The National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

¹ Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

² *Inter alia*, Gertrude E. Schroeder, 'The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of "Reforms"', *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 312-40; Timothy Dunmore, *The Stalinist Command Economy: The*

positions reveal a powerful tendency towards the personal appropriation of public office.³ In order to hold this tendency in check and to promote the implementation of its own directives, Moscow relies on 'cadres policy', its ability directly and indirectly to offer appointments in the apparatuses of the party-state in return for compliance with its directives.

The questions addressed by the field of elite studies on the Soviet Union have long been framed, explicitly or implicitly, with reference to this basic issue. Numerous analyses of Soviet elites have examined the changing attributes of officials over time in order to establish (a) what sort of individuals are at one time or another favoured by the appointments policy of the centre and (b) what the changing profile of the Soviet elite suggests about policy change or even systems change in the Soviet Union.⁴ Moreover, awareness of the centralized system of appointments, the *nomenklatura*, has made this task the easier, or so it would seem. If certain types of individuals are being recruited and promoted at certain points, one view would contend, then we can have confidence in the fact that Moscow is consciously pursuing certain cadres policies in tandem with its overall policy orientations. Inasmuch as the *nomenklatura* system concentrates enormous appointment powers in Moscow and, secondarily, in the capitals of the republics,⁵ the assumption that the right hand (cadres policy) knows what the left hand (substantive policy) is doing is not an unreasonable one to make.

But this assumption has recently been called into question by a number of studies which indicate that the political centre uses its formal powers of appointments largely to ratify the results of the real process of selection taking place in the localities.⁶ These studies represent a challenge to, and in certain respects an

Soviet Apparatus and Economic Policy, 1945-1953 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980); Michael E Urban, 'Information and Participation in Soviet Local Government', *Journal of Politics*, 44 (1982), 64-85; Nicholas Lampert, 'Law and Order in the USSR: The Case of Economic and Official Crime', *Soviet Studies*, 36 (1984), 366-85.

³ Michael E. Urban, 'Conceptualising Political Power in the USSR: Patterns of Binding and Bonding', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 18 (1985), 207-26.

⁴ A sample of this literature would include Bohdan Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984); Ronald J. Hill, *Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984); T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Joel C. Moses, *Regional Party Leadership and Policy-Making in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1974); Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1978).

⁵ Discussions of the *nomenklatura* system can be found in Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment*; Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984).

⁶ John H. Miller, 'Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in the Non-Russian Republics of the USSR', *Soviet Studies*, 29 (1977), 3-36; John H. Miller, 'Nomenklatura: Check on Localism?' and Gyula Jozsa, 'Political *Sellschaften* in the USSR', both in T. H. Rigby and B. Harasymiw, eds, *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 15-61 and pp. 139-73 respectively; Joel C. Moses, 'The Impact of Nomenklatura in Soviet Regional Recruitment', *Soviet Union*, 8 (1981), 62-102; Joel C. Moses, 'Regionalism in Soviet Politics: Continuity as a Source of Change', *Soviet Studies*, 37 (1985), 184-211; Robert E. Blackwell, Jr, 'Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era', *Problems of Communism*, 28 (1979), 29-42.

advance over, the conventional assumptions about central control over elite circulation in the Soviet Union. The method which informs them, however, is consistent with the general orientation in the field which gives primacy to individuals rather than to the relations among them. As a result, the evidence which these studies adduce to support their overall conclusions about a declining importance of centralized direction in the Soviet personnel process is more suggestive than systematic. Take, for instance, the use of cross-regional transfers, an indicator commonly employed to measure the centre's influence on regional elite mobility. A diminishing frequency of such transfers and a concomitant tendency for officials to make their entire careers within a single republic or region are taken as indications of a weakening of the centre's influence over the movement of personnel and suggests that something of a *laissez faire* posture (summed up in Brezhnev's slogan of 'trust in local cadres') has been adopted with respect to the circulation of sub-national elites.

But as plausible as this argument seems, it remains inconclusive because it seeks to address a systemic issue – the degree of centralization in the system – on the basis of individual-level data. As a consequence, it finds itself unable to engage a counter-argument constructed in terms of relations within the system, namely, that declining rates of cross-regional transfers may signal an *increase* in centralized control over personnel matters. The argument is that the centre is now able to vet, groom and install local cadres on whom it can rely, thus obviating its need to shift personnel around among the various regions in order to secure compliance with its policy directives. Rather than a decline in centralization, a diminishing frequency in cross-regional transfers may indicate that centralization has been perfected to the point that the relatively clumsy method of moving subordinate officials around the map has become obsolete.

The point of this discussion is neither to suggest that indicators such as cross-regional transfers are useless nor that, in the present illustration, a decline in the rate at which actors are shifted among the regions of the Soviet Union shows that central control over the movement of personnel has indeed been perfected. Rather, it merely points up the ambiguity which results when an analysis of systemic factors such as centralization is undertaken on the basis of methodological individualism, an orientation which, as Valerie Bunce has noted, is both characteristic of this field of study and ill-suited to entertain questions of a systemic nature.⁷

The issue of whether *actual* (as opposed to purely nominal) centralization governs the circulation of Soviet elites is just such a question. In order to engage it on a systems level, the present study introduces a number of departures from conventional approaches in the field. Firstly, the concern with actors and their attributes is replaced here with a focus on jobs and the relations among them. Such a focus enables analysts to specify their concepts in systems terms where

⁷ Valerie Bunce, 'Of Power, Policy and Paradigms: The Logic of Elite Studies', in R. H. Linden and B. H. Rockman, eds, *Elite Studies and Communist Politics: Essays in Memory of Carl Beck* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1984), pp. 21–48; esp.

relations appear in place of individuals. Secondly, a study of centralization requires ample data on what is potentially the object of centralization – the jobs and the actors who fill them. Consequently, this research has generated a more or less complete inventory of positions and incumbents in the Belorussian Republic for the period 1966–86, with jobs rather than individuals as the primary unit of analysis. Finally, this focus on the system of positions makes possible the use of an exceptionally powerful method, vacancy chain analysis, for which a demonstrable superiority *vis-à-vis* competing methods has been shown in a number of sociological studies.⁸

DATA

The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) has been selected as the sample of positions for reasons of size and political orientation. Located in the northwest quadrant of the Soviet Union, the BSSR, with a population of just over ten million, is administratively subdivided into six oblasts and a capital city, Minsk. In terms of size, the BSSR is well-suited for a vacancy chain analysis of elite circulation. On the one hand, it is large enough to generate an adequate data base while, on the other, it is not so large as to place prohibitive costs on the gathering of personnel data on those in local offices. The particular history of Belorussia also recommends itself for such a study. Prior to the Revolution, Belorussia was the least developed area in European Russia with arguably the lowest level of national consciousness. Economic development in the Soviet period has been impressive, especially in the postwar years, yet national identification in the BSSR has continued to lag considerably behind that which can be found in neighbouring republics.⁹ In this respect, the results of a study of elite circulation in the BSSR may suggest something about the same process in, say, the Russian Republic or other republics of the Soviet Union, assuming that nationalism, and the reactive cadres policies of Moscow, are factored out.

Personnel data on Belorussian elites and sub-elites for the period 1966–86 were collected from a number of sources.¹⁰ A computerized data file was then constructed wherein each actor appeared as a 'case', and to each case was

⁸ Shelby Stewman, 'Two Markov Models of Open System Occupational Mobility: Underlying Conceptualizations and Empirical Tests', *American Sociological Review*, 40 (1975), 298–321; Suresh Konda and Shelby Stewman, 'An Opportunity Labor Demand Model and Markovian Labor Supply Models: Comparative Tests in an Organization', *American Sociological Review*, 45 (1980), 276–301; Suresh Konda and Shelby Stewman, 'Careers and Organizational Labor Markets: Demographic Models of Organizational Behavior', *American Journal of Sociology*, 88 (1983), 637–85; Sam Marullo, 'Housing Opportunities and Vacancy Chains', *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 20 (1985), 364–88.

⁹ Nicholas P. Vakar, *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation* (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1956); Stephen L. Guthrie, 'The Belorussians: National Identification and Assimilation, 1897–1970' (part 1 and part 2), *Soviet Studies*, 29 (1977), 37–61, 270–83; Roman Szporluk, 'West Ukraine and West Belorussia', *Soviet Studies*, 31 (1979), 76–98.

¹⁰ The main source for these data is the daily, *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, over the period January 1966–June 1986. I also relied on the monthly, *Kommunist Belarussii* (1976–June 1986), selected numbers of the daily, *Zvyazda*, and on listings which appeared (far less frequently, of course) in

appended a code which designated the position held by the actor in specified years. This yielded a matrix of 3,127 rows (officeholders) and twenty-one columns (each a one-year interval over the period 1966–86) into which the 2,034 jobs that appeared in the sample were entered. The jobs spanned the following hierarchies: Communist Party of Belorussia (KPB), governmental positions in the BSSR (ministries, state committees, main administrations, soviets, etc.), Komsomol, trade-union, cultural and educational posts. The vertical range extended from republic-level positions in these hierarchies through regional (*oblast*), and for party and soviet positions, district (*raion*)-level jobs, and to the positions of directors (and in some cases deputy directors) and the secretaries of primary party organizations and trade-union presidents in large enterprises. Additionally, twenty-four jobs at the all-union level known to have been taken by former officeholders in the BSSR were included.

The matrix of officeholders/years (1966–86) with offices as the entries was then transformed into a matrix of offices/years (1966–86) wherein the entries were the officeholders. As such, each actor who held a given position at the end of a particular year occupied a cell in the matrix designated by the intersection of the corresponding row (position) and column (year). Row entries then change with mobility into and out of the positions which designate the row.

In order to study the centre's influence on mobility in the BSSR, it is essential to specify a hierarchy in which mobility occurs. This issue is clearly a problem in all analyses of the Soviet system because: (a) the careers of actors commonly progress over a number of formal institutional hierarchies making *a priori* judgements as to which moves constitute promotions, which involve demotions and which represent lateral transfers hazardous at best; (b) Soviet organizations, as Hough has demonstrated,¹¹ do not evince the legal-rational gradations of authority associated with bureaucracy in advanced capitalist systems. Consequently, having no ready-made hierarchy of offices with which to work, one had to be generated.¹²

A hierarchy of BSSR positions over the period 1966–86 was composed on the basis of the probability of incumbents reaching higher positions. That is, a top

Sovety narodnykh deputatov (January 1976–June 1986) and *Izvestiya* (1983–86). Some data were taken from Soviet personnel directories compiled by the CIA, from Val Ogareff's *Leaders in the Soviet Republics* (Canberra: Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 1980), and from the short biographies in relevant editions of *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*

¹¹ Hough, *The Soviet Prefects*, *passim*.

¹² To be sure, individual scholars in the field have devised ranking systems for positions in the Soviet Union. However, these are either of a purely nominal type (Philip D. Stewart *et al.*, 'Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process. A Partial Test of Two Models', *American Political Science Review*, 66 (1972), 1269–94) or refer to a single set of positions (Peter Frank, 'Constructing a Classified Ranking of CPSU Provincial Committees', *British Journal of Political Science*, 4 (1974), 217–30). The latter is obviously of no use for present purposes because we are dealing here with multiple sets of positions, while the former provides no basis for the validity of the ranking scheme. For details on this problem and on the mobility-generated hierarchy used here, see Michael E. Urban, 'Elite Stratification and Mobility in a Soviet Republic', in David Lane, ed., *Elites and Political Power in the USSR* (London: Edward Elgar, 1988).

stratum of jobs was first isolated which included those positions whose incumbents regularly appeared on the Buro of the Central Committee of the KPB, reputedly the highest decision-making organ in the BSSR. To these thirteen positions were added twelve executive jobs at the all-union level into which BSSR officeholders had moved in the course of their careers. These twenty-five jobs comprised Stratum 1.

A second stratum was then partially specified in an analogous way by including jobs whose incumbents revealed irregular membership or regular candidate membership on the Buro, plus sub-executive jobs in Moscow which had been taken by former BSSR officials (total, twenty-six jobs). With these rankings in place, a computer program was designed to create succeeding strata for the remainder of the jobs in the data set and to assign individual jobs to individual strata on the basis of the formula:

$$S_i = P_{i-j} + P_{i-k}$$

where S_i represents the stratum to which a given job is assigned, P designates the level of probability that an incumbent in a given job will move into one of the positions in S_k (i.e., the stratum above S_i), and the subscripts, $i-j$, $i-k$, denote movement from i (initial, unstratified position) into jobs in hierarchically ordered strata (j , k) above S_i . If the computed probabilities that the holder of a given position can move to jobs in, say, the first and second strata are summed, and if this sum equals or exceeds the probability level (0.4) set for inclusion into the third stratum, then the job will be ranked in that third stratum. Succeeding strata are created and composed in the same way.

This method of generating a hierarchy of positions in the BSSR on the basis of the transition probabilities of incumbents to jobs in higher strata ranked all 2,034 jobs in the sample in ten strata. The shape of this hierarchy is pyramidal from Stratum 1 through Stratum 6, after which point the sizes of the respective strata taper off as a consequence of the fact that the incumbents in lower level positions appeared less frequently in the sources from which the data were gathered and are therefore relatively less well represented in the sample.¹³

¹³ Limitations of space preclude a full listing of the 2,034 jobs ranked in the ten strata. In order to provide an idea as to the ranking itself, however, a summary of the positions ranked in Strata 2-10 may be useful. In Stratum 2, in addition to those jobs specified at the outset as noted in the text: Head of the Propaganda Department of the KPB, five *obkom* first secretaries, First Secretary of the Minsk *gorkom*, six deputy chairs of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Industrial Construction, BSSR. In Stratum 3 appear eight department heads of the KPB, thirty ministers of the BSSR, the chairs of *oblispolkoms*, three directors of major industrial enterprises, six chairs of state committees and the Procurator of the BSSR. Stratum 4 includes ten department heads of the KPB (as well as the first deputy heads of most of the departments ranked in Stratum 3), eleven *obkom* secretaries, the first secretaries of a number of large *gorkoms* and urban *raikoms*, twenty-three deputy ministers, three newspaper editors and the First Secretary of the Komsomol. Strata 5-7 include 1,043 jobs of varied formal rank from chairs of state committees through instructors of the KPB and department heads in the ministries to presidents of *rauspolkoms*. The bottom three strata contain some 779 positions such as *gorkom* and *raikom* secretaries, heads and deputy heads of departments in *obkoms*, *gorkoms*, *raikoms*, *oblispolkoms*, *gorispolkoms* and *rauspolkoms*, and directors, party secretaries and trade-union chairs in large industrial firms.

METHOD

Vacancy chain analysis, a method originated by Harrison C. White, is used here to test for the effects of centralization on the circulation of elites in the BSSR.¹⁴ It begins with a 'nothing' or, more accurately, a *vacancy* which occurs in some position and sets in motion the process of circulation. Initially, vacancies are assumed to move independently of one another and to form 'chains' as they circulate through an array of offices. That is, when a vacancy appears and is filled by some incumbent in the system, a new vacancy is created in the job which this incumbent has just left. This vacancy is, in turn, filled by another incumbent, creating thereby another vacancy until the chain formed by the movement of vacancies passes outside the system (recruitment of a non-incumbent). A vacancy chain can be taken as the mirror image of a replacement chain, i.e. the chain of actors (replacements) who move through a given chain of vacancies. A vacancy chain would terminate in the Belorussian case when the last vacancy in a chain has moved out of the Republic (i.e., when the replacement has come from another republic or from the all-union level) or down the organizational hierarchy to be filled by a new recruit. Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion involves the movement of vacancies (rather than actors) in the system. Therefore, in speaking of, say, a 'vacancy that has moved outside the system', we have in mind the fact that it is a vacancy that has moved out and, simultaneously, a replacement who has moved in.

TABLE 1 *Illustration of Vacancy Chain Formation**

Years	In	Jobs					Out
		1	2	3	4	5	
1980	I, J	C	G	J	F	I	A, H
1979		A	G	C	F	H	
1978	H	A	G	C	F	H	E
1977	A, C	A	F	E	C	G	B, D
1976		B	F	E	D	G	

*Matrix array in time series for ten persons in five jobs over five years (persons = A, B, C ... J; jobs = 1-5, years = 1976-80)

Vacancy chains can be detected through the use of a matrix taking the form of the hypothetical one in Table 1 in which chains can be noted by simple observation. In Table 1, two chains are apparent when comparing incumbents, replacements and those leaving the system between the years 1976 and 1977. Two people left the system (B,D) and two entered as direct replacements, yielding two

¹⁴ Harrison C White, *Chains of Opportunity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). See also D. J. Bartholomew, *Stochastic Models for Social Processes*, 3rd edn (New York: Wiley, 1982), pp. 244-7.

chains, each of length 1. For 1977–78, a chain of length 4 was begun with the exit of E, creating a vacancy which travelled from job 3 to job 4 to job 2 to job 5 and then out of the system with the arrival of H. No vacancies occurred in 1979, but two are observable in 1980 when A's departure from job 1 created a vacancy which moved to job 3 and then out of the system with the arrival of J (chain length, 2) and H's departure which summoned replacement I (chain length, 1).

For our purposes, this method has two important advantages over conventional approaches in the field. Firstly, the vacancy model analytically includes the concept of circulation and, accordingly, builds into the analysis the relational nature of the circulation process. Vacancies are what circulate within the system and their circulation in chains reports events within the system that are themselves empirically linked. Conventional approaches, by abstracting the attributes of the actors from their empirical context, miss entirely the real linkages in the movement of actors across the array of positions. The vacancy model is fashioned so as to offer an immediate empirical interpretation of the concept of elite circulation: vacancies circulate in chains.

Secondly, the vacancy model is concerned with the *process* by which this circulation occurs. It postulates that the process is a Markovian one, meaning that specifiable probabilities exist that govern transitions in the system from one state to another. The 'states' in the system under consideration are the ten strata of positions in our hierarchical model. The vacancy approach, then, postulates that events in the system can be predicted solely on the basis of the distribution of vacancies among the strata in the system and the probabilities which affect their transitions among these strata.¹⁵ Accordingly, the vacancy approach allows us to postulate a pure model of elite circulation in which central control plays no role, and then to compare empirical cases against this baseline. To the degree that the model fits the data, elite circulation across the array of positions in our stratified system of Belorussian offices can be regarded as Markovian. Vacancies can be taken as moving independently of one another in accordance with fixed transition probabilities which govern this movement. Effective, as opposed to nominal, central control over appointments would not add, if the model is successful, anything to an explanation of the circulation of elites within the system.

When a vacancy occurs in any of the ten strata in our hierarchical model, it can trace a chain through any number of strata before passing outside the system. The mathematical expressions¹⁶ relevant to modelling the movement of vacancies are:

- j = length of a vacancy chain;
- j_m = mean length of chains by stratum of origin (column vector);
- p = probability that a vacancy passes outside the system (column vector);

¹⁵ For a development of this point, see John G. Kemeny *et al.*, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics*, 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966), Krishnan Namboodiri, *Matrix Algebra: An Introduction* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1984).

¹⁶ These have been adapted from White, *Chains of Opportunity*, *passim*.

- P_j = probability by stratum of origin that chains will be of length j (column vector);
 F = number of vacancies created;
 A_{ij} = number of moves by vacancies from stratum i to stratum j ;
 Q = matrix of transition probabilities among strata.

Direct observation or simple calculation provides values for j , j_m , F and A_{ij} . The matrix Q is composed of transition probabilities (i.e., the probability that a given vacancy's next move will be within the same, or to any other, stratum), each derived from A_{ij}/F . The values for p are computed according to the equation, $p = 1/j_m$ and they give the probability that a vacancy's next move in the system will be to the outside. Table 2 sets out the Q matrix and p vector for the entire sample of positions in the BSSR arranged in ten strata, for the period 1966-86. This matrix of transition probabilities is read by taking any row entry as the stratum in which a given vacancy has arisen and matching it to any column as the probability that its next move will be to that stratum. For instance, the first row reports that vacancies in the first stratum had a 0.38 probability of moving next to another job in Stratum 1, a 0.25 probability of moving next to Stratum 2 and an equal chance (0.06) of making their next moves to either Stratum 3 or Stratum 4. The p value in the right-hand column of Table 2 indicates a 0.25 probability that Stratum 1 vacancies will next move outside the system (i.e., the replacement who fills the vacancy will come from outside of the BSSR).

The main test for a centralizing influence on the circulation of vacancies within the set of positions in the BSSR involves P_j , the column vector that predicts chain length by the stratum in which a given chain has originated. P_j is computed as: $P_j = Q^{-1}p$, where Q is the transition matrix, j is chain length and p is the probability that the vacancy passes outside the system. P_j , then, is computed successively, by stratum in which initial vacancies occur, for chains of length 1, 2, 3, ... 8 (the longest chain in the sample). It yields a prediction that a

TABLE 2 *Q Matrix of Transition Probabilities of Vacancies Among Strata, 1966-86*

Stratum of origin	Stratum of destination										P
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1	0.38	0.25	0.06	0.06	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.25
2	0.06	0.06	0.56	0.06	0.06	—	—	—	—	—	0.22
3	—	0.02	0.07	0.50	0.05	0.04	—	—	—	—	0.32
4	—	—	0.05	0.05	0.53	0.07	0.02	—	—	—	0.28
5	—	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.11	0.33	0.03	—	—	—	0.49
6	—	—	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.24	0.02	—	—	0.67
7	—	—	—	—	0.01	0.04	0.07	0.18	0.02	—	0.67
8	—	—	—	—	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.09	—	0.74
9	—	—	—	—	—	0.01	0.02	0.02	—	0.03	0.92
10	—	—	—	—	0.01	0.04	0.01	—	0.03	0.05	0.86

certain percentage of chains originating in, say, Stratum 1 will be of length 1, a certain percentage will be of length 2, and so forth. If the observed distribution of vacancy chains originating in this stratum and others matches the predicted percentages in P_j , then the process is Markovian. In other words, the circulation of elites (taken as the circulation of vacancies) is not affected by a centralizing influence.¹⁷

In addition to this test for determining whether the system of positions in the BSSR exhibits the Markov property, three auxiliary measures of centralization are employed in this study. The first, and strongest, indicator of centralization involves a comparison of the career histories of those in the top three strata of the model (i.e., the strata in which effectively all jobs are subject to Moscow's *nomenklatura*) with the observed vacancy chains initiated by their exits from the system. If there are matches, that is, if we find the jobs in a certain actor's career history appearing again in the chain of vacancies set off by his departure from the system, then it is reasonable to infer that certain positions function as stepping stones to others, that the central authorities are grooming replacements for the top positions by installing certain individuals in stepping-stone jobs and that the circulation of elites in the BSSR is determined from above.¹⁸ To the degree that no significant overlaps of this type occur, however, the hypothesis that the central authorities are merely ratifying the results of a personnel process specific to the BSSR would be supported.

A second, and weaker, indicator of a centralizing effect on elite circulation in the BSSR involves the vetting of personnel in Moscow. Are vacancies in the Belorussian positions which numbered among the offices in the top three strata filled by replacements whose previous jobs were at the all-union level? A pattern of such would constitute evidence that candidates for high office in the BSSR regularly are placed in upper-level jobs after a career detour which takes them to Moscow where they are vetted by the central authorities.

The third, and weakest, indicator of centralization utilizes the p value (the probability that a vacancy will leave the system) for Strata 1–3. Increases or decreases in p over various periods in the time frame would suggest a concomitant tendency on the part of the central authorities to pack higher offices in the BSSR with individuals from outside (or from those who briefly have held jobs outside) of the Republic. As with the second indicator, above, this is a rather weak measure of centralization, 'weak' because unlike P_j , which is based on the structure of elite circulation in the BSSR, it is confined to the particular movements of particular individuals. We might assume that Moscow, having vetted these individuals, has come to rely on them to carry out specific directives in the Republic. But this practice might be regarded as a rather poor substitute for effective personnel centralization in a systemic sense. Having been parachuted into high office in the BSSR, these same individuals must work with personnel there in

¹⁷ For a discussion of this question in the context of other settings, see White, *Chains of Opportunity*, pp. 100–44; Marullo, 'Housing Opportunities', pp. 383–8.

¹⁸ White, *Chains of Opportunity*, pp. 308–10.

place. If the career mobility of the latter is shown to be beyond the effective reach of the centre either directly or indirectly, then these outsiders would be surrounded by 'natives' whom, even if they did not 'marry', they would probably find difficult to control.

ANALYSIS

The Main Test

The Q matrix presented in Table 2 reports the transition probabilities for individual vacancies to the ten strata in the model over the entire twenty-year period encompassed by our study. As we would expect from the method used to stratify the sample of positions, the diagonal line in the matrix running through the intersection of row values and the column values found one step to the right of the corresponding row (2, 3; 3, 4; etc.) records in all but two cases the highest transition probabilities for vacancies in the system. So, for instance, vacancies which arrived in Stratum 2 had a probability of 0.56 of moving next to Stratum 3; those arriving in Stratum 3, a probability of 0.50 of moving next to Stratum 4, and so forth as one follows the diagonal towards the bottom-right quadrant of the matrix. The exceptions to this pattern occur at the top-left and bottom-right of Table 2. We notice in this respect that vacancies appearing in the first and last strata show a higher probability of circulating within these same strata than they do of moving to any other stratum in the model. In the case of Stratum 10, this simply reflects the fact that there are no lower strata from which to summon replacements. For Stratum 1, however, the relatively high probability (0.38) that a vacancy arriving there will make its next move to another job in the same stratum indicates a considerable degree of internal rotation among these top-level jobs.

Our main test for centralization is concerned with discrepancies between predicted and observed chain lengths by stratum of origin, and involves the term, P_j , which predicts the distribution of chain lengths. Table 3 presents these data. In comparing the predicted distributions of chain lengths against the observed values for same, it is clear that the largest differences occur in the top three strata. Stratum 1 records two instances in which the differences between predicted and observed values reached or exceeded 10 percentage points, as does Stratum 3, while Stratum 2 involves one such case. Additionally, it will be noticed that modal values in the predicted and observed distributions agree in the case of Stratum 2 but diverge in the first and third strata.

Among the remaining strata, all differences between predicted and observed values are under the 10 percentage point mark. The largest difference in this group occurs in Stratum 4, a difference of 8.1 per cent. For these seven strata taken together, predicted and observed values were separated by a single percentage point or less in twenty-nine of the forty-eight instances involved (60.4 per cent of the cases) and by two percentage points or less in forty-one of the instances (85.4 per cent).

TABLE 3 *Predicted (P) and Observed (O) Distribution of Chain Lengths by Stratum of Origin (in percentages)**

Chain lengths	Stratum 1			Stratum 2			Stratum 3		
	P %	O %	n	P %	O %	n	P %	O %	n
1	25.0	16.7	5	22.2	13.9	5	32.1	18.8	18
2	18.7	20.0	6	24.8	38.9	14	21.8	34.4	33
3	16.7	6.7	2	18.2	16.7	7	21.8	26.0	25
4	13.5	23.3	7	16.0	13.9	5	13.3	12.5	12
5	10.5	16.7	5	9.8	8.3	3	6.2	4.2	4
6	7.0	6.7	2	4.9	8.3	3	2.7	3.1	3
7	4.1	6.7	2	2.3	—	—	1.1	1.0	1
8	2.2	3.3	1	1.0	—	—	0.4	—	—
9	1.1	—	—	0.5	—	—	0.2	—	—

Chain lengths	Stratum 4			Stratum 5			Stratum 6		
	P %	O %	n	P %	O %	n	P %	O %	n
1	28.2	26.5	32	48.7	48.8	177	67.1	70.2	420
2	34.9	43.0	52	30.8	33.3	121	21.5	22.4	134
3	21.0	19.0	23	12.4	12.4	45	7.7	6.4	38
4	9.3	7.4	9	5.0	2.5	9	2.5	0.5	3
5	3.9	3.3	4	1.9	2.8	10	0.8	0.3	2
6	1.6	—	—	0.7	0.3	1	0.2	0.2	1
7	0.6	0.8	1	0.3	—	—	0.1	—	—
8	0.2	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	—	—

Chain lengths	Stratum 7			Stratum 8			Stratum 9		
	P %	O %	n	P %	O %	n	P %	O %	n
1	67.4	67.5	305	74.4	76.4	410	91.8	90.0	261
2	23.3	26.3	119	19.4	19.7	106	6.1	9.0	26
3	6.6	4.7	21	4.2	3.7	20	1.5	1.0	3
4	1.8	1.6	7	1.3	0.2	1	0.4	—	—
5	0.6	—	—	0.4	—	—	0.1	—	—
6	0.2	—	—	0.2	—	—	—	—	—
7	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	—	—

Chain lengths	Stratum 10		
	P %	O %	n
1	86.0	87.7	220
2	11.0	8.8	22
3	2.1	3.2	8
4	0.6	—	—
5	0.2	0.4	1
6	0.1	—	—

*The number of vacancy chains (N) was 2,774.

Although we are not attempting to generalize the findings in a sample to a larger population, there seems to be some utility in following White's suggestion that the application of a significance test to data such as these would provide an indication of the meaning which we might attach to the differences recorded between predicted and observed values.¹⁹ A non-parametric statistic, the Kolmogorov Goodness of Fit Test, is appropriate to this purpose.²⁰ Setting the significance level at 0.5 (for we wish to test rigorously the predictive accuracy of the model and, hence, we want to make it difficult for ourselves to say that no significant differences obtain) we find that none of the differences between predicted and observed values is significant. This finding would support the predictive accuracy of the model and indicate that the circulation of elites in the BSSR resembles a Markovian process in which the centralized *nomenklatura* system in Moscow (or its counterpart in Minsk) has but a marginal influence.

Let us, however, examine this influence further. The data in Table 3 indicate that disruptions in our hypothesized Markov process for the flow of vacancies in the system are effectively confined to the top three strata. Since the jobs in question here overwhelmingly fall within the scope of Moscow's *nomenklatura*, this is to be expected on substantive grounds as well. However, a question remains about the precise manner in which this centralizing influence functions. We can clarify matters by conceptually distinguishing between, on the one hand, a direct form of centralization in which Moscow's cadres policies reach into the BSSR to alter the results of a personnel process which is endemic to the Republic and, on the other, an indirect form of central influence which derives from the interaction between the personnel system in the BSSR and that which exists at the all-union level. As far as the latter is concerned, the influences disturbing a postulated Markovian flow of vacancies may come about as a result of events taking place in Moscow rather than in Belorussia. Since a number of all-union positions appear among the jobs contained in the top two strata, we can determine whether the centralizing influence is directly or only indirectly at work by removing the all-union positions from the data set and repeating the analysis.

The results of this procedure are displayed in Table 4 which (owing to the small number of cases remaining in the data set for the top two strata once the all-union positions have been excluded) lumps together all jobs in the top three strata. These data show that an indirect form of centralization appears to be present in the system, but do not support the idea of a direct form of central control over elite circulation within the BSSR. The centralizing effect is evident in the marked disagreements (larger than 10 percentage points in two cases) between the columns of predicted and observed values on the left-hand side of Table 4, which include the all-union positions in the sample. It disappears on the right-hand side, however, where the all-union jobs have been excluded from the analysis and where the predicted and observed distributions of chain lengths come into very close agreement. To be sure, some of the closeness apparent in

¹⁹ White, *Chains of Opportunity*, p. 104

²⁰ W. J. Conover, *Practical Nonparametric Statistics* (New York: Wiley, 1971), pp. 293–8.

TABLE 4 *Predicted (P) and Observed (O) Distributions of Chain Lengths for the Top Three Strata, With and Without All-Union Jobs*

Chain length	Strata 1-3 all-union jobs included		Strata 1-3 all-union jobs excluded	
	P %	O %	P %	O %
1	28.9	17.3	62.6	62.5
2	22.0	32.7	22.7	23.6
3	20.3	20.4	8.8	9.1
4	14.0	14.8	3.5	2.6
5	7.7	7.4	1.4	1.2
6	3.8	4.9	0.5	0.7
7	1.8	1.9	0.2	0.4
8	0.8	0.6	0.1	—
9	0.3	—	—	—
10	0.2	—	—	—

matching predicted and observed values on the right-hand side of Table 4 is a statistical consequence of performing the analysis after having excluded the all-union positions. This skews the distribution in the direction of short chains, since we have artificially removed a number of the 'links' provided by vacancies in all-union positions which are evident in the greater proportion of long chains in the left-hand columns of Table 4. None the less, the predicted values fit the observed results in the right-hand columns with such a high degree of accuracy (all differences are under one percentage point) that it seems safe to infer that to the degree that a centralizing effect on the circulation of vacancies in the model is apparent, it can be traced to the interaction of two separate personnel systems, one at the all-union level and another in the BSSR. Of course, in the real order of things this division between personnel systems is somewhat artificial, but in drawing it we have been able to distinguish analytically between two varieties of centralization. One takes the direct form of a cadres policy which systematically manipulates the movement of actors among the offices in the BSSR; the other is indirect and consists of the implications which events taking place at one level of the system have for events at other levels. On the basis of the results from the main test, it appears (a) that a centralizing influence on elite circulation in the BSSR is of marginal importance and (b) to the extent that the flow of vacancies in the Belorussian Republic is subject to such an influence, centralization is manifested indirectly as the interaction between personnel systems at the all-union and republic levels.

Auxiliary Tests

The first, and strongest, potential indicator of centralization among the three auxiliary tests to be conducted is concerned with what matches might be found

between the jobs contained in the career histories of those leaving the system by virtue of death, retirement, transfer to a position not included in the data set or simple removal from office, and the specific positions included in the vacancy chains initiated by their exits. We confine the application of this test to those actors whose departures from the system left a vacancy in some job which is numbered among the top three strata. The focus on these strata follows both from their position at the top of the hierarchy and from the marginal impact of a centralizing influence on this sub-set of jobs which we observed in the results of the main test. Here, we are looking for another way in which centralization might manifest itself in the system. Job matches between the career histories of those leaving the system and the vacancy chains triggered by their exits would indicate the presence of a cohort of cadres, advancing through stepping-stone jobs, who fill vacancies in the top jobs as they occur. Such would be demonstrable evidence of a centralizing influence on elite circulation, suggesting that Moscow has effectively reached into the personnel process in the BSSR and systematically staffed the top positions with replacements whom it had groomed and eventually installed in elite jobs.

Table 5 summarizes the results of this test for the top three strata. A total of twenty-four vacancy chains containing a total of seventy-nine vacancies occurred in Stratum 1. Of these chains, as the upper-left portion of Table 5 shows, seven were initiated by a vacancy in an executive job in Moscow which had been held by an official whose former career had been in the BSSR. Five of these were of length 1 (indicating that these vacancies summoned no replacements from the BSSR), two were of length 4 and one of these contained a single match with the career history of the official whose exit initiated the chain.

TABLE 5 *Job Matches Between Career Histories of Officeholders and Vacancy Chains Initiated by Their Exits, 1966-86 (Strata 1-3)*

	Chains initiated in Moscow	Chains initiated in BSSR
Chains initiated in Stratum 1		
Total number of vacancies	13	66
Number of chains	7	17
Chain lengths	1-4	1-8
Number of matches	1	3
Chains initiated in Stratum 2		
Total number of vacancies	4	91
Number of chains	4	28
Chain lengths	1	1-6
Number of matches	0	3
Chains initiated in Stratum 3		
Total number of vacancies	—	159
Number of chains	—	54
Chain lengths	—	1-7
Number of matches	—	6

A similar dearth of matches is observable in Stratum 1 for those chains begun by the exit of an officeholder in the BSSR (upper-right section of Table 5). In only three cases were there matches and each involved a single job in the replacement chain matching one of the positions in the career history of the exiting official (although, in one instance, the second person in the replacement chain revealed two matches between *his* career history and the other jobs in the chain through which he was moving at the time). Inasmuch as these seventeen vacancy chains varied in length from 1 (the Head of the Belorussian KGB who in the two reported cases drew a replacement from outside the BSSR) to 8, and accounted for some sixty-six vacancies in all, the three matches recorded do not indicate that the centre has been grooming and installing replacements in Stratum 1 jobs in the BSSR.

The application of this same test to Stratum 2 yielded comparable results. No vacancies in Moscow summoned replacements from the BSSR (middle-left portion of Table 5). For those twenty-eight chains begun by a vacancy in a BSSR job (middle-right section) only three contained jobs which matched the career histories of those leaving the system (one in each case). Given that ninety-one vacancies were included in these twenty-eight chains, three matches seems quite a negligible figure.

The data on the career histories of those leaving the system from jobs in Stratum 3 are incomplete. As a result, the analysis excludes thirty-four chains (with a total of ninety-seven vacancies) begun by the exit of an official for whom no career history is available. The remaining fifty-four chains which were triggered by a vacancy first appearing in a job in this stratum were all initiated in the BSSR, owing to the fact that Stratum 3 includes no all-union positions. These fifty-four chains contain a total of one hundred and fifty-nine vacancies, of which only six (one in each case) match jobs in the career histories of those exiting officials on whom data are available. Again, the relative absence of matches indicates an absence of centralization measured in this way.

A subset of positions in Stratum 3, however, shows a slightly higher score on this indicator. If we divide the jobs in Stratum 3 into one group which contains the executives of the state apparatus (ministers and deputy ministers, chairs and deputy chairs of state committees and so forth) and another group composed of all other positions in Stratum 3, we find that those leaving jobs in the state apparatus have career histories which match their respective vacancy chains more often than is true for the other group. In the case of the state executives, four matches were recorded against forty-nine vacancies contained in twenty-one chains (8.2 per cent), whereas the career histories of those exiting from the remaining positions in Stratum 3 evinced only two matches against 110 vacancies contained in thirty-three chains (1.8 per cent). While the percentage figures in either case are far too low to support the notion of centralization under this test, it is interesting to observe a muted 'bureaucratic' effect in the system, involving some (albeit, small) measure of predictability in the career paths to top jobs in the state apparatus. These results are consonant with those reported by

other observers in the field, and apparently reflect the influence of the *nomenklatura* powers held by ministerial superiors at the all-union level.²¹

Even taking into account this (rather small) 'bureaucratic' effect which we have observed for certain jobs in Stratum 3, the overall results of this test indicate a decided absence of centralization in staffing the top three strata of positions in the BSSR through the use of a specifiable set of offices which function as stepping stones to jobs at the top of the hierarchy. The positions in these strata are clearly within the purview of the all-union *nomenklatura*, yet Moscow seems not to have used its formal authority to shape systematically the process of elite recruitment in the BSSR.

One indication of what might be driving this process also emerges from these data, namely, the effect of region, in this case taking the form of a disproportionate representation of organizations located in the capital city, Minsk, in the vacancy chains begun in the top three strata. Minsk is a city of republic, rather than *oblast*, subordination and consequently shares with the *oblast* in which it is located a formally equivalent administrative status.²² However, in terms of rank in the KPB, the party organization in Minsk City is apparently inferior to the Minsk *oblast* organization. The First Secretary of the Minsk *obkom* has always been over the period of our study a full member of the Buro of the KPB while the First Secretary of Minsk *gorkom* has never been included on the Buro as even a candidate member. Additionally, the First Secretary of the *obkom* is the official head of the entire delegation from Minsk to congresses of the CPSU.²³ Therefore, we might expect that jobs in the city and *oblast* organizations of Minsk would be more or less evenly represented in the vacancy chains initiated in the top three strata, with any edge going to Minsk *oblast*. We find, however, that the reverse is true. Among the vacancy chains begun in Stratum 1, jobs in Minsk City appeared eleven times while jobs in Minsk *oblast* turned up only twice; the comparable figures for chains begun in Stratum 2 are ten for Minsk City and four for Minsk *oblast*; and for Stratum 3, fifteen for Minsk City and ten for Minsk *oblast*. Positions in Minsk City, then, are something of a fast track to high office in the Republic, a feature of this set of jobs which also accounts for the case, mentioned above, of two jobs matches between the career history of the second person in the replacement chain and the vacancy chain through which he was moving at the time (both jobs matches were Minsk City positions).

The salience of Minsk City organizations as stepping stones to top elite positions in the BSSR may be better explained from the bottom-up rather than from the top-down. That is, an identifiable pool of positions with a relatively high frequency of transitions to higher office is not in itself evidence of an effective

²¹ Miller, 'Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas'; J. W. Cleary, 'Elite Career Patterns in a Soviet Republic', *British Journal of Political Science*, 4 (1974), 323-44.

²² P. U. Brovka et al., *Belorusskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika* (Minsk: Glavnaya redaktsiya Belorusskoi Sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1978), p. 587.

²³ I am indebted to Alexander Rahr for this observation on the leadership of delegations to congresses of the CPSU.

centralizing influence on elite circulation. It simply records the fact that a certain set of positions lines much of the avenue to higher office. As documented in another study which considers the influence that region brings to bear on the circulation of elites in BSSR,²⁴ a patronage group emerged in Minsk City organizations over the period encompassed in this study which, through ties with actors in Moscow, managed to distribute jobs in Minsk City to group members for whom these positions functioned as stepping stones to the highest offices in the Republic. In so far as a regionally-based pattern of patronage is concerned, centralized control over elite circulation in the BSSR would be of the nominal variety. A centrally-placed patron would be engaged in a particularistic exchange with clients in the BSSR; however, this could not be taken as evidence that Moscow has been pursuing a co-ordinated cadres policy in the Republic in conjunction with other of its substantive policy orientations.

The results of the second auxiliary test indicate that Moscow makes very sparing use of a surrogate form of centralization, the vetting of candidates for higher office in the BSSR by means of sojourns in all-union offices which immediately precede their appointments to top positions in Belorussia. For Stratum 1 positions, such vetting seems to have occurred on four occasions. The position of First Secretary of the KPB was twice filled by Belorussian politicians who held jobs in Moscow prior to this appointment. The other two cases involve Belorussians who held all-union jobs prior to being appointed secretaries of the KPB. Stratum 2 contains only two instances in which actors occupied Moscow positions before they were named Chair of Gosplan, BSSR, and Chair of the BSSR State Committee for Construction Affairs, respectively. For vacancies which appeared in Stratum 3 posts, the data record three instances in which replacements were drawn from Belorussian politicians who were occupying all-union offices at the time. In one case, the Ambassador to North Korea was recalled to fill the position of Belorussian Minister of Social Security, in another, the Head of the Main Administration for Repair and Technical Services of the USSR's State Committee for Agricultural Technology returned to Belorussia to become Head of the BSSR's State Committee for Agricultural Technology and, in a third, the Head of the Main Administration for Automotive Inspections of the USSR's Ministry of Internal Affairs came back to the BSSR to become its Minister of Internal Affairs. Taken together, the infrequency with which Belorussian politicians held all-union posts prior to taking up a position in the BSSR in any of the top three strata appears to indicate that vetting, even as a surrogate form of centralization, does not seem to be a pronounced factor in shaping the circulation of elites in the Belorussian Republic.

The results of the final auxiliary test are displayed in Table 6. These data allow for a comparison between the probability (p statistic) and the relative frequency (observed rate) of vacancies passing out of the system over various periods of time. The figures in the two left-hand columns have been calculated by using the

²⁴ Michael E Urban and Russell B Reed, 'Regionalism in a Systems Perspective. Explaining Elite Circulation in a Soviet Republic', *Slavic Review* (forthcoming)

TABLE 6 *Probabilities and Relative Frequencies of Vacancies Passing Out of the System in Strata 1-3 (Combined), by Time Periods, With and Without All-Union Jobs*

Time period	All-union jobs included		All-union jobs excluded	
	Predicted	Observed	Predicted	Observed
1966-86	0.29	0.17	0.63	0.63
1966-76	0.29	0.20	0.58	0.52
1977-86	0.29	0.15	0.71	0.70
1966-71	0.24	0.21	0.48	0.57
1972-76	0.45	0.19	0.55	0.58
1977-81	0.25	0.18	0.68	0.70
1982-86	0.36	0.13	0.72	0.72

full set of data while those in the right-hand columns have been derived from the same calculations but with all-union jobs excluded from the data set. This division permits us to make some further comparisons. The figures in the left-hand columns include data on those all-union positions which were at one time or another held by politicians from Belorussia who were replaced by individuals from outside the BSSR. The inclusion of such jobs tends to inflate somewhat the predicted and observed values in the table, adding to the turnover in specifically Belorussian positions a small fraction of the turnover in all-union jobs through which Belorussians had circulated. The figures in the right-hand columns are not affected by this consideration since they have been calculated solely on the basis of positions in the BSSR. As a consequence, however, vacancies in Belorussian jobs which have been filled by a Belorussian politician returning to the BSSR from a post at the all-union level are recorded as vacancies which have passed outside of the system. This, as the figures indicate, raises predicted and observed values even more.

A comparison of the predicted and observed values in the left-hand columns of Table 6 shows that the probabilities of vacancies passing to the outside consistently run ahead of the actual rates at which they do so. Although the figures in the fourth row of the table (1966-71) are close to agreement (0.24 vs. 0.21), those in other rows, such as the fifth (1972-76), are clearly not (0.45 vs. 0.19). The lack of overall agreement between predicted and observed values is apparently due to two things: the fact that the data used to calculate these values include all-union jobs and, relatedly, the method employed for calculating the predicted values. The former enables those vacancy chains begun in the BSSR to trace a path through jobs in Moscow, thus adding to their respective lengths. One result of this is apparent in the left-hand columns of Table 4 in which the predicted modal length of chains begun in the top three strata is a length of 1 (28.9 per cent) while the observed mode is a chain length of 2 (32.7 per cent). A similar difference between predicted and observed modes for chain lengths

initiated in the top three strata obtains when the same analysis is performed on the data divided into discrete time periods.²⁵ The model's inability to predict modal lengths in the distribution of vacancy chains (Table 4) has already been traced to the inclusion of all-union jobs in the sample. This same factor seems to account for the differences apparent in the left-hand columns of Table 6. Recalling that the p statistic is the reciprocal of the mean chain length ($p = 1/j_m$) its tendency to 'overpredict' the rate at which vacancies in the top three strata next move to outside the system is a consequence of the bunching of modal values for observed chain length distributions at lengths 2 and 3. Such distributions make for relatively low mean chain lengths and, hence, result in relatively high values for their reciprocal, p . Again, the presence of all-union jobs in the data set explains why the p values outrun the relative frequencies in Table 6. If, for instance, a job in any of the top three strata is filled by a Belorussian politician who leaves an all-union position, and this all-union job is, in turn, taken by an individual from some other locale in the Soviet Union, the resulting chain attains a length of 2. Such a transaction does not then show up in the observed frequencies at which vacancies pass out of the system for the observed frequencies here would be recorded as chains of length 1, but it does tend to raise the probability estimate that they will do so because of the very small increment which a chain of length 2 adds to the score for mean chain length (the reciprocal of p). In the right-hand columns of Table 6, predicted and observed values come into close agreement precisely because all-union positions have been extracted from the data set, hence eliminating the pattern of chain length bunching around low values greater than 1.

Focusing on the observed rates at which vacancies in Table 6 have moved outside the system, we notice two patterns running in opposing directions over time. With all-union jobs included in the sample, rows 4-7 (i.e., those which cover the four periods of five years each) display a monotonic decrease in the relative frequency of movements to the outside; when the all-union jobs are excluded from the data, the relative frequency increases monotonically. The first pattern suggests a relative decline in the number of instances in which Moscow installed outsiders (i.e., officials from other parts of the Soviet Union) in elite positions in the BSSR. Accordingly, the second pattern, which combines the installation of outsiders with the vetting of personnel in Moscow, indicates that over time Belorussian politicians who advanced to all-union posts were returning to top level jobs in the BSSR with increasing frequency.

Taken together, the individual cases represented in the data show a limited proclivity on Moscow's part to exercise central control over elite circulation in the BSSR by packing positions in Belorussia with outsiders. For jobs in Stratum 1, such packing took place on three occasions, two of which involved outsiders who were installed as Chair of the Belorussian KGB, and in the third an out-

²⁵ For the period 1966-76, the predicted mode in the distribution of chain lengths is 1 (28.6 per cent) while the observed mode is 3 (26.8 per cent). For the 1977-86 period, the predicted mode is, again, 1 (29.4 per cent) and the observed mode is 2 (39.6 per cent).

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sider was parachuted into the position of Secretary of the KPB in charge of agriculture. No such parachuting occurred for any of the positions in Stratum 2. Among the twenty-one vacancies in Stratum 3 which were not recorded as having been filled by an individual who moved immediately from another job in the system, eight involved cases in which either no background information on the replacement was available or the jobs themselves were terminated by administrative re-organization. Of the remaining thirteen cases, eight are recorded instances of vacancies filled by individuals who had career histories in the BSSR and who had either left the collection of positions assembled in the data set for brief periods (for health reasons, for a return to full-time studies, or for a posting described in the data sources as 'other work') or had entered from a job in the BSSR which was not included in the data set. Hence, the data support only five possible instances of packing for Stratum 3 offices: Minister of the Belorussian Peat Industry, Minister of Rural Construction, Procurator of the BSSR, Chair of Gosteleradio and Deputy Chair of the Belorussian State Committee for Petroleum Products.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the third auxiliary test for centralization. Firstly, the method of packing has seldom been used by Moscow as a means to manipulate elite circulation in the BSSR. Over the twenty-year period spanned in this study, some 1,368 vacancies occurred in the Belorussian jobs numbered among those in the top three strata. The data record only nine instances in which these vacancies were filled by the transfer of an individual who had no previous career history in the BSSR. Even allowing for those few additional cases in which data are missing, this method of centralized control over the personnel system bulks quite small.

Secondly, on the qualitative side, it is interesting to note something of a pattern in the positions which have been packed. One subset of these, involving jobs in the area of political and legal control, includes the offices of Chair of the Belorussian KGB (twice packed) and Procurator of the BSSR (once packed). These cases appear to be particularly clear illustrations of cross-regional transfers which are designed to serve the purpose of enhancing Moscow's control over events in Belorussia through the insertion of outsiders into the leading positions of the law-enforcement apparatuses. By the same token, however, one may well wonder about the efficacy of this device, especially because one of the individuals in question, V. A. Mogilnitskii (Procurator of the BSSR from 1973-83), was dismissed from office in the wake of a major scandal which also toppled a number of Belorussians in the Procuracy and Ministry of the Interior. Perhaps in this instance, the outsider sent in to control the natives ended up marrying them. At any event, these cases would indicate that Moscow has relied on packing certain sensitive positions in the BSSR in the interest of asserting central control, but the infrequency of these cases and the unreliability of the results should also caution us against attaching much significance to this method.

Another subset of Belorussian jobs for which some packing is evident involves the agricultural sector. Agriculture, including both the production of foodstuffs and the raising of crops for industrial use, has been an especially important

component of Belorussia's economy.²⁶ It might be expected, then, that Moscow would take a particular interest in Belorussian agriculture and dispatch to the BSSR reliable cadres to superintend the agricultural sector. The data show three instances of such: V. S. Shevelukha served as Secretary of the KPB in charge of agriculture from 1974 to 1979, at which time he was transferred out of the BSSR and became Deputy Minister of Agriculture for the Soviet Union; L. M. Chura was appointed Belorussian Minister of Rural Construction in 1980 and retains that post at the present time; I. Ya. Britov was named Minister of the Peat Industry, BSSR, in 1970 but drew an early pension in 1972 for reasons of health. Although this subset of jobs differs from that discussed above by virtue of the fact that these positions have more to do with making things happen, than with preventing things from occurring (the forte of law enforcement) the small size of the subset leads us to the same conclusion that we drew in reference to the first group.

Over the remaining policy sectors in the BSSR – light and heavy industry, education, health, cultural affairs and so on – only two instances of packing were recorded. G. N. Buravkin was named Chair of Gosteleradio, BSSR, in 1978 and continues in that post at present; V. S. Baranovskii became Deputy Chair of the Belorussian State Committee for Petroleum Products in 1980 and also holds that post currently. We draw from these rare instances in which outsiders were installed in Belorussian jobs the inference that packing as a method of centralized control is distinguished by the infrequency of its use.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Soviet system concentrates enormous powers of appointment in the hands of central authorities. The basic question addressed in this study, however, concerns the degree to which nominal control over appointments manifests itself in practice as a mechanism which structures the process of elite circulation. In order to treat the issue of centralization adequately, we have sought to view it as a characteristic of a system rather than as an aggregate of individual attributes. Accordingly, we constructed an analytic model of elite circulation, which derives from the method of vacancy chain analysis, and postulated that the circulation process is a Markovian one in which events in the system can be predicted solely on the basis of the distribution of vacancies among the 'states' in the system (our ten strata of hierarchically ranked jobs) and the probabilities that govern the transitions of vacancies to other states. Framing our model of elite circulation in these terms allowed us to test empirically for the presence of a centralizing influence on the flow of vacancies by means of comparisons drawn between the model's predictions and the observed results.

The findings produced by the main test performed on the data indicated that,

²⁶ W. J. McGrath, 'The Politics of Soviet Federalism' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1981), pp. 107–87; Brovka *et al*, *Belorusskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika*, pp. 286–98

while not statistically significant, some measure of centralization appeared to be present in the system and its influence was most pronounced among those offices ranked in the top three strata of positions (Table 3). In pursuing this line of inquiry, we learned that the influence of centralization was indirect. Rather than a mechanism which interfered with the movements of vacancies via direct and systematic manipulation of the personnel system in the BSSR, centralization emerged out of the interaction between vacancy flows at two levels of the Soviet system (Table 4). From this we drew two conclusions. Firstly, effective (as opposed to nominal) centralization has no more than a marginal influence on the circulation of elites in the BSSR. Secondly, to the extent that such an influence is present, it appears to be a by-product of the interaction between personnel systems at the all-union and republic levels.

The three auxiliary tests which were conducted in order to check further for traces of centralization in the circulation process tended to support the findings of the main test. The use of stepping-stone jobs which function to groom replacements for higher office, the vetting of upwardly mobile actors by means of sojourns in all-union offices prior to entry into a top position in the BSSR, and the packing of elite jobs in Belorussia with outsiders are all related to the matter of central control over the Republic's personnel process. Examples of each are evident in the data, but they are so few in number that they resemble exceptions to the rule rather than explicit patterns of intervention on the part of the central authorities.

The narrative in this study has devoted the bulk of attention to these exceptions, isolating them as possible instances in which a centralizing influence has been manifest in the circulation process. Consequently, little emphasis has been placed on the larger pattern. Here, we might correct this imbalance a little by drawing attention to the overall predictive accuracy of the vacancy model. If some disturbances are apparent in the circulation process at the upper end of the hierarchy due to the interaction between personnel systems operating on two levels of the Soviet federal structure, no such disturbances seem to condition the flow of vacancies at the middle and lower ranks (Strata 4-10). This, in turn, suggests the effective absence of a central personnel directorate within the BSSR which systematically shapes the process of elite circulation. There is, of course, no reason to assume *a priori* that the conclusion drawn for the BSSR would also hold for other of the Soviet republics or for the Soviet Union as a whole. In view of the salience of the issue of centralization in all phases of the Soviet political process, however, the results reported here might be regarded both as a substantive contribution to the debate on the importance of centralization in the Soviet system and as an analytic direction to be pursued in future research.

Principled Tolerance and the American Mass Public

PAUL M. SNIDERMAN, PHILIP E. TETLOCK,
JAMES M. GLASER, DONALD PHILIP GREEN AND
MICHAEL HOUT

Americans appear to be more tolerant of deviant opinions and life-styles now than they were a generation ago. Recent research by Sullivan and his colleagues suggests, however, that this apparent change is largely illusory – a product not of an increase in principled support for tolerance, but rather of shifts in public dislike for, and hence intolerance of, particular political groups. An alternative account of tolerance is proposed which shows that citizen attitudes on issues of tolerance are remarkably consistent – far more so than has been commonly appreciated. In particular, the empirical analysis distinguishes two kinds of consistency – ‘principled’ and ‘situational’. Using log-linear techniques, it demonstrates that substantial numbers of the general public now support a variety of forms of tolerance consistently, and do so, not for reasons peculiar to each, but rather on principle.

The broader implications of the results for the study of public opinion and democratic theory are noted.

The more tolerant citizens are of the rights of others, the more secure are the rights of all, their own included; hence the special place of political tolerance in contemporary conceptions of democratic values and democratic citizenship.

This conception of tolerance has come under attack – not of course as undesirable, but instead as unrealistic. The public’s support for the principle of tolerance, it is claimed, is not itself principled. People may be willing to tolerate groups they like. But when it comes to those they dislike and fear, it is another matter altogether: then the average citizen is all too likely to show just how intolerant he or she is.¹

This revisionist thesis now dominates research on tolerance. However, we have become persuaded that it suffers a double weakness: on the one hand, it overestimates the extent to which citizens’ emotions – and their dislikes

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¹ See John L. Sullivan, James Piereson and George E. Marcus, ‘An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases, 1950s–1970s’, *American Political Science Review*, 73 (1979), 781–94; and John L. Sullivan, James Piereson and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

especially – dominate their political reasoning; on the other, it underestimates the extent to which they are capable of supporting an abstract political value like tolerance in a principled manner. This article, accordingly, has two major objectives – one negative, one positive. The negative objective is to rattle the bones of the revisionist thesis by establishing the extent to which, and the various ways in which, opinions of citizens on issues of tolerance are consistent. The positive, and more fundamental, objective is to demonstrate that substantial numbers of the general population are indeed capable of making a principled commitment to democratic values like tolerance; a demonstration of relevance to political psychology and democratic theory alike.

THE EMOTIVIST THESIS

Background

Americans now appear more tolerant politically than a generation ago. In 1954, for example, only one-quarter of the population were prepared to allow an admitted Communist to have a job even as a store clerk – hardly a sensitive position from a national security point of view; in 1973, 57 per cent of them would do so – by no means an overwhelming consensus, but a clear majority.² But according to Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus this change, which might seem to signal a growth in tolerance, is an illusion.³ It reflects not an increase in the public's tolerance of politically non-conformist groups in general, but rather a decrease in their concern about, and hence a decrease in their intolerance of, groups on the Left in particular. Ask Americans about groups they dislike and fear now, as they once disliked and feared Communists, and you will find that they are as intolerant now as they were a generation ago.

The problem with the classic studies of tolerance, it follows, is the pseudo-tolerant citizen – people willing to put up with the rights of particular groups because they like or simply are indifferent to them rather than because they have a genuine commitment to tolerance. Consider, for example, the familiar hypothesis that political liberalism promotes tolerance.⁴ Sullivan and his colleagues argue that studies of tolerance following the Stouffer paradigm⁵ have focused on toleration of left-wing groups – communists, socialists, and the like. This focus on groups on the Left, they go on to suggest, gives an edge to people on the Left; for it is surely easier to support the rights of a group on the same side of the fence as oneself, harder to do the same for a group on the opposite side. Hence, if you see to it that liberals are asked to put up with groups on the Right, as conservatives have been asked to put up with those on the Left, it becomes apparent, in

² See Clyde A. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett, Jr, and J. Allen Williams, Jr, *Tolerance for Nonconformity* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978), p. 43.

³ See Sullivan *et al.*, 'An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance'.

⁴ See, for example, Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1970* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970).

⁵ For example, Nunn *et al.*, *Tolerance for Nonconformity*.

the words of Sullivan and his colleagues, that 'the levels of tolerance among liberals, moderates, and conservatives are only *marginally* different'.⁶

There is another consideration: the relationship between education and support for civil liberties. The classic studies of tolerance claim that schooling is an engine for political tolerance.⁷ The revisionist analysis of Sullivan and his colleagues calls this into question. The relation between education and a genuine commitment to tolerance, they contend, is weaker than had been supposed; far weaker, in fact.⁸ The less educated tend to dislike groups on the Left; the more educated, groups on the Right. Hence, when asked only about groups on the Left, the well educated will, misleadingly, appear to be markedly more tolerant than the less educated.

The revisionist view, then, has a deeply pessimistic cast to it; a pessimism that invites cynicism about the willingness of the average citizen to embrace, disinterestedly and consistently, a foundational value of democratic politics – tolerance. It had been disturbing when Stouffer and others documented the general public's indifference, or outright opposition, to civil liberties in the 1950s;⁹ indeed, so disturbing that it prompted a re-interpretation of democratic politics in the form of the so-called theory of democratic elitism, which stressed the role of political elites as guardians of democratic values.¹⁰ Still, there was reason to hope for improvement. An increasingly educated citizenry might contribute to tolerance. So, too, might a more liberal climate of opinion. Not so, according to the revisionist view. Americans are more educated, while the overall climate of opinion – as reflected in laws and social practice – has become more open-minded. Yet the mass of citizens are no more tolerant now than they were in the heyday of McCarthyism.¹¹

If the revisionist view is valid, the principal contribution that citizens can make to a tolerant society is to disagree about who they do not want to tolerate. It is thus worth examination.

Definition of the Emotivist Thesis

What is distinctive about the revisionist view? Not the contention that disliking or feeling threatened by a group promotes intolerance. Stouffer had himself pointed this out, and in truth, no one has ever supposed otherwise. Rather, what gives the revisionist view its distinctive cast is the idea that political tolerance is

⁶ Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*, p. 186 (italics in original)

⁷ See, for example, Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); also Nunn *et al.*, *Tolerance for Nonconformity*.

⁸ Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*, pp. 114ff.

⁹ See, for example, James W. Prothro and Charles W. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 276–94, and Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 58 (1964), 361–82.

¹⁰ See Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

¹¹ See Sullivan, 'An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance'

the willingness to put up with ideas or people you dislike. As the revisionists repeatedly argue, it takes no tolerance to put up with people you agree with, who want to do what you in any case approve of.

This emotivist thesis – that a person should not be said to be tolerant of a group unless he dislikes it – is intuitively appealing. It would be odd to describe a person as a committed civil libertarian on the ground that he supports the right of fascists to hold a public rally – if he is himself a fascist. Hence, the acid test of commitment to civil liberties, Sullivan and his colleagues contend, is an individual's willingness to defend the rights of groups he or she dislikes. The emotivist thesis offers an empirically grounded, and normatively provocative account of the nature, and limits, of political tolerance. It is, accordingly, worth scrutiny both at a descriptive and at a prescriptive level.

CONSISTENCY

For empirical guidance we rely on a uniquely comprehensive survey series, the General Social Survey, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center.¹² The General Social Survey provides the best source of American opinion on diverse aspects of tolerance (political, racial, sexual and social) over the last generation. The results are reported from the 1977 General Social Survey, and selectively cross-validated for 1980 and 1984. Since the analysis involves issues of racial tolerance, it focuses on whites only.

Our point of departure is political tolerance. Attitudes towards the rights of five groups were assessed – people who are against all churches and religion; people who believe that blacks are genetically inferior; people who admit they are communists; people who advocate doing away with elections and letting the military run the country; and people who admit they are homosexual. The five are heterogeneous politically. Some are on the Left – admitted communists; others are on the Right – militarists and racists; still others, although non-conformists, are not necessarily political non-conformists – homosexuals and atheists.

Attitudes towards the range of rights each group should enjoy were assessed. Specifically, respondents were asked three questions about each group: would they support the right of a member of the group to make a speech in their community? Should a member of the group be allowed to teach in a college? And should a book written by a member of the group be removed from their public library if other people in their community wished it to be removed? All in all, then, the questions cover a range of groups and issues that have historically excited popular intolerance in America.

¹² The General Social Survey provides exemplary opportunities for cross-validation. We have taken advantage of them, examining two other years, 1980 and 1984, and focusing on selected comparisons, the results of which always sustain the findings reported from 1977. In particular, the 1977 GSS does not include a Stouffer item series on socialists, but the 1980 and 1984 surveys, among others, do. Analyses of these data, not reported here, confirm principled consistency holds for attitudes to socialists, too.

The Minimalist Version

In its simplest version, the emotivist thesis hinges on a double contention: firstly, that in making judgements about the rights of particular groups, people are fundamentally expressing their feelings, positive or negative, towards that group; and secondly, that how they feel towards one group has nothing necessarily to do with how they feel towards other groups. If so, there is no reason to expect consistency in people's attitudes towards civil liberties across groups.

One way of addressing this issue is to construct a series of measurement models and examine the relationship between the observed measures of tolerance and some underlying attitudinal dimension. Using LISREL, a factor analytic technique which estimates the epistemic correlations between indicators and factors, we may see whether the relationship between observed tolerance toward any specific group and one's underlying, or 'true' level of tolerance, varies widely




Fig. 1. Measurement models of political tolerance, by activity, 1977

Notes: Entries are the standardized epistemic correlations between each indicator of group tolerance and the underlying tolerance factor for the activity in question. Number of cases = 1,454. Estimates obtained by the method of maximum likelihood. Standard errors range from 0.019 to 0.022.

Source: 1977 General Social Survey




Fig. 2. Measurement models of political tolerance, by group, 1977

Notes: Entries are standardized epistemic correlations between each indicator of tolerated activity and the underlying tolerance factor for the group in question. Number of cases = 1,454. Estimates obtained by the method of maximum likelihood. Standard errors range from 0.019 to 0.022

Source: 1977 General Social Survey.

from group to group.¹³ It would strongly support the emotivist thesis, for example, if the correlations turned out to vary according to the ideological character of the group in question, for this would indicate that the 'glue' holding the cluster of responses together is in fact group affect. It would also bolster the emotivist thesis to observe a pattern of weak factor loadings, for this would suggest that the common topic of discussion which runs through all the questions, namely civil liberties, does little to generate consistency.

Neither turns out to be the case. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the epistemic correlations across the various group referents and forms of expression are remarkably strong and stable. There is little evidence that the expression of underlying tolerance in observed responses differs across groups or acts. For example, the loadings for the free speech questions range from 0.81 to 0.94, with racists at 0.83 and communists at 0.90.

The LISREL results thus demonstrate that consistency of response overwhelms both group- and act-centred inconsistency; and the emotivist thesis, although well positioned to give an account of cross-act consistency, is poorly placed to account for cross-group consistency.

However, the emotivist thesis can be taken to mean not merely that citizens' attitudes toward the civil liberties of groups depend heavily on whether they like or dislike particular groups, but additionally, that people's likes and dislikes of groups are themselves determined by a systematic consideration – their outlook on politics for instance. This version of the emotivist thesis does imply consistency, over both acts and groups; so it merits attention in its own right.

A Maximalist Version

Clearly Sullivan and his colleagues have this more complex version of the emotivist thesis in mind. They take pains to show that people's likes and dislikes of political groups make sense politically: liberals are more likely than conservatives to dislike, and therefore have more reason to be intolerant of, groups on the Right; conversely, conservatives are more likely than liberals to dislike, and therefore to have more reason to be intolerant of, groups on the Left.

By a similar line of reasoning, Herson and Hofstetter speak of 'discriminating intolerance'.¹⁴ Some in the general public, they point out, are intolerant of the political Right but not of the political Left; others are intolerant of the Left but not of the Right. McCutcheon, relying on the powers of latent class analysis, has revived the core of the Herson and Hofstetter approach.¹⁵

¹³ Because the tolerance measures are dichotomous, the standard errors and chi-square associated with the maximum likelihood estimates are unreliable. The estimates themselves are still reliable, as the data are not highly skewed (see Karl G. Joreskog and Dag Sorbom, *LISREL VI Analysis of Linear Structural Relationships by the Method of Maximum Likelihood* (Moorville, Indiana: Scientific Software, 1984), Chap. IV).

¹⁴ Lawrence J. R. Herson and C. R. Hofstetter, 'Tolerance, Consensus and the Democratic Creed: A Contextual Exploration', *Journal of Politics*, 37 (1975), 1007–32.

¹⁵ Allan L. McCutcheon, 'A Latent Class Analysis of Tolerance for Nonconformity in the American Public', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49 (1985), 474–88.

The pivotal suggestion here is that public support for the value of tolerance is frequently strategic – or less flatteringly, hypocritical: citizens support the rights of groups on their side of the political fence, oppose the rights of groups on the opposite side. Accordingly, the key consideration is not how the general public, taken as a whole, responds to issues of civil liberties, but rather how people of opposing points of view respond to them. Table 1 shows, for liberals and for conservatives separately, the extent of consistency in support of free speech for atheists, communists, racists, militarists and homosexuals. The selected statistic is odds ratios, the figures for liberals appearing in the left column, the figures for conservatives in the right. These ratios are defined formally in the Appendix; here, let us remark informally that the ratios give an estimate of the likelihood of people responding consistently to pairs of groups, either tolerating both or refusing to tolerate both. As a summary statistic the ratios have two favourable features: like unstandardized regression coefficients, the ratio ensures that comparisons of liberals and conservatives are not biased by differences in the variance of their tolerance scores; unlike unstandardized regression coefficients, the ratios are symmetrical.

If the more complex version of the emotivist thesis holds, then conservatives should uphold the rights of groups on the Right – racists or militarists – while opposing the rights of groups on the Left – communists and atheists; conversely, liberals should uphold the rights of groups on the Left, while opposing those of groups on the Right. Nothing like this is the case, as Table 1 shows. The signs of the odds ratios for conservatives and for liberals are, in every case, identical –

TABLE 1 *Log Odds Ratios for Tolerance Pairings* (1977 General Social Survey)*

	Liberals	Conservatives
Atheist/communist	1.58	1.17
Atheist/racist	1.01	1.08
Atheist/militarist	1.11	1.16
Atheist/homosexual	1.47	0.94
Communist/racist	0.80	0.95
Communist/militarist	1.36	1.09
Communist/homosexual	1.31	1.23
Racist/militarist	0.89	0.98
Racist/homosexual	1.02	0.78
Militarist/homosexual	1.28	0.98

*Numbers represent the log of the odds ratio of the various item pairs. Odds ratios are defined formally in the Appendix. The variables used in this analysis are whether or not a respondent will allow a member of a particular group the right to speak in public. Liberals are those respondents who described their political views as 'extremely liberal' or 'liberal'; Conservatives as those who described their political views as 'extremely conservative' or 'conservative'. The analysis is restricted to white respondents.

evidence of the consistency of their readiness to tolerate, or to refuse to tolerate, pairs of groups whether the overall point of view of the groups is congruent (e.g., atheists and homosexuals; racists and militarists) or incongruent (e.g., communists and racists; militarists and homosexuals), and whether the individual's own point of view is liberal or conservative.¹⁶

These results, by demonstrating consistency, undermine the maximalist version of the emotivist thesis. But they address only one of two ways that consistency may be conceived. On the one hand, consistency may be defined as the similarity of judges across objects judged; on the other, as the similarity of objects judged across judges.

To see the difference, consider the logic of a beauty contest. This particular contest has two judges, Bob and Ted, and two contestants, Alice and Carol. As it happens, Bob gives higher marks to both Alice and Carol than does Ted (consistency in sense one), yet both Bob and Ted give their highest scores to Alice, their lowest to Carol (consistency in sense two). It is, in short, possible both for Bob to find all women more beautiful than Ted, yet for both men to agree on which woman is the more beautiful, which the less.


As with beauty contests, so with issues of tolerance: one may ask if the person who is most tolerant of one group will be the one most tolerant of other groups. Alternatively, one may ask if the group that liberals find hardest to put up with is also the one that conservatives find most difficult to tolerate. The first kind of consistency is proof only of the consistency of individuals' levels of tolerance *relative to one another*. Liberals and conservatives, however, may play favourites all the same: each may give more support to groups on their side, less to groups on the other side.

This second view of consistency – as similarity over groups rather than over individuals – is less familiar than the first; but it is no less important. It is, for example, just this sense of consistency which is at issue in the charge that IQ tests are racially biased; for the root of the charge is that some items are easy for whites but hard for blacks, while other items – which are equally valid and could have been used – would have been easy for blacks but hard for whites.

The issue here is whether certain groups are easy for conservatives but hard for liberals to tolerate whereas others are just the other way round. To get empirical leverage on this problem, Figure 3 maps variation in acceptance levels of the rights of different groups, first for liberals and then for conservatives. Groups are arrayed in order, from easiest to hardest to accept. If the emotivist thesis is correct, the group easiest for liberals to accept should be hardest for conservatives to accept while the group easiest for conservatives to accept should be hardest for liberals to accept.

The first, and most obvious, result in Figure 3 is that conservatives offer less support for the rights of every group. Indeed, liberals typically offer at least as

¹⁶ It is worth remarking that the ratios for liberals are higher than for conservatives for several group pairs (e.g., atheists and communists and militarists and homosexuals), a point we shall return to and build on in our analysis of principled consistency



much support to the group they support least as conservatives offer to the group they support most. Figure 3 holds a second, and still more important result: namely, that the groups that conservatives find it easiest to accept tend to be the same ones that liberals find it easiest to accept; conversely, the groups that give conservatives the most trouble tend also to be the ones that give liberals the most trouble. Consider, for example, attitudes towards the availability of controversial books in libraries. Liberals are most supportive of racists, least of militarists and homosexuals. And conservatives? They, too, are most supportive of racists, least of militarists and homosexuals. Or consider attitudes towards teaching. Liberals are most supportive of homosexuals, least of militarists. Likewise, conservatives are most supportive of homosexuals, least of militarists. Finally, look at attitudes towards free speech. Both liberals and conservatives find homosexuals to be the hardest to stomach, militarists to be the easiest.

In sum, the evidence runs against the idea that citizens play favourites and judge issues of civil liberties according to whether a group is on their side of the political fence or not. Instead, they show a strong tendency to consistency; consistency, moreover, not only with respect to the ordering of individuals across groups, but also with respect to the ordering of groups by individuals.

'PRINCIPLED' VERSUS 'SITUATIONAL' TOLERANCE

Two objections to this showing of consistency can be made, one obvious, the other not. Let us take up the obvious one first.

So far, the evidence shows that responses to tolerance questions have a strong tendency to consistency, variously defined. But notice that all the questions refer to one kind of tolerance, political tolerance, and no other. It is also hard to miss the repetitiveness of the questions – first, three are asked about one group, then the same three are immediately asked about a second group, then about a third, fourth and fifth group. Apart from referring to different groups, each trio of items is (nearly) identical in wording, each item in the sequence of three, and each sequence of three, being asked one right after the other. It is only natural to wonder if this juggernaut style of measurement, minimizing diversity of content and maximizing sequence effects, exaggerates the tendency to respond consistently. If so, the evidence we have surveyed may be read as proof, not of coherent attitudes towards issues of tolerance on the part of ordinary citizens, but rather of measurement error on the part of survey researchers.

The second objection turns on a fundamental question: what does it mean to say that a person supports the value of tolerance on principle? Consider toleration of free speech for atheists and for socialists. Broadly speaking, it is obvious that one person may support free speech for both groups out of a principled commitment to freedom of speech while another may do so because he happens, for different reasons, to agree with atheists and to agree with socialists. This is an obvious enough point, but one with a no means obvious lesson. Despite the fact that one of these people is acting out of a principled commitment to tolerance

whereas the other is not, the two are indistinguishable; both are consistent in their support of tolerance, or still more exactly, both are equally consistent.

Let us put the problem more formally. Suppose there are four ways for people to be tolerant. One can conceive of a sixteen-cell table, one cell of which (+ + + +) contains the count of people consistently tolerant, in the sense of giving affirmative responses to all four forms of tolerance. At the other extreme is a cell (— — — —) containing the count of people consistently intolerant, in the complementary sense of giving negative responses to all four forms of tolerance. Less obviously, respondents in the constantly tolerant cell (+ + + +) belong to two distinct sets: the first consists of people consistent out of a commitment to the principle of tolerance; the second, of people consistent as a function of factors specific to each group. The first kind of consistency we shall call 'principled' consistency, the second 'situational' consistency.

The difference between principled and situational consistency matters greatly, not only for understanding the nature of public support for tolerance but also for the development of democratic theory. To borrow from *Murder in the Cathedral*, it is not enough to know that citizens have done the right thing; it is important to learn if they have done it for the right reason. The problem, however, is that principled and situational consistency are, in terms of observed responses, indistinguishable.

A two-fold analysis, then, is called for: firstly, to investigate the linkage between kinds of tolerance dissimilar in content and method of measurement; and secondly to distinguish empirically between principled and situational consistency.

Fortunately, in addition to questions on political tolerance, the General Social Survey asks questions on racial tolerance, assessing attitudes about inter-racial marriage; socializing with blacks in homes; the 'pushiness' of blacks; and fair housing. Unlike the so-called Stouffer items, the racial tolerance items are varied in content, format and response alternatives. Our analysis, then, crosses three forms of political tolerance ('speak', 'books', 'teach') with four racial tolerance items, yielding twelve combinations. For each of the three activities to be tolerated, we use three groups — militarists, racists and communists — selected to ensure a variety of political points of view and to ensure that consistent tolerance is not easier for liberals than for conservatives. Hence, so far as consistency between racial and political tolerance obtains, it cannot be attributed to mere similarity of content or method of measurement.

To carve an empirical distinction between principled and situational consistency, we shall rely on Duncan's response consistency model.¹⁷ The model's mathematical logic is laid out in detail in the Appendix. Despite its computational complexity, its basic objective is straightforward: the model aims to estimate the proportion of a population that possesses a set of attributes above the

¹⁷ Otis Dudley Duncan, 'Indicators of Sex Typing', *American Journal of Sociology*, 85 (1979), 251-60.

expected proportion given the frequency of the attributes and the correlations among them.¹⁸

A final point merits emphasis. Certain factors should strengthen a tendency to principled tolerance. Two in particular come to mind: education and liberalism.¹⁹ However, this is no humdrum affair of finding out if education or liberalism encourages tolerance, an already familiar result. Rather, the crucial question is whether either, or both, predisposes the average citizen consistently to support tolerance *on principle*.

The principled consistency analysis, then, hinges on nine sixteen-fold tables (three education groups by three categories of liberalism-conservatism) for each of the twelve combinations of tolerance items, yielding a total of 108 analyses, the analyses being separate but not independent given that consistency is constrained across education and ideology within combinations of political and racial tolerance. The analysis of these sixteen-fold tables yields the 'principled consistency' ratios (τ), set out in Table 2. These ratios indicate the bonus of support for tolerance due to principled consistency.

The τ ratios, accordingly, record how education and liberalism promote principled tolerance over and above their sizable effects on each tolerance item, taken separately. Take more educated liberals. The τ of 5.33 on the free speech/inter-racial marriage combination indicates that more than five times as many well-educated liberals are consistently tolerant than would be the case in the absence of principled tolerance. Throughout Table 2, the largest principled consistency ratios are obtained for the better educated liberals. This is a remarkable result, for it signals not simply that well-educated liberals are more likely to be tolerant, but rather that *they are the most likely to be tolerant as a matter of principle notwithstanding the fact that they are the most likely to be tolerant in any event*.

Both education and liberalism, then, provide a bonus for tolerance, in the form of principled support. But education's bonus is bigger than liberalism's, according to the way both have been assessed. Thus, each row of Table 2 shows the principled consistency ratio is greater for more educated conservatives than for less educated liberals.

How is it possible for ordinary citizens to achieve some measure of principled consistency? Plainly, it is not plausible to suppose that they have a strong grip

¹⁸ It is worth considering the logical fitness of latent class analysis employed by McCutcheon in 'A Latent Class Analysis', the alternative response model to Duncan's. The details of McCutcheon's latent class analysis are puzzling – Table 2, for instance, fails to sum as it should – but the more vital point to grasp is that latent class analysis is a methodologically inappropriate technique for the assessment of consistency. It is inappropriate because it presumes that principled consistency accounts for all of the correlations. In contrast, the Duncan technique discounts the zero-order correlations on behalf of principled consistency, taking as principled only that consistency that cannot be accounted for by the pairwise correlations among items. In short, we have chosen the technique that makes it hardest, not easiest, to confirm our principal hypothesis.

¹⁹ See Paul M. Sniderman, *Personality and Democratic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and Herbert McCloskey and Alida Brill, *Dimensions of Tolerance* (New York: Russell Sage, 1983).

TABLE 2 *Principled Consistency Effect Ratios (τ) by Form of Civil Tolerance and Racial Tolerance Item for Persons at the Extremes of Education and Political Views*

Racial tolerance item	Less than 12 years education		More than 12 years education	
	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal
Free speech				
Interracial marriage ¹	1.12	1.69	3.50	5.33
Black dinner guest ²	1.41	1.69	3.74	4.48
All white neighbourhood ³	1.43	1.72	2.84	3.41
Blacks shouldn't push ⁴	0.40	0.83	1.37	2.78
Library book				
Interracial marriage ¹	1.40	2.21	3.67	5.88
Black dinner guest ²	1.62	1.71	3.07	3.29
All white neighbourhood ³	0.97	1.10	2.08	2.36
Blacks shouldn't push ⁴	0.91	0.97	2.37	2.52
College teaching				
Interracial marriage ¹	1.34	2.65	3.49	6.91
Black dinner guest ²	1.29	1.88	3.51	5.09
All white neighbourhood ³	0.99	1.70	2.41	4.13
Blacks shouldn't push ⁴	1.00	1.62	1.63	2.65

¹'Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/Blacks) and whites?'

²'How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a (Negro/Black) friend home to dinner?'

³'White people have a right to keep (Negroes/Blacks) out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and (Negroes/Blacks) should respect that right.'

⁴'(Negroes/Blacks) shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted.'

on the abstract concept of tolerance and, in addition, are capable of rigorous reasoning from it. But recent research on prototypes suggests how citizens can put together a consistent position on issues of tolerance notwithstanding their lack of familiarity with abstract political concepts.²⁰ From this point of view, to make a consistent judgement about issues of tolerance it suffices to be able to summon to mind a particularly vivid example or prototype of tolerance (e.g., letting a person say what is on his mind), then to judge the similarity of the particular issue one is being asked about (e.g. letting a group use the local high school to present its point of view on some public issue) to the prototype. The LISREL factor analysis consistently showed that free speech was the highest loading item (Figure 1a); and 'letting someone say what's on their mind' does seem a vivid, paradigmatic example of tolerance. Accordingly, it may supply the basis for consistency. If so, no mysterious powers of cerebration on the part of

²⁰ See, for example, Eleanor Rosch, 'Principles of Categorization', in Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd, eds, *Cognition and Categorization* (Hillside, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978).

the average citizen need to be assumed. Instead citizens learn what is tolerant the same way they learn to apply a wide range of 'fuzzy set' natural categories to complex, ambiguous, real-world events – on the basis of judgements of similarity. Concretely, they learn what is tolerant the same way they learn what is yellow.²¹

Table 2 permits exploration of this natural category approach by presenting consistency effect ratios for each racial and political tolerance item. The racial tolerance items vary in similarity to the prototype of free speech. The most similar is interracial marriage: both involve claims to officially validated rights – to talk freely, in the one instance; to choose freely, in the other – which do not conflict with competing rights. By comparison, the issue of social intimacy with blacks is less similar; for it sets up the prospect of competing claims between the member of the family inviting a black friend home to dinner and the respondent who may have a different preference – and may have a claim to have that preference go unchallenged within his own home. Less similar still is the issue of fair housing, for it involves competing rights, not merely competing claims. Thus, the housing issue is defined by a conflict between the right of a prospective home buyer to purchase a home in any neighbourhood and the claim on the part of current residents that they have a right to keep the neighbourhood from changing. And least similar to all to the issue of free speech is the 'blacks pushing' item; it alone does not make an appeal to some familiar right.

A reading of Table 2 suggests that similarity may be the basis of principled consistency; for the more similar the type of racial tolerance and the prototype of political tolerance, the larger the principled consistency ratios (τ). Thus, interracial marriage tends to be the racial tolerance item most likely to evoke principled consistency, followed by 'black dinner guest', 'all white neighbourhood', and 'blacks should not push', in that order.²²

A further buttress for the hypothesis that similarity-based judgements permit even citizens at large to achieve some principled consistency is the finding that education more strongly elicits principled consistency when the political tolerance items refer to free speech than otherwise. For example, compare the ratio of

²¹ See W. V. Quine, 'Natural Kinds', in his *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 122.

²² To be specific: 70 per cent of those who *strongly disagree* with the proposition that white people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighbourhoods if they want to, and that blacks should respect that right, agree that a person who believes that blacks are genetically inferior should be allowed to speak, by comparison, only 50 per cent of those who *strongly agree* that whites should, as a matter of principle, be entitled to segregate their neighbourhoods believe that a spokesman for the inherent inferiority of blacks should be allowed to present his point of view. This finding that racists are less likely than non-racists to support the rights of a racist group certainly runs counter to the suggestion of 'opportunistic tolerance' implicit in Sullivan *et al.*'s argument. On the other hand, the data on atheists at first appears to run counter to the finding on racists. In brief: 95 per cent of persons with no religious preference endorse free speech for atheists compared with 61 per cent of persons stating a religious preference. Similar differences, moreover, hold for questions on teaching and books. On fuller examination, however, these results fail to support the emotivist thesis, for atheists are more likely to endorse the civil liberties of all groups by margins that are only slightly smaller than the margin of their greater support for atheists' civil liberties.

principled consistency on the intermarriage item among more educated liberals to the principled consistency on that item among less educated liberals for each of the political tolerance items. The result is [$5.33/1.69 =$] 3.15 for free speech, 2.66 for library book, and 2.61 for college teaching.

There is, then, reason to believe that citizens put together a consistent position on different forms of tolerance on the basis of judgements of similarity. But whatever the means, the point to stress is the kind of consistency they can achieve. An exceedingly stringent standard has been specified; stringent because it simultaneously involves three criteria. Firstly, people must give tolerant responses to each of a battery of political and racial tolerance items. This is the conventional test of consistency, and strikingly, not a demanding one by itself with respect to tolerance. Even among less educated conservatives (the group least likely to be tolerant on any of the items), there is a substantial minority who give four racially tolerant responses. Secondly, the consistency that arises because the tolerance items are positively correlated is discounted. The principled consistency ratios measure the extent to which observed consistency exceeds that expected on the basis of pairwise correlations. As Table 2 showed, nearly all of them are significantly greater than 1.0, indicating a surplus consistency attributable to the generalization of tolerance. Thirdly, as a matter of construct validity, principled consistency should correlate with education and liberalism. As Table 2 shows, this clearly is the case.

Why do we set stringent standards for consistency? Quite simply, to drive home the finding that substantial numbers of the public at large put together a consistent position in favour of diverse forms of tolerance, both racial and political; and, equally important, that the degree of consistency they achieve is evidence of a commitment to the principle of tolerance, consistently applied.

The burden of previous research on tolerance has stressed the numbers of citizens who misunderstand, or who are opposed or indifferent to principles of civil liberties. Our results point in a different direction. The Duncan response consistency model shows that nowadays substantial numbers of the general public not only support different forms of tolerance consistently but that they do so on principle.

A CONCLUDING WORD

The emotivist thesis leads us to expect selective patterns of intolerance. People should play favourites, granting basic civil liberties to groups relatively close to them on the political spectrum but denying those same liberties to groups relatively distant from them. However, exactly the opposite pattern is observed in our data. The person notable for tolerance of a group on the political Left tends also to be notable for tolerance of a group on the Right. Furthermore, the groups that a person on the Left finds it most difficult to put up with tend to be those a person on the Right finds it hardest to tolerate, while the groups that a person on the Left finds it easiest to put up with tend also to be those a person on the Right finds least objectionable. In short, a hallmark of public attitudes to-

wards issues of tolerance is consistency, both towards groups and across individuals and by individuals and across groups; a consistency, moreover, that is not merely a function of reactions to particular groups and issues but rather the product of a principled commitment to tolerance as a value.

It may be objected that our findings, rather than challenging the emotivist conception of tolerance advanced by Sullivan and his colleagues, sidestep it. After all, the root assumption underlying their conception is that an indispensable first step in assessing tolerance is to ensure that people are being asked about groups they in fact strongly dislike and, in turn, that assurance can only be given by using their 'content-controlled method', which is not available in the studies we have analysed.

In fact, our findings demonstrate that the problem is the other way round: their conception of tolerance cannot be assessed properly by their method. The fundamental flaw is this. Sullivan and his colleagues argue that a person cannot be said to be tolerant of a group unless he dislikes it and is none the less willing to put up with it; hence their content-controlled method restricts attention to reactions to disliked groups. They take this position for an understandable reason: they fear falsely concluding that an intolerant person may appear tolerant because he liked or was simply indifferent towards the group in question. In short, they assume that tolerance is the natural, first response of people, a response they would be inclined to make except *in the case of groups they strongly dislike*.

Sullivan and his colleagues, however, assume too much. In order to tell if dislike is in fact a necessary condition of tolerance it is necessary to take account of people's reactions not only to groups they dislike but also to groups they are indifferent to or possibly even like. And what we are thus able to show using our approach, which they are unable to show using theirs, is that in fact it is *not* true that people must dislike a group in order to be intolerant of it. To suppose that they must reflects a profound misunderstanding of the nature of tolerance. The person who does not honour and protect the rights of those whose point of view clashes with his own is for this very reason a bad bet to protect the rights even of those whose point of view he supports. On the other hand, the person who goes out of his way to support the rights of those he agrees with will also, and again for this reason, be a more attractive bet to support the rights of those he disagrees with. To make this point as briefly and as graphically as possible: it is the racial bigot, not the person committed to racial tolerance, who is the more likely to oppose free speech for racists.²²

In a word, dislike is not a necessary condition of tolerance; for the person only loosely attached to the value of tolerance, it can suffice that a group is out of the ordinary or merely unfamiliar to excite an intolerant response.

It is also vital to appreciate that Sullivan *et al.*'s approach focuses too narrowly on the fact that almost everyone dislikes some group. As a result it overlooks the far more important fact that some people dislike many more groups than others do and that some groups warrant dislike more than others do.

There is a double mistake here. Firstly, it is misleading to equate the person who has difficulty putting up with one particular group but is otherwise prepared to accept all the other groups regardless of their political outlook or character and the person who is unwilling to tolerate nearly any group which is different, unfamiliar or threatening. Yet, by focusing on reactions to only one or at most a few groups, this is just what Sullivan *et al.*'s approach does. It may be true that no one is perfect; it does not follow that everyone is equally imperfect.

The second mistake is this. Even if it is true that everyone is unwilling to put up with some particular group, it does not follow that everyone is intolerant. Quite simply, it is intolerant to refuse to accept as legitimate a group merely because its ideas are different; it is by no means intolerant – indeed, it may reflect an effort to defend tolerance – to refuse to accept as legitimate a group because its conduct is violent and illegal. To refuse to tolerate socialists is to be intolerant; but to refuse to tolerate terrorists is to be tolerant. Sullivan *et al.*'s approach, by confining attention to the fact that there is always some group a person is unwilling to support, hopelessly confounds the two.

The emotivist thesis has given new force to the old idea that the public is ill-equipped – even unequipped – for democratic citizenship. The ordinary run of citizens, the backers of the emotivist thesis maintain, are bound to play favourites, rewarding their friends and punishing their enemies; so much so that even given favourable social and political circumstances they cannot deepen their commitment to tolerance as a value.²³

The fundamental question is whether ordinary citizens are capable of subscribing to tolerance, and hence to democratic values generally. It would be foolhardy to suppose that they are uninfluenced by their likes and dislikes, by their hopes and fears. But granted that all fall short, the question remains whether citizens in modern democracies can protect and honour the value of tolerance with some consistency. Our findings demonstrate that substantial numbers of them now do have a commitment to tolerance – a limited and imperfect commitment to be sure, but a genuine one all the same.

APPENDIX

The model is a 'log-linear model with structural zeros'.²⁴ It estimates the proportion of situationally consistent responses in the following way. Cross-classify persons from some subgroup of interest, say liberals with one or more years of college, according to whether or not they have given a tolerant response to four tolerance items. The result is a table like Table A which presents both the observed and expected frequencies for two of the subtables we analysed. In such a table we measure the association between a pair of items,

²³ See Sullivan *et al.*, 'An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance'.

²⁴ See Leo A. Goodman, 'The Analysis of Cross-Classified Data', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 63 (1968), 1091–131, and Stephen E. Fienberg, *The Analysis of Cross-Classified Data*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980).

TABLE A *Observed and Expected Frequencies from Cross-Classification of Liberals with More than 12 Years of Education and Conservatives with Less than 12 Years of Education According to Responses to Four Tolerance Items: United States, 1977*

Tolerance (coded) of			Racial tolerance*			
			Observed frequencies		Expected frequencies	
Communists†	Militarists‡	Racists§	Intolerant	Tolerant	Intolerant	Tolerant
<i>Liberals with more than 12 years of education¶</i>						
1	1	1	1	5	3.94	7.97
1	1	2	1	0	1.13	2.44
1	2	1	0	4	0.75	2.44
1	2	2	1	1	0.63	2.20
2	1	1	0	6	0.96	6.16
2	1	2	0	5	0.73	4.96
2	2	1	1	8	0.73	7.51
2	2	2	0	103	1.62	94.78
<i>Conservatives with less than 12 years of education¶</i>						
1	1	1	30	14	30.58	13.12
1	1	2	17	7	14.97	6.84
1	2	1	3	0	3.18	2.20
1	2	2	2	3	4.60	3.39
2	1	1	2	6	3.31	4.51
2	1	2	5	8	4.28	6.21
2	2	1	1	2	1.38	3.02
2	2	2	5	14	5.25	13.66

*"Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/Blacks) and whites?" A 'Yes' response is considered to be intolerant (scored 1); 'No' is considered tolerant (scored 2)

§"If such a person [one who 'believes blacks are genetically inferior'] wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak or not?" A 'Not allowed' response is considered to be intolerant (1); a 'Yes' response is considered tolerant (2).

‡"Consider a person who advocated doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak or not?" A 'Not allowed' response is considered to be intolerant (1); a 'Yes' response is considered tolerant (2).

†"Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak or not?" A 'Not allowed' response is considered to be intolerant (1), a 'Yes' response is considered tolerant (2).

¶Liberals identified their political views as 'extremely liberal' or 'liberal'; conservatives identified their political views as 'extremely conservative' or 'conservative'.

say racial tolerance and tolerance of free speech for racists, controlling for the other two (tolerance of free speech for communists and militarists) using the odds ratio:

$$\theta_{ij} = F_{11j} F_{22j} / F_{12j} F_{21j} \quad (1)$$

(for $i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2$) where F_{11j} , F_{22j} , F_{12j} , and F_{21j} are expected frequencies under some (as yet unspecified) model. A subscript equals 1 for an intolerant response and 2 for a tolerant response. The first subscript refers to racial tolerance, the second to tolerance of

racists, the third to tolerance of communists, and the fourth to tolerance of militarists. The odds ratios for the observed frequencies are undefined because of the presence of zeros in some of the cells. Using the expected frequencies for highly educated liberals we obtain: $\theta_{11} = 1.07$, $\theta_{12} = 1.07$, $\theta_{21} = 1.07$, and $\theta_{22} = 5.69$. The numerator of θ_{22} includes the expected number of consistently tolerant responses (F_{2222}); none of the other odds ratios depend on the extent of consistent tolerance. Since the odds ratios that do not depend on consistent tolerance are all equal (although some differences may appear in practice because of rounding errors), i.e., $\theta_{11} = \theta_{12} = \theta_{21} = \theta^*$, we may suppose that situational consistency exerts a constant effect on all well-educated liberals and that θ^* measures that effect. If there were no principled consistency, we would expect θ_{22} to equal θ^* also; therefore our estimate of the effect of principled consistency on overall consistency is the ratio: $\tau = \theta_{22}/\theta^*$. We call this number τ the principled consistency ratio. Using the data for well-educated liberals we obtain a principled consistency ratio of $\tau = 5.33$; for less-educated conservatives we obtain a ratio of $\tau = 1.12$ (see Table 2).

The principled consistency ratios are multiplicative parameters, so a τ greater than 1.0 indicates a positive effect and a τ near 1.0 indicates a weak effect. These numbers may also be transformed into percentage change factors. In general, any τ can be turned into a percentage change factor by subtracting one from the ratio and multiplying by 100 (i.e., $\Delta\% = (\tau - 1) \times 100$). For example, the 1.12 for less-educated conservatives indicates that, because of principled consistency, there are 1.12 as many less-educated conservatives who give tolerant answers consistently than we could expect based on our knowledge of the pairwise correlations among tolerance items – that is, principled consistency increases overall consistency among less-educated conservatives by 12 per cent $[(1.12 - 1) \times 100 = 12\%]$. In a similar manner we calculate that principled consistency increases overall consistency among well-educated liberals by 433 per cent $[(5.33 - 1) \times 100 = 433\%]$.

We can also estimate the number of situationally consistent responses. It is the frequency that would make θ_{22} equal θ^* :

$$F_{222S} = \theta^* (F_{122}F_{212}/F_{112}) \quad (2)$$

Our estimates of the number of situationally consistent responses are 17.77 for well-educated liberals and 13.70 for less-educated conservatives. The number of consistent principled responses is the difference between the expected number of consistent responses and the number of situationally consistent ones:

$$F_{222N} = F_{222} - F_{222S}. \quad (3)$$

Our estimates of the number of consistent responses on principle are 77.01 for well-educated liberals and 9.33 for less-educated conservatives.

These calculations require that the expected frequencies satisfy the constraint $\theta_{11} = \theta_{12} = \theta_{21} = \theta^*$. This can be accomplished within the framework of log-linear models. We form nine sixteen-fold tables: one for each combination of political views (recoded to a trichotomy of Liberal ('extremely liberal' or 'liberal'), Middle of the Road, and Conservative ('extremely conservative' or 'conservative') and education (recorded into a trichotomy of less than 12 years, 12 years, and more than 12 years of schooling). We combine the nine tables into one large $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3 \times 3$ cross-classification of racial tolerance (Y) by tolerance of racists (R) by tolerance of militarists (M) by tolerance of communists (C) by education (E) by political views (P). Then we fit a log-linear model that includes all pairwise effects: $[YR][YM][YC][YE][YP] [RM][RC][RE][RP] [MC][ME][MP] [CE][CP][EP]$ plus a 'structural zero' in each of the nine consistency

cells²⁵ Because of the large number of cells with small counts, we add 0.25 to each frequency before beginning the fitting procedure. This increases total N by $(2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3 \times 3)/4 = 36$, so we use $wt = (f + 0.25) \times (N/(N + 36))$ as a weight. Degrees of freedom can be saved by using dummy variables to control variation in consistency across categories of education and ideology (dummy variables cannot be used in computer programs like SPSSX HILOGLINEAR or Goodman's ECTA that employ the iterative proportional fitting algorithm to arrive at expected frequencies; programs like GLIM and SPSSX LOGLINEAR can accommodate covariates and dummy variables). There is one degree of freedom for the main consistency effect that applies to all combinations of education and ideology, two degrees of freedom for the interaction between consistency and education, two for the interaction between consistency and ideology, and four for the three-way interaction among consistency, ideology and education. The model we use eliminates the three-way interaction.

More complicated models may also be used. For example, this model could be relaxed to allow the associations between pairs of tolerance items to depend on ideology or education, or both. In principle, any higher-order interaction that involves no more than two tolerance items is acceptable. As long as this principle is adhered to, the constraint $\theta_{11} = \theta_{12} = \theta_{21} = \theta^*$ will hold and the principled consistency ratio τ can be calculated for each combination of education and ideology.

To decide among the alternative forms of the response consistency model we use the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic: $L^2 = 2 \sum f \log_e(f/F)$, where f is the observed frequency and F is the expected frequency in each cell and the sum (Σ) is over all cells in the $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3 \times 3$ table.²⁶ Model selection was facilitated by the use of the *bic* index of fit.²⁷ Details of model selection are not reported here because they run to several pages. They are available from us upon request. We also offer the 1980 and 1984 results to all interested readers. Write us or contact us via BITNET (send E-mail to: mikehout@ucbmcmsa).

²⁵ Fienberg, *The Analysis of Cross-Classified Data*, pp. 148–52

²⁶ See Leo A. Goodman, 'Multivariate Analysis of Qualitative Data', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 65 (1970), 226–86 and Leo A. Goodman, 'A General Model for the Analysis of Surveys', *American Journal of Sociology*, 77 (1972), 1035–86.

²⁷ See Adrian Raftery, 'Choosing Models for Cross-Classifications', *American Sociological Review*, 51 (1986), 145–6

Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies

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The theme of strong and weak states has recently figured largely in comparative political economy. However, significant variation across sectors in single countries in the degree to which the state is able and willing to intervene in the economy has led to calls for a disaggregated view of the state, with more attention devoted to the different levels – micro, meso, macro – at which the state confronts the economy. The concepts of strength and weakness must pay much greater attention to specific bureaucratic arrangements and the relationships with key societal actors which, in company with bureaucratic agencies, form the core of ‘policy networks’ at the sectoral level. The article uses the concepts of state capacity and societal mobilization to identify six ideal typical policy networks at the sectoral level. It elaborates on the organizational logic associated with these policy networks by examining them in conjunction with industrial policy. After distinguishing between two approaches to industrial policy – anticipatory and reactive – it shows how different policy networks emerge to support alternative approaches and how a disjunction between networks and approaches can produce policy failure.

Theoretical development and empirical research in comparative political economy over the past decade have been greatly influenced and stimulated by debates surrounding the theme of strong and weak states. Authors such as Dyson, Katzenstein and Krasner have used these distinctions to characterize relations between state and society in national economies.¹ However the usefulness of this approach has been increasingly suspect as research has progressed.² Successive studies have demonstrated that in single countries significant variations occur across sectors in the degree to which the state is able and willing to intervene in the economy.

Take, for example, the classically ‘strong’ states of France and Japan. Cawson, Holmes and Stevens, Green, Milner, and Underhill have all used case studies to

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¹ See Kenneth Dyson and S. Wilks, eds, *Industrial Crisis. A Comparative Study of the State and Industry* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), especially the essay ‘The Cultural, Ideological and Structural Context’ by Dyson, P. Katzenstein, ‘Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy’, in Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

² For a useful summary of these criticisms see Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, ‘Conclusion: Comparing Government–Industry Relations: States, Sectors, and Networks’, in Wilks and Wright, eds, *Comparative Government–Industry Relations* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 274–313. Suleiman raises similar points in his examination of the relationship between state centralization and state autonomy, see Ezra N. Suleiman, ‘State Structures and Clientelism: The French State Versus the “Notaires”’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 17 (1987), 257–79.

show that the supposedly centralized, autonomous French state is frequently internally divided.³ It is not only responsive to, but sometimes captured by, societal interests. And when it is not captured, the French state often coordinates its policy closely with its business community. Peter A. Hall's study of French economic policy in the postwar period traces this gradual breakdown of an *étatiste* approach to economic policy.⁴ In the case of Japan, Samuels has argued eloquently for a revision of the conventional wisdom of bureaucratic dominance. He has shown that the nature and extent of intervention is *negotiated* between the state and business.⁵ Richard Boyd seconds this analysis by noting how business in Japan effectively resists state control while regarding state regulation of markets as indispensable to economic growth.⁶

Contrary evidence is also available at the weak state pole of the continuum. In such weak states as Canada and Britain, monetary policy is led by strong, autonomous central banks, seemingly impervious to societal complaints.⁷ Moreover, despite a firm-centred industry culture in both countries, corporatist arrangements have developed to sustain policy in such sectors as agriculture, financial services and construction.⁸ Even in the United States, with its weak state tradi-

³ Alan Cawson, Peter Holmes and Anne Stevens, 'The Interaction between Firms and the State in France: The Telecommunications and Consumer Electronics Sectors', in Wright and Wilks, eds, *Comparative Government-Industry Relations*, pp. 10-34; Diane Green, 'Strategic Management and the State: France', in Dyson and Wilks, eds, *Industrial Crisis*, pp. 161-92; Helen Milner, 'Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s', *International Organization*, 41 (1987), 639-65; and Geoffrey Underhill, 'Neo-Corporatist Theory and the Politics of Industrial Decline: The Case of the French Textile and Clothing Industry', *European Journal of Political Research*, forthcoming.

⁴ Peter A. Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

⁵ Richard J. Samuels, *The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

⁶ Richard Boyd, 'Government-Industry Relations in Japan: Access, Communication, and Competitive Collaboration', in Wilks and Wright, eds, *Comparative Government-Industry Relations*, pp. 61-90.

⁷ For Britain, see Hall, *Governing the Economy*, Part II. For Canada, see Duncan Cameron, 'Monetary Policy in North America', *International Journal*, 42 (1986-8), 170-98.

⁸ On securites, see Michael Moran, 'Deregulating Britain, Deregulating America: The Case of the Securities Industry', paper presented by the ECPR Workshop on Deregulation in Western Europe, Amsterdam, April 1987; W. D. Coleman 'The Canadian Securities Industry: A Study in Self-Regulation', paper presented to the ECPR Workshop on Meso-Corporatism, Amsterdam, April 1987. On agriculture, see Wyn Grant, ed., *Business Interests, Organizational Development and Private Interest Government: An International Comparative Study of the Food Processing Industry* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987); Grant, 'Private Organizations as Agents of Public Policy: The Case of Milk Marketing in Britain', in Wolfgang Streeck and P. C. Schmitter, eds, *Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State* (London: Sage, 1985), pp. 182-96; M. M. Atkinson and W. D. Coleman, 'Corporatism and Industrial Policy', in Alan Cawson, ed., *Organized Interests and the State: Studies in Meso-Corporatism* (London: Sage, 1985), pp. 22-44. On construction, see Wyn Grant and Wolfgang Streeck, 'Large Firms and the Representation of Business Interests in the UK and West German Construction Industry', and W. D. Coleman, 'State Corporatism as a Sectoral Phenomenon: The Case of the Quebec Construction Industry', both in Cawson, ed., *Organized Interests and the State*, pp. 145-73 and pp. 106-24 respectively.

tion,⁹ industrial and agricultural policy making, in addition to financial services, have sometimes been accomplished by creating corporatist structures.¹⁰

Such findings have led to calls for a disaggregated view of the state, with more attention devoted to the different levels – micro, meso, macro – at which the state confronts the economy.¹¹ The reasoning here is sound. There is growing evidence that original conceptions of strength and weakness, offered almost exclusively at the macro level, are too crude to begin to account for the rich variety of state–society relations that are being documented. Of course, any approach based on a more disaggregated conception of the state must take care not to treat these levels of analysis, whatever the inconsistencies between them, as independent of one another. What is required is a more precise specification of what Lehmbruch has called the ‘interorganizational logic’ of relationships among macro, meso and micro levels.¹² But before even this theoretical step can be taken, it is necessary to descend the analytical ladder and begin to identify and categorize further state–society relations at the meso and micro levels.

In this article, we focus on the meso level, the level of sectors of the economy.¹³ In seeking to refine concepts appropriate to the sectoral level, the temptation is to borrow the language of strength and weakness employed so effectively at the level of whole states. Unfortunately, as we will show, it is not quite so simple. At the meso level, the matter of state strength cannot be settled

⁹ Theda Skocpol, ‘Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal’, *Politics and Society*, 10 (1980), 155–201. On the concept of a state tradition, see Kenneth H. F. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980).

¹⁰ Michael Moran, ‘An Outpost of Corporatism: The Franchise State on Wall Street’, *Government and Opposition*, 22 (1987), 206–23; Brigitta Young, ‘Interest Intermediation in the American and West German Dairy Industries: A Comparative View’, paper presented to the ECPR Workshop on Meso-Corporatism, Amsterdam, April 1987; Susan Hansen, ‘Industrial Policy in the American States: Meso-Corporatism or Interest Group Politics’, paper presented to the ECPR Workshop on Meso-Corporatism, Amsterdam, April 1987.

¹¹ See, for example, Cawson, Holmes and Stevens, ‘The Interaction between Firms and the State in France’, p. 11.

¹² Gerhard Lehmbruch, ‘Comparative Political Economy of Neo-Corporatism: Inter-Organizational and Institutional Logics’, paper presented to the ECPR Workshop on Meso-Corporatism, Amsterdam, April 1987.

¹³ We recognize that the concept of a sector itself may be problematic. First, the definition of a sector may or may not correspond to the industrial classification used in a given country. Where correspondence does not obtain, it is usually because the ‘sector’ is more narrowly defined than the government’s classification. Second, research has increasingly sought to incorporate into analysis the subjective aspects of sector definition. Thus Wilks and Wright use the concepts of ‘policy focus’ and ‘policy community’ to capture these properties. The policy focus refers to a ‘commonality of product or products, service or range of services, a technology or range of technologies, a market, size of “batch”, and so on’. A policy community then refers to the group of actors or potential actors whose community membership is defined by this common policy focus (Wilks and Wright, ‘Comparing Government–Industry relations’, pp. 293–305). Pross also tries to capture some of this complexity when he introduces the concept of a ‘policy community’ with its attendant notions of sub-governments and attentive publics (see A. P. Pross, *Group Politics and Public Policy* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 96–107).

by an appeal to constitutional norms, the embeddedness of the party system, recruitment practices or the degree of state centralization. Much greater attention must be paid to specific bureaucratic arrangements and to the relationships that the officials involved maintain with key societal actors.¹⁴ Similarly, greater attention must be paid to the specific organizational properties of associational systems and individual firms. Such societal actors, in company with bureaucratic agencies, form the core of 'policy networks' at the sectoral level. We use the concepts of state capacity and societal mobilization that have proven so successful at the macro level, but redefine them in order to encompass the wider variety of sectoral institutions.

In the first part of this article, we develop the concept of policy network and establish some criteria for assessing the different networks that exist at the sectoral level in advanced capitalist economies. The second half of the article elaborates on the organizational logic associated with these policy networks by examining them in conjunction with industrial policy. After distinguishing between two approaches to industrial policy, anticipatory and reactive, we show how different policy networks emerge to support alternative approaches and how a disjunction between networks and approaches can produce policy failure.

STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS AT THE SECTORAL LEVEL: POLICY NETWORKS

Peter Katzenstein introduced the concept of 'policy network' to bring some order to the variety of relations that prevail between public and private sector actors in advanced capitalist systems. He argued that the amount of centralization in society and in the state, and the degree of differentiation between the two, were the critical variables in the establishment of policy networks. Once these were determined, the policy network could be described and the range and type of policy instruments likely to be associated with such a network could be established. For example, in the United States, the decentralized state, fragmented business and labour organizations (the decentralization of society) and a low level of differentiation between the two ('in practice a symbiosis between public and private actors') has served to limit the number of policy instruments available in the realm of foreign economic policy.¹⁵ In Japan, by contrast, a centralized state bureaucracy and an integrated, hierarchically organized business community combine to make feasible the use of a wide range of policy instruments and, according to Katzenstein, 'successful sectoral policy'.¹⁶

Provocative as it is, this formulation is not without its problems. Determining just what constitutes centralization and differentiation is difficult in the abstract

¹⁴ This is one of the messages contained in Ezra N. Suleman, *Private Power and Centralization in France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 303. He writes here that 'state power or autonomy varies across sectors' and one cannot approach this problem in a formalistic manner without 'the necessary empirical investigations'

¹⁵ Katzenstein, 'Conclusion', in Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty*, p. 311.

¹⁶ Katzenstein, 'Conclusion', p. 316

and is rendered only slightly more tractable by comparing nations. And, as we have stressed, more complicated patterns of centralization and differentiation are likely to emerge on closer examination of particular sectors. Allowing for such complications requires some modification and expansion of the Katzenstein formulation, beginning with the concepts of state and society centralization.

It may be possible at the macro level to characterize an entire state apparatus as centralized or decentralized, but at the sectoral level the concept of centralization must be more nuanced. In an important sense, policy is seldom completely centralized. Ordinarily, a number of departments and agencies can lay claim to one or another instrument in a particular policy area. In pursuing their mandates, they will often take decisions that impinge on the prospects of individuals, firms and sectors. Under these circumstances, policy making can become exceptionally diffuse.

In evaluating weakness and strength at the sectoral level, it is critical to determine, first, the degree to which ultimate decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of officials¹⁷ and, secondly, the degree to which these officials are able to act autonomously. Normally, power will be concentrated when a single agency or bureau (of the several that are active) is able to dominate relations in a given sector. Such a bureau would have the capacity to aggregate authority from regional instances of government and draw information from sectoral actors, whether firms or interest associations. In contrast, the state is weak in a given sector when authority is dispersed and no one group of officials can take the lead in formulating policy. Under these circumstances, authority is typically diffused among several bureaux and between levels of government resulting in overlapping jurisdictions and bureaucratic competition.

The concentration of power is significantly enhanced when arrangements are in place that encourage the formation of informal alliances between members of the political executive and civil servants.¹⁸ In sectors with strong state characteristics, task forces, co-ordinating committees or working liaison groups encourage the independent thinking and broader perspective required for longer-term policy planning. By contrast, in sectors with weak state structures, a wide range of politicians and bureaucrats can claim some jurisdiction, no institutions exist to link their activities, and a more traditional division of labour prevails. Such 'bureaucratic pluralism' encourages incremental, short-term decision making that is based on lowest common denominator criteria and always vulnerable to the introduction of a partisan political calculus.

The second criterion, following Katzenstein, is the degree to which state organizations are distinct from societal organizations or, put another way, the degree to which the state bureaucracy is autonomous. Concentration of

¹⁷ See Peter A. Hall, 'Policy Innovation and the Structure of the State: The Politics-Administration Nexus in France and Britain', *The Annals*, No 466 (1983), 43-59, pp 46-7

¹⁸ Hall, 'Policy Innovation' and Green 'Strategic Management and the State' in Dyson and Wilks, eds, *Industrial Crisis*, pp. 161-92

authority and bureaucratic autonomy are not unrelated. John Zysman combines them with the system of civil service recruitment to offer an estimate of the state's capacity for intervention. The more centralized, autonomous and elitist a state's bureaucratic-administrative core, the greater this capacity.¹⁹ In a similar vein, Hall writes that policy innovation is easier when the actors holding a preponderant share of power are relatively free of vested interests.²⁰ Sulieman, on the other hand, notes that a strongly centralized state on the macro level may limit the capacity of state bureaucracies at the sectoral level to achieve autonomy from special interests.²¹

What are the conditions for state autonomy at the sectoral level? No exhaustive list can be supplied, but the following would appear to be particularly important:

1. The bureaux involved should have a clear conception of their role and a value system consistent with and supportive of that mandate. Strong political support for the bureau's role is critical: bureaucrats and elected representatives should co-operate easily.
2. Where bureaucrats are charged with conveying and interpreting the demands of clientele groups, they should possess a professional ethos distinct from that prevailing among professionals in society at large. Autonomy will always be more difficult to maintain for those bureaux with a clientele rather than a functional mandate.²²
3. Individual bureaux will be more autonomous when they administer a corpus of law and regulation that defines their responsibilities and those of societal groups. These rules will not be subject to negotiation, either in their interpretation or their implementation.
4. Bureaux will be more autonomous when they themselves generate the information, technical or otherwise, required for the pursuit of their mandate.²³ Information may still be collected from firms and associations, but the autonomous bureau will possess an in-house capacity to evaluate and employ this information.

When the state is penetrated by sectoral interest groups, bureaux have little autonomy. Officials see sectoral groups as their clients and, accordingly, attend to their needs rather than any broader public interest. A weak state organization disperses critical information among a larger number of officials or leaves that information in the hands of firms and associations in the sector. The result is a dependency relationship.

¹⁹ John Zysman, *Governments, Markets and Growth* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 300.

²⁰ Hall, 'Policy Innovation', pp. 46-7.

²¹ Sulieman, 'State Structures', pp. 257-79.

²² This distinction among types of agencies is made by Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 2nd edn (New York: Norton, 1979), pp. 79-91.

²³ Hall, 'Policy Innovation', pp. 46-7.

If the autonomy of the state bureaucracy is a critical variable in establishing policy networks at the sectoral level, what is the sectoral parallel to Katzenstein's 'centralization of society'? The answer lies in the organization of relevant socio-economic producer groups, particularly business. In market-based economies, business is the state's critical partner, especially in matters related to economic policy.²⁴ How business is organized at the sectoral level will help to determine whether and in what way major socio-economic producer groups can make a contribution to policy development and implementation. There is great variety in the sectoral organization of business in all liberal democracies. At bottom, however, the critical issue is what we shall call mobilization.²⁵ To what extent is the business community in a particular sector mobilized to assume a role in the making and implementing of policy?

A highly mobilized sector is characterized by the following:

1. A horizontal division of labour will mark the associational system with separate associations or divisions representing different products, service groups or territories. Such a division of labour implies the absence of overlapping organizations, on the one hand, and of gaps in the associational system on the other. There will be no competition for members.
2. One and (normally) only one association will speak for the sector as a whole. Either subsectoral organizations will belong to this sector-wide association (such that a simple vertical division of labour is sustained), or individual firms will associate directly.
3. Both sectoral and subsectoral associations will have a high density, that is a high proportion of the firms (or of the production) in a given sector will be represented by the association.
4. In oligopolistic sectors where major firms enjoy the option of direct contact with the state, these firms will retain a high profile of activity in the association, thereby employing both direct and indirect means of securing influence.
5. Firms and associations will possess considerable in-house capacity for the generation of information, both technical and political.
6. In a highly mobilized sector, associations will have the capacity to bind member firms to agreements negotiated with the state and to offer assurances of individual firm compliance with policy decisions.

This discussion of strength and weakness at the sectoral level has stressed state capacity and societal mobilization. In Table 1 we combine the dimensions of bureaucratic autonomy, concentration of authority and business interest

²⁴ This point is made in a host of recent volumes including Hall, *Governing the Economy*. An earlier statement is contained in Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

²⁵ In their discussion of sectoral policy networks, Cawson, Holmes and Stevens refer to a similar variable, the 'monopoly closure in state-group relationships'. See their article, 'Interaction between Firms and the State in France', pp 30-1.

mobilization to create six categories of policy networks.²⁶ It is important to make two observations at the outset. First, what is being described here are necessary, but not always sufficient, conditions for these policy networks. Developments at both the micro and macro levels will also be particularly important. Thus while corporatism at the sectoral level requires a high degree of state autonomy and a highly mobilized business community, it may also require high levels of industrial concentration, low levels of foreign ownership, and a political commitment to negotiation with producer groups that can be secured only at the highest political levels. What can be said is that each category contains that policy network most likely to arise in the absence of a serious political or economic obstacle.

TABLE 1 *Conditioning Factors for Policy Networks*

Mobilization of business interests	State Structure			
	High autonomy, high concentra- tion	Low autonomy, high concentra- tion	High autonomy, low concentra- tion	Low autonomy, low concentra- tion
Low	State- directed	Pressure pluralism	Pressure pluralism	Parentela pluralism
High	Concertation	Clientele pluralism	Corporatism	Industry dominant pressure pluralism

A second cautionary note: rarely can systems of business representation be expected to possess all of the qualities outlined above. Similarly, very few bureaucratic systems at the sectoral level will possess all of the attributes of concentration and a fully autonomous bureaucracy. In short, the policy networks defined below represent ideal types. They are not to be found pristine in the real political world. For that reason, there may be some ambiguity with respect to which network dominates in any particular sector, and there will occasionally be evidence of more than one network.

²⁶ In attempting to define these categories we join forces with Cawson *et al.*, who made a brief attempt along these lines in their article on the telecommunication and consumer electronics sectors in France', Cawson *et al.*, 'Interaction between Firms and the State in France', pp. 29-32. At the same time, we depart from their effort in an important respect. First, their typology is defined based on two variables, state autonomy and monopoly closure in state-group relations (analogous to our mobilization variable) We find it useful to add the dimension of concentration of authority as a defining characteristic. As noted above, the circumstances are rare in which one agency or bureau assumes responsibility for a sector. Furthermore, the use of these three defining variables provides a more complete description of the organizational logic of the networks involved.

SECTORAL POLICY NETWORKS

Let us turn to a brief discussion of the salient features of each network, beginning with pressure pluralism. In the pressure pluralist network, the particular circumstances of economic development and the organizational evolution of the bureaucracy in a sector combine to deny the state both autonomy and concentration of decision-making power. Business interests cannot be accommodated to one another, either because the organization of business is hopelessly rudimentary, or because there exist diametrically opposed interests in the same sector. As a result, these interests are fragmented, with groups operating on their own in narrow, specialized and overlapping domains. No one is discouraged from organizing and no group possesses a monopoly of power. Groups are confined to the task of policy advocacy, and no power sharing is countenanced. The objectives of state officials emerge in the process of competition among contending interests.²⁷

The organization of the state in the pressure pluralist network resembles the organization of interests in society. Departments and agencies, each intent on organizational survival, pursue narrow, short-term goals that bring them into conflict with other departments and agencies doing precisely the same thing. The phenomenon of bureaucratic politics, described by Graham Allison and others,²⁸ amounts to applying the logic of pluralism to internal governmental processes.²⁹ Any clear distinction between state and society dissolves under these circumstances. Business interests cannot take over the state because no single interest in a sector has achieved a status of primacy and, besides, there is not much to take over. The state is little more than the distillation of societal conflicts and is, in any event, so torn by internal dissension that business would accomplish little by capturing a single part.

In the case of clientele pluralism, the state actually relinquishes some of its authority to private sector actors, who, in turn, pursue objectives with which officials are in broad agreement. Ostensibly, it is the details over which these 'private interest governments' have control.³⁰ Situations in which business associations (typically the instruments of clientele pluralist arrangements) undertake these responsibilities include those in which insufficient resources are available within state agencies, or where there are no objectives the state wishes to see achieved, short of the prosperity of the sector itself. Since prosperity is precisely what the business community has in mind, there is no better custodian of sectoral interests than the representatives of business.

Of course, business must be in a position to capitalize on the state's need to-

²⁷ See J. J. Richardson and A. G. Jordan, *Governing Under Pressure* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979).

²⁸ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971).

²⁹ Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, p. 27.

³⁰ W. Streeck and P. C. Schmitter 'Community, Market, State - and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order', in Streeck and Schmitter, eds, *Private Interest Government*, pp. 1-29.

off-load responsibilities. The associational system that undergirds clientele pluralism must have at least some of the qualities that typify a highly mobilized sector. In particular the representative agencies of business must have the capacity to obtain information on the practices and prospects of individual firms and to aggregate this information in a manner that makes self-policing and self-administration a relatively easy task. But since associations are not bargaining with state agencies, they need not have the capacity to bind members to negotiated solutions to common problems. Unlike other networks, where several interests may be involved, in the clientele pluralist network one interest dominates and mediation is replaced by delegation.³¹ Similarly, the associational system need not be as hierarchical or as vertically integrated as that required in a corporatist network, for example. That said, by bestowing the authority of the state on business associations, a large measure of order and symmetry will soon characterize interest intermediation. A system of privilege is created in which competition among groups is discouraged and participants are urged to accommodate themselves to the dominant system of clientelism.³²

It is not uncommon for observers of state-society relations to stretch the term 'corporatism' to include what we have called clientele pluralism. Alan Cawson, for example, defines corporatism as a 'specific socio-political process in which organisations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political exchange with state agencies over public policy outputs which involves those organisations in a role which combines interest representation and policy implementation through delegated self-enforcement'.³³ What is critical for Cawson's definition is the fusion of representation and policy implementation in the hands of groups. We argue instead that the fusion about which Cawson speaks can occur in three distinctive forms: clientele pluralism, concertation and corporatism. In each case, the balance of power among societal groups and between groups and the state varies, yielding quite different policy consequences.

The case of parentela pluralism is less problematic. In this network, a close relationship exists between owners or managers of individual firms and the dominant political party. Such a relationship has distinct implications for ties between the sector and the bureaucracy. Joseph LaPalombara identifies several defining characteristics of this network.³⁴ The party in power dominates the state and members of the government are willing, indeed eager, to intervene,

³¹ The reader might legitimately ask why we call clientele pluralism 'pluralist' in these circumstances. We do so for two reasons. First, the emphasis in group representation is on narrowing group domains and on specialized groups acting in opposition to one another rather than in concert. Both of these emphases differ from corporatism as we note below. Secondly, we suspect that future research will show that clientele pluralist arrangements become particularly likely when states are weak and pluralistic on the macro level.

³² Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, p. 60. His notion of 'sponsored pluralism' is closely related to the phenomenon we are describing here.

³³ Cawson, *Corporatism and Political Theory* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 38.

³⁴ J. LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in the Italian System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964).

employing a partisan calculus in the administrative process. Ordinarily, interest groups will have attained a prominent place inside the party organization. But in systems where there is high sub-system autonomy between the party and interest group systems – Britain and Canada for example – it is individual firms that are crucial to the party organization. When it comes to the bureaucracy, decision-making authority is dispersed, technical expertise is weak, and a professional, bureaucratic ethos is scarcely, if at all, developed. Accordingly, individual politicians have more freedom to exert pressure at regional or local levels where decisions on specific allocations are often made.

The remaining three networks vary significantly from the pluralist models. In the case of corporatism, arguably the most familiar of the three, an autonomous but divided state seeks to place the onus for decision making in the hands of conflicting socio-economic producer groups. On the macro plane, the conflict at issue has normally been between capital and labour. However, when one descends to the sectoral level, other patterns of conflict emerge: the struggle may involve business and farmers,³⁵ or even two or more fractions of business.³⁶ Whatever the level or the groups involved, corporatism arises when the parties are in a position of 'mutual deterrence'.³⁷ Each can prevent the other from realizing its interests directly. A corporatist network provides a means for incorporating two or more classes or class fractions into forums where policy is formulated and implemented.³⁸ This process of incorporation makes demands on the producer groups in question. They must develop structures that permit comprehensive representation of their domain and that facilitate the internal expression and integration of competing interests. All of these properties have been identified by Schmitter in his influential portrayal of corporatist systems.³⁹

Meso-corporatism also differs from its macropolitical analogue in the relationship that prevails between producer groups and political parties. In the macro version, corporatism requires a degree of co-ordination and leadership exchange between a social democratic party and the representatives of organized labour. At the sectoral level, however, co-ordination with the party system is more likely to involve informal arrangements between the socio-economic partners and groups of legislators drawn from a range of parties who represent the *territory* relevant to the sector. In a parliamentary system, legislators from

³⁵ See Atkinson and Coleman, 'Corporatism and Industrial Policy' for an example drawn from the dairy industry

³⁶ Cawson makes a similar point. Because meso-corporatist networks examine a restricted range of issues, 'There is no presumption that meso-corporatist arrangements are tripartite in form, or that the interests they embrace are restricted to capital and labour' (Alan Cawson, 'Varieties of Corporatism: The Importance of the Meso-level of Interest Intermediation', in Cawson, ed., *Organized Interests and the State*, p. 11).

³⁷ P. Schmitter, 'Neo Corporatism and the State', in Wyn Grant, ed., *The Political Economy of Corporatism* (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 32–62

³⁸ For further discussion of this point, see Klaus von Beyme, 'Neo-Corporatism: A New Nut in an Old Shell?' *International Political Science Review*, 4 (1983), 173–96.

³⁹ See in particular, P. C. Schmitter, 'Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Social Change in Western Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 10 (1978), 7–38

the government party often become the key intermediaries in group-state relations.⁴⁰

Corporatism at the meso level, as on the macro plane, arises when the state, acting with some restraint, delegates sufficient authority to conflicting groups to permit them to resolve their differences without further state interference. The arrival of corporatism is, as Marin suggests, a two-step process which begins with a stalemate between two or more producer groups.⁴¹ In the first stage, the state devolves decision-making authority on to these conflicting groups. At this point, informal coalitions of regionally organized legislators may provide additional co-ordinative capacity by acting as mediators between the conflicting parties and relevant state agencies. When a tentative agreement is reached, the sanction of the state is sought to legitimize the rules needed for implementing the agreement. In this manner, the state attains a degree of autonomy it would not normally possess. As Schmitter writes: 'State agents acquire the capacity to make an independent and significant contribution towards the negotiation of a more stable and institutionalized interest compromise and, at the same time, are empowered to extract some "public regarding" concessions from the bargaining associations.'⁴²

Corporatism must be distinguished from a closely-related network that we have labelled 'concertation'.⁴³ Some of the organizational requirements resemble those of corporatism: the need for inclusive, hierarchical and non-voluntary associations will not have diminished. But in a concertation network, it is business, and usually just a single element or fraction of business, that shares policy-making responsibility with the state. Labour is involved in only a marginal way, if at all, in negotiations about the investment decisions of individual firms. Even in the area of labour mobility, the formal participation of labour groups is extremely limited. Concertation networks are common in Japan, as Samuels's work suggests,⁴⁴ and in France beginning in the late 1960s.⁴⁵ They occurred commonly in Canada and the United States during the Second World War and continue to develop in some sectors in these countries. In these latter countries, as well as Japan and France, direct negotiations between a strong business association and strong state agencies at the sectoral level are a more likely development than corporatism.

The second feature of the concertation network that requires emphasis is the strength of the state. Unlike a corporatist network where state action is circum-

⁴⁰ See Lehmbruch's discussion of this point in 'Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks', in J. H. Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 72-4.

⁴¹ B. Marin, 'Austria: The Paradigm Case of Liberal Corporatism', in Grant, ed., *The Political Economy of Corporatism*, pp. 89-125.

⁴² Schmitter, 'Neo Corporatism and the State', p. 36

⁴³ Lehmbruch makes a distinction similar to ours between corporatism and concertation. See his article, 'Concertation', pp. 60-80

⁴⁴ Samuels, *The Business of the Japanese State*, Chap. 1

⁴⁵ Hall, *Governing the Economy*, Chap. 7

scribed, concertation involves an autonomous state agency. To build a common frame of reference, including a common set of objectives and an agreement on the appropriate means of achieving them, the state must, paradoxically, have its own agenda. State officials must articulate objectives which are more encompassing than those of their private-sector partners and insist on standards that they alone set. In short, there are areas of policy-making and implementation which are non-negotiable. At the sectoral level, state officials seek an accommodation with business that not only meets the latter's need for freedom of action and economic support, but also is in step with a set of broader political objectives. Some of these will be established by the government of the day, but most will be negotiated over a period of time with business in the sector concerned.

The final policy network depicted in Table 1, state direction, is characterized by a weak system of business representation, as found in the pressure pluralist case, combined with a high degree of state autonomy. In this network the privileged position of business in advanced capitalist systems is put to a severe test. With little warning, and sometimes with little explanation, the state embarks upon economic projects that have serious repercussions for the investment decisions of business. Business is typically divided and, in any event, considered untrustworthy by officials. Politicians and bureaucrats are often self-righteous and manipulative. Officials are not in the mood for concertation, and they are by no means neutral with respect to outcomes and instrumentalities. The political-administrative style is one of managerial directive followed by a polite briefing. Business-state relations are barely cordial.

There are those who imagine that the state is perpetually ready to assert its independence.⁴⁶ In Britain, the nationalization of the coal mines, in France, the reorganization of the computer industry and in Canada, the National Energy Program, all illustrate the poignancy of this perspective. But these examples notwithstanding, circumstances are rare indeed in which the state has both the room to act independently and the will to do so. Not only must conditions of autonomy and concentration be met, but a significant measure of political direction will be required. While many suggest that such direction is forthcoming on a regular basis in countries like Japan and France, recent research is not particularly supportive. Autonomous state action at the sectoral level requires a commitment that can come only from the political centre. Even in these countries, politicians tend to be reluctant to proceed without the support of business, except in unusual circumstances.

POLICY NETWORKS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

In this section of the article, we identify several factors that favour the emergence of a particular policy network in different types of sectors. We show that the mix

⁴⁶ See, in particular, Eric Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).

of policy networks is likely to vary across sectors and within sectors depending on a host of factors. Such variation is illustrated here through an examination of one component of economic policy, that which has come to be called industrial policy. While recognizing that the meaning of this term is a matter of some debate, we adopt for present purposes the following rather conventional definition: selective measures, adopted by the state, intended to alter patterns of investment and the structure of industrial organization to the long-term advantage of both workers and the owners of capital.⁴⁷

There exist different types of industrial policy premised on different assessments of the policy response required, what can be accomplished, and what constitutes an appropriate role for the state in the marketplace.⁴⁸ Two major alternatives have emerged as ideal types: *anticipatory* industrial policy, with its emphasis on intrusive policy instruments, integrated with one another and aimed at structural transformation; and *reactive* industrial policy, which is organized around the immediate needs of specific firms (often for distress financing) and is devoted to creating a climate attractive to investment.⁴⁹

The nature of industrial policy employed in a sector is closely linked to the character of the policy network. In the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the most common arrangement involves a reactive approach to industrial policy and a pressure pluralist network. Even at the sectoral level, where business organization is often more mobilized and state structure more variable, the state is predisposed to leave business alone. Policies are responses to political pressure from business. They tend to be *ad hoc*, uncoordinated with previous decisions, and oriented almost entirely to the short term. Other than discussions about specific, short-term problems, the state administration requires little from business and business makes few demands of the state.

While reactive industrial policy will often constitute an effective response, a number of developments – including major shifts in trade patterns, fiscal crises and changes in government – may disturb the equilibrium on which this approach depends. Particularly important at the sectoral level are changes in the industry cycle. The sector may have reached a point where new expansion is imminent, a different technology has destabilized the production cycle, or perhaps the sector is faced with precipitous decline. The disturbances in policy arrangements resulting from changes in the industry cycle may not be accommodated well by the combination of reactive policies and pressure-group politics. If adjustments are made to the policy objectives of a sector or to the policy instruments employed, a new network, based on different assumptions about business–state relations, may be required.

The question of appropriate policy networks becomes particularly acute

⁴⁷ See, for example, Paul Whiteley, *Political Control of the Macroeconomy* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1986), pp. 175–8.

⁴⁸ Jeanne Kirk Laux and Maureen Appel Molot, *State Capitalism: Public Enterprise in Canada* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 126.

⁴⁹ For a similar distinction, see the discussion of 'interventionist' versus 'non-interventionist' states in Wilks and Wright, 'Conclusion', pp. 277–8.

when policy change involves a move from a reactive to an anticipatory strategy. What distinguishes an anticipatory approach from a reactive one is the predisposition on the part of the state to intervene in the industrial organization of the sector. At the sectoral level, anticipatory policies seek to shape industrial organization, including the size and number of firms and their sources of equity. Thus anticipatory policies have a greater range than reactive ones and a greater depth – they aim beyond existing products and organization.⁵⁰ Finally, anticipatory policies at the sectoral level are well integrated – they are co-ordinated and mutually reinforcing. In keeping with the strong state–weak state distinction, we would expect anticipatory policies to be more common in France and Japan (and perhaps Germany) than in the Anglo-American democracies since the latter possess few of the institutional features ordinarily associated with large-scale intervention in the economy. None the less, there is every reason to expect that the pressures for a more anticipatory approach will be felt in the Anglo-American democracies as well. Here, however, the response will be confined to particular sectors and will depend heavily on the character of policy networks.

State officials and political leaders may consider a shift from reactive to anticipatory policies in order to ensure significant expansion of a sector following a successful start-up. Their rationale is twofold: they wish to enhance the ability of firms to appropriate privately the benefits of innovation (i.e. improve their profitability) and they hope to generate social benefits in excess of those that would have emerged from the operation of competitive markets.⁵¹ An anticipatory approach to these objectives would favour, first of all, the promotion of mergers and the gradual restriction of inefficient domestic competition to prepare firms better for intense international markets. Product innovation and greater efficiency would be the target of extensive support for research and development. These initiatives might be augmented with financial assistance and market intelligence to help secure a foothold in export markets. Governments might even move at this point to develop a set of chosen firms or ‘national champions’ in the given sector.⁵²

The Japanese semi-conductor industry provides an example of anticipatory policy at this expansionist phase. In the early stages of industry development, between 1960 and 1974, the Japanese government protected the domestic market using production quotas and strict limits on foreign investment.⁵³ During the same period, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) pushed firms into a series of mergers with a view to realizing the

⁵⁰ Geoffrey Shepherd and François Duchêne, ‘Introduction: Industrial Change and Intervention in Western Europe’, in G. Shepherd, F. Duchêne, and C. Saunders, eds, *Europe's Industries* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p. 21

⁵¹ Yehuda Kotowitz, *Positive Industrial Policy The Implications for R & D* (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1986), p. 34

⁵² For some discussion of this chosen firm approach, see John Zysman, *Political Strategies for Industrial Order. State, Market and Industry in France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)

⁵³ OECD, *The Semi-Conductor Industry. Trade Related Issues* (Paris: OECD, 1985), pp. 67–9.

economies of scale required for international competition. In 1975, having cultivated a group of highly competitive, large firms, MITI, in close consultation with the industry, assisted these firms to establish co-operative research laboratories where they could combine their expertise in a further drive for product innovation. Rationalized and well-equipped for future developments, the industry ended up well-placed to maintain and expand positions already secured in export markets in the United States and Western Europe.

For industries in a stable phase, where the main problem is one of maintaining markets for standardized products, an anticipatory approach may seem less attractive. Even here, however, the state may discover, or invent, strategic reasons for planning comprehensive policies for industry. When this occurs, emphasis will probably be laid on regulatory instruments. These will be used to stabilize the price of inputs and other operating costs, maintain product quality, restrict the entry of new firms and ensure domestic political stability. Research and development support emphasizing product improvement and production efficiency will continue to complement these regulatory systems. Since the firms involved are mature, more of this R & D can now be carried out by the firms in-house rather than by government laboratories or universities. Finally, competition policy may be relaxed to afford industry the opportunity to construct mergers for export purposes or resist the intrusion of foreign firms. Firms and the state share responsibility for the future of the sector.

An example is the pulp and paper industry in Canada. Input costs have been stabilized somewhat through price regulation schemes that take into account both market conditions and longer-term regeneration of the resource. Timber-access policies favour larger companies and as such provide a barrier to entry.⁵⁴ The federal government has supported an extensive modernization of plants in the industry through its billion dollar Pulp and Paper Modernization Program. It has also provided the facilities, as well as some operating support, to the industry's research institute, Paprican. These measures have helped forestall a threatened decline in an important traditional sector of the Canadian economy.

In declining sectors the state will find anticipatory policy attractive if only because the alternatives implied in a reactive policy, chiefly increased levels of trade protection, are either unpalatable or unavailable. The ideal typical anticipatory policy approach in a declining sector is planned positive adjustment. The state seeks to reduce production capacity to a level that matches demand and to encourage modernization in order to ensure firms can meet this demand efficiently. The most inefficient plants will be closed, and the remaining firms will be merged and their assets consolidated. Most important, labour adjustment programmes will be established to retrain and relocate workers. Programmes may even be launched that will attract new firms to areas abandoned by declining industries.

Jon Pierre provides a useful example of such an approach in his analysis of the

⁵⁴ For a discussion of such a policy in British Columbia, see P. Marchak, *Green Gold* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983)

termination of three shipyards in Sweden.⁵⁵ While there were special features in each of the three cases, the overall approach used took the following form. The closing of the shipyard was anticipated years in advance. Committees composed of local labour unions, industrialists, bankers and research institutes were formed and given funding to search out new industries to replace the soon to be abandoned shipyards. These committees searched for industries with growth potential that could be operated on a market-conforming basis. Governments aided in the transition by providing subsidies for worker retraining, the winding down of the old industrial plants and the building of new industries. In each case, new jobs helped compensate for the loss of the shipyards and the communities that had existed on the basis of the industry remained viable.

None of these anticipatory strategies could have been sustained with a pressure pluralist policy network. Competition among producer interests and among state agencies is antithetical to planned positive adjustment. Anticipatory policies, by their very nature, require close co-operation between business and the state. Either business must be highly mobilized – capable of looking to the longer term and sufficiently strong to keep state intervention under control – or the state must be autonomous from business – capable of articulating its own vision of the industry's future, and sufficiently co-ordinated to implement a range of policies. The requirements of an anticipatory policy are best met when centralized and autonomous state agencies meet business interests that are mobilized into hierarchical and inclusive groups. The result is a concertation network and collaborative policy making. Thus Table 2 indicates that concertation is the preferred policy network for the delivery of anticipatory policy.

TABLE 2 *Policy Approach, Sector Type and Policy Networks*

Sector type	Policy approach	
	Anticipatory	Reactive
Expansionist	<i>Concertation/ State Directed</i>	<i>Pressure pluralism/ Parentela pluralism</i>
Stabilizing	<i>Concertation/ Clientele pluralism</i>	<i>Pressure pluralism/ Clientele pluralism</i>
Declining	<i>Concertation/ Corporatism</i>	<i>Pressure pluralism/ Parentela pluralism</i>

Such concertation arrangements emerged in both the Japanese semiconductor and the Canadian pulp and paper examples. Both partners shared the same definition of the industry's problems and its requirements. The state had its

⁵⁵ Jon Pierre, 'Industrial Policy and Meso-Corporatism: The Policy and Implementation of Terminating Three Shipyards in Sweden,' paper presented to the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop on Meso-Corporatism, Amsterdam, April 1987

own objectives, more general than those of business, but this did not pose an obstacle to collaboration. At all stages of industry development, and regardless of the specific character of industry problems, divisions between state officials and business leaders were increasingly regarded as artificial. Public policy-making and private interests were progressively integrated.

Needless to say, these organizational demands are exceedingly difficult to meet. Business and the state will often be out of step, even at the sectoral level where macro-level factors, like the operation of the country's party system, are only remote obstacles. There will be instances, for example, in which the state possesses all of the required organizational attributes of centralization and autonomy, but business is not highly mobilized. Under these circumstances, a state-directed network often becomes the vehicle for anticipatory policy. This is particularly likely where state support is required to achieve the product and process innovations necessary for the establishment of competitive positions in international markets. The subsidization of high risk R & D, the negotiation of state-to-state purchases of volatile technologies, and the transfer of technical innovations from government laboratories to those of industry are measures that autonomous state agencies can initiate in support of innovative firms. These are activities that even Schumpeterian firms, regardless of their marketplace potential, are often unable to perform for themselves or to accomplish through collective political action.⁵⁶

There are, of course, some instances in which producer groups and not the state possess the necessary organizational properties. When business and labour (and perhaps even farmer) interests are highly mobilized, but state agencies are unable to co-ordinate or take the lead in decision making, producers will demand a political structure to accommodate their interests. Under these circumstances, anticipatory policy is entrusted to a corporatist network and sectoral corporatism becomes the alternative to concertation (see Table 2).

A corporatist network will often arise when a sector is faced with the problem of stemming serious decline. Such a sector will typically have had a long history presided over by a host of state agencies each dealing with a different aspect of the industry, including international trade, home markets, employee training and quality control. On the other hand, the long experience of the industry with a series of problems is likely to have fostered a highly effective industry associational system.⁵⁷ This associational system will often house sophisticated policy expertise and possess experience in dealing with other social groups, particularly labour. The state, lacking the organizational capacity to resolve the social conflicts and the hardships involved in decline, delegates to organized interests the problem of formulating a long-term policy solution to these problems.

The Swedish shipyard case followed this pattern with labour organizations, industry associations and financial firms co-operating to formulate an alternat-

⁵⁶ Richard Harris, *Trade, Industrial Policy and International Competition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp 99-103

⁵⁷ The observation that industry associations accumulate over time is made most forcefully in Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1982)

ive industrial strategy for the community. Once formulated, these associations took responsibility for implementing the strategy, using funds provided by the state. Hence the state continued to take advantage of the high mobilization of sectoral interests, but achieved some distance from the delicate political questions of winners and losers in the adjustment process.

There are two reasons why anticipatory policies and their associated networks occur less frequently in the Anglo-American democracies. First, macro level variables, including a weak-state tradition, the centrality of the legislature and the presence of a firm-centred industry culture, make it difficult to meet the organizational requirements for concertation, state-directed and corporatist networks. Secondly, the most convenient, and often the most appropriate, response to many of the problems inherent in the life cycle of an industry is reactive policy, devised and implemented through pressure pluralist networks.⁵⁸ In the case of expanding sectors, small programmes designed to assist in product and market development may be sufficient. Once stabilized, a sector can be supported by a minimal regulatory scheme designed to keep product quality high and competition 'fair'. If an industry is in decline, governments are free to react *ad hoc* with higher tariffs, import quotas and bail-outs. None of these policy scenarios places demands on either the state or business that cannot be accommodated within a pressure pluralist network. For officials anxious only to distance themselves from the structural sources of unemployment and to associate with high-profile, firm-specific successes, selective aid to industry is more than sufficient.

Reactive policies can, of course, be sustained by other types of pluralist networks. Table 2 indicates the phases of the industry cycle when other pluralist networks might substitute for pressure pluralism. Parentela pluralism, for example, may dominate during either expansion or decline. In the early stages of sectoral development, collective action by firms is often at an elemental stage while the state has not yet adjusted its structures to take account of the new industry. Similarly, when the industry has been pitched headlong into decline, competition for the remaining markets may become so fierce that collective action in a sectoral association becomes impossible. Within the state structure, officials may be demoralized and governments unwilling to devise a policy response to the problem. Both of these sunrise and sunset scenarios leave a path open for parentela pluralism and the employment of partisan criteria for intervention.

Pressure pluralism may develop into clientele pluralism when the state seeks to capitalize on industry expertise without signalling a change in policy. For example, during the stabilized phase of the industry cycle when state agencies develop limited regulatory systems for quality control and 'fair competition', they normally establish regular contact with firms in the sector. The technical

⁵⁸ As Ikenberry has pointed out, 'a minimalist state strategy that involves enforcing market processes may be as efficacious as the juggernaut of extensive and systematic direct intervention' (G John Ikenberry, 'The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s', *International Organization*, 40 (1986), 105-38, p. 137).

expertise necessary for running such systems lies initially with the firms. If state agencies are able to learn from these firms and transfer some of this expertise in-house, a pressure pluralist network will persist. Alternatively, these sectoral agencies may be content to leave expertise with the industry, particularly if it is accessible through an interest association. This association then is incorporated into the policy-making process, penetrating the state in a way consistent with the clientele pluralist network.⁵⁹

When it comes to countries with a weak-state tradition, such as the Anglo-American democracies, our analysis of the conditions underlying policy networks suggests two conclusions. First, anticipatory policies are likely to be attempted only on those exceptional occasions when circumstances combine to render reactive policies inappropriate. This will normally occur where state agencies are strong – officials and politicians have succeeded in concentrating resources and decision-making power – or where business mobilization is high. It is unlikely to happen often. The second conclusion follows directly from the first. Where the political conditions for anticipatory policy are not met, that is when policy networks are not based on concertation, corporatism or state direction, and anticipatory policies are attempted anyway, frustration will follow. Not only will these policies fail, but the exceptional resources committed will fall into the hands of the strongest vested interests in a pressure pluralism network.

CONCLUSIONS

This article has presented a framework for the analysis of policy networks at the sectoral level. These networks may take on a variety of forms and hence their study requires a more nuanced categorization than the strong state–weak state, or pluralist–corporatist formulations. We have every reason to expect that any given liberal democratic polity will possess most of these policy networks in varying numbers at any given time. As Schmitter and Lanzalaco indicate, the meso-level may provide a propitious environment for experimentation.⁶⁰ It is less subject to international or meta-regimes than the macro level and unlike the micro level of the firm, it is less bound by forms of traditionalism and personalism. The sectoral level may also often be much less visible politically than either the macro or micro levels, a point also made by Wassenberg.⁶¹ In the face of these weaker constraints, margins of manoeuvre widen and alliance possibilities increase.

None the less, as we mentioned at the outset, it is also reasonable to expect that the relative frequency of different types of policy networks will vary system-

⁵⁹ Pross captures this process well in his discussion of sub-governments in policy communities. See *Group Politics and Public Policy*, pp. 99–102.

⁶⁰ P C Schmitter and Luca Lanzalaco, 'Regions and the Organization of Business Interests', Florence, 1987, mimeo, p. 47.

⁶¹ Arthur F P. Wassenberg, 'Neo-Corporatism and the Quest for Control. The Cuckoo Game', in Gerhard Lehmbruch and P C Schmitter, eds, *Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making* (London, Sage, 1982), pp 83–108.

atically across democratic polities depending on the macropolitical institutions. For example, sectoral associations are likely to assume a highly mobilized form when the interest intermediation system that exists at the macro level is hierarchical, vertically integrated and highly representative. By contrast, an undifferentiated, weakly integrated, and poorly representative interest-intermediation system on the macro level will offer few incentives for high mobilization on the meso plane. Under these circumstances, meso-corporatism or sectoral concertation becomes much less likely.

Similar macro-meso relationships obtain when it comes to state structures. While suggesting the need for more sectoral analysis, Wilks and Wright stress the possible importance of 'administrative continuity' resulting from a more general bureaucratic culture. They also note the relevance of industry culture, particularly as it bears upon the legitimate limits of state intervention as perceived by business and the state. Hence the 'rules of the game' at the sectoral level draw significantly from these more macro conditions.⁶²

In short, both continuities and discontinuities are possible between the general orientation of state and society at the macro level and the patterns of policy networks at the sectoral level. There is reason to suspect that meso-level networks will take on forms not found at the macro level, but this does not necessarily jeopardize the conceptual work that has been done at the macro level on the subject of strong and weak states. Rather, macro-level phenomena provide one set of constraints, which, in combination with the economic organization of a sector and the institutional legacy of state agencies and interest associations, combine to favour the dominance a particular sectoral policy network. Meso-level phenomena cannot be explained in isolation from broader political institutions.

⁶² Wilks and Wright, 'Conclusions', pp 291-3.

Review Article: Re-Examining Rights

PETER JONES

The language of rights has become part of the common currency of modern political life. Asserting a right has become the orthodox way in which to make a case or to formulate a demand. States are frequently reviled, and their legitimacy called into question, for violating the rights of individuals or the rights of peoples. Very many states have themselves given formal endorsement to this way of viewing the political world by embodying bills of rights in their constitutions. Whether Britain will follow suit still remains to be seen; but Britain, along with other members of the Council of Europe, is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights and, along with most other countries, has endorsed the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights have also acquired increasing significance in international relations and now figure prominently in 'dialogue' between West and East and between North and South.

All of this might lead one to suppose that philosophical battles on behalf of rights have long since been fought and won, even if many campaigns for their practical implementation have still to be waged. Most of the widely used rhetoric of rights simply takes the cogency of what it asserts for granted. Human rights in particular tend to be invoked as though their existence and content could not be in doubt. In some measure this widespread deference to the ideology of rights has its parallel in contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy. The protagonists of rights are now very much in the ascendant and the sort of carping hostility to rights, typified by Bentham's caustic remarks on the subject, has become a comparative rarity. Whether a moral or political theory provides a satisfactory home for rights has become, for most philosophers, a standard test of its acceptability. Even Bentham's modern disciples, so far from dismissing rights as 'nonsense upon stilts', seem only too anxious to demonstrate that utilitarianism can accommodate our 'intuitions' about rights. Yet one does not have to penetrate very far beneath this surface of consensus to discover that it disguises disagreements and uncertainties that run very deep. The confidence and conviction with which rights are asserted in the market-place of politics is not underwritten by any substantial philosophical agreement on the character, content or foundations of rights. In truth there is very little concerning rights that is not disputed: what they are, what they entail, what rights we should attribute to people and why, are all subjects of profound disagreement. In this article I shall examine six recent studies of rights whose collective content constitutes a substantial contribution to the debate about rights and which, taken

together, provide a comprehensive portrait of the issues concerning rights that preoccupy modern moral and political philosophy.¹

Of these six, only one – that by Alan White – is exclusively concerned with what it means to have a right. However, in elucidating that concept, White also dissects other concepts with which rights commonly keep company such as 'ought', 'duty' and 'obligation'. Whilst modest in scope and humble in its foundations, White's analysis results in some remarkably novel and unorthodox conclusions. Much of Samuel Stoljar's book is also taken up with analysing the concept of a right although the conclusions of his analysis share precious little in common with those of White. Stoljar gives equal attention to the idea of natural rights and attempts an original but somewhat tenuous account of why people have natural rights and of what natural rights they have. What Stoljar describes as natural rights would more usually be described nowadays as human rights, and it is human rights that form the focus of Jack Donnelly's work. In his slim but briskly argued volume, he too analyses what it is to have a right and develops a theory which can provide a plausible foundation for human rights and one which he believes can counter the criticisms traditionally brought against the doctrine. Once again, however, a shared subject-matter does not result in a shared understanding and Stoljar and Donnelly confront us with contrasting rather than congruent accounts of rights.

The remaining three volumes are collections of essays. That edited by Ellen Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul has previously appeared as the second issue of the recently established journal *Social Philosophy and Policy*. This particular collection covers a variety of philosophical issues concerning rights. The contributions are also variable in quality – some are extremely good, others bear the marks of having been written to order. The volume edited by Jeremy Waldron ranges over four decades. It can have been no mean task to select nine articles from the wealth of material that has appeared during that time. We have here an excellent collection of some of the most distinguished and influential pieces on rights written since the War. It is supplemented by a lucid introduction by Waldron in which he charts the development of arguments about rights in recent years. The inclusion of 'Theories' in the title is no mere embellishment for each of the articles offers a substantial view of the role of rights in moral and political thought. The articles brought together by R. G. Frey constitute a more sharply focused collection than the other two. Its subject is one of the major preoccupations of contemporary philosophy – the relation of rights to utilitarianism and, more particularly, whether that relation is one of opposition or complementarity. As one would expect, the contributors to this volume present us with a cavalcade of competing arguments illustrating the deeply divided views that this issue evokes.

¹ Alan R. White, *Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Samuel Stoljar, *An Analysis of Rights* (London: Macmillan, 1984); Jack Donnelly, *The Concept of Human Rights* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul, eds, *Human Rights* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); Jeremy Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); R. G. Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

In surveying these writings I shall consider their content thematically rather than volume by volume. More particularly, I shall examine the answers they provide to a number of fundamental questions: what it means to have a right – whether legal, moral, natural or human; what sort of status rights can and should possess within a moral or political theory; whether rights must be asserted in opposition to, or whether they can be satisfactorily accommodated within, ‘goal-based’ theories such as utilitarianism; how claims to ‘human’ rights might be substantiated; whether different rights call for different justifications; and what we are to make of assertions of absolute or inviolable rights

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Much of the conceptual analysis of rights has been conducted as a search for the ingredient common to the various usages of rights. However, as well as seeking to track down what unites rights, analyses of rights have also been concerned with what divides them. One analysis in particular has dominated jurisprudential thought on rights throughout this century – that of the American legal theorist, Wesley Hohfeld.² Hohfeld alleged that the term ‘right’ as it occurred in law covered four distinct kinds of jural relation. It might refer (1) to a *claim* of A against B, in respect of which B owes A a correlative duty, e.g. A’s right to be repaid by B; or (2) to a *liberty*³ in which case A’s right to do X refers simply to his having no duty not to do X, e.g. in Britain and the United States people have the right to smoke tobacco but no right to smoke marijuana; or (3) to a *power*, that is the ability to change a legal relation, as in the right to get married or the right to get divorced; or (4) to an *immunity*, to not being subject to another’s power, e.g. in the United States citizens enjoy certain rights in virtue of the Constitution’s divesting Congress and state legislatures of powers over those matters. Hohfeld himself thought that only claims constituted rights properly so-called but subsequent writers have generally adopted the more generous and inclusive usage. Hohfeld’s analysis has given rise to a number of questions. Firstly, it is not easy to discern a common ingredient in his four types of rights in virtue of which each can be considered a species of the same genus. Neither the choice nor the interest theory covers the field adequately.⁴ Secondly, some have

² Wesley N. Hohfeld, *Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning* (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1919)

³ Hohfeld himself spoke of this as a ‘privilege’, but subsequent writers have generally used the term ‘liberty’ or ‘liberty-right’ as a more appropriate and less misleading way of referring to this sort of right.

⁴ Certain sorts of claim-right and immunity seem to afford no choice to the right-holder. Certain sorts of power are difficult for the interest theory – can we really locate the right of the judge to decide, or the right of the legislator to enact, in the ‘interests’ of those right-holders? The most conspicuous proponent of the choice theory has been H. L. A. Hart, see his ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, in Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights*, pp. 77–90, and his chapter ‘Legal Rights’ in his *Essays on Bentham* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 162–93. For statements of the interest theory, see David Lyons, ‘Rights, Claimants and Beneficiaries’, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 6 (1969), 173–85; D. N. MacCormick, ‘Rights in Legislation’, in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz, eds, *Law, Morality and*

thought his analysis should be transferred to moral rights; others have not. And thirdly, some have attempted to unsettle the details of Hohfeld's analysis, though, in my view, with little success. Both Stoljar and White see Hohfeld as an adversary and both see themselves as giving a more economical and accurate rendition of rights.

On Stoljar's analysis a right is essentially a claim and a claim is something put forward not merely as a demand but as a demand accompanied with a justification indicating that that demand should be met.⁵ Stoljar deals with a number of objections to the analysis of rights as claims but fails to confront the most significant – that not all claims constitute rights. For example, a devoted friend who has helped me through many a difficult patch may have a claim to recognition in my will but we might still fight shy of describing that claim as a right. Rights may be claims but they are claims of special status. Stoljar recognizes that to the extent that he wants claims to be understood in an especially strict sense, but that seems to be using the term 'right' to invest the term 'claim' with meaning rather than vice versa.

Like Hohfeld, Stoljar holds that rights, in their primary sense, are not only claims to something but also claims against someone and are therefore accompanied by correlative duties. Without that correlativity, he argues, rights would lose most of their point. Indeed he holds not only that A's right to X (e.g. to non-interference or to a sum of money) entails B's duty to provide X, but also that a correlative duty falls upon some C (usually a government or a community) to uphold that right. That is why he believes that rights, even 'natural rights', have to be understood in the context of a community for only in such a context can they have real point as rights. However, Stoljar's analysis seems to conflate two separate matters. If A is B's creditor, A has a right to be repaid and B has a correlative duty to repay A. A's right may also be a good ground for holding that C has a duty to ensure that B performs his duty to A, but C's duty is then a matter of reasoning rather than of logical entailment. In many cases, no doubt, A's right will be of such a kind that it provides the best of reasons for imputing a duty to some C to protect and uphold it, but that should not be included in what it *means* for A to have a right to be repaid by B.

Are there then no rights without duties? What of Hohfeld's liberties and powers? Stoljar is highly critical of Hohfeld's analysis, but he does make a concession in the case of Hohfeld's liberty-rights. Stoljar is willing to acknowledge that there can be a right in this 'dutile' sense, as in the right to criticize or the right to compete, but he draws the limits of that usage more closely than Hohfeld. Stoljar dubs these 'defensive' rights (claim-rights are 'assertive' rights) since they are typically invoked defensively against a complaint or challenge. Such defences are needed to justify a hurt or a harm visited upon someone of a

Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 182–209, and J. Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Chap. 7. See also Waldron's discussion, *Theories of Rights*, pp. 9–12. For an analysis which shuns both theories, see V. Haksar, 'The Nature of Rights', *Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie*, 64 (1978), 183–202.

⁵ Stoljar, *An Analysis of Rights*.

kind which would normally contravene a right-duty relation but which, exceptionally, may be justified – as in the right to use violence in one's self-defence. Once again this is a more problematic analysis than Stoljar appears to recognize. It is true that liberty-rights are most likely to be asserted when someone is challenged (e.g. 'why are you wearing those disgusting clothes?'; response – 'I have a perfect right to dress as I please'). But we should not confuse the typical occasion for invoking a right with its meaning. Liberty-rights do not come into being just at the moment that they are challenged. At any particular time I have the right to do (am 'at liberty' to do) the indefinitely many things I am not prohibited from doing, even though I may not even think about them, be challenged or make claims about them.

It would be tedious to go through all of the points in Stoljar's analysis which are open to doubt. His is not a book for the novice and should be read only after a thorough acquaintance with those theorists he takes to task (not only Hohfeld but also Hart, Raphael, White, McCloskey and Lyons) so that one can judge the success of his criticisms for oneself.

One thing that bedevils Stoljar's, and many others', analyses of rights is that it is not made entirely clear what the ground of the analysis is. Is it the term as it is used in ordinary language or as it occurs in the technical vocabulary of the lawyer or the philosopher, or is it an attempt to stipulate an improved usage which is not entirely identical with either? Stoljar is apparently doing a combination of the first two, but his frequent claim that such and such a usage is, or would be, 'pointless' suggests the third. That complaint cannot be made against Alan White.⁶ His approach is very much in the 'ordinary language' tradition, although ordinary language here includes that of lawyers and judges and the writers of political manifestoes but not, perhaps understandably, that of political philosophers. Most of the book is taken up with the examination of what we say of, or by way of, rights. Indeed White says very little directly on what a right is and spends most of his time elucidating the concept by illustrating its use.

When White finally gets round to stating what a right is, it turns out to be simply what is possessed in virtue of a title; in other words, rights are entitlements. Although White devotes remarkably little space to this notion, the idea of entitlement silently guides the argument of the whole book. His analysis has two particularly striking features. First, in some respects, it is more inclusive than most. He concerns himself not only with rights to do or to have done, but also with rights to be in a certain state such as happy or depressed, to feel certain things such as pleased or angry, and to take a certain attitude such as to assume, to expect or to conclude. Second, in other respects, his analysis is more exclusive than most. He insists that there is one and only one concept of rights that inhabits all usages of the term and he is particularly hostile to the Hohfeldian approach with its division of rights into claims, liberties, powers and immunities. Rather he treats rights as conceptually quite separate from these. As this indicates, White's argument is more radical and controversial than his devotion to ordinary language might lead one to suppose.

⁶ White, *Rights*

Thus White argues that not all rights have correlative duties and that not all duties have correlative rights. Nothing unusual in that. But White does not merely limit the scope of the correlativity of rights and duties, he completely rejects the correlativity thesis as it is ordinarily understood. *No* right is logically connected to a duty and *no* duty is logically connected to a right. White accepts that some rights (e.g. the right to protection) may have associated duties because those rights would be useless without them. But this, it would seem, is a purely contingent connection. The right could exist in the absence of the duty even though it would then be of little practical value.

Now what is clear is that, if there is only one concept of a right (i.e. 'entitlement') common to all uses of 'a right', and if not all rights entail duties, those rights which do have correlative duties must be describable as entitlements without specific reference to duties. It is also the case that some duties can be associated with rights without being logically tied to them (e.g. the liberty-right to express one's views and the duty of others not to prevent one so doing). However, there are other rights which, *pace* White, are unintelligible in the absence of duties. How can I have the right to have a debt repaid or not to be assaulted without anyone having a duty to repay me or not to assault me? Both are rights which concern not my conduct but the conduct of others. In the case of claim rights such as these, duties are not contingent extras which serve to protect the right or render it useful, but necessary accompaniments of the right. White seems to be misled into supposing that because the concept of entitlement in general can be analysed without reference to duty, no particular sort of entitlement is logically linked to duty.

In addition to attacking the ordinary conception of claim-rights, White also questions Hohfeld's characterization of liberties and powers as rights. A liberty is a purely 'negative' concept implying only the absence of a duty or an obligation, whereas a right is a 'positive' concept implying the presence of a title. Many have shared the view that liberties merely *qua* liberties ought not to be spoken of as rights. Yet this cannot be an easy position for White to hold. For one thing it debars our speaking of a whole range of liberties as rights, even though we think of them as rights (including as *legal* rights), merely because they do not exist as entitlements for which there is express provision. Moreover, White's position means jettisoning a common and well-established usage of 'right'. As Stoljar points out, if I do something I have no duty not to do (e.g. express unpopular views) and I am challenged, my normal response is to protest not that I am 'free' to do it, but that I have a 'right' to do it. Given that that usage is well-established, it is not clear how White can cope with it. He refuses to accept that it indicates that the term right has two senses and he is unwilling to accept that I can be deemed legally 'entitled' to do whatever I am not legally prohibited from doing. The only option left is to dismiss this usage as improper and this is the option he adopts ('It is far too liberal ...', p. 145). Yet given his loyalty to ordinary language, it is not at all clear upon what this judgement of impropriety is grounded.

A quite different way in which White seeks to limit appeals to rights concerns

what sort of being or entity can possess rights. In recent years, rights have been ascribed with increasing generosity so that they are now claimed not only for adult persons but also for infants, fetuses, future generations, animals and even works of art. White is one of many who are unhappy about this extension of the ascription of rights. He argues skilfully that having interests is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for having rights, nor is being the beneficiary of a duty or being capable of right treatment. Only 'persons' have rights. But why only these? White's reasons are not ones of legal or moral substance but of the limits imposed by language. 'A right is something which can be said to be exercised, earned, enjoyed, or given, which can be claimed, demanded, asserted, insisted on, secured, waived, or surrendered ...' (p. 90). This White describes as the 'full language' of rights. Only persons are capable of possessing rights because only they can figure as possessors of rights in that language. I cannot believe that proponents of animal rights will be silenced by this appeal to language; nor should they. Proper treatment of this issue requires investigation into the moral point of claiming rights rather than into the features of conventional language. Even White seems uneasy about the exclusiveness of his criterion and he has to struggle hard, and somewhat disingenuously, to save rights for children, the dead and the feeble-minded since they too seem not the kind of subjects of whom White's 'full language of rights' can be used.

Finally, there is reason to question not only what White excludes but also some of what he includes in the compass of rights. White regularly refers not only to rights to do and to have done but also, as I mentioned earlier, to rights to be in a certain state (e.g. happy), rights to feel certain things (e.g. annoyed), and rights to take a certain attitude (e.g. to assume or expect). White is justified in claiming both that these are common usages and that they have been overlooked by other analysts. However, they seem to me to be largely figurative usages which are parasitic upon the use of the term 'right' as it occurs in morals and law. It is a way of saying that one has 'good reason to' or that one is 'justified in' rather than something which points to a 'title' in any ordinary sense. It is significant that these rights do not gell with White's 'full language' of rights. The right to be happy or angry might be claimed or asserted, but it could not be 'secured, waived or surrendered' and it would be unusual to speak of its being 'exercised' or 'enjoyed'. It is not easy to draw the line between figurative and non-figurative uses of 'rights' and it might not matter very much were it not that White regularly wheels out these rights to test matters such as the relationship between rights and duties and the necessary and sufficient grounds of rights. That something does not hold true of the right to be happy or to sneer or to hope does not show that it does not hold true of rights as these occur in moral and legal contexts.

There is much that is of value in White's fine attention to the details of usage not only in relation to rights, but also in relation to concepts such as duty and obligation. However, I doubt that his assault upon the current conceptual orthodoxies will radically change the way legal, moral and political philosophers think about rights. Common parlance may not be entirely at one with

legal conceptions of rights, and analysis of the term 'right' as it occurs in legal contexts may not be a wholly adequate guide to the meaning and significance that the term has come to acquire in moral and political philosophy – a possibility that, so far, most analysts have been reluctant to contemplate.⁷

MORAL RIGHTS AND MORAL STRUCTURES

It is with moral, rather than legal, rights that political philosophy has been primarily concerned. The reason is plain. If rights are to indicate the proper content and the proper limits of law, they must be more than mere creatures of law themselves. Hence the popularity and persistence of the idea of natural rights, rights which are founded upon something more fundamental than the artifice of human law. However, the notion of 'moral' rights has always attracted suspicion and that of 'natural' rights even more so.

L. W. Sumner is one such sceptic.⁸ While he does not challenge the idea of moral rights altogether, he does attempt to demolish the idea of natural rights. He stipulates four defining features of a natural rights theory: (1) it must contain some rights; (2) it must treat rights as morally basic; (3) it must tie possession of those rights to some natural property; and (4) it must rest upon some form of realist moral epistemology. Like Bentham, Sumner is opposed to all such natural rights theories on both conceptual and moral grounds. Indeed, Sumner's conceptual attack upon the notion of natural rights consists of a modified version of Bentham's syllogism: there can be no rights without laws, there are no natural (moral) laws, therefore there are no natural rights. The critical point for Sumner, as for Bentham, is that there is no natural analogue to the system of acceptance and compliance that give identity to ordinary man-made laws. If we cannot identify natural laws then we have nothing by which to recognize natural rights. Thus Sumner holds that the requirement that a natural rights theory be rights-based is inconsistent with the requirement that it must be founded upon a realist moral epistemology.

It is not clear that either the traditional or more recent theories of natural rights are confused in the way that Sumner alleges. Traditional (i.e. seventeenth- and eighteenth-century) theories of natural rights typically viewed these as the offspring of a system of natural laws of which God was the author. There was therefore a direct analogue between the structure of natural laws and rights and that of positive laws and rights. Given the requisite belief in God, etc., natural rights could be viewed as as much facts in the world as positive rights and were securely anchored in a realist epistemology. More recent theories of natural rights have, for the most part, done without this cosmology and have accordingly recognized the distinction between the character of positive rights (whose existence is a matter of institutional fact) and natural rights (whose claim to re-

⁷ Although Joseph Raz has proposed reversing the usual order of analysis; 'Legal Rights', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 4 (1984), 1–21

⁸ L. W. Sumner, 'Rights Denaturalized', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp 20–41.

spect is a matter of moral commitment). Such theories provide reasons for ascribing rights to human beings simply *qua* human beings and are now more frequently spoken of as human rights than natural rights. But such theories remain theories of *natural* rights not because they regard rights as part of the natural furniture of the universe but because they found rights upon moral principles which apply across all humanity rather than upon artifices such as law, custom and contract. As such, they need not be associated with a 'realist moral epistemology' and they need not therefore fall victim to Sumner's reasoning.

In addition to challenging the conceptual coherence of natural rights, Sumner finds all such theories morally objectionable. While he does not simply counterpose Bentham's utilitarianism to natural rights, he sympathizes with Bentham's complaint that claims of natural right are 'so much flat assertion'. An acceptable theory of rights must provide us with some standard for discriminating between justified and unjustified claims of right. A natural rights theory, he claims, is unable to provide that. Since it is in essence a rights-based theory, it cannot appeal to some deeper or external moral principle to discriminate between claims of right and to keep these within bounds. All it can do is to look to 'nature' (i.e. our human nature) to supply a criterion for rights. But that nature is too indeterminate a source to be equal to the task so that natural rights theory can do nothing to control what Sumner describes as the contemporary 'population explosion' of rights-claims.

Once again this is too short a way with natural rights. Certainly theories of natural or human rights typically relate the claims they make to the nature of humanity – it would be a strange moral theory that did not. But they need not suppose that answers to questions about the rights humans have, and how far they extend, can be simply 'read off' from nature. Certainly there will continue to be arguments over the content of natural rights but such arguments need not be arbitrary. Moreover, it is not obvious that a natural rights theory must be rights-based. There is no reason why, in principle, consequentialist or contractarian moral theories (which Sumner finds acceptable) could not yield rights which were 'natural' in the sense that I have indicated.

That raises the larger issue of the status that rights can and should occupy in a moral or political theory. Sceptics have sometimes sought to diminish the significance of rights by questioning that status. Rights, it is commonly said, entail duties. From this it is often inferred that rights are merely the offspring of duties and that everything that is said about rights can be said as well, if not better, in terms of duties so that we should expunge the word 'rights' from our moral vocabulary. In the hands of some writers, this argument is about as compelling as the argument that, since 'south' is merely the opposite of 'north', all references to 'south' can be replaced (with some circumlocution) by references to 'north' so that we should jettison the word 'south' from our geographical vocabulary. However, there is more at stake here than mere linguistic or conceptual economy. If it is the case not merely that rights and duties are correlative but that rights are the 'offspring' of duties, then duty is the more fundamental moral notion and rights have a purely derivative status. Similarly, if the ultimate

justification of rights is their instrumentality in promoting social goals, it is those goals rather than rights which are morally fundamental. Ronald Dworkin in a useful classification has suggested that political theories can be categorized as goal-based, duty-based or rights-based.⁹ John Mackie suggests that the same tripartite division can be applied to moral theories in general.¹⁰ Thus, the ultimate question about the status of rights becomes the question of whether a morality can and should be rights-based.

Mackie argues the case for a rights-based morality. What is it for a morality to be X-based? Mackie suggests that the X indicates the fundamental purpose of that morality: 'statements about Xs should be seen as capturing what gives point to the whole moral theory' (p. 180). In light of this, Mackie questions the appeal of a duty-based morality. Except perhaps in the context of certain theistic moralities, the notion that we have duties for their own sake seems absurd – surely the point of duties must lie outside of themselves. That complaint cannot be made against goal-based moralities, but goal-based theories suffer from the well-known problem that they may require the well-being of one individual to be sacrificed, without limit, for the well-being of others and Mackie is unpersuaded by any of the strategies that have been proposed as ways around this problem.

Thus Mackie concludes not only that there *can* be a rights-based morality but also that there is no *acceptable* morality that is not rights-based. For Mackie the right central to an acceptable morality is that of persons 'progressively to choose how they shall live' (p. 176). 'Acceptability' is, of course, a controversial matter and there are those who would find acceptable what Mackie does not. However, the more modest claim that rights can occupy a fundamental place in a morality is hard to resist. It is difficult to understand why a rights-based morality of the sort Mackie espouses should be found unintelligible. To hold that a right can be 'basic' in Mackie's sense is not to hold that it must be self-evident or logically primitive such that it is unanalysable in terms of other values; it is to hold only that, in order of argument, rights can appear before duties and social goals.

However, there is more at issue here than whether, logically, rights can precede duties and goals. Dworkin's typology and Mackie's development of it suggest a bolder thesis: that an acceptable morality is one in which *only* rights are basic and in which *all* duties and goals occupy a subordinate and derivative position. Joseph Raz, while accepting that rights can figure as fundamental precepts in a morality, argues that a morality that was *exclusively* rights-based would be unacceptably impoverished.¹¹ Such a morality would be unable to

⁹ Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 169–73. Dworkin uses this classification in arguing that Rawls's *Theory of Justice* is ultimately rights-based. Rawls himself has subsequently rejected that description: 'Justice as Fairness. Political not Metaphysical', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 14 (1985), 223–51, p. 236.

¹⁰ J. L. Mackie, 'Can There Be a Right-Based Moral Theory?', in Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights*, pp. 168–81.

¹¹ J. Raz, 'Right-Based Moralities', in Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights*, pp. 182–200, and also in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp. 42–60. Raz's position on rights is developed more fully in his *Morality of Freedom*, especially Chaps 7–10.

give full moral significance to 'oughts' which were other than duties, to acts of supererogation, and to virtue and the pursuit of excellence. More particularly, Raz argues that such a morality could not accommodate collective goods which possess intrinsic rather than merely instrumental value and which, because they can exist only as 'collective' goods, cannot be reduced to a set of individual claims of rights. Examples of such goods include a tolerant society, an educated society, a society characterized by respect for human beings and a society which makes available options essential to an autonomous life. In other words, Raz believes that many of the features of a humanistic and liberal society that proponents of individual rights typically hold dear cannot ultimately be analysed into individual claims of rights. Some of the difference between Mackie and Raz may be explained by Raz's more severe understanding of what it means for a morality to be rights-based. If, like Mackie, we mean only that rights give 'point' to what else the morality enjoins, it is arguable that the value of collective goods, such as a tolerant society, can be explicated by reference to individuals' rights. Even so, there remain other elements of morality which fall outside the rights-based model and, as Raz argues, a pluralistic understanding of the foundation of morality, which takes in rights but not only rights, seems much more defensible than one which is built upon nothing but rights.

RIGHTS, GOALS AND UTILITY

For many theorists Raz's pluralism would be unacceptable not because it gives too little but because it gives too much moral significance to rights. That objection would be voiced most loudly by the advocates of goal-based moralities and, more especially, by utilitarians. Indeed, the juxtaposition of rights and utility is perhaps the most prominent and recurrent feature of contemporary argument about rights. Even amongst those who seek to accommodate both rights and utility in their thinking, rights are typically regarded as placing constraints upon consequentialist reasoning. Dworkin's well-known conception of rights as moral titles which 'trump' background moral considerations such as social utility is but one expression of that view.

The same sort of conception of rights is offered by David Lyons, although he prefers to express this feature of rights by way of the idea of an 'argumentative threshold'.¹² 'If I have a right to do something, this provides an *argumentative threshold* against objections to my doing it, as well as a presumption against others' interference' (p. 114). Thus reasons which would otherwise adequately justify my being prevented from doing X, can be rendered inadequate by my having a right to do X. However it is normally supposed, even by those who counterpose utilitarianism and *moral* rights in this way, that utilitarianism can provide a plausible foundation for a system of *legal* rights. Lyons challenges even that, arguing that the demands of unqualified direct utilitarianism are incompatible with the moral force of (justified) legal rights. Lyons's claim is

¹² David Lyons, 'Utility and Rights', in Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights*, pp. 110-36

unusual for its extravagance and it is not clear that he can make his case merely by appealing to the logic of utilitarianism. He himself is not trying to hold that to have a right, moral or legal, is to have an absolutely indefeasible claim (cf. pp. 115, 118, 120). Hence his challenge to the idea of utilitarian legal rights must rely not upon the idea that such rights would sometimes lapse in the face of competing considerations, but upon the claim that, under utilitarianism, they would lapse so frequently and so casually as to make nonsense of them as 'rights'. Utilitarians are likely to respond to this by pointing to the utility of security, predictability, co-ordination and the like in human affairs. These may provide utilitarian reasons 'all things considered' for respecting rights even when there are apparently more immediate utilitarian reasons for abrogating them, thus conserving their intelligibility as rights. Ultimately, this sort of dispute cannot be settled by logical sword-play but by the evidence of human beings and human circumstances. But Lyons's argument is at least a healthy reminder to utilitarians that they must make their case and not merely presume that utilitarianism endorses institutions which have become part of the common fabric of life.

A modified form of utilitarianism that seems better suited to 'taking rights seriously' is rule-utilitarianism. However, as Lyons observes (p. 129), that is so only to the extent that it ceases to be fully utilitarian. Partly for that reason and partly because it fails to avoid many of the standard objections to utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism seems to have fallen out of favour in recent years. Another version of utilitarianism, which is also calculated to make room for rights and which is proving more popular, is indirect utilitarianism.

The idea fundamental to indirect utilitarianism is simply stated. We are often more successful in promoting utility by pursuing secondary principles formulated in non-utilitarian terms than by attempting the direct pursuit of utility itself. Thus there is a utilitarian case for endorsing and propagating those secondary, and apparently non-utilitarian, principles rather than attempting to convert people to simple act-utilitarianism. Although the phrase 'indirect utilitarianism' appears to be of recent origin, the position it describes is not. John Gray, as well as providing a lucid and critical account of the doctrine, argues persuasively that versions of it are fundamental to the thought of Hume, J. S. Mill, Spencer and Sidgwick.¹³

Allan Gibbard develops a utilitarian defence of human rights which is of just this sort.¹⁴ Given the limitations and failings of humanity and even of expert utilitarians, utility, he suggests, will be better served by a precise respect for human rights than by direct utilitarianism. The problem for the utilitarian then becomes one of how he should foster this utile, but non-utilitarian, commitment to human rights. Gibbard rejects Machiavellian subterfuge and argues that a

¹³ John Gray, 'Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights', in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 73–91. See also his *Mill on Liberty: a Defence* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), and 'Spencer on the Ethics of Liberty and the Limits of State Interference', *History of Political Thought*, 3 (1982), 465–81.

¹⁴ Allan Gibbard, 'Utilitarianism and Human Rights' in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 92–102.

good utilitarian can induce in himself and in others the requisite deep and sincere commitment to human rights – a commitment which will be utile but which will be held not merely *as* utile. The obvious problem with Gibbard's argument is whether this trick of commitment can be pulled off. His utilitarian is rather like Plato's Philosopher-King who tells his noble lie so successfully that eventually he comes to believe it himself. Moreover, in spite of his emphasis upon the utility of sincerity, Gibbard's approach remains uncomfortably close to the maintenance and exploitation of beliefs which are useful but which are also, from a utilitarian point of view, false.

The most comprehensive recent defence of indirect utilitarianism, including an interpretation of rights, has come from R. M. Hare.¹⁵ Hare distinguishes between two levels of morality: the critical and the intuitive. At the critical level choices are made 'under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concepts and by the non-moral facts, and by nothing else' (p. 40). At this level, Hare argues, moral thinking must be utilitarian. An archangel blessed with perfect knowledge and impartiality could do all of his thinking at the critical level. However, ordinary mortals, with their limited powers of thought, their limited knowledge and foresight and their propensity for partiality, cannot. For such beings to live only by calculations of social utility would be disastrous. Hence the need for a subordinate level of moral thinking – the intuitive. Intuitive morality consists of all of those principles, dispositions, attitudes, sentiments and the like that make up the morality of everyday codes of conduct. This morality is 'intuitive' simply in that its ingredients have typically, and desirably, been implanted in us by our moral upbringing and therefore have an instinctive appeal for us. However, these intuitions are not self-validating. Ultimately, they must be evaluated by the principles of critical morality and they derive what value they have from being endorsed at the critical level. Thus, there are good reasons why people should live in accordance with an intuitive morality rather than attempt to live like act-utilitarians all the time, but those good reasons are themselves utilitarian.

One complication in Hare's theory is the question of when it is appropriate to operate at what level. A 'prole', who was as weak-witted and ignorant as the archangel was steadfast and omniscient, should always be guided by intuitive morality. But most people are somewhere in between the two and different levels will be appropriate to different people and on different occasions. This, Hare points out, is not a matter that can be resolved by philosophy alone, but the weight of his view seems to be that most of us most of the time do best by living in accordance with that intuitive morality that has been evolved to cope with the ordinary business of life. The one major exception arises when we confront a moral dilemma; when two intuitions conflict we have to engage in critical thinking if we are to resolve that dilemma.

Hare argues that most of the values that are supposed to create difficulties for utilitarianism, such as justice, truth-telling and promise-keeping, can be dealt

¹⁵ R. M. Hare, *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)

with satisfactorily in terms of his two-level view. So too can rights. Hare regards the traditional counterposing of rights and utility as arising from a simple confusion of the two levels of morality. Rights are quite properly given an important place in our moral thinking and taking rights seriously does entail allowing them to 'trump' simple calculations of utility. But that is true only at the intuitive level.¹⁶ Ultimately, rights, like all intuitive principles, are justified (or not) by the critical test of utility. One way in which Hare believes this to be evident is that the rights commonly ascribed to people sometimes conflict with one another. That conflict can then be resolved only by reference to some principle other than, and more fundamental than, rights themselves and that, for Hare, must be the critical principle of utility.

Any theory which attempts to reconcile the positions of two opposing camps is likely to be criticized by both and so it has proved with Hare's theory. R. G. Frey is an unreconstructed act-utilitarian who has no inclination to temporize with the claims of rights theorists.¹⁷ He questions the viability of Hare's theory on a number of counts. (1) Are not the utilitarian calculations involved in selecting an intuitive morality so complicated that we can have no great confidence in the results? (2) Will not the human failings which make intuitive morality necessary also infect the critical thinking needed to arrive at that morality? (3) If we can shift between intuitive and critical thinking, are not rights liable to be set aside for consequentialist reasons more frequently than serious rights theorists would find acceptable? (4) And, conversely, can we implant intuitive morality in people's characters, in the way that Hare advocates, without ossifying their commitment to that morality and making them unduly resistant to consequentialist considerations? These are, I think, real difficulties for Hare's position. In particular, Hare seems inclined to suppose, in a Burkean fashion, that the intuitive morality that the world needs is that which the world has evolved. However that supposition need not be a part of the sort of theory Hare has developed and most of the differences between himself and Frey are of an empirical rather than a philosophical nature (as, indeed, arguments *amongst* utilitarians should be). They can be properly pursued therefore only by their protagonists getting out of their studies and engaging in empirical inquiry.

Another worry about Hare's theory is that, even if utilitarianism could be shown to yield those rights which we typically hold dear, would that utilitarianism really capture the reason why we give special value to those rights? It is that concern which preoccupies John Mackie who attacks Hare from the other side of the argument.¹⁸ Mackie does not adopt Lyons's tack of questioning whether

¹⁶ The only exception to this is the 'right to equal concern and respect' This Hare regards as a purely formal principle equivalent in meaning to the requirement of universalizability. As such it belongs to the critical level of morality but is, he argues, quite consistent with, indeed entails, preference utilitarianism (p 154) Dworkin, the author of the phrase, would, of course, disagree.

¹⁷ R. G. Frey, 'Act-Utilitarianism, Consequentialism, and Moral Rights', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp 61–85. See also his *Interests and Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), and *Rights, Killing and Suffering* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)

¹⁸ J. L. Mackie, 'Rights, Utility, and Universalization', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp 86–105.

utilitarianism, even as tamed by Hare, would really issue in a secure institution of rights. Rather his attack focuses upon the, by now, familiar objection that utilitarianism does not respect the 'separateness of persons'. That is, in aggregating preference satisfactions across individuals, utilitarianism allows the interests of one person to be sacrificed, without limit, to those of others provided only that that serves to maximize overall utility. Mackie argues that only a theory which locates rights in its foundations, i.e. at the critical level, can do justice to the separateness of persons. Like Frey, Mackie questions whether the perfectly informed and completely impartial critical perspective of Hare's theory is accessible, intellectually and emotionally, to human beings. If not, can it really be that sort of utilitarian foundation that underlies our ordinary moral norms? Mackie draws on the findings of sociobiology to suggest that it is more likely that those norms were evolved through a process of 'interaction, negotiation and debate' (p 100) amongst individuals each of whom was fully aware of, and concerned for, his own interests. And that, he suggests, is just the sort of process likely to result in a rights-based morality.¹⁹ Hare seeks to deal with these objections in a characteristically robust and exact reply to Mackie.²⁰ However, his response is perhaps most remarkable for the artlessness with which he claims not to understand how the 'separateness of persons' can give rise to misgivings about utilitarianism.

Before leaving the subject of utilitarianism and rights, I must say something about Dworkin's celebrated theory of rights, a theory which has been developed very much on the basis of a juxtaposition of rights and utility.²¹ Clearly I cannot here give Dworkin's theory the attention it deserves and, anyway, his theory has been closely examined by others.²² However, I do want to comment on two rather curious features of Dworkin's thinking on rights, features which relate closely to his distinction between rights and goals.

Firstly, for someone who is so prominent an advocate of rights, the role he is willing to give to rights in decision-making is oddly parsimonious. The one right that he asserts unequivocally is the right to be treated as an equal or the right to equal concern and respect. Nothing is more fundamental than that right and, to that extent, his position is rights-based. However, in the context of utilitarian theory, the only preferences against which that right would seem to be operative

¹⁹ For another study which puts the findings of sociobiology, as well as of game theory, to good use in elucidating the morality of rights, see Robert Sugden, *The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare* (Oxford Blackwell, 1986).

²⁰ R. M. Hare, 'Rights, Utility and Universalization: Reply to J. L. Mackie', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp 106–20.

²¹ Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*. Dworkin's thought is represented in Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights*, by a piece entitled 'Rights as Trumps' (pp. 153–67), that is a reduced version of his article 'Is There a Right to Pornography?', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 1 (1981), 177–212, which is reprinted in his *A Matter of Principle* (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1985), Chap. 17.

²² See, for example, H. L. A. Hart, 'Between Utility and Rights', in Alan Ryan, ed., *The Idea of Freedom* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 77–98, J. Raz, 'Professor Dworkin's Theory of Rights', *Political Studies*, 26 (1978), 123–37, Marshall Cohen, ed., *Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence* (London Duckworth, 1983).

are 'external preferences' – preferences individuals hold about how *others* should be treated or about what kinds of lives those others should lead. The right to equal concern and respect requires that such external preferences should not influence public decisions. However, Dworkin's rights would seem to provide no safeguard against the consequences of other individuals' *personal* preferences. In other words, they would not allay the usual distributive worries about utilitarianism except in so far as those worries could be said to arise from the possible existence of external preferences. Thus, for example, my right of free expression is a right that my freedom of expression should not be curtailed to satisfy the external preferences of others, but not a right that my preference to express my views should be given greater significance than other people's competing personal preferences for public order, a quiet life, etc. Dworkin specifically rejects an understanding of rights which seeks to ground their special status in interests fundamental to human beings as such.²³ While he does not elaborate his reasons for this rejection, my guess is that these are (1) because the 'fundamental interest' theory of rights would make rights different merely in degree, rather than in kind, from ordinary considerations of utility, and (2) because the 'interest' approach would violate his liberal requirement that political decisions must remain neutral as between individuals' *own* conceptions of the good.²⁴

The other curious feature of Dworkin's theory is the linkage he makes between rights and the goal-based theory which forms the background to a society's ordinary decision making. Dworkin denies that he himself is committed to any particular background theory such as utilitarianism.²⁵ However, he often presents his conception of rights as though a goal-based theory were primary and as if certain rights were generated from that theory, so that the rights constraining the pursuit of the goal were implicit in, and justified by, the goal-based theory itself. That would be odd in two ways. Firstly, the rights to be ascribed to individuals would then seem to be entirely contingent upon the adoption of a particular goal-based theory. Secondly, that would seem to imply that, for Dworkin, a political morality had ultimately to be goal-based. However, that is not what Dworkin seems to intend. Rather, I understand him to mean that the right to equal concern and respect is to be regarded as fundamental and un-derived. What particular *institutionalized* rights are then required to protect that basic right will depend upon what sorts of goal a society is pursuing. So that rights are contingent upon goals not at the basic level but only at the level of implementation and institutional provision. Even so, this would still seem to imply that Dworkin's position cannot be a purely rights-based one but must be one based upon a mixture of rights and goals.

Utilitarianism is, of course, only the most prominent member of the set of goal-based theories; it is not the only member of that set. It may be that a more

²³ Dworkin, 'Rights as Trumps', pp 164–5.

²⁴ Cf. Ronald Dworkin, 'Liberalism', in Stuart Hampshire, ed., *Public and Private Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 113–43, reprinted in Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, Chap. 8.

²⁵ Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, p 357; 'Rights as Trumps', p. 165

varied and imaginative goal-based theory can be developed which gives rights a greater significance and a more secure foundation. This, at least, is what T. M. Scanlon argues.²⁶ Scanlon's starting point is that we seem to need rights to prevent the possible horrors of utilitarianism and yet we also need some form of consequentialism both to justify rights and in order to evaluate them in relation to competing goods. Like Hare, he seeks to meet this double-barrelled need by way of a two-tier theory which provides a fundamentally consequentialist account of rights but in which, at a subordinate level, rights function as limits upon consequentialist reasoning. However, unlike Hare, Scanlon's consequentialism is not 'utilitarian' in the ordinary sense. It does not aim to maximize the satisfaction of (subjective) preferences but employs 'an ethically significant, objective notion of the relative importance of various benefits and burdens' (p. 138). These ethically significant benefits and burdens include not only what happens to people but also their ability to determine for themselves what will happen to them. The possibility of choice and freedom from the interference of others are important goods and that importance justifies their having the special status of rights. The institution of rights is to be valued principally 'as a way of parcelling out valued forms of discretion over which individuals are in conflict' (p. 145). That is why they may not be easily set aside in the pursuit of some social optimum. Even so, Scanlon's approach remains resolutely teleological. His case for rights depends upon 'the goal of promoting an acceptable distribution of control over important factors in our lives' (p. 147). Rights therefore have special but not absolute value and may sometimes for this reason properly give way to competing values of a similar sort or to the value of particular ends.

In an article very similar in spirit, James Griffin also seeks to give rights a significant status within a framework that is essentially teleological.²⁷ He too proposes a two-level approach. At the first level, he recognizes a variety of values that might be held to ground those rights which are typically claimed as human rights – the values of autonomy and liberty usually associated with the concept of personhood, principles of 'equal regard' and also purely practical considerations. However, an adequate theory of rights cannot stop there and must descend to a deeper level of moral theory concerned with the nature and structure of those values themselves. Only thus can we address the issue of how those values relate to one another and how far they can be accommodated by a purely 'formal' concept of utility. Only by first settling these substantive questions about the content of rights can we settle structural questions concerning the character of rights, e.g. whether we are to regard them as 'trumps', 'side-constraints', etc.

Griffin is clearly right about the last point. Although much analysis of rights has been conducted as though we could first determine the structure of the concept and then go on to determine its content, the structure of (moral) rights is itself a moral matter. It is also a virtue of the approaches of Scanlon and Griffin that they recognize how much rights must be the product rather than the

²⁶ T. M. Scanlon, 'Rights, Goals and Fairness', in Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights*, pp. 137–52.

²⁷ James Griffin, 'Towards a Substantive Theory of Rights', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp. 137–60.

premise of moral argument and that assertions of rights must ultimately be made in the context of a fully developed moral theory rather than as though they constituted a distinct and self-contained segment of morality. Yet the sort of approach they propose brings its own difficulties with it. Both are concerned to avoid the undue ease with which standard utilitarianism allows matters of right to be set aside, the undue rigidity of giving rights an absolute status, and the undue indeterminacy of those who allow that rights may sometimes be set aside but who offer no criteria for assessing when those exceptions are justified. Yet, while a theory which avoided all of these shortcomings would be highly appealing, Scanlon's and Griffin's goal-based but pluralist approaches do not provide clear indicators of how we are to rank values and of just how much special status rights are to receive. Moreover, I remain to be convinced that their teleological approaches can adequately accommodate distributive values. Scanlon is least convincing when he tries to build fairness and equality into his system as goals and Griffin clearly finds ideas of equal regard the most difficult to build into his approach.

JUSTIFYING HUMAN RIGHTS

Moral rights come in different guises and some are more significant than others. The sort of rights that have been at the centre of recent arguments in moral and political philosophy are human rights. If the basic moral community is humanity, it is human rights that must stand at the foundation of rights-based moralities – although, as I have already indicated, a theory which incorporates human rights need not be a rights-based theory. Given the universality and the fundamental character of human rights, theorists have been anxious to find a suitably universal and compelling justification for them. Much of the task consists in finding a first premise which is sufficiently uncontroversial to persuade the doubters. Thus, for example, Gregory Vlastos, in a celebrated essay, has argued that basic human rights are implicit in the intrinsic worth that we attribute to human beings as such.²⁸ While we grade human beings in terms of their 'merit', we also attribute 'worth' to human beings, equally and indifferently, just because they are human beings. This certainly articulates a widely shared sentiment but Vlastos's view has also attracted the criticism that it will do little to persuade the sceptic. If someone is disposed to doubt that humans possess rights, why should he be any less doubtful that they possess equal intrinsic worth? Vlastos might reasonably reply that there are limits to what can be achieved by the moral philosopher and that it is unreasonable to expect him to come up with a proof that will remove all possibility of scepticism.

Alan Gewirth is more optimistic.²⁹ He does think it possible to find a premise,

²⁸ Gregory Vlastos, 'Justice and Equality', in Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights*, pp. 41–76

²⁹ Alan Gewirth, 'The Epistemology of Human Rights', in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 1–24. Gewirth's theory is stated more fully in his *Reason and Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), and in his collection of articles, *Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

generating human rights, in the very ideas of agency and action. Certain evaluative and deontic judgements are, he believes, logically implicit in action itself. All actions, he argues, have two generic features: (1) voluntariness or freedom – an agent controls his own conduct; and (2) purposiveness or intentionality – an agent acts to attain some end or goal. Thus an agent in performing an action X may be described as saying 'I do X for end or purpose E'. That entails that he must hold that 'E is good'. But, if E is good, so too must be the conditions necessary for attaining E, the most fundamental of which are the conditions of action as such. These are freedom and well-being (the latter being understood as the conditions necessary for achieving one's purposes such as life, physical integrity, self-esteem and education). The agent must therefore hold that he must have those necessary goods, which is to hold that he has a *right* to freedom and well-being. Now since he has those rights only as a prospective purposive agent, rationally he must accept that other prospective purposive agents equally have those rights and he must act accordingly. This latter is what Gewirth calls the principle of generic consistency. Thus he believes that a commitment to fundamental human rights is implicit in the mere recognition of human beings as moral agents.


Gewirth's ingenious argument is far more carefully and fully developed than this bare outline of it may suggest. Not surprisingly, the simplicity with which he closes the is/ought gap and the strength of the conclusions that he draws from such innocent premises has attracted suspicion. Here I can do no more than hint at possible areas of doubt in Gewirth's argument.³⁰ Firstly, his conception of human conduct as that of autonomous and purposive agents is clearly conducive to a rights view but also takes for granted what the sceptic might question. There is also something suspicious about the ease with which Gewirth moves from goods to rights. Does having reason to be concerned about one's freedom and well-being equate with having a right to those goods? Do Gewirth's premises necessarily exclude other egalitarian but non-rights moralities such as utilitarianism? And can we derive the substance and detail of rights to freedom and well-being from the minimal foundations of Gewirth's argument? However, Gewirth's work on rights remains some of the most impressive and fruitful of recent years and he himself is obviously unmoved by the various attempts that have been made to fault his 'dialectically necessary' justification of human rights.³¹

Samuel Stoljar also attempts to show that natural rights are implied in the idea of morality itself.³² Like Gewirth, he does not derive natural rights from

³⁰ For discussions of Gewirth's theory, see the symposia in *Ethics*, 86 (1976), 265–87 and in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds, *Human Rights (Nomos XXIII)* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 148–74; Loren E. Lomasky, 'Gewirth's Generation of Rights', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 31 (1981), 248–53; Arthur C. Danto, 'Constructing an Epistemology of Human Rights: A Pseudo Problem?', in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 25–30.

³¹ Alan Gewirth, 'Action and Rights: A Reply', *Ethics*, 86 (1976), 288–93, 'Replies to Some Criticisms' in Gewirth, *Human Rights*, pp. 67–78; 'A Reply to Danto', in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 31–4.

³² Stoljar, *An Analysis of Rights*, Chaps 7–10.



some other fundamental value or values, but tries to show that such rights are rationally necessary for moral life itself and that they can therefore be made to 'stand on their own feet' (p. 77). The reasoning by which he reaches this conclusion is not always easy to follow, but appears to go something like this. Suppose we are to have a society in which peace is maintained by discursive means – individuals interrelate with one another via 'mutual argument and moral answerability' (p. 84). Such a community must be characterized by equality and freedom – the equal status of all of its members as arguers and their (negative) freedom to enter into argument. A community of such 'arguers' must also acknowledge certain basic or natural rights because they are the essential conditions of that equality and freedom. However, the acknowledgement of these rights is not only a pre-condition of the settlement of disputes by rational argument, it is also a pre-condition for moral argument of any sort being carried on. So that Stoljar (like Gewirth, but for different reasons) sees natural rights as embedded in morality as such.

Unfortunately the minimal grounds upon which Stoljar argues for natural rights prove too minimal to be equal to the task. Despite his abjuring a deductive argument which calls upon values such as Vlastos's notion of intrinsic human worth, certain moral ideas of this sort are smuggled into his argument via his notions of freedom and equality which, in truth, cannot be accounted for simply as analytic features of a peaceful society. Nor is the attempt to characterize natural rights as pre-conditions of all forms of moral discourse convincing, unless, by definitional fiat, we simply remove the description 'moral' from all non-rights moralities. Stoljar's argument also proves too scanty to justify the rights to life, limb, property and welfare that he goes on to enumerate. These either remain unspecific or, in so far as they are made more specific, have to rest upon more than Stoljar's thesis about the conditions of argument. Nor is it clear why argument should monopolize the field. Stoljar's 'discursive' approach is in some ways similar to Ackerman's 'dialogic' method and shares the same fault of giving too literal and too exclusive a significance to an image which captures only one part of human relationships.³³ The difficulties into which his approach leads Stoljar are clearly evident in his attempt to square it with children's rights. Young children lack the capacity to make claims or to enter into argument. Nevertheless, they should be accorded rights by a community of adult right-holders, says Stoljar, because their existence is a condition of that community's continuing to exist in the future. Is that really why we do, or should, ascribe rights to children?

Much more plausible is the kind of approach proposed by Jack Donnelly.³⁴ Donnelly rejects attempts, such as those of some needs theorists, to derive an account of human rights from a scientific or quasi-scientific analysis of human nature. If a theory is to yield human rights, it must be a theory of man's nature as

³³ Bruce A. Ackerman, *Social Justice in the Liberal State* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1980)

³⁴ Donnelly, *The Concept of Human Rights*, especially Chap 3

a *moral* being. Scientific investigation has something to contribute to this since it sets the outer limits of human possibility but the theory itself must be an exercise in 'philosophical anthropology'. It must be a theory of man's potentialities as a moral being, of the kind of being man should become, and of what a fully human life would consist in. Human rights are to be understood as those rights which are instrumental to the attainment of those ideals. A society which protected and implemented those rights would, in so doing, create ideally developed moral beings.

Hence, on Donnelly's view, so far from human rights being 'derived' from human nature, it is human rights that produce an ideally conceived human nature. Thus he calls the approach for which he argues a 'constructivist' theory of human rights. He himself does not develop a substantive theory of man's moral nature nor an account of the rights it would yield although, since he believes that 'constructivism' underlies most of the classic doctrines and statements of human rights, he presumably supposes that those would be the sorts of rights typically found in past and current declarations of rights. He also claims that constructivist theory, while retaining the universality essential to any theory of human rights, can explain historical changes in conceptions of rights as the offspring of the evolutionary changes in the moral vision underlying theories of rights. Indeed, rather optimistically, he suggests that constructivism can go some way to accommodating the historicist views of human nature of anti-rights theorists such as Burke and Marx.

Donnelly's approach to the justification of human rights has two sterling merits. Firstly, it recognizes that to embrace a doctrine of human rights is to embrace a moral position and to embrace one amongst a number of possible moral positions. Secondly, it accepts that a satisfactory theory of human rights must take account of the richness and complexity of human life and human potentialities. There is no reason therefore to suppose that articulating a fully developed theory of human rights can be a simple matter, let alone something to be achieved by a few shifts of logic. However, in spite of Donnelly's claim to have captured the moral ground common to human rights thinking in general, his approach is too thoroughly perfectionist to be acceptable to all. Several prominent contemporary rights theorists (e.g. Rawls and Dworkin) would, rightly or wrongly, reject a position that subordinates rights to some ideal of human development. Moreover, Donnelly is somewhat extravagant in the moral role that he claims for human rights. He would have us believe that the establishment and maintenance of human rights secures not only the necessary, but also the sufficient, conditions for the full realization of human potentialities.

The only clearly contractarian approach to the justification of rights in the writings under review here is offered by Jan Narveson.³⁵ He argues that we can identify human rights as those rights that people have good reason to establish for their mutual advantage – each contractor being concerned to promote only his own values and interests and each being unhampered by anything such as a

³⁵ Jan Narveson, 'Contractarian Rights', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp. 161–74

Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Recognizing that hypothetical contracts cannot yield genuinely contractual obligations, he makes his case by way of the idea of an 'implicit' contract. The notion that agreements amongst people can be 'implicit' or 'tacit' but still real is a perfectly defensible one. However, this sort of unspoken but mutual understanding is most likely to arise within groups whose members share a common life. It is difficult to make plausible with respect to humanity at large. Consequently Narveson's 'implicit contract' still turns out to be more hypothetical than real and he seems hard put to show that it provides a satisfactory foundation, either logically or morally, for human rights.

Commitment to individual rights has always been closely associated with liberalism. Much of the concern for rights, both past and present, has been motivated by the traditional liberal concern for individual freedom. Ascribing rights to individuals is frequently seen as a way of providing them with a secure territory within which they can develop their own lives as they see fit, and as a way of limiting the extent to which their lives and their choices can be subordinated to the pursuit of larger social purposes. A goodly part of the contemporary discontent with utilitarianism derives from the belief that it threatens to ride roughshod over the value of individual self-determination. We have already seen how this concern for individual autonomy motivates the commitment to rights of philosophers such as Mackie, Scanlon and Gewirth – a trio who, in other respects, view rights quite differently. Loren Lomasky proposes another way of interpreting that shared concern.³⁶ For Lomasky the characteristic of human beings that explains our concern for basic rights is that they are 'project pursuers'. It is, he argues, 'a deep fact about human beings that they can and do order their lives by reference to long-term commitments and aspirations' (p. 35). A human life does not consist of an attempt to satisfy a series of evanescent desires which possesses neither structure nor common direction. Rather it has a coherence and purpose that is given to it by the ends or projects to which the person concerned has committed himself. By projects Lomasky means 'those ends which reach indefinitely into the future, play a central role within the various endeavours of the person, and which provide structural stability to his life' (p. 39). Thus a morality that ignores the special significance for individuals of the ends to which they have committed themselves, and which subjects their lives to the attainment of a single impersonal standard of value, cannot be satisfactory. Lomasky's carefully developed conception of the nature of human purposes does, I think, capture much of what liberals feel is special about human lives, although I sometimes worry that academics who insist upon conceiving the lives of their fellow human beings in terms of plans and projects are guilty of a form of occupational ethnocentrism. However, to be fair to Lomasky, he does take a generous view of what can count as a project and, in the spirit of liberalism, holds that we should not be overly censorious about the content of one another's projects. It is the significance that people's projects have for them

³⁶ Loren Lomasky, 'Personal Projects as the Foundation of Basic Rights', in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 35–55.

which, for Lomasky, explains our preoccupation with rights. A right constitutes a sort of 'moral space' within which a person is able to pursue his adopted projects. Lomasky's thesis is obviously more suited to some sorts of rights than to others. He himself recognizes that it supports most clearly the classical rights of non-interference, although it might also provide a case for certain positive rights. However, it is not a failing of a theory that it does not yield all of the rights that we believe should receive recognition. Different rights can rest upon different reasons and good arguments are sometimes turned into bad ones when too much is claimed for them. Even if the detail of Lomasky's conception is not acceptable to all, something like it figures at some point in most contemporary accounts of rights.

JUSTIFYING SPECIFIC RIGHTS

The type of argument developed by Lomasky raises the broader question of whether we should take for granted that all of the rights to which we give significance can be generated by a single grand premise or even encompassed in a single grand theory. Even those rights that are typically claimed as human rights are sufficiently diverse to give reason for doubting that. Free expression, a fair trial, social security, not being tortured, may all be important but, in the first instance at least, they seem to be important for different reasons. It might therefore be more profitable to tackle the subject of the justification of rights by taking an assortment of specific and different rights and investigating what reasons there might be for their being rights, without supposing that those reasons must ultimately reduce to the same reason.

One right which is an obvious candidate for such individual treatment, and which has always proved problematic for rights theorists, is the right of private ownership. The concept of possessing rights over goods is central to the institution of private property. But is that institution simply the contingent product of custom and law or is it expressive of a more fundamental set of moral titles? Ever since Locke, property has figured prominently in declarations of natural rights. Yet Locke's theory of property rights as natural rights is seriously flawed in ways that have long been recognized and more recent attempts to re-work his theory (e.g. Nozick's) have had little more success in overcoming those difficulties. Within the human rights tradition the picture has been further complicated by the assertion of other sorts of human rights, such as welfare rights, which compromise rights of ownership.

Rolf Sartorius offers one more attempt to present a theory of property rights as natural rights and one which remains Lockean in spirit if not in detail.³⁷ He founds his position on two claims of right. First, each has a right to the fruits of his labour. Second, each has a right that the property system be 'just and efficient', by which he means that all, and especially the least advantaged, should be as well off as they would be in any alternative realizable and morally acceptable

³⁷ Rolf Sartorius, 'Persons and Property', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp. 196-214

system of property (a sort of analogue to Locke's 'enough and as good' proviso). This constraint turns out to be less severe than one might suppose. A 'morally acceptable' system is one that respects the right of each to the fruits of his labour and Sartorius thinks that the redistributive impact of his 'just and efficient' constraint will not be great. Like all theorists of this sort, Sartorius quickly runs up against the problem of explaining how individuals acquire rights over things that are not the products of their own labour such as natural resources. Here he rejects Locke's labour-mixing theory and, rather than replace it with another rights-based principle of original acquisition, opts for a Humean solution. Any of a number of methods of initial allocation are apparently acceptable provided only that they satisfy Sartorius's 'efficiency' condition. So conventionalist and utilitarian a solution sits oddly at the base of an entitlement theory and threatens the 'naturalness' of the rights that Sartorius thinks is so essential if they are to be claimed 'outside of and against government' (p. 203).

Another way in which property rights have been presented as natural rights is by their subsumption under the right to liberty. However, this derivation has also proved no simple matter partly because of long-standing disputes about what is to count as 'liberty', but also because of the complexity and diversity of the phenomenon that we label property and because conceptions of freedom may themselves be shaped by conceptions of property.³⁸ Thus David Kelley casts doubt upon the whole enterprise of deriving the right to property (in the sense of full private ownership) from the right to liberty.³⁹ Hillel Steiner's requirement that individuals' rights to liberty must be 'compossible' does not yield rights of individual private ownership for it can also be satisfied by other sorts of property arrangement.⁴⁰ Nor are Mack and Nozick able to found property rights upon the right not to be coerced for, in their thinking, property rights themselves define what is to count as coercion.⁴¹ Kelley's point is not that property and liberty are unrelated but only that we need other moral criteria such as ends and purposes before we can evaluate different freedoms and the forms of property associated with them.

Given the problems encountered by theories which treat property rights as basic, or which derive them from other sorts of basic right, we might do better to look elsewhere for a satisfactory appraisal of them. That is what Alan Ryan proposes.⁴² While he accepts that utilitarianism cannot take all rights as seriously as we would wish, he suggests that it can take property rights 'with all the ser-

³⁸ The diversity of forms of property and the complications that that entails for justification are well brought out in Andrew Reeve, *Property* (London: Macmillan, 1986).

³⁹ David Kelley, 'Life, Liberty and Property', in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 108–18.

⁴⁰ Hillel Steiner, 'The Structure of a Set of Compossible Rights', *Journal of Philosophy*, 74 (1977), 767–75.

⁴¹ Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975); Eric Mack, 'Liberty and Justice', in John Arthur and William H. Shaw, eds, *Justice and Economic Distribution* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), pp. 183–93.

⁴² Alan Ryan, 'Utility and Ownership', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp. 175–95.

iousness that they deserve' (p. 176). In a careful and persuasive account, he sketches the characteristics of the utilitarian's approach to property and then makes his case by arguing for its adequacy in dealing with four issues crucial to any theory of ownership: the initial acquisition of property rights, the proscription of slavery, taxation and bodily integrity (as, for example, in the 'survival lottery' issue⁴³). Ryan is least confident of forsaking rights for utility on that last issue but then that issue is, he suggests, improperly treated as one of *property* rights. It does not therefore stand in the way of his forthright conclusion that 'of those rights that are genuinely property rights, utilitarianism gives the plainest and most compelling account we have' (p. 193). It certainly seems that utilitarianism is better equipped than a simple rights-based theory to cope with the multitude of competing considerations that arise in relation to property and with the diversity of forms that property can take within a single society. But can one be utilitarian on some things without being utilitarian on everything? I see no reason why not. Some matters may be properly handled in utilitarian terms, others may not. That seems to be the burden of much of Dworkin's writing, even though his position on utilitarianism is somewhat ambivalent. And it is worth noting that no less a natural law theorist than St Thomas Aquinas approached the subject of property in a spirit not too dissimilar from that proposed by Ryan.

Ryan's case for property rights is a useful warning that we should not assume that all justified legal rights have the same sort of moral foundation. Some may simply be expressive of moral rights but others may have a rationale which is ultimately at some distance from the immediate interest of the individual who holds the right. Consider the right not to incriminate oneself which is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. That right, so far from being dictated by justice, seems to place an obstacle in its path (assuming that the laws in question are themselves just). Nor does it obviously belong to that family of rights that finds its natural parentage in 'respect for persons'. So what can justify its assertion? Alan Donagan's answer is that history has shown that 'while prohibiting the civil authorities from compelling self-incriminating testimony does not seriously jeopardize the prosecution and punishment of the guilty, permitting them to compel it has gone hand in hand with all kinds of moral outrages' (p. 146) and a society has a duty of beneficence to sustain institutions which protect individuals from those outrages.⁴⁴ This institutional justification of the right not to incriminate oneself is far more plausible than an attempt to ground the right upon a moral duty owed directly to the criminal. Indeed, on Donagan's view, a criminal has no *moral* right against self-incrimination; he is merely the legal beneficiary of an institutional safeguard. Thus the moral justification of the legal right not to incriminate oneself does not preclude our holding that, on occasion, the criminal, morally, ought not to do what, legally, he is entitled to do. The case of self-incrimination is a good

⁴³ John Harris, 'The Survival Lottery', *Philosophy*, 50 (1975), 81-7.

⁴⁴ Alan Donagan, 'The Right Not to Incriminate Oneself', in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 137-48.

example of how circuitous the justification of a legal right might have to be and of how that justification bears upon the status of the right itself.

ABSOLUTE OR DEFEASIBLE?

Assertions of rights were once swathed in adjectives such as imprescriptible, inalienable and, most importantly, indefeasible. Nowadays, with some notable exceptions, exponents of rights tend to be more guarded in their claims. While there is virtually unanimous agreement that rights constitute restraints upon consequentialist reasoning, there is also a widespread reluctance to allow that rights should never give way to considerations of consequence. As Lomasky remarks, 'the problem with upholding rights though the heavens may fall is that the heavens may indeed fall' (p. 54). That, in turn, has given rise to two issues: can we make sense of the concept of 'having a right' if that right can lapse in the face of consequentialist considerations and, if so, how do we determine if and when rights should lapse?

In response to the first question Richard Flathman argues that we can make sense of defeasible rights.⁴⁵ Rights, he argues, are rule-governed practices and function as special reasons for respecting what people have rights to. Not to acknowledge the specialness of that reason is not to understand what a right is. Even so, recognition of the institution of rights can co-exist with a consequentialist or teleological theory which allows that, on occasion, rights may be justifiably overridden – just as one can recognize the institution of authority and what it entails while, at the same time, allowing the possibility of justified civil disobedience. In particular, while Flathman, like Lyons, doubts whether Benthamite act-utilitarianism can accommodate the institution of rights, he argues that rights can find a home in Mill's more sensitive form of utilitarianism. Moreover, the 'moderation' of rights by such a consequentialist theory makes the institution more acceptable since it curbs that 'extremism in the exercise of rights' which, he contends, has given them 'an undeservedly bad name' (p. 171).

However, even if we can make sense of the concept of a defeasible right, Flathman's remarks on 'moderation' beg the question of how and why rights should be moderated. For someone with Flathman's utilitarian sympathies the case for moderating rights is clear – in principle if not in detail. The same goes for other consequentialist moralities part of whose continuing appeal derives from their providing over-arching norms by which competing values, including rights, can be evaluated in relation to one another. Indeed, the problem with consequentialist theories tends to be not that of finding reasons why rights should lapse but the opposite one of finding reasons why they should not. But what of those theorists whose adherence to rights constitutes a rejection of consequentialism? How can they moderate rights? How can they cope with the possibility of conflicts not only between rights and other values but also amongst rights themselves?

⁴⁵ Richard E. Flathman, 'Moderating Rights', in Paul, Miller and Paul, eds, *Human Rights*, pp. 149–71.

This is an issue taken up by H. J. McCloskey.⁴⁶ While being an uncompromising proponent of rights, including 'self-evident' rights, McCloskey accepts that rights are generally held '*prima facie*'. The formula '*prima facie*' (originally taken from W. D. Ross⁴⁷) has been widely used as a way of indicating that there are at least some circumstances in which a right may be justifiably overridden. However, McCloskey maintains that accepting that a right is *prima facie* does not entail that, in the event of conflict, it must be evaluated in terms of some non-rights principle. Rather conflicts involving rights may be resolvable purely by reference to the rights themselves. Unfortunately, the cases of conflict that McCloskey cites to exemplify his approach do not intimate self-evidently correct solutions and, since he does not tell us what it is about a right that should make it overriding, we do not seem to be much further forward.

Alan Gewirth is more helpful.⁴⁸ In accordance with his argument for rights as the necessary conditions of action, he proposes that, in the event of conflict, that right should take precedence which is the more necessary for action. That, at least, provides us with a yardstick, even if it is one of doubtful adequacy. However, Gewirth's stance on this issue is more notable for his claim that there are absolute rights, rights which can never be justifiably infringed. Gewirth, perhaps understandably, uses an emotive example to make his case: the right of a mother not to be tortured to death by her son. He tests the absoluteness of this right by imagining that a group of terrorists have got hold of nuclear weapons and have threatened (credibly) that they will destroy a city and its inhabitants if a particular individual does not torture his mother to death. What should that individual do? The consequentialist would hold that the mother's right should be sacrificed to save thousands of innocent lives. Gewirth disagrees. But how then can the son honour his mother's right without incurring responsibility for the deaths (and, therefore, for violating the rights) of thousands of innocent citizens? Gewirth answers by way of his 'principle of intervening action' which sets limits to an individual's responsibility for the consequences of his actions. There is a causal connection between the son's act and the nuclear disaster, but the son bears no moral responsibility for it because that disaster is the known and intended consequence of the intervening action of the terrorists. Given the nature of the example Gewirth uses, there is a temptation to upstage him by thinking of still more excruciating and improbable circumstances in which his argument would not hold.⁴⁹ However, the details of Gewirth's example are of less significance than the general principles that he brings to bear upon them. Indeed, it turns out that the mother-son relationship is not crucial. The same argument would hold were one stranger required to torture another. Gewirth generalizes his claim to

⁴⁶ H. J. McCloskey, 'Respect for Human Moral Rights versus Maximizing Good', in Frey, ed., *Utility and Rights*, pp. 121-36

⁴⁷ W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930)

⁴⁸ Alan Gewirth, 'Are There Any Absolute Rights?', in Waldron, ed., *Theories of Rights*, pp. 91-109.

⁴⁹ Cf. Jerrold Levinson, 'Gewirth on Absolute Rights', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32 (1982), 73-5, and Gewirth's reply, 'There Are Absolute Rights', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32 (1982), 348-53.

'all innocent persons have an absolute right not to be made the intended victims of a homicidal project' (p. 108). Nor is that all. All rights are absolute which stem from the principle that 'agents and institutions are absolutely prohibited from degrading persons, treating them as if they had no rights or dignity' (p. 108).

Whatever one thinks about the substance of Gewirth's case, it indicates two fairly obvious features of the issue of defeasibility. Firstly, this, along with other issues concerning the moral 'structure' of rights, cannot be resolved as though it were a purely technical conceptual matter distinct from issues of moral substance. Secondly, Gewirth must be right in holding that a doctrine of absolute rights can exist only in conjunction with a doctrine which limits the range of individuals' moral responsibilities (although that is arguably true for any doctrine of *rights*, absolute or *prima facie*). That is not to say, of course, that that is all that a doctrine of absolute rights requires, and the import of Gewirth's doctrine of responsibility is likely to be less clear for governments whose responsibilities are often more diffuse and more complicated than those of private individuals.

CONCLUSION

The writings reviewed here constitute but a small part of a profusion of material on rights that has appeared in the last twenty years. It is difficult to know whether one should claim that those writings manifest any progress in thought about rights. As we have seen, there are still fundamental disagreements amongst philosophers over the conceptual question of what it is to have a right let alone over issues of moral substance. If there has been progress in recent years it has been the progress of an unfolding diversity rather than progress towards a single truth. But should we expect anything else? It is an unfortunate legacy of the natural rights tradition that people are sometimes still inclined to view argument over rights as though it must be argument over the existence of a single indisputable catalogue of rights. Many contemporary pronouncements on human rights also imply that that notion must incorporate a single uniform set of rights. But the concept of a right is one that can be accommodated in many different moral points of view and those who share the more specific idea of human rights may still have reason to disagree over what rights humans have and why. Consequently, to look for an end to argument over rights may be as absurd as to look for an end to moral and political argument itself.

Notes and Comments

Getting Inside the Beltway: Perceptions of Presidential Skill and Success in Congress

BRAD LOCKERBIE AND STEPHEN A. BORRELLI

Different methodological approaches sometimes lead to different substantive conclusions. Nowhere is this more evident than in studies relating assessments of presidential skill to legislative success. Scholars of the historical, traditionalist school of presidency research argue that presidents who are perceived to be adept at getting what they want are more likely to achieve their legislative goals than are those perceived as less adept. Neustadt identifies perceived skill, or what he calls 'professional reputation', as one of the three resources that are the essence of presidential power.¹ Yet students of the presidency who employ quantitative methods have found little or no systematic relationship between variations in skill evaluations and variations in success. George Edwards reports that similarly situated Congressmen are not especially more likely to support highly esteemed presidents than lowly esteemed presidents.² Fleisher and Bond similarly find that once contextual variables have been controlled for, there is no pattern suggesting that presidents thought to be highly skilled do better with Congress.³

Some scholars have suggested that this paradox arises from theoretical confusion about what reputation and skill really mean or the conditions under which they operate. A common view is that the president's reputation for skill is irrelevant on the broad mass of issues considered by Congress and comes into play only on the most crucial and controversial issues in which the president takes an active interest (which are the sample considered in the historical case studies).⁴ Fleisher and Bond add that given the extraordinary political skills required to get elected president in the first place, the differences between presidents are not large enough to produce large disparities in success.⁵ Kernell notes that Neustadt was careful to make the distinction between

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¹ R. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter* (New York: Wiley, 1980).

² G. Edwards, *Presidential Influence in Congress* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1980); G. Edwards, 'Presidential Legislative Skills: At the Core or at the Margin?' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1986).

³ R. Fleisher and J. Bond, 'Presidential Skill and Success in Congress' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1986).

⁴ Anthony King, 'A Mile and a Half is a Long Way' in Anthony King, ed., *Both Ends of the Avenue* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), p. 253.

⁵ Fleisher and Bond, 'Presidential Skill and Success in Congress'.

Washingtonians' estimates of presidential skill (reputation) and public approval of presidential performance (prestige), a distinction that may have been valid in 1960 may no longer be so; increasingly, Washington impressions of the president's capability are being directly transmitted to the public through the mass media.⁶ These theoretical considerations may be part of the explanation for the poor performance of presidential skill assessments in the large-sample studies, but we feel that attempts to refine the measurement of perceived skill in these studies should precede any drastic theoretical reappraisals. In the following section, we identify four problems with the way skill and reputation are currently operationalized in quantitative research, show how these problems may have prevented positive findings regarding the efficacy of perceived skill, and propose a new measure.

PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT MEASURES

The usual procedure for testing the effects of perceived presidential skill on legislative voting begins with a designation of presidents as 'skilled', 'unskilled', 'moderately skilled', etc., and proceeds to a comparison of the success rates or levels of support achieved by presidents of each type.⁷ The categorical assignments are based on historical and journalistic assessments of overall presidential skill and performance. Bert Rockman has pointed out that summary retrospective evaluations of presidents are not immune from changes in standards and expectations in the period between the end of the president's service and the time of evaluation.⁸ What is needed is an estimate of the president's reputation that is contemporaneous with the roll calls he is trying to influence, for Congress does not have the benefit of hindsight. The use of summary skill assessments contributes to a second problem: the forced, usually implicit, assumption that skill is a constant within administrations. While this may be true in a very basic sense – for example, presidents' intelligence and personality probably remain the same throughout their terms – it is reasonable to expect that perceptions of presidential skill can change.⁹ Neustadt states emphatically that presidents' exhibitions of skill and reputations vary throughout their tenure; the same Eisenhower who botched the budget in 1957 emerged as strong as ever in 1959, when 'impressions of equivocation were replaced by visions of tenacity and not a little skill.'¹⁰

A third shortcoming of the skill assessments currently in use is their lack of positive definition. There has been no shortage of scholarly work exploring the nature and types of presidential legislative skill through general theorizing, comparisons across different

⁶ S. Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1986), pp. 146–7.

⁷ Edwards, *Presidential Influence in Congress*; Edwards, 'Presidential Legislative Skills: At the Core or at the Margin?'; R. Fleisher and J. Bond, 'Assessing Presidential Support in the House: Lessons from Reagan and Carter', *Journal of Politics*, 45 (1983), 745–58; R. Renka, 'Comparing Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as Legislative Leaders', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 15 (1985), 806–25.

⁸ B. Rockman, *The Leadership Question* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 190–1.

⁹ P. Light, 'The President's Agenda: Notes on the Timing of Domestic Choice', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 11 (1981), 67–82, reports that Carter's legislative reputation steadily improved throughout his term but could not completely overcome the impressions of his initial poor performance.

¹⁰ Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 61.

administrations, and examples of specific legislative episodes.¹¹ Yet quantitative studies generally do not even consider skill or reputation as explicit variables; assessments of the role of skill are usually performed as addenda to analyses of other, more precisely defined factors. Mere comparison of presidential success rates, even ones that are adjusted for contextual factors, is not an adequate method of determining whether presidents with reputations for skill are more successful.¹² When perceived skill is treated as a residual factor rather than an explicitly included independent variable, it is impossible to determine how much of the unexplained variance should be attributed to it, and risky to assume that perceived skill is responsible for all of the residual.

Finally, students of presidential reputation have neglected a rich and theoretically relevant source of data. Neustadt, Grossman and Kumar, and others discuss the role of Washington opinion leaders in making and unmaking presidential reputations from week to week. Influential columnists based in Washington reflect and mould perceptions of presidential skill among their readership, which includes the very Congressmen the president is trying to persuade.

But those who watch a President because their work requires it do not see only what he chooses to disclose to them. They see some part of almost everything he does with almost everyone — they read with care the news reports, and newsletters, and syndicated columns circulating 'inside dope' drawn from men like themselves. There is usually a dominant tone, a central tendency, in Washington appraisals of a President. If one wants echoes of that tone at any time one reads Krock, Lippmann, Reston, and half a dozen others.¹³

Despite the ready availability of newspaper and magazine columns for a number of years, researchers have preferred more global, detached, and scholarly assessments of presidential skill. Still, it is difficult to ignore the very raw materials with which Washingtonians make their decisions to support or resist the president.

A NEW MEASUREMENT APPROACH

We propose a measure that begins to address the theoretical concerns outlined above. Our measure is a monthly index based on a content analysis of political columns appearing in *Newsweek* by George Will and Meg Greenfield, whose commentaries also appear in the influential *Washington Post*. The columns are drawn from issues contemporaneous with the roll calls which will serve as our measures of presidential influence in Congress, so information regarding skill that was unavailable to Congressmen at the time of voting will not bias the measure. Since we gauge Will's and Greenfield's assessments at monthly intervals, our measure is dynamic and can track changes within administrations. While we are as guilty as our colleagues of not carefully differentiating between the kinds of skill discussed in the theoretical literature, our measure will at least produce an estimate of impact that can be compared to those for other factors. Finally, the index is not just an indicator of presidential reputation, to some extent, the columnists' assessments both reflect and shape presidential reputation.

¹¹ See B. Kellerman, *The Political Presidency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), Rockman, *The Leadership Question*, and E. Hargrove and M. Nelson, *Presidents, Politics, and Public Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) for extensive theoretical discussions of presidential legislative skills.

¹² See fn. 7 for the work that has employed this methodology of residual analysis.

¹³ Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 47, see also M. Grossman and M. J. Kumar, *Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 206–25 for a discussion of the role of Washington-based columnists.

In constructing our index, we made use of the *Newsweek* columns written by George Will and Meg Greenfield during the years 1977 to 1979 and 1981 to 1983. As Grossman and Kumar point out, Washington officialdom regards the weekly appearance of *Newsweek* (and that of its competitor, *Time*) as an important event. The impression given by the newsmagazines, according to Grossman and Kumar, greatly influences the reputation of the president's administration.¹⁴ The columns are coded on a scale of 1 to 5, with the higher scores representing high levels of skill. The columnists were, for the most part, unambiguous in their assessments of presidential skill. When we encountered a column of a mixed nature, we coded it according to its general tenor; that is, a column that appeared to be slightly positive on balance was coded positive, and a column that tended in a negative direction was coded negative. If we found a column to be equally positive and negative, we coded it as a '3'. Finally, there are some weeks in which the columnists did not address presidential skill at all. For example, George Will would occasionally use his weekly space to extol the merits of the Chicago Cubs. In a case such as this, we would code the column as a '3', the same as if it had been relevant but offered a mixed assessment. If a Washington columnist does not think the president a worthy subject of his or her column, the columnist's assessment of the president's skill is not likely to be appreciably high or low during that time period. So that the reader can get a rough idea of the nature of the commentaries and the coding procedure employed, a few examples are provided below.

High Skill (4) Carter (George Will, 18 April 1977)

Carter seems prepared to govern. He knows popularity is capital that cannot be banked forever

What Carter says will be evidence of a free people's willingness to be far-sighted, to be governors of rather than governed by appetites. To be, in a word, mature.

Very High Skill (5) Reagan (Meg Greenfield, 27 July 1981)

He is also agile, quick moving, good at surprise and at seizing the initiative... the playing of Congress...

Very Low Skill (1) Carter (Meg Greenfield, 4 June 1979)

Some of the Congressmen were appalled – and had been going around saying so – by the President's submersion, as they saw it, in the minutiae and trivia of the issue (energy)

Carter continually undermines his own credibility... Politically they are at death's doorstep.

Last week, in Washington, the whole thing seemed about to go under.

Very Low Skill (1) Reagan (Meg Greenfield, 22 March 1982)

For whether we are for the President or against him, we know that there is a real danger. It is titillating, absorbing. A Presidency can be destroyed.

... the evident disarray among his Cabinet secretaries and other advisors.

These things gnaw at, undermine confidence in the other actions of the President.

Having constructed our measure of presidential skill, it is important to assess its validity. First, it is readily apparent that the commentators were discussing skill at attaining presidential goals, as distinct from the substance of those goals. Thus, the measure has face validity, but this is not enough. Are the columnists providing an accurate and realistic appraisal of presidential skill? Most presidency scholars agree that Reagan is a highly skilled president while Carter is an example of a president with low

¹⁴ Grossman and Kumar, *Portraying the President*, p. 61.

skill.¹⁵ We would therefore expect that the mean skill index for Reagan would be higher than that for Carter. By our measure, Carter's mean skill level is 2.69, and Reagan's is 3.01. This difference is significant at the 0.0005 level, one-tailed ($T = 3.61$, d.f. = 56.54).

Is our measure of presidential skill also reliable?¹⁶ So that we might be more confident in the application of our coding scheme, both authors coded the columns for 1977 and 1981. Having done this, we ran a number of reliability checks, and they all turned out positively. The Pearson's correlation coefficient between the two authors' coding (aggregated to the monthly skill indexes which are used in the analyses to follow) is 0.88. In addition, the monthly averages resulting from the two authors' coding are identical for ten out of the twenty-two months coded by both authors. Finally, in only two of the months recoded for the reliability test did the authors' monthly indexes differ by more than 0.5.

We have argued that perceptions of presidential skill may vary over time. Our monthly index certainly does reveal such variation. Instead of finding Reagan's perceived skill level to be uniformly high and Carter's to be uniformly low, we find variance within as well as between presidents. Figures 1 and 2 present a picture of this variability. As one can easily observe, the reputations of the two presidents are by no means static. It should, also, be noted that a president does not become monotonically more or less skilful, at least in the view of members of Congress.¹⁷

CONTROL VARIABLES

The legislative success of a president may be affected by factors other than perceptions of presidential skill. One must control for other factors that affect the president's ability to get his program approved by Congress and to stop Congress from passing legislation contrary to his desires. First among these factors is the president's popularity among the mass public, or what Neustadt calls 'prestige'.¹⁸ One would expect that the more popular a president is, the more likely it is that he can exert influence on poll-watching Congressmen. Furthermore, it has been suggested that presidential reputation and the president's popularity are one and the same.¹⁹ To refute this argument, and to show that reputation operates independently of popularity, we must include a measure of the president's public approval alongside our skill measure in our regression model predicting legislative success.²⁰ The bivariate correlation between monthly approval and monthly skill index is 0.44; suggesting a clear but not overwhelming relationship between the two.

¹⁵ See, for example, C. Jones, 'Presidential Negotiation with Congress' in King, ed., *Both Ends of the Avenue*; M. Malbin, 'Rhetoric and Leadership: A Look Backward at the Carter Energy Plan', in the same King edited volume, and Fleisher and Bond, 'Assessing Presidential Support in the House: Lessons from Reagan and Carter'.

¹⁶ For a discussion of the reliability problems inherent in content analysis research, see J. Manheim and R. Rich, *Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981).

¹⁷ This is an interesting finding, in light of Paul Light's theories of 'the cycle of decreasing influence' and 'the cycle of increasing effectiveness' (see Light, 'The President's Agenda: Notes on the Timing of Domestic Choice', p. 71).

¹⁸ Neustadt, *Presidential Power*; Kernell, *Going Public*.

¹⁹ Kernell, *Going Public*, pp. 146-7.

²⁰ Source of data: Gallup, *Gallup Opinion Index* (Reports #180 and #231, published 1980 and 1984, respectively).




Fig. 1 Skill over time Carter




Fig. 2 Skill over time Reagan

Another contextual factor certain to influence legislative outcomes is the number of the president's fellow party members sitting in Congress. An additional control, made necessary by our use of only two presidents, is one for who is president. If we failed to include such a control, we would be susceptible to the accusation that our measure simply captures Reagan's higher level of success, and that skill adds nothing more than this to the explanation of presidential success. To include both a control for party split and a control for the presidential incumbent in the same equation, however, invites drastic multicollinearity; the two items are correlated at 0.98! We have therefore opted to use the president item in our equation. By doing this, we manage to control for both who is president and the party split in Congress with a single variable. The coding is '0' for Carter and '1' for Reagan, and of course we expect a positive coefficient.

Additionally, we should control for the state of the national economy. The economy, independent of its effects on public opinion or reputation, may influence legislative support for the president. The state of the economy may be viewed by Congressmen as an indirect indicator of future presidential popularity. If the economy is doing poorly in the present time period, conventional wisdom suggests that presidential popularity will suffer a decline in the next time period. We have chosen to operationalize the state of the economy by adding together the civilian unemployment rate and the rate of inflation.²¹

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SUCCESS IN CONGRESS

A number of decisions regarding the operationalization of the dependent variable must be made at this point. The units of analysis can be either Congress as a whole or individual Congressmen; the 'two presidencies' thesis argues that Congressional response to presidential preferences differs systematically between issues.²² We are persuaded by Bond and Fleisher's argument that what really matters theoretically is the president's ability to promote or inhibit legislation, more so than his support from individual Congressmen.²³ To the extent that the 'two presidencies' thesis is valid, combining domestic and foreign roll calls in the same analysis may mask important differences in the role of skill assessments between the two policy areas. It is therefore wise to examine each policy area separately; in this Note we restrict our attention to domestic roll calls. Our dependent variable is the percentage of domestic roll calls which resulted in approval of the president's position – be it for or against passage – in a given month in the House of Representatives (95th, 96th, 97th, and 98th Congresses). The sample of bills considered consists of all domestic (as coded by authors) roll calls in the House on which the president took a public position recorded by *Congressional Quarterly* (1977–79, 1981–83). Of these, only those in which the consensus in favour or against was 80 per cent or less were selected to enter the percentage success figure.²⁴ The percentage figure ranges

²¹ Source of data: *Economic Report of the President* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978–1985).

²² For a discussion of these issues see J. Bond and R. Fleisher, 'Presidential Popularity and Congressional Voting: A Re-Examination of Public Opinion as a Source of Influence in Congress', *Western Political Quarterly*, 37 (1984), 291–306, and A. Wildavsky, 'The Two Presidencies' in A. Wildavsky, ed., *The Presidency* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1969).

²³ Bond and Fleisher, 'Presidential Popularity and Congressional Voting: A Re-Examination of Public Opinion as a Source of Influence in Congress'.

²⁴ Source of data. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1977–79, 1981–83). The 80 per cent + criterion is commonly used to eliminate trivial and non-conflictual roll calls, some of which may be targets of presidential attempts to inflate their CQ scores.

from 0 to 100 per cent success. The n on which these percentages are based is typically 10–15, with some months coded 'missing' due to Congressional recess.

THE MODEL

Great care must be exercised in specifying our model to ensure that logically impossible or spurious relationships are not estimated. The misery index (inflation + unemployment) is lagged one month. Economic statistics for a month are not made available until the month is over. If Congressmen do use such indicators in deciding whether or not to support the president, the most current information they have is from the previous month. The same lagging procedure was employed for the Gallup approval measure. The monthly average approval rating is by definition not available until the end of the month. Technically, the monthly average can only have an impact after the last poll of the month is taken. The rating may be high at the beginning of the month and take a precipitous drop at the end of the month, or vice versa. Similar logic applies to the assessments of presidential skill. The monthly skill rating cannot be fully assessed until the end of the month, because not all of the columns are printed until the end of the month. Perhaps a more damning criticism of using the skill measure for a given month to predict roll calls taken within the same month is the potential for *post-hoc* explanations of presidential success or failure to enter (spuriously) as independent variables.

The first model to be tested, a simple additive model, is one in which presidential success is hypothesized to be a linear function of perceived skill

$$\text{SUCCESS}_t = a_0 + b_1(\text{SKILL}_{t-1}) + b_2(\text{APPROVAL}_{t-1}) + b_3(\text{MISERY}_{t-1}) + b_4(\text{PRESIDENT}) + e$$

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: THRESHOLD EFFECT?

The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimates for the model specified above are as in Table 1 (t -ratios in parentheses). The coefficients for two of the control variables – the misery index and the Gallup approval rating – are significant in the expected directions. The Carter/Reagan dummy variable is not significant but has a sizable coefficient with the anticipated sign, it indicates that, on average, Reagan did almost 19 percentage points better than Carter each month in Congress, all else being equal. But the prospects for our skill index appear dismal: its coefficient is highly insignificant in the incorrect direction. Furthermore, the Durbin–Watson statistic indicates that our estimates are not significantly affected by autocorrelation.

Given these initial findings, it would be tempting to question the validity of the hypothesis relating skill assessments to legislative success, or the validity of our skill index, or both. We suggest, however, that the problem lies neither with the hypothesis nor the measure, but with the simple specification of the relationship employed in the model above. The usual regression assumption regarding the linearity of the relationship between skill and success may not be warranted. One might plausibly reach the conclusion that skill is collinear with success at high levels of skill but not at all related to success at lower levels, *ceteris paribus*. Public opinion, the state of the economy and the

(see C. Covington, 'Congressional Support for the President: The View from the Kennedy–Johnson White House', *Journal of Politics*, 48 (1986), 717–27, Bond and Fleisher, 'Presidential Popularity and Congressional Voting')

TABLE 1 *Simple Additive Model Predicting Monthly Success Rate*

SUCCESS _t = 158.71 - 3.09 SKILL _{t-1} + 0.939 APPROVAL _{t-1} *	
	(-0.228) (2.28)
- 17.40 MISERY _{t-1} * + 18.72 PRES	
	(-3.23) (1.17)
R ² = 0.349	Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.94

* Significant at 0.05 level, one-tailed.

party split in Congress dictate that certain kinds of policies will be pursued regardless of the wishes of the president, as Congressmen pursue their own policy and re-election goals. As Neustadt writes, presidential power is the power to persuade, or to steer Congress away from its 'normal' course of action in a direction favourable to presidential goals. If the president is thought to be skilful at persuasion, he will be rewarded with a success rate above that he would have achieved due to contextual factors alone. If he is incompetent, the worst that can happen to him is that he will be ignored, the Congress will pursue the policy goals prescribed by the contextual influences.²⁵ This can be illustrated with an example from Kellerman's excellent collection of case studies involving presidential skill.²⁶ The penalty for Carter's erratic performance in promoting his energy program was not so much a defection of Congressmen who would have been inclined to support the president anyway as a general licence for Congressmen to ignore the president and bow to their usual voter and 'special interest' constituencies. While some Congressmen might have been so annoyed with Carter's secrecy and sudden reversals in developing and promoting the energy package that they voted against him out of spite, the overall effects of unskilled performance were to create an environment in which the president had no influence, positive or negative.²⁷

The threshold model can be tested by performing the following operations on our skill variable. First, we dichotomize it in such a way as to separate months that featured great exhibitions of skill from the other months: we choose to code skill levels of 3.2 or greater (which represent 14.3 per cent of the months in our sample) as '1', and the rest as '0'.²⁸ We then multiply this dichotomous variable times our original coding of the skill variable, creating a new measure scored '0' for all levels below 3.2 and equal to the original coding (i.e., 3.2, 3.25, 3.5 . . .) at or above 3.2. The coding reflects the logic stated above: at low or mixed levels, skill is hypothesized to have no effect; at high levels, skill has a linear impact on success. The model with the transformed variable (called 'HISKILL') produces the OLS results shown in Table 2 (*t*-ratios in parentheses). Again, the lagged approval and misery index measures have significant coefficients with the expected signs. The dummy

²⁵ Edwards, 'Presidential Legislative Skills: At the Core or at the Margin', p. 9.

²⁶ Kellerman, *The Political Presidency*, Chap. 10.

²⁷ Edwards, 'Presidential Legislative Skills', p. 9, Kellerman, *The Political Presidency*, p. 199. There is some dispute as to whether Carter's attempt to legislate a national energy policy succeeded or failed. This is irrelevant to the point here, which is that the penalties for failure (whether real or hypothetical) were not so much a reversal of support but a reversion to a natural level of support.

²⁸ Carter equalled or exceeded the 3.2 threshold only twice in thirty-five months, Reagan exceeded it eight times. The correlation between 'PRES' and 'HISKILL_{t-1}' is only 0.25, indicating that skill varies within as well as across presidencies, and that collinearity between the president dummy variable and perceived skill should not affect the results.

TABLE 2 *Threshold Model Predicting Monthly Success Rate*

SUCCESS _t = 140.15 + 6.375 HISKILL _{t-1} * + 0.649 APPROVAL _{t-1} *	
(1.66)	(1.71)
- 14.085 MISERY _{t-1} * + 5.34 PRES	
(-2.53)	(0.329)
R ² = 0.383	Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.91

* Significant at 0.05 level, one-tailed

variable for incumbent president is still in the pro-Reagan direction, but is much further from significance than in the initial model. The biggest news, of course, is that our new operationalization of skill fits the data much better than does the original full index. The percentage of variance explained improves slightly over the first model, and the coefficient for the attenuated skill measure is significant in the expected direction. Taking the interaction into account, a president who crosses the threshold of high skill is at least 20 per cent more successful per month (on average) than one who remains below the threshold. The implication is that skill does not exert consistent effects on success over the entire range of skill; only when skill surpasses a certain level does it overcome the contextual influences on legislative success.

Our analysis suggests a new way of looking at the controversy between the historical and the quantitative schools of presidency research. The usual way to reconcile the disparity between the two schools' findings on skill is to say that skill operates only in special contexts; only when conditions are 'right', as in Roosevelt's Hundred Days and Reagan's extended 1981 honeymoon, is it possible for skill to be efficacious. We have presented evidence that extraordinary displays of skill can prevail over contextual factors. Our analysis supports the contention that presidents, when they are perceived to be highly skilful, can influence their own legislative success.

Women Candidates for Parliament: Transforming the Agenda?

PIPPA NORRIS AND JONI LOVENDUSKI

Why should more women be elected to positions of power in Britain? What difference would it make? This Note aims to examine these questions using data from a survey of almost six hundred men and women candidates to the British Parliament in the 1987 general election. There are two major arguments for increasing women's representation.

Department of Politics, Edinburgh University; Department of European Studies, Loughborough University. We should like to thank officers at party headquarters for supporting this research and providing assistance with lists of candidate addresses, particularly the help of Joyce Gould, Anne Wilkinson, Peter Knowlson and Wendy Buckley. The authors are grateful to all the candidates who completed the questionnaire while they were fully occupied by the campaign, and to Denise Ralph for the administration of the survey. Assistance towards the costs of this project was kindly made available by Professor Stewart Kirk of the Department of Human Sciences, Loughborough University. We should also like to thank Susan Welch for helpful comments concerning an earlier draft.

One argument is simply that there should be more women in politics on the grounds of symbolic equity. This *symbolic* argument is based on a theory of representation in which Parliament can only function democratically if it acts as a public forum for all points of view, reflecting the major divisions in society. Reform is justified by the self-evident disparity between the proportions of women in the electorate and in public office. In this view Parliamentary democracy requires increased female representation as an end in itself, irrespective of whether women make a difference. This view has an immediate straightforward appeal but it is not clear why women should be represented *qua* women unless they have a distinct set of concerns and interests.

The *substantive* argument is stronger. It claims that more women in Parliament would make a substantive difference. From this perspective more women should be elected because they represent a 'woman's point of view', with distinctive values, attitudes and concerns which may have an impact on legislative behaviour and the content of public policy. Alternative studies have claimed that women are more 'liberal', 'conservative', 'pacific', 'moralistic', 'humane' or 'feminist' in their ideological beliefs. These gender differences in attitudes can be attributed to women's experience or to innate differences. However, there is little agreement on whether there are significant gender differences in politicians, and, if so, what their nature is. The evidence, particularly concerning Britain, can only be described as inconclusive.

PREVIOUS STUDIES

In the United States Stanwick and Kleeman found that elected and appointed women officeholders are likely to be more sympathetic to liberal policies such as nuclear disarmament and welfare programmes.¹ In separate studies Leader, Frankovic, Welch and Norris have confirmed that in Congress women are more liberal than their male colleagues in their attitudes and in their legislative behaviour, although the differences were not great and may be diminishing.² Similar attitudinal gender differences have been found among US party delegates and state legislators.³ Studies in the Nordic countries suggest that women have played a crucial role in raising the profile of women's issues on the legislative agenda.⁴

¹ K. Stanwick and K. Kleeman, *Women Make a Difference* (New Brunswick, NJ: Center for the American Woman and Politics, Rutgers University, 1983), see also S. Carroll, 'Women Candidates and Support for Feminist Concerns: The Closet Feminist Syndrome', *Western Political Quarterly*, 37 (1984), 307-23.

² S. G. Leader, 'The Policy Impact of Elected Women Officials', in L. Maisel and J. Cooper, eds, *The Impact of the Electoral Process* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977); K. Frankovic, 'Sex and Voting in the US House of Representatives, 1961-1975', *American Politics Quarterly*, 5 (1977), 315-30; F. L. Gehlen, 'Women Members of Congress: A Distinctive Role', in M. Githens and J. Prestage, eds, *A Portrait of Marginality* (New York: McKay, 1977); P. Norris, 'Women in Congress: A Policy Difference?', *Politics*, 6 (1986), 34-40; S. Welch, 'Are Women More Liberal than Men in the US Congress?', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 10 (1985), 125-34.

³ S. Baxter and M. Lansing, *Women and Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), p. 133; J. W. Soule and W. E. McGrath, 'A Comparative Study of Male-Female Political Attitudes at Citizen and Elite Levels', in Githens and Prestage, *A Portrait of Marginality*; I. Diamond, *Sex Roles in the State House* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

⁴ D. Dahlerup and E. Haavio-Mannila, in E. Haavio-Mannila et al., eds, *Unfinished Democracy. Women in Nordic Politics* (London: Pergamon Press, 1985); M. Eduards, 'Sweden', in J. Lovenduski and J. Hills, eds, *The Politics of the Second Electorate* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).

Yet some observers remain sceptical, arguing that women who enter political elites successfully are largely similar in their political attitudes to their male colleagues, due to the process of selective recruitment, party pressure and political socialization within legislatures.⁵ The minority status of women in public office keeps women within the mainstream of politics. Vallance found that in the British Parliament most women felt that their loyalty lay with their party and constituents, rather than with women *per se*.⁶ In the European Parliament Vallance and Davies found that women MEPs were pre-occupied with specialist interests or constituency interests, rather than 'women's issues', although women were strongly involved in sex equality legislation.⁷ Diamond suggested that the majority of female state representatives in the United States do not campaign on women's issues nor, once elected, do they actively pursue explicitly feminist goals.⁸ Holsti and Rosenau found considerable similarities in the foreign and defence policy attitudes of women and men in the American political elite.⁹ Sapiro has suggested that perceptions about gender differences in politicians may reflect common stereotypes about women as 'nurturers and carers', rather than adequate evidence.¹⁰ Whatever the explanation, there is strong evidence that, once elected, women politicians behave similarly to their male counterparts, which implies that the case for more women in office must be argued on the grounds of symbolic equity rather than substantive effect.

This long-standing debate has been given added impetus by recent party efforts to increase the number of women candidates. The 1987 election was notable for the entry of a record number of women to the House of Commons. The proportion of women candidates for the major parties increased from 194 (10.2 per cent) to 250 (12.8 per cent) and there was a sharp rise in the number who were elected. Between 1983 and 1987 the number of women in Parliament doubled from twenty-three to forty-one (see Table 1). Yet in 1987 women MPs still constituted only 6.3 per cent of the House of Commons, one of the lowest proportion of women in European legislatures.¹¹ Immediately before dissolution there had been twenty-eight women MPs due to a series of by-election victories since 1983. The change was therefore less dramatic than it appeared at first sight.

DATA AND METHODS

But will more women in Parliament make a difference to public policy? In Britain we lack systematic evidence to assess this question. The overriding problem is that with so few women MPs we have to rely upon anecdotal and impressionistic evidence rather than a more systematic approach. It is difficult to generalize about such diverse politicians as

⁵ V. Randall, *Women and Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1987).

⁶ E. Vallance, *Women in the House* (London: Athlone, 1976); see also M. Currell, *Political Women* (London: Croom Helm, 1974).

⁷ E. Vallance and E. Davies, *Women of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

⁸ Diamond, *Sex Roles in the State House*, T. Bers, 'Local Political Elites', *Western Political Quarterly*, 31 (1978), 381-91; S. Mezey, 'Support for Women's Rights' Policy', *American Politics Quarterly*, 6 (1978), 485-97; Gehlen, 'Women Members of Congress'; Frankovic, 'Sex and Voting in the US Representatives'; C. Mueller, 'Feminism and the New Women in Public Office', *Women and Politics*, 2 (1982), 7-21; Carroll, 'Women Candidates and Support for Feminist Concerns'.

⁹ Holsti and Rosenau, in E. Boneparth, ed., *Women, Power and Policy* (New York: Pergamon, 1982).

¹⁰ V. Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983).

¹¹ E. Vallance, 'Two Cheers for Democracy' Women Candidates in the 1987 General Election', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 41 (1988), 86-91.

TABLE 1 *Female Candidates and MPs, 1983 and 1987*

	1983 Candidates		1983 MPs		1987 Candidates		1987 MPs	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Conservative	40	6.3	13	3.3	46	7.3	17	4.5
Labour	78	12.3	10	4.8	92	14.5	21	9.2
Liberal/SDP	76	12.0	0	0.0	105	16.6	2	9.1
PC/SNP	16	14.5	0	0.0	7	6.6	1	16.6
Total above	210	10.2	23	3.5	250	12.8	41	6.4

Note The percentages are based on the total number of candidates and MPs in the major parties

Source *The Times Guide to the House of Commons*, 1983, 1987

Edwina Currie, Diane Abbott and Margaret Thatcher. In addition, most legislative behaviour in Parliament is severely constrained by the nature of party discipline. It is possible to analyse the record on relevant free votes but these involve only a restricted range of issues. We can compare gender differences in behaviour through the membership of Parliamentary committees, affiliation to party groups, or Parliamentary Questions, but again we have few cases for comparison.

Yet evidence is available which enables us to assess the logically prior question: are women *candidates* for Parliament more liberal or feminist in their *attitudes* and *priorities*? Gender differences in attitudes can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for gender differences in behaviour. A wider sample drawn from candidates for the major parties allows for more reliable generalizations than a study restricted to the Parliamentary elite. Accordingly this Note analyses data from a survey of men and women candidates from the major British parties in the 1987 general election (British Candidate Survey, 1987).¹² In late April/early May 1987 a postal questionnaire designed to gather information about the social background, political experience and attitudes of candidates was distributed to 2,004 candidates, including 250 women. Minor parties with no Parliamentary representation were excluded from the British Candidate Survey, including the Green and Communist parties, both with a relatively high proportion of women candidates.

In total the British Candidate Survey included 590 completed questionnaires, replies from a third of all candidates (including 106 women and 484 men). The sample included 139 British MPs which represents 22 per cent of the current Parliament.¹³ The low response rate was not unexpected as most candidates were fully occupied by the general election campaign in May/June. Nevertheless, we were concerned to establish whether there was a bias in the sample, for example, whether the questionnaire was more likely to be completed by losing candidates than by winning ones. Accordingly we checked the characteristics of the respondents against a profile of all candidates derived from *The*

¹² For other results from the survey see J. Lovenduski and P. Norris, 'Political Recruitment and the Masculine Candidate Model in the British General Election of 1987: Obstacles to the Feminisation of Political Elites', *European Journal of Political Research* (1989).

¹³ The survey included responses from 139 MPs, who represented 24 per cent of the sample, compared with 633 elected British MPs out of 2,004 candidates, which represents 31.5 per cent of all candidates for the major parties.

Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1987.¹⁴ Using *t*-tests we found no statistically significant differences ($p > 0.05$) between the sample and all candidates in terms of gender, age and education, and the slightly lower response rate amongst Conservative candidates was adjusted by weighting for party.¹⁵ On this basis we concluded that although the response rate was not ideal, the sample was representative of all candidates.

DO WOMEN HAVE DIFFERENT PRIORITIES?

Certain previous studies claim that the gender gap in attitudes extends to different priorities about the major issues in politics. Some argue that women candidates, given their experience of family responsibilities, or their occupational background, may have different concerns about public policy issues such as childcare, education or social services while male politicians may give a higher priority to issues like defence, trade unions or unemployment. Is this the case then more women in politics might change the agenda, as well as the direction, of the Parliamentary debate?

TABLE 2 *Mean Issue Salience*

	All	Conservative		Liberal/SDP		Labour	
		M	F	M	F	M	F
Unemployment	7.2	6.0	6.9	7.3	7.3	7.9	7.7
NHS	5.7	4.3	5.1	5.9	6.1	6.8	7.1
Education	5.2	4.3	5.5	5.7	5.8	5.5	5.9
Defence	4.1	5.4	4.5	4.2	3.9	2.9	4.1
Law and order	3.6	4.7	5.3	3.3	2.5	3.7	3.9
Social services	2.8	1.8	2.3	2.3	2.9	3.9	3.5
Inflation	2.4	4.4	4.4	2.2	2.0	1.6	0.6
Nuclear energy	1.6	0.8	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.7	2.0
Equal opportunities	1.8	0.6	0.3	1.5	1.9	2.8	2.3
Local government	1.8	1.4	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.3
Unions	1.1	1.9	1.1	0.7	1.1	0.9	1.3
Childcare	0.9	0.5	0.1	0.4	0.7	1.8	1.9
Agriculture	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3

Note Respondents were asked to rank these issues from most important (10) to least important (1).

Source British Candidate Survey, 1987

¹⁴ Alan H. Wood, ed., *The Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1987* (London: The Times, 1987).

¹⁵ As a result of the first mailing, 542 completed questionnaires were received, along with some refusals ($N = 28$) and non-contacts at the given address ($N = 10$). Given limited resources we were unable to send a second mailing to all non-respondents, but reminders were sent out after the election to female non-respondents because we were concerned about the number in the sub-sample. Following the second reminder we received 628 replies in total, including 590 completed questionnaires (29.5 per cent of all candidates). The response rate from Conservative candidates was slightly lower (26.2 per cent) than from Labour (33.5 per cent) or the Alliance (31.6 per cent). Accordingly, the Conservative response was adjusted by applying a positive weighting (1.26) to the results so that the sample remained representative of all candidates. It should be noted that given the small number of cases in some sub-samples (e.g. female Conservative candidates) considerable caution is needed when interpreting the results in cross-tabulations.

To assess this hypothesis, we asked candidates to rank the most important issues in the general election, ordering ten from a list of items. The mean results were then ranked from most important (10) to least important (1). The issues given a high priority by the candidates were similar to those nominated by the public in most public opinion polls during the campaign, namely unemployment, the National Health Service, education, defence and law and order (see Table 2). There was quite a high level of consensus among all candidates about the relative rank order of the issues, although the social services were seen as more important by Labour while inflation was given greater priority by the Conservatives. There was also agreement that certain issues were not considered important, including those such as childcare and equal opportunities, which are part of the feminist agenda. Within each party, there were certain gender differences in priorities which proved to be statistically significant. Across all parties women put a slightly higher priority than men on the nurturing issues of the NHS and education, as well as on nuclear energy; only in the Labour party do women give higher priority than men to 'defence' (which probably means 'peace'). There was no strong tendency for women to give higher priority than men to equal opportunities. Overall there was a large measure of agreement about the relative rank orderings. On this evidence, therefore, there are gender differences in candidate issue priorities but the differences are minor.

ARE WOMEN CANDIDATES MORE LIBERAL OR FEMINIST THAN MEN?

To analyse gender differences in political attitudes we asked candidates to respond to a series of six standard items, used since 1979 in the (Essex/Oxford) British Election Survey, which can be employed to measure liberal or conservative attitudes towards social change.¹⁶ These items ask respondents whether they feel that certain aspects of social change, such as welfare benefits, the availability of abortion, equal opportunities for women, nuclear power, racial equality or defence spending, have gone too far, not far enough, or are about right (see Table 3). These items were designed to examine enduring and fundamental aspects of liberal and conservative attitudes, not the specific policy proposals or issues which featured in the 1987 campaign debate. Responses were coded to range from liberal (+1) to conservative (-1) and the mean scores were calculated for each item. There was a strong correlation between these items, which suggested that we could use the series as the basis for a summary CON-LIB Index ranging from liberal (+6) to most conservative (-6)¹⁷. Party was re-coded into a dummy variable for Government versus all Opposition parties.

¹⁶ The items were as follows: 'Can you say whether the following have gone too far, not far enough or are they about right. (a) Welfare benefits that are available to people today (WELFARE), (b) Attempts to give equal opportunities to women in Britain (WOMEN); (c) Government spending on defence (DEFENCE), (d) The building of nuclear power stations (NUCLEAR), (e) Attempts to give equal opportunities for black people and Asians in Britain (RACE), (f) The availability of abortion on the NHS (ABORTION)'

¹⁷ Pearson correlations between attitudes on these items were significant ($p > 0.01$ in each case, $N = 585$).

	Welfare	Women	Defence	Nuclear	Race
Women	0.62				
Defence	0.53	0.39			
Nuclear	0.55	0.60	0.50		
Race	0.59	0.69	0.39	0.52	
Abortion	0.29	0.33	0.26	0.29	0.33

The bivariate analysis suggests that, as expected, party proved to be most strongly associated with conservative-liberal attitudes. Nevertheless, women were more liberal within each party, including the Conservatives. In terms of parties, there was a predictable ranking, with the clearer distinction being between Conservative candidates and the Opposition parties (see Table 3). The results also demonstrate that within the Alliance the leadership divisions which emerged during the last election between David Owen and David Steel reflected wider differences in their parties, with the Social Democratic candidates closer to Conservatives while the Liberals were nearer Labour.

The Pearson correlation analysis suggests that the candidate's gender, occupational class, education and age were also significantly related to attitudes. Since these factors were inter-related, for example more women candidates in the last election stood for the

TABLE 3 *Analysis of Mean Conservative-Liberal Index*

	Mean CON-LIB Rating	No. of Candidates	Pearson Corr. (<i>r</i>)	Standardized Beta Coefficient
Party				
Conservative	-1.1	154		
SDP	2.7	73		
Liberal	3.4	112		
SNP/PC	3.7	50		
Labour	4.3	196	0.47**	0.72**
Gender				
Men	2.0	478		
Women	3.2	106	0.17**	0.07**
Occupation				
Prof./Managerial	1.9	389		
Other	2.7	197	0.14**	0.02
Age group				
Younger	2.5	252		
Older	2.0	331	-0.13**	-0.09**
Education				
Graduate	2.2	453		
Non-grad.	2.1	133	0.10**	0.10**
Region				
Northern	2.4	228		
Southern	2.1	146	0.05	0.03
Multiple <i>R</i>				0.72
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²				0.54

Note. Attitudes were coded from +6.0 (most liberal) to -6.0 (most conservative). For the Pearson correlation and multiple regression, parties were re-coded into Government (1) and Opposition (0). For the items see fn. 16 ($p > 0.01 = **$). Age groups were classified as 'Younger' (under 40) or 'Older' (over 40). Region was classified using the twelve standard census regions collapsed into two categories: 'Northern' (North, North-West, Yorkshire and Humberside, Scotland and Wales); 'Southern' (all the other regions).

Source: British Candidate Survey, 1987.

Labour party than for the Conservative, we entered the independent variables in a multi-variate analysis using ordinary least squares multiple regression. For the analysis we transformed into dummy variables the candidate's party (Conservative/ Opposition), region of the constituency (Northern/ Southern), occupational class (professional and managerial/ other) and education (graduate/ non-graduate) with mean conservative-liberal score as the dependent variable.

The results confirmed the earlier conclusion that party was the strongest predictor of liberal attitudes, but gender, age and education continued to prove significant using standardized beta co-efficients. The factors of region and occupation dropped out of the analysis as insignificant, since these were strongly related to the candidate's party. Overall the model showed a high level of goodness of fit with an adjusted R^2 of 0.54. The results therefore suggest that gender is one of the factors which distinguishes attitudes among Parliamentary candidates: within each party women tended to prove more liberal than men. As shown in Table 4, gender differences were particularly marked in the Liberal and Nationalist parties, where women tended to be as liberal as the men in the Labour party.

The picture becomes more complex if we turn to the specific items within the index. The results suggest that on a range of issues the sharpest divide was between the Conservatives and the Opposition parties (see Table 4). On the provision of social services 94 per cent of Conservative candidates felt that welfare benefits had gone too far or were about right, while in contrast 92 per cent of Labour candidates believed that they had not gone far enough. The candidates were also polarized by party on the question of equal opportunities for women, with 89 per cent of Labour and 80 per cent of Alliance candidates in favour of further change compared with only 14 per cent of Conservatives. Attitudes towards defence spending and racial equality showed a similar party divide.

TABLE 4 *Mean Liberal-Conservative Scores by Party and Gender*

	Lib-Con score	N
Conservative		
Men	-1.1	139
Women	-0.7	15
SDP		
Men	2.4	52
Women	3.5	21
Liberal		
Men	3.2	92
Women	4.2	20
PC/SNP		
Men	3.6	41
Women	4.2	9
Labour		
Men	4.2	154
Women	4.3	41

Note Attitudes were coded from +6.0 (most liberal) to -6.0 (most conservative). For the items see fn. 16.

Source British Candidate Survey, 1987

TABLE 5 *Mean Liberal-Conservative Attitudes to Change*

	Women equal	Abortion	Welfare benefit	Race equality	Nuclear power	Defence spending
Con women	0.36	-0.60	-0.20	0.00	-0.20	-0.07
Con men	-0.03	-0.44	-0.15	-0.09	-0.28	-0.11
SDP women	0.86	0.05	0.95	0.65	0.57	0.68
SDP men	0.74	-0.21	0.85	0.63	0.33	0.26
Lib women	0.95	0.05	0.72	0.94	0.99	0.94
Lib men	0.78	-0.15	0.72	0.72	0.85	0.47
Lab women	0.83	0.32	0.86	0.85	0.85	0.64
Lab men	0.85	0.19	0.91	0.81	0.80	0.68
Gamma by gender	0.45**	0.23**	0.25**	0.29**	0.33**	0.37**
Gamma by party	0.66**	0.28**	0.66**	0.59**	0.62**	0.45**

Note Attitudes were coded from +1.0 (most liberal) to -1.0 (most conservative). Gamma coefficients of association (chi square, $p > 0.01 = **$), $N = 586$. For the items see fn 16.

Source British Candidate Survey, 1987

Yet the results suggest that within each party there was a significant gender gap on many of the issues, although considerable caution is needed when interpreting the results given the smaller number of cases in each sub-category. Among Alliance candidates women tended to be slightly more liberal than men across every item, with the greatest differences on defence spending, abortion and equal opportunities for women. In the Labour party the gender differences were less marked or consistent, except on reproductive rights where women were more strongly pro-abortion. But on this issue, just as in the electorate, women's attitudes are polarized; women candidates do not speak with one voice. In the Conservative party a higher proportion of women than men felt that the availability of abortion had gone too far and none supported further liberalization. Feminists cannot assume, therefore, that women candidates will necessarily support 'women's issues' more strongly than men in their party. It depends on the nature of the issue. Women candidates across all parties strongly supported female equality of opportunity but abortion proved more divisive, as indeed it does in the women's movement.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Overall our results provide support for the substantive argument. Among Parliamentary candidates women tend to be more sympathetic than men to liberal concerns in their parties. If these attitudes affect legislative behaviour then the entry of more women into Parliament could influence the direction of public policy. The extent of the gender difference should not be exaggerated. Women candidates remain party politicians first and foremost. The evidence in this survey is necessarily limited and further research needs to examine elite attitudes towards a wider range of issues, particularly feminist concerns. Nevertheless, the results are significant and provide tentative support for the view that in Britain women politicians may prove substantively different to their male colleagues.

Whether the gender difference is sufficient to matter is open to debate. A number of reasons suggest that it may. Party discipline might preclude backbench attitudes from having a major effect on the legislative process in Britain, yet there are free votes in Parliament where backbenchers can play a decisive role. Elite attitudes can influence the non-legislative activities of Parliament through written and oral questions, private correspondence, select committees and adjournment debates. Gender differences may prove even more significant if women move into policy-making positions within government.

Lastly, some believe that gender differences could transform public policy if enough women were elected to reach a 'critical mass' in Parliament. It is argued that if women remain below 10 per cent of the legislature gender differences in attitudes will fail to make a major impact. Those women who manage to enter the House of Commons will feel that they have to play by the 'rules of the game' to succeed. If they have different priorities or values they will not feel free to articulate them. Once women candidates are more successful, as in the European and Scandinavian countries where 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the legislature is female, women may be able to transform the agenda. Until that critical mass is reached the odds against women politicians *qua* women having a measurable influence are so high that almost any indicators that they have affected the policy agenda must be taken seriously. Neither the substantive nor the symbolic arguments for increasing the number of women politicians may be safely discarded.

Community Cohesion and Voter Turnout in English Parliamentary Constituencies

MUNROE EAGLES AND STEPHEN ERFLE

Voting turnout varies both over time and across space. In Britain there has been a secular trend in the postwar period for decreasing turnout at parliamentary elections (from a high of 84.1 per cent in 1950 to 75.4 per cent in 1987, with a low point of 71.8 per cent in 1970). Such temporal variations in turnout are dwarfed in scale, however, by differences in turnout across constituencies at the same election. In the 1970 election, for example, turnout ranged from a low of 44.9 per cent in Stepney to 85.3 per cent in Cornwall North. Though diminished slightly, variation in constituency turnout rates remained significant in the June 1983 election (from a low of 51.8 per cent in City of London and Westminster South to a high of 81.1 per cent in Leicestershire NW).

Given the underdeveloped state of empirical research on participation generally,¹ it is not surprising to find few studies of variations in turnout across constituencies. In his recent geographical analysis of the 1983 election, for example, R. J. Johnston had difficulty developing hypotheses about turnout due to the paucity of existing research.² Consequently, although the importance of community characteristics as determinants of

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¹ Anthony Mughan, *Party and Participation in British Elections* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 1-21. However, research on political participation in Britain is showing signs of increasing vitality as seen in the recent work of George Moyser and Geraint Parry, 'Class, Sector and Political Participation in Britain', *Manchester Papers in Politics* (Manchester: Department of Government, University of Manchester, 1987), pp. 1-47.

² R. J. Johnston, *The Geography of English Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 135.

levels of political participation has been recognized for almost three decades,³ efforts to investigate their relationship to turnout levels at English elections are conspicuously absent. Community influences have been generalized by Geraint Parry and George Moyser into a 'communitarian model' of political participation which elevates the importance of community characteristics in understanding political activity, by suggesting that 'the motive, or the justification, for taking part in politics is a concern for one's community'.⁴

Two closely related features of community life are generally hypothesized as being responsible for spatial differences in electoral participation; community identification and community cohesion. Parry and Moyser put particular emphasis on the former, suggesting that 'a strong sense of community enhances levels of political involvement'.⁵ On the other hand, it has long been argued that cohesive communities give rise to strong group pressures for participation. It seems reasonable to expect that residents of cohesive communities are more likely to exhibit strong community identification, and thus are more likely to be affected by group pressures to vote. These two interpretations of community influences on voter turnout may therefore be reconciled as an effect of community cohesion.

In this Note we present an aggregate data analysis (using census and electoral data at the constituency level) of the impact of community cohesion on voter turnout at three recent British elections. Ecological analysis such as that employed here is particularly suitable for investigating the impact of community characteristics on turnout because cohesiveness is an attribute of aggregates, not individuals. Its impact on turnout, then, should appear in aggregate patterns of turnout. Furthermore, individual-level survey analyses of turnout are vexed by the propensity of individuals to misrepresent their voting regularity. For example, the British Election Studies for the February and October 1974 elections indicated that turnout among respondents was 88 and 85 per cent respectively, as compared to the actual turnout figures of 79 and 73 per cent. As Crewe *et al.* have noted, 'almost all sample surveys in Britain have "over-represented" voters by similar margins'.⁶ In the light of these considerations, a reliance on aggregate data representing actual (as opposed to reported) voting behaviour is not only justifiable, but may be preferable.

We concentrate on three elections (1966, 1970 and 1983) for which census information at the constituency level is both available and relatively reliable. The 1966 sample census and turnout figures for 1966 and 1970, together with 1981 census and 1983 turnout figures, are employed as data for this study.⁷ Potential complications arising from

³ Robert Lane, *Political Life. Why and How People Get Involved in Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1959).

⁴ Geraint Parry and George Moyser, 'Political Participation in Britain. A Research Agenda for a New Study', *Government and Opposition*, 19 (1984), p. 80.

⁵ Parry and Moyser, 'Political Participation in Britain', p. 80.

⁶ Ivor Crewe, Tony Fox and Jim Alt, 'Non-Voting in British General Elections, 1966–October 1974', in Colin Crouch, ed., *Participation in Politics, British Political Sociology Yearbook, Vol. III* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 46.

⁷ Electoral returns for this study have been taken from the 'Nuffield' series on British general elections. The relevant sources in chronological order are: David Butler and Anthony King, *The British General Election of 1964* (London: Macmillan, 1964), David Butler and Anthony King, *The British General Election of 1966* (London: Macmillan, 1966), David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, *The British General Election of 1970* (London: Macmillan, 1970); David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1983* (London: Macmillan, 1983). Estimated 1979 results on the basis of the constituency boundaries used in 1983 were taken from *The BBC ITN Guide to the*

nationalist sentiments and parties in Scotland and Wales are avoided by restricting our focus to English constituencies.

MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNITY COHESION WITH AGGREGATE DATA

Existing research has repeatedly demonstrated that the nature of the social context influences the propensity of individuals to vote, and, in general, there seems to be a growing recognition of the need to incorporate both individual and communal influences in a comprehensive theory of political participation.⁸ Although primarily designed to assess the impact of marginality on turnout, pioneering research by Denver and Hands found that constituencies in which miners formed a substantial proportion of the work-force frequently had higher than predicted levels of turnout.⁹ Mining communities, typically isolated settlements where workmates are also neighbours, are often cited as the epitome of traditional, cohesive working-class communities. They continued to exhibit abnormally high turnout into the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁰

Research on the relationship between housing tenure and turnout also points to the effects of community cohesion on turnout.¹¹ Here again integration into the residential community (an associated attribute of communal cohesiveness) appears to contribute positively to turnout.

This Note is principally concerned with the contribution of community cohesion to turnout. 'Community' and its associated properties are complex concepts and their operationalization in empirical research is often highly problematic. This Note presents two measures of community cohesion and estimates their impact on levels of turnout. The first measure is taken from indices of the socio-economic homogeneity of a constituency. According to Gaynor Cohen, 'planners who are concerned with building communities, rather than houses, have accepted the fact that social homogeneity is a necessary prerequisite of community cohesion'.¹² For this reason, participation in socially

New Parliamentary Constituencies (Chichester: Parliamentary Research Services, 1983). Unfortunately, these estimates did not include turnout figures. Census data for 1966 were taken from Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, *1966 Census. General and Parliamentary Tables* (London: HMSO, 1969). 1981 census data came from Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, *Census 1981 Parliamentary Constituency Monitors* (London: Government Statistical Service, 1983).

⁸ Robert H. Huckfeldt, *Politics in Context* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 104–16; Michael Giles and Marilyn K. Dantico, 'Political Participation and Neighborhood Social Context Revisited', *American Journal of Political Science*, 26 (1982), 144–50; Sidney Tarrow, 'The Urban–Rural Cleavage in Political Involvement: The Case of France', *American Political Science Review*, 65 (1971), 341–57; Richard Muir and Ronan Paddison, *Politics, Geography and Behaviour* (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 88–9, and Crewe *et al.*, 'Non-Voting in British General Elections', pp. 38–109.

⁹ D. T. Denver and H. T. G. Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections', *British Journal of Political Science*, 4 (1974), 31–2.

¹⁰ Ivor Crewe, 'The Politics of "Affluent" and "Traditional" Workers in Britain: An Aggregate Data Analysis', *British Journal of Political Science*, 3 (1973), 29–52; David Lockwood, 'Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society', in Martin Bulmer, ed., *Working-Class Images of Society* (London: Croom Helm, 1975, originally published in 1966), pp. 16–31; D. T. Denver and Gordon Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s', *British Journal of Political Science*, 15 (1985), 382–3; and Johnston, *The Geography of English Politics*, p. 138.

¹¹ Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s', p. 384, although see also Crewe *et al.*, 'Non-Voting in British General Elections, 1966–October 1974', p. 56.

¹² Gaynor Cohen, 'Community Cohesion and Space Planning', in Ronald Frankenberg, ed., *Custom and Conflict in British Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 259.

homogeneous areas ought to be higher than in areas where residents exhibit varied class or status positions. In fact, previous empirical research has suggested that 'turnout is higher where the SES of an area is more homogeneous'¹³ Herbert Tingsten referred to this phenomenon as 'the law of the social centre of gravity'.¹⁴

Two plausible interpretations can be placed on such findings, both of which could be seen as variations of the impact of communal cohesion. These have been designated 'the proportion effect' and the 'concentration effect' by Robert Lane. The proportion effect occurs when individual members of a local majority have their sense of political efficacy enhanced. They then vote in greater proportions than individual members of a local minority who are aware of their relative powerlessness. The concentration effect 'follows from the greater group interaction where the group is concentrated, and the consequent reinforcement of group solidarity, sentiments, and knowledge of their community'.¹⁵

In either case, we measure this contributing factor to community cohesiveness by computing a 'Herfindahl index' of the socio-economic homogeneity of each constituency. Herfindahl indices are often used by economists as a measure of concentration within an industry.¹⁶ The Herfindahl index is defined as:

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^n (S_i)^2$$

where S_i is firm i 's market share and where there are n firms in the industry. Consequently, the Herfindahl index is bounded by $1/n$ and 1. If all firms are of equal size then $H = 1/n$; if one firm dominates the market, the value of the Herfindahl approaches 1. A measure of the homogeneity of communities can be obtained by computing a Herfindahl index of socio-economic group homogeneity in each constituency. The 1966 census identifies seven socio-economic groups (professional; employer/managers; non-manual; skilled manual; semi-skilled manual; unskilled manual; and other) while the 1981 census identifies six (professional and employers/managers are combined). Herfindahl index scores of socio-economic homogeneity (H_{seg}) can be computed by substituting data on the size of these groups for the size of firms in the formula above. For comparability with our other variables, we have multiplied these scores by 100 so that the variable has a range from 100/7 for 1966 (and 100/6 for 1981) to 100.

Our second measure of community cohesiveness is based on the geographic relationship between homes and workplaces in a constituency. When workplace and residence are proximate, workmates are more likely to be neighbours than when the two are distant. Some researchers have seen the workplace-residence relationship as a key to explaining different patterns of working-class behaviour in general. This is largely due to the importance of the work situation as a determinant of friendship networks, incomes and lifestyles.¹⁷

The behavioural importance of the spatial relation of work and residence need not be confined to the working class. Martin Bulmer couched the issue more broadly in terms of

¹³ Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp 97-8.

¹⁴ Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behaviour* (London: P. S. King, 1937), pp 126-7.

¹⁵ Lane, *Political Life*, pp. 262-3.

¹⁶ For a general discussion of this and other indices of size inequality see F. M. Scherer, *Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance*, 2nd edn (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980), pp. 58-9.

¹⁷ Michael Storper and Richard Walker, 'The Theory of Labour and the Theory of Location', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 7 (1983), 32-3.

networks 'The more local bridges there are . . . between different social networks in a neighbourhood, the more cohesive it is likely to be.'¹⁸ Overlapping (or dense) and spatially-bounded networks are one particularly important defining feature of cohesive communities, and are likely to contribute directly to the emergence of strong group norms and pressures through processes akin to Lane's 'concentration effect'.

Existing research, although weak, has established a connection between the attitudes and behaviour of individuals and the distance separating their workplaces from their homes. For example, a factor analysis of the results of the English 'Community Attitudes Survey' found that employment in one's 'home area' (i.e. the area in which respondents felt 'at home', which for most is a very small area surrounding home) was one of the main factors predisposing individuals to feel involved in their community.¹⁹ More generally, Ray Pahl has argued that 'men who are paid the same wage, have exactly the same conditions of work, and exactly the same aspirations and reference group perspectives, may nevertheless have very different patterns of behaviour depending on whether they live close to their work and other facilities.'²⁰

Direct information on the length of journey to work is not available in the census materials. As a result, we have introduced a measure of the spatial relationship of workplaces and residences based on commonly available journey-to-work data.²¹ For our purposes, individuals walking to work (from the 1966 census) or walking and bicycling (from the 1966 and 1981 censuses) are taken to represent those individuals for whom work and residence are close.²² Correspondingly, those driving or using public transport (bus and/or train) are assumed to reside further away from their workplaces.

THE ANALYSIS

To evaluate the impact of community cohesion on voter turnout, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was undertaken for each election. In each case, the dependent variable was the logistic transformation of voter turnout.²³ Following Mughan's example, we decided against adjusting the turnout figures to allow for the age of the electoral register (they are compiled in October of each year, and published in February of

¹⁸ Martin Bulmer, 'The Rejuvenation of Community Studies? Neighbours, Networks and Policy', *The Sociological Review*, 33 (1985), p. 442.

¹⁹ Royal Commission on Local Government, *Community Attitudes Survey: England* (London HMSO, Research Study Number 9, 1969), pp. 143-4.

²⁰ Ray E. Pahl, *Patterns of Urban Life* (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 56-7.

²¹ Munroe Eagles and Stephen Erfle, 'Community Cohesion and Working Class Politics: Workplace-Residence Separation and Labour Support, 1966-1983', *Political Geography Quarterly*, 7 (1988, forthcoming).

²² The 1981 census tables only provide figures on those travelling to work by car, bus, rail or underground. Those remaining must, therefore, travel to work on foot or by bicycle, but there is no way to distinguish the relative proportions of these. We report coefficients for both the percentage walking (WALK) and walking and cycling (BALK) for the earlier time periods since the former permits a stronger inference about the proximity of homes and workplaces.

²³ The logistic transformation of the percentage of voter turnout is defined as: $\text{Logistic}(\text{turnout}) = \log(\text{turnout}/(100 - \text{turnout}))$ where turnout is the percentage of the eligible voters in a constituency who cast a ballot in the election. This transformation is appropriate in situations where the dependent variable has a limited range (in this case the range is zero to 100 per cent). The transformed variable has a range of negative infinity to positive infinity; thus predictions cannot be made outside the allowable range of the dependent variable (as would be the case if the dependent variable were bounded by 0 and 100).

the next) since the differences involved are insignificant.²⁴ In order to estimate the impact of community cohesiveness it is necessary first to identify and empirically estimate a model representing the most likely factors influencing turnout, excluding community cohesion. By adding our measures of community cohesion to this 'baseline' model we can assess the importance of this factor's contribution to an explanation of variation in turnout when other factors are controlled.

We based our socio-political model of variations in turnout loosely on the aforementioned work of Denver and Hands.²⁵ Like them, we controlled for housing tenure by incorporating the percentage of council tenants and owner occupiers into the regressions. The percentage of the labour force working as employers or managers and professionals (PROMGR) was used to give an indication of the class composition of the constituencies.²⁶ To control for rural-urban differences we used the customary measure based on the percentage employed in agriculture. The impact of minor party activity was controlled by including a variable measuring the proportion of the vote going to parties other than the victorious and runner-up party in each constituency (MINOR). Finally, we controlled for the political marginality of the constituency by including a measure of the closeness of the victory (CLOSE).²⁷ This measure is defined as:

$$\text{CLOSE} = 100 \times \left[\frac{(\% \text{ vote attained by the second place party in the last election})}{(\% \text{ vote attained by the winning party in the last election})} \right].$$

The resulting variable has a range of 0 to 100, with higher scores representing closer races. We expect turnout in marginal constituencies to be higher than in relatively safe seats.

The results of our analysis of the three elections are presented in Tables 1 to 3. In each table, the 'baseline' equation, measuring the impact of the general determinants of voter turnout as outlined above, is presented in the first equation (see 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 in Tables 1, 2 and 3). The adjusted *R*-squared figures for these equations (0.639, 0.597 and 0.645) suggest that variations in turnout at general elections in England are relatively well explained by differences in the social structure and political context of these constituencies.

The baseline variables seem to perform broadly in line with expectations derived from existing research. In particular, percentage owner occupied, percentage agricultural and the closeness of the previous electoral victory are all strong positive predictors of voter turnout. The coefficients of these variables are consistent in size and significance across elections and across specifications.

However, three exceptions to the general performance of the baseline variables are worth noting. Firstly, in each election the proportion of council housing in a constituency makes a significant positive contribution to the level of turnout in a constituency. This contrasts with Denver and Hands' findings that council housing was fairly weakly and

²⁴ Mughan, *Party and Participation in British Elections*, p. 26.

²⁵ Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections'; and Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s'.

²⁶ We departed from Denver and Hands by excluding the census category 'non-manual workers' from this class measure because the class location of these lower white-collar workers is ambiguous. Moreover, the proportion of employers and managers alone was identified by William Miller, *Electoral Dynamics in Britain Since 1917* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 64, as one of the strongest single predictors of turnout.

²⁷ Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections'; Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s'; and Mughan, *Party Participation in British Elections*.

negatively related to turnout²⁸ Rather, it lends support to the contention of Crewe *et al.* that turnout among council tenants should be higher since 'most council houses and flats are on large, densely populated and homogeneously working class estates where interpersonal pressures to vote (and to vote Labour) are easily exerted.'²⁹

Secondly, while the 'middle-class occupation' variable (PROMGR) normally makes a significant positive contribution to the level of voting turnout, in the 1970 analysis this contribution is weak (to the point of insignificance in equations 2.1 to 2.4, shown in Table 2). In every other instance, its contribution to turnout is significant and in the expected direction. It seems possible that it is less the class character than the class homogeneity of the constituency that counts in determining aggregate levels of turnout. Given the strong aggregate relationship between occupational class and party choice, class influences on turnout are probably expressed through the role that the distribution of classes within constituencies plays in determining the closeness of electoral competition among the parties. This interpretation accords with the finding of survey researchers that class and socio-economic status are poor predictors of the propensity to vote at the individual level.³⁰

A third finding concerns the weak (to perverse) impact of minor parties on turnout. In the earlier time periods (1966 and 1970), the coefficients for this influence (MINOR) are almost always statistically insignificant, and although they did achieve an acceptable level of significance in the 1983 election (i.e. a *t*-statistic of at least 1.95), they were negatively related to turnout. Previous research by Denver and Hands has demonstrated that minor party activity in a constituency consistently increased turnout at elections between 1959 and 1979 (although they do not report the coefficients and *t*-statistics in their multivariate analysis of elections in the 1970s).³¹ Presumably the explanation for their positive relationship was that the presence and activities of minor parties heightened interest in the campaign, thereby increasing the overall mobilization of voters. Although these discrepancies might reflect nothing more than our departures in operationalizing different influences, some of the difference could be accounted for by Denver and Hands' inclusion of Welsh and Scottish constituencies in their analysis. Perhaps the nationalist parties' activities generated more mobilization and interest than the Liberal/Social Democratic parties did in English constituencies.

Successive equations illustrate the impact of introducing one or more measures of community cohesiveness. Overall, the results strongly confirm that community cohesiveness enhances levels of turnout at general elections. In each instance across the three elections, using both measures of community cohesion (singly and in combination), the cohesiveness of a community contributes positively to the level of voting. The robust *t*-statistics for the community cohesion variables suggest that such influences are both real and important even after other influences have been controlled.

In most equations that combine both the workplace-residence and the homogeneity measures of community cohesion (1.5, 1.6, 2.5, 2.6 and 3.4, shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3) it is apparent that both influences independently increase voter turnout. Only in equation 1.5

²⁸ Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections', pp. 23-4; and Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s', pp. 383-4

²⁹ Crewe *et al.*, 'Non-Voting in British General Elections', p. 56

³⁰ Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 34-6, and p. 103

³¹ Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections', pp. 26-9, and Denver and Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s', pp. 381-5.



TABLE 1 *Community Cohesion and Electoral Turnout, 1966**

Equation no.	Baseline equation						Community cohesion				
	Constant	% Prof. and managers	% Council	% Owner occupied	% Agriculture	MINOR 1966	CLOSE 1964	% Walking	% Bike and walk	Herfindahl Socio-Economic Group Index	R ²
1.1	-0.51 (7.0)	0.0095 (5.0)	0.0093 (8.9)	0.014 (15.8)	0.018 (8.5)	0.0023 (1.46)	0.0076 (14.2)	—	—	—	0.639
1.2	-0.84 (9.7)	0.014 (7.1)	0.0100 (9.9)	0.015 (17.0)	0.015 (7.0)	0.0018 (1.19)	0.0079 (15.3)	0.011 (6.5)	—	—	0.666
1.3	-0.75 (9.5)	0.014 (7.0)	0.0092 (9.1)	0.014 (16.1)	0.009 (3.7)	0.0017 (1.17)	0.0074 (14.4)	—	0.0091 (6.5)	—	0.666
1.4	-0.92 (6.6)	0.015 (6.1)	0.0087 (8.3)	0.013 (14.2)	0.019 (9.1)	0.0031 (1.99)	0.0079 (14.7)	—	—	0.015 (3.5)	0.646
1.5	-1.00 (7.3)	0.016 (6.7)	0.0096 (9.3)	0.014 (15.5)	0.016 (7.2)	0.0022 (1.44)	0.0080 (15.3)	0.010 (5.6)	—	0.007 (1.50)	0.666
1.6	-1.08 (7.9)	0.017 (7.5)	0.0087 (8.5)	0.013 (14.6)	0.011 (4.3)	0.0024 (1.63)	0.0077 (14.8)	—	0.0086 (6.2)	0.012 (2.9)	0.671

*The dependent variable in each equation is the logistically transformed turnout level in the parliamentary constituency. See text for definitions of the other variables. *t*-statistics in parentheses.

TABLE 2
*Community Cohesion and Electoral Turnout, 1970**

Equation no	Baseline equation					Community cohesion					R ²
	Constant	% Prof. and managers	% Council	% Owner occupied	% Agriculture	MINOR 1970	CLOSE 1966	% Walking	% Bike and walk	Herfindahl Socio-Economic Group Index	
2.1	-0.37 (5.5)	-0.0022 (1.19)	0.0081 (7.9)	0.013 (14.2)	0.022 (10.3)	0.0034 (2.1)	0.0058 (11.1)	—	—	—	0.597
2.2	-0.79 (9.9)	0.0032 (1.76)	0.0089 (9.2)	0.014 (16.0)	0.018 (8.8)	0.0016 (0.99)	0.0063 (12.7)	0.014 (8.5)	—	—	0.648
2.3	-0.67 (9.1)	0.0029 (1.57)	0.0079 (8.2)	0.013 (14.7)	0.011 (4.9)	0.0023 (1.48)	0.0056 (11.4)	—	0.011 (8.1)	—	0.643
2.4	-0.87 (6.4)	0.0037 (1.64)	0.0073 (7.1)	0.012 (12.3)	0.023 (11.0)	0.0042 (2.6)	0.0064 (12.0)	—	—	0.018 (4.2)	0.610
2.5	-0.96 (7.4)	0.0052 (2.4)	0.0085 (8.6)	0.013 (14.2)	0.019 (8.9)	0.0020 (1.26)	0.0065 (12.8)	0.013 (7.5)	—	0.007 (1.67)	0.649
2.6	-1.05 (8.0)	0.0073 (3.3)	0.0073 (7.5)	0.012 (12.9)	0.013 (5.5)	0.0030 (1.92)	0.0061 (12.0)	—	0.010 (7.7)	0.014 (3.5)	0.651

*The dependent variable in each equation is the logistically transformed turnout level in the parliamentary constituency. See text for definitions of the other variables. *t*-statistics in parentheses.

TABLE 3 *Community Cohesion and Electoral Turnout, 1983**

Equation no.	Baseline equation					Community cohesion		
	Constant	% Prof. and managers	% Council	% Owner occupied	% Agriculture	MINOR 1983	CLOSE 1979	% Bike and walk
								Herfindahl Socio-Economic Group Index
3.1	-0.56 (6.8)	0.009 (8.4)	0.009 (9.6)	0.013 (16.0)	0.019 (8.6)	-0.0037 (2.9)	0.0058 (16.1)	—
3.2	-0.18 (8.2)	0.010 (9.5)	0.010 (10.7)	0.014 (16.8)	0.012 (4.7)	-0.0030 (2.3)	0.0057 (16.0)	0.0049 (4.4)
3.3	-0.69 (6.8)	0.009 (8.1)	0.008 (8.0)	0.013 (13.8)	0.020 (8.8)	-0.0034 (2.6)	0.0060 (16.2)	0.0083 (2.1)
3.4	-0.96 (8.3)	0.010 (9.2)	0.009 (9.0)	0.014 (14.7)	0.013 (4.9)	-0.0026 (2.0)	0.0059 (16.2)	0.0050 (4.6)
								0.0093 (2.4)
								0.645
								0.657
								0.647
								0.660

*The dependent variable in each equation is the logistically transformed turnout level in the parliamentary constituency. See text for definitions of the other variables *t*-statistics in parentheses.

(see Table 1) does the combination of WALK and H_{res} result in the latter losing significance. The two variables therefore appear to measure different dimensions of community cohesion. While there is little difference between the magnitude of the coefficients for WALK/BALK and H_{res} , it is clear from their impact on the adjusted R -squared and from their t -statistics that the workplace-residence measure of community cohesion is the stronger of the two. This affirms our contention that the workplace-residence relationship is a particularly important dimension of modern communities.

A final method of examining the effect of community cohesion on turnout is to examine the residuals from the baseline equations (equations 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1). A positive residual signifies a constituency where the turnout is under-predicted by the baseline equation. We would expect constituencies with large positive residuals to be unusually cohesive. An examination of the largest residuals confirms this expectation. The three most significant positive outliers in equation 1.1 are Hemsworth, Don Valley, and Dearne Valley. All three are mining constituencies (the percentage of the work-force employed in mining in these constituencies is 39.5, 24.0, and 30.4, respectively). Moreover, these constituencies score well above average on our community cohesion measures. (Indeed, Dearne Valley and Hemsworth have the second and third highest H_{res} score.)³²

Despite the fact that both cohesion measures consistently appear to make a statistically significant contribution to the explanation of turnout levels, it must be acknowledged that the magnitude of their impact on turnout is disappointingly small. This may be because constituencies are too large and internally differentiated adequately to represent communities; consequently, communal influences are probably underestimated using constituency-level data. In any event, the t -statistics of the community cohesion variables suggest that these variables perform at least as well as some other widely cited influences on turnout, such as the presence of minor parties.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis confirms much of what scholars have said for many years about the impact of community cohesion on voting turnout. Even after controlling for a wide variety of social and political characteristics of constituencies, both the socio-economic homogeneity of a constituency and the geographical relationship of workplaces and residences contribute significantly to turnout levels at general elections.

While offering welcome empirical support for common suppositions, this analysis cannot resolve all questions about community characteristics and the level of voting. Specifically, the actual social mechanisms responsible for the creation and transmission of group pressures to vote (e.g. Lane's concentration or proportion effects) cannot be ascertained. Such important questions can best be addressed in individual-level studies that build in measures of the cohesiveness of the voters' communities. Our results suggest that such a combination of data and perspectives will shed valuable light on the question of voting as well as other forms of political participation.

³² The same pattern holds in other years as well. Indeed, three of the four largest residuals in 1970 are these three constituencies. The fourth, Morpeth, is also a mining constituency (34.8 per cent mining), which has the fifth highest H_{res} score. Morpeth also exhibited the fifth largest positive residual in 1966.

A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting: Great Britain, 1987

JOHN W. GALBRAITH AND NICOL C. RAE

The issue of 'tactical voting' aroused a great deal of interest during the 1987 United Kingdom general election campaign. This Note considers the nature and importance of tactical voting in Britain and makes an attempt to detect its presence empirically using electoral data

THE ADVENT OF TACTICAL VOTING

'Tactical' or 'strategic' voting can be defined as voting other than for one's preferred party or candidate in order to increase the probability of a satisfactory overall outcome. Voting non-tactically implies voting without regard to the candidate's probability of success; voting tactically implies a calculation of the *most* likely means of bringing about a desired result, whether or not achieving the result is actually probable.

As such, tactical voting has certainly been present to some extent since the advent of mass parliamentary democracy in Britain. In recent times, however, with the growth of support for third (and in Scotland and Wales, fourth) parties, the topic has aroused greater public and academic interest.

In parliamentary by-elections tactical voting has been commonplace at least since the Orpington by-election of March 1962, enabling Liberals, Social Democrats and Nationalists to achieve spectacular swings at the expense of one or both major parties, which were generally not replicated at the subsequent general elections. By-elections, moreover, expedite the process of voting tactically because of (i) the media focus on one particular constituency and (ii) the usual plethora of opinion polls in which relatively small shifts in voter support can be magnified by media coverage into a 'bandwagon' of support for a particular party. It should be stressed that many third or fourth party victories have come in seats where the winning party finished in third place at the previous general election. We have thus become used to seeing spectacular collapses in support for one major party in by-elections where the polls and media make it apparent that that party cannot win the seat.¹

During the period of two-party dominance in Britain (1945-70), tactical voting in general elections appeared to be of little relevance outside a handful of unrepresentative constituencies where the Liberals were competitive. For the overwhelming majority of British electors, the best means by which to defeat the less-favoured of the two major parties' candidates in one's constituency was to vote for the candidate of the other major party. Britain's simple plurality electoral system and the division of the country into over

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¹ The most recent instance of these tendencies was in Greenwich where the Conservative vote fell from 35 per cent in 1983 to 11 per cent in the 1987 by-election, a collapse which bore little relation to national trends but was evidently the product of the polls' depiction of the local electoral situation early in the campaign.

six hundred constituencies combined to make projections from the local to the national outcome hazardous, and these constituted a further substantial barrier to tactical voting.

The potential significance of tactical voting has increased, however, with the revival in the electoral fortunes of the Liberal party (and the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalists) since 1970. As in the inter-war period, the division of the non-Conservative vote between Labour and the resurgent Liberals in alliance with the newly-formed Social Democratic party appeared only to work to the benefit of the Conservatives, who were able to secure majorities of 43 seats in 1979 and 144 seats in 1983 on the basis of 43.9 per cent and 42.4 per cent respectively of the national popular vote (this may be compared with 43.4 per cent in 1964, when they narrowly *lost* to Labour).

In desperation, political analysts hostile towards the post-1979 Conservative governments began to consider tactical voting as the most effective means of mobilising a putative 'anti-Conservative' majority at the following general election.² This advocacy of 'tactical voting' accorded with the 'heretical' opinions of commentators such as Professor Eric Hobsbawm and Frank Field MP, who favoured a closer electoral arrangement between Labour and the Alliance to ensure the defeat of the Conservatives. An organization named TV '87 was formed with the purpose of campaigning for tactical voting, and the *Guardian*, *Today* and *New Statesman* obligingly published lists of seats so as to assist the anti-Tory tactical voter.³

These kinds of argument had an intuitive appeal in non-Conservative circles, and it was in fact a common assumption during the 1987 campaign that tactical voting worked exclusively in one direction, i.e., that tactical votes cast *against* the Labour party were likely to be insignificant. There were no empirical grounds for this assumption, however, and the Labour party's poor showing in 1983 could have been attributed to the existence of a large block of voters whose primary wish was that Labour be kept out.⁴

A second possible difficulty concerned those constituencies where the gap between parties in second and third place to the Conservatives was numerically small. Without reliable constituency opinion poll-data, there could be no secure answer to this problem, illustrating the difficulties of transferring the concept of tactical voting from the peculiarly 'presidential' atmosphere of by-elections to the national political arena of six hundred and fifty individual constituencies.⁵

² See, for example, Walter Schwartz, 'Bishop Tells Tactical Voters to Hit Tories', *Guardian*, 5 June 1987; Jeremy Seabrook, 'Why A Tactical Vote is a Vote for the Poor', *Guardian*, 18 May 1987; Ivor Crewe, 'Why Neil Need Not Lie Down: Tactical Voting and a Small Swing Against the Tories Could Beat Maggie', *Today*, 15 May 1987.

³ Martin Linton, 'Charting a Path Through the Tactical Voting Forest', *Guardian*, 25 May 1987, and also 'Tactical Voting: How to Unseat the Member for Finchley', *New Statesman*, 22 May 1987. See also Andrew Shaw and Nina Fishman, 'TV '87: Tactical Voting Makes Votes Count' in Ivor Crewe and Martin Harrop, eds, *Political Communications: The General Election Campaign of 1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

⁴ From survey evidence it appeared that the second preferences of Alliance voters were dividing 55/45 per cent in favour of the Conservatives, and that only 20 per cent of them were willing to vote Labour to keep out the Conservative candidate in their constituency. Robin Oakley, 'Rise of Tactical Vote in Marginals Could Threaten Many Safe Seats', *The Times*, 18 May 1987.

⁵ A large number of constituency polls in marginal seats were conducted by national and local polling organizations during the campaign. Their success in predicting the outcome accurately was mixed to say the least. See Robert Waller, 'Constituency Polls in the 1987 General Election', in Crewe and Harrop, eds, *Political Communications*. On the pitfalls of tactical voting see Michael Hart, 'Why Tactical Voting Does Not Always Work', *Sunday Telegraph Election Guide*, Paul Vallye, 'Tactical Voting Fails to Impress the Analysts', *The Times*, 11 June 1987.

A final problem concerned the national vote totals of Labour and the Alliance. Both parties had an obvious interest in maximizing their national vote totals in order to be able to claim to be the major opposition party after the election. Large-scale tactical voting on a constituency basis was thus potentially dangerous if it operated in favour of one opposition party rather than the other.⁶

The advent of widespread tactical voting would accord with the various new models of British voting behaviour postulated by Crewe and Sarlvik and Himmelweit *et al.*, in which the British electorate is decreasingly attached to the major political parties and is electorally more volatile. In a de-aligned electorate with a more 'consumerist' as opposed to 'solidary' approach to voting, the major barriers to tactical voting arising from class or party identification are removed. If significant tactical voting in 1987 could be demonstrated, this would have obvious relevance for the continuing debate over models of voting behaviour in modern Britain.⁷

DETECTING TACTICAL VOTING IN ELECTORAL DATA

Our attempt to discover the impact of tactical voting rests on the following observation. If tactical voting is present and significant, then there should be certain detectable patterns in general election returns. In particular, there should be systematic differences in a party's success between constituencies where that party would be the beneficiary of tactical voting and constituencies where it would not. If we examine the changes between two general elections in the fractions of votes cast for each party in each constituency, then (after controlling for other factors) parties should show greater increases/lower decreases in those constituencies where they were second at the previous election than where they were third.

Tactical voting is not the only factor which could account for differences between constituencies of the type that we examine. For example, greater concentration by party strategists on constituencies where the party lies second could produce similar results. It seems interesting, in the first instance, to attempt to determine whether the aggregate of these effects can be detected (i.e., whether parties' gains/losses differ systematically between districts where they were in second place versus those where they were third). If so, it will be interesting to attempt to discriminate between some of the constituent effects, e.g. tactical voting and party effort. We attempt to detect the effects by the following method.

First, using data from the British⁸ elections of 1983 and 1987, we define ΔS_{ij} , the series of changes in proportions of vote in each constituency and for each party:

$$\Delta S_{ij} = (V_{ij}^{87}/T_j^{87}) - (V_{ij}^{83}/T_j^{83}),$$

where i indexes the three major parties and j indexes the six hundred and thirty-three constituencies, V_{ij} indicates the number of votes won by party i in constituency j , and T_j indi-

⁶ Robin Cook, 'Beware a Tactical Vote Hijack', *Guardian*, 8 May 1987.

⁷ Ivor Crewe and Bo Särilvik, *Decade of De-alignment: the Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); John Curtice, Roger Jowell and Anthony Heath, *How Britain Votes* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1985); H. Himmelweit, P. Humphreys, M. Jaeger and M. Katz, *How Voters Decide* (London: Academic Press, 1981); Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher T. Husbards, *British Democracy at the Crossroads: Voting and Party Competition in the 1980s* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

⁸ We restrict ourselves to the 633 constituencies in Great Britain, omitting the seventeen seats in Northern Ireland where the major British parties are not contenders.

cates the total number of votes cast in constituency j . We then perform regressions to attempt to explain these changes in terms of demographic data relating to the constituencies, their geographic locations, and the parties' standings in the first of the elections (through which it may be possible to capture tactical effects).

As an alternative, we report some results in which the dependent variable is simply the logarithm of the share of votes obtained by each party. The reason for including this other choice of dependent variable is to examine the robustness of the conclusions; we hope that similar conclusions will emerge for each choice, indicating some robustness across transformations of the data. As Table 1 indicates, the test results are similar for the two specifications.

The very straightforward statistical technique that we employ has two elements. The least restrictive test of the importance of tactical effects that we perform is the widely-used Chow test for equality between sets of coefficients;⁹ it is applied here by splitting the sample of Conservative seats into those where the Alliance was second and those where Labour was second. Should tactical effects be significant, changes in Labour and Alliance voting should differ between these two samples; should they be unimportant the patterns should not differ. When regressions are estimated for each sample, the Chow test allows a formal test of the hypothesis that they do not differ.¹⁰ We then examine anti-Labour voting by splitting the sample of Labour seats into those where the Alliance was second and those where the Conservatives were second, and repeating the procedure.

The other element in our study involves concentration on the regression parameters themselves. Because inferences drawn from poor models are especially suspect, we estimate the most general models allowed by the data set to explain changes in vote shares (the ΔS_j). We then impose on the models only those restrictions which cannot be rejected in formal tests, and make inferences from the final model. The reader should of course note that the models contain many variables other than those of immediate interest, since omitted variables correlated with the included regressors produce biased coefficient estimates. We will not discuss the estimated parameters corresponding to these additional variables at any length.

We carry out Chow tests to examine the presence or absence of both anti-Conservative and anti-Labour tactical voting; a convincing test of the presence of anti-Alliance tactical voting is precluded by the smaller number of Alliance seats. Given estimated regression models, we can go beyond these tests for presence or absence of tactical voting and estimate its *magnitude*. This is done for anti-Conservative tactical voting only.

DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

For each constituency we have data from the 1981 Census describing the percentage of constituents living in Council housing, the percentage of adult male constituents classed

⁹ The Chow test is an F -test which compares coefficients in several samples with those in a joint sample comprised of all of these; if the restrictions implied by lumping all samples into one are rejected, then the hypothesis that coefficients are the same in each is rejected. The test can be calculated from sums of squared residuals (SSR) as reported in Table 1. See G. C. Chow, 'Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions', *Econometrica*, 28 (1960), 591–605.

¹⁰ We use PC-GIVE (D. F. Hendry, *PC-GIVE: An Interactive Menu-Driven Econometric Modelling Program* (Oxford: Institute of Economics and Statistics, 1986) and RATS (T. A. Doan, and R. B. Litterman, *RATS (Regression Analysis of Time Series) Version 2.00* (Minneapolis: VAR Econometrics, 1986)).

TABLE 1A *Tests of Parameter Constancy Across Sub-samples: Seats Held by Conservatives Preceding the 1987 Election**

Dependent variable: changes in vote shares				
Regressand	Sample	No. of regressors	SSR	Chow test:† distribution
$\Delta(S_L)$	$C_{XX} = 390$	10	2,282.3	3.02: $F(10,390)$
$\Delta(S_L)$	$C_{AX} = 265$	10	1,256.9	
$\Delta(S_L)$	$C_{LX} = 125$	10	853.4	
$\Delta(S_A)$	$C_{YA} = 390$	10	5,313.8	6.78: $F(10,390)$
$\Delta(S_A)$	$C_{AX} = 265$	10	3,136.9	
$\Delta(S_A)$	$C_{LX} = 125$	10	1,353.7	

Dependent variable: logarithms of vote shares				
Regressand	Sample	No of regressors‡	SSR	Chow test: distribution
$\log(S_L)$	$C_{X\lambda} = 390$	11	0.3267	3.63: $F(11,390)$
$\log(S_L)$	$C_{A\lambda} = 265$	11	0.2109	
$\log(S_L)$	$C_{L\lambda} = 125$	11	0.0838	
$\log(S_A)$	$C_{X\lambda} = 390$	11	0.2985	3.47: $F(11,390)$
$\log(S_A)$	$C_{A\lambda} = 265$	11	0.1851	
$\log(S_A)$	$C_{L\lambda} = 125$	11	0.0854	

*Symbols are:

L_{11} seats held by Labour in 1983, second-place party Conservative or Alliance

L_{11} seats held by Labour in 1983, second-place party Conservative

L_{11} seats held by Labour in 1983, second-place party Alliance

C_{11} seats held by Conservative in 1983, second-place party Labour or Alliance

C_{11} seats held by Conservative in 1983, second-place party Labour

C_{11} seats held by Conservative in 1983, second-place party Alliance

Numbers following indicate number of seats in the category; clearly $L_{XX} = L_{CX} + L_{AX}$ etc.

S_L, S_C, S_A shares of votes in each constituency won by Labour, Conservative, Alliance respectively

†Note that the tables contain all information necessary to calculate the test statistic: e.g., for the first case, $3.02 = [(2282.3 - 1256.9 - 853.4)/(1256.9 + 853.4)] \times [(265 + 125)/10]$.

‡The number of regressors increases by one simply because the change in vote share from 1983 to 1987 is split into the two shares, necessitated by the fact that the change may be negative so that the logarithmic transformation is not applicable. The share in 1983 becomes an extra regressor.

as professional, and constituents' average education. The data set also contains unemployment rates in 1984 and 1987, and a variable which divides the constituencies of Great Britain into five regions.¹¹ Finally we have the votes for each of the major parties in each constituency,¹² the total number of votes polled and the number of eligible electors, and various derived quantities.

¹¹ Regressions below include, of course, only four of the five so as not to produce perfect multicollinearity with the constant term. The (BBC-classified) regions are 1: North of England; 2: Midlands; 3: South; 4: Scotland; 5: Wales

¹² We exclude nationalist and other small parties from the sample, i.e. constituencies where one of these parties was first or second do not appear.

TABLE 1B *Tests of Parameter Constancy Across Sub-samples. Seats Held by Labour preceding the 1987 Election**

Dependent variable: changes in vote shares				
Regressand	Sample	No. of regressors	SSR	Chow test: distribution
$\Delta(S_C)$	$L_{XX} = 208$	9	2,103.5	2.50: $F(9,208)$
$\Delta(S_C)$	$L_{CX} = 161$	9	1,587.7	
$\Delta(S_C)$	$L_{AX} = 47$	9	293.1	
$\Delta(S_A)$	$L_{XX} = 208$	9	3,054.4	1.77: $F(9,208)$
$\Delta(S_A)$	$L_{CX} = 161$	9	2,346.4	
$\Delta(S_A)$	$L_{AX} = 47$	9	471.1	
Dependent variable: logarithms of vote shares				
Regressand	Sample	No. of regressors	SSR	Chow test: distribution
$\log(S_C)$	$L_{XX} = 208$	10	0.1944	3.11: $F(10,208)$
$\log(S_C)$	$L_{CX} = 161$	10	0.1393	
$\log(S_C)$	$L_{AX} = 47$	10	0.0276	
$\log(S_A)$	$L_{XX} = 208$	10	0.1931	2.86: $F(10,208)$
$\log(S_A)$	$L_{CX} = 161$	10	0.1387	
$\log(S_A)$	$L_{AX} = 47$	10	0.0290	

*See notes to Table 1a

We turn first to the tests of differences in voting patterns between constituencies where a given party is second and those where it is third. Table 1 reports test statistics for models in the changes in shares and logarithms of share of votes received by each party. To repeat, the object is to search for a significant difference in parties' success between constituencies where they would benefit from tactical votes and those where they would not; if tactical voting (and other tactical effects such as extra party effort in such constituencies) is insignificant, no difference should be detectable.

As the reader may verify, each of the test statistics in Table 1a exceeds the 1 per cent critical value for the corresponding distribution (that is, with 99 per cent confidence, there are differences between the sub-samples). Since the samples were split on the basis of the potential for tactical effects, we conclude that the null hypothesis that these effects have no or negligible impact on the results is rejected with 99 per cent confidence. This strong result pertains to anti-government tactical effects.

Tests reported in Table 1b pertain to seats won by the Labour party in 1983. The evidence here is much less clear, but does seem to point to an anti-Labour tactical effect. For models in changes in vote shares, the first statistic (testing differences across sub-samples in changes in the Conservative vote share) is just significant at a level of about 1 per cent; the second (analogous, but for changes in Alliance vote share) is significant at 10 per cent but not at 5 per cent. The weight of evidence seems to suggest a tactical effect, but one that is weaker than in the anti-government case. Results for the logarithmic models are stronger; however a cautionary note is in order here. While the strength of the results for anti-government tactical effects was robust to a number of changes of specification in the

equations estimated (not reported), at least one such change in the estimated model produced substantial reductions in the logarithmic models' test statistics for anti-Labour voting.

We have not yet been able to make any statement about the likely size of the tactical voting effect. Conclusions about this quantity are necessarily tentative, but we report results below which give some indication. In the course of doing so, we present some rudimentary evidence which may allow us to discriminate tactical voting from the effects of party effort.

The equation specifications that we adopt use the ΔS_i as the dependent variables, the advantage of this being the ease of interpretation of the coefficient estimates. Before beginning, some summary statistics describing the ΔS_i are in order.

Series	Sample mean	Standard deviation
ΔS_C	-0.556	3.620
ΔS_L	3.735	3.924
ΔS_A	-3.148	4.213

The overall average change in share of votes was only slightly negative for the Conservatives; average changes were more substantial for the other two parties.

Results are given in Table 2. We concentrate on anti-government tactical voting, and to do so we consider explanation of the changes in vote shares for the two opposition parties. Each of the regressions reported here contains a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the party being examined (i.e., Labour or Alliance) ran second to the Conservatives in 1983, and 0 otherwise; this 'tactical dummy' therefore selects constituencies in which anti-government tactical votes should have accrued to the party under consideration. Other explanatory variables include demographic data for each constituency and dummy variables to represent the region in which each constituency lies. The estimated equations are therefore of the form

$$\Delta S_L = \alpha_0 + \beta'X + \gamma'Z + \varepsilon_1 \text{ and } \Delta S_C = \delta_0 + \nu'X + \pi'Z + \varepsilon_2,$$

where α_0, δ_0 are constants, X is a vector of demographic data on each constituency and Z is a vector of dummy variables indicating region and party standing in the 1983 election. The dependent variables are again, of course, the vote shares defined above for the Labour and Alliance parties.

TACTICAL VOTING VERSUS PARTY EFFORT

One important ground on which the results below might be questioned is the following: the effect that we find might be explained not by tactical voting, but by greater effort by each party in constituencies where that party lies second. Clearly no fully satisfactory discrimination of these two effects will be possible without some direct measure of party effort, which is extremely difficult to obtain even in principle. There is, however, some reason to think that the effect which we identify is not accounted for solely by this phenomenon. The fairly stringent limits on expenditure by parties in constituency campaigns (although perhaps widely evaded) constitute a major obstacle to effective 'tactical campaigning'. Indeed, just prior to the 1987 campaign, the three major British parties all had to suspend national mailing campaigns tailored to individual constituency requirements, because they contravened the laws on constituency election expenditure.

In any event we can attempt to incorporate any party effort effect into our regressions by seeking a proxy. We therefore include in Table 2's regressions the percentage majority

TABLE 2A *Share of Vote (%) Regressions: Labour Party*

Dependent variable ΔS_L	Unrestricted		Restricted	
	Coef	t-stat.	Coef.	t-stat.
Regressor*				
COUNCIL	-0.008	-0.72	—	—
PROFML	0.96	3.18	0.91	2.98
EDUC	-0.90	-2.92	-0.81	-2.68
UNEMPCHG	0.23	1.50	—	—
UNEMP87	0.24	5.60	0.24	5.89
TACTICL	1.89	3.69	1.79	3.56
LABWON83	1.12	2.63	0.97	2.51
PCTMJ*TL	-0.06	-1.99	-0.06	-1.88
PROFML ²	-0.04	-1.94	-0.03	-1.80
EDUC ²	0.03	1.86	0.03	1.71
CONSTANT	-0.98	-1.00	-1.35	-1.45
BBCREG1	3.35	10.36	3.40	10.75
BBCREG2	0.41	1.13	0.40	1.11
BBCREG4	5.33	11.35	5.37	13.09
BBCREG5	5.65	10.67	5.56	10.97
R ²	0.502		0.499	
Standard error	2.801		2.803	
SSR	4,849.2		4,871.8	
Test of restrictions [distributed $F(2,633)$]:	1.4421			
Specification/heteroskedasticity:†	2.11 [$F(24,600)$]		2.42 [$F(22,602)$]	

*The variable PCTMJ*TL is simply the product of the percentage majority variable and TACTICL, the tactical dummy for Labour. PCTMJ*TA is defined analogously.

†See H. White, 'A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity', *Econometrica*, 48 (1980), 817-38. The null hypothesis is that the specification is valid and that errors are homoskedastic.

Note that we do not report a residual normality test as these are unreliable in models which do not have close fits.

The test is performed on seven variables only because of the number of products and cross-products to be calculated (see Hendry, *PC GIVE*). There is some dependence of the statistic on the variables chosen, results presented here are representative.

(i.e. $100 \times (V_W - V_S)/V_T$; V = number of votes received and subscripts W, S, T indicate winner, second place and total) in each constituency in 1983. This variable is multiplied by the dummy variables indicating constituencies in which tactical voting effects would be expected. The two resulting variables then give the percentage Conservative majority in districts where the Labour or Alliance parties ran second to the Conservatives; they are intended to capture the possibility that these parties will expend more effort in such districts. These regressions also include squares of two demographic variables in an attempt to capture some non-linearity in their effects. In each case we report for comparison a restricted regression in which some insignificant parameters are omitted. Estimates of the parameters of interest appear little affected by such changes.

TABLE 2B *Share of Vote (%) Regressions: Alliance*

Dependent variable ΔS_A	Unrestricted		Restricted	
	Coef.	t-stat.	Coef.	t-stat.
Regressor*				
COUNCIL	- 0.026	- 1.75	- 0.02	- 1.52
PROFML	- 1.03	- 2.50	- 1.06	- 2.65
EDUC	1.45	3.49	1.40	3.45
UNEMPCHG	- 0.06	- 0.29	—	—
UNEMP87	0.05	0.92	—	—
TACTICA	5.30	7.52	5.29	7.52
ALLWON83	2.39	2.85	2.33	2.80
PCTMJ*TA	- 0.12	- 4.96	- 0.13	- 5.14
PROFML ²	0.04	1.60	0.04	1.61
EDUC ²	- 0.07	- 2.62	- 0.06	- 2.50
CONSTANT	- 4.68	- 3.39	- 4.03	- 3.40
BBCREG1	- 0.89	- 2.11	- 0.83	- 1.99
BBCREG2	0.021	0.04	0.02	0.04
BBCREG4	- 2.27	- 3.55	- 2.34	- 3.81
BBCREG5	- 2.76	- 3.87	- 2.69	- 3.87
R^2	0.211		0.210	
Standard error	3.784		3.780	
SSR	8,848.5		8,860.8	
Test of restrictions [distributed $F(2,633)$]:	0.4315			
Specification/heteroskedasticity [$F(24,600)$]:	1.23 [$F(24,600)$]		2.31 [$F(22,602)$]	

As can be seen, the tactical voting effects that we find are not eliminated by the attempt to capture the other effect.¹³

Insofar as we are concerned with tactical voting, the interesting coefficients are those on the dummy variables TACTICL/TACTICA which pick out districts where Labour and the Alliance, respectively, were second to the Conservative Party. As Table 2 indicates, these variables are significant in each regression. The magnitude of the effect is also reasonably substantial, especially for the Alliance; in districts where anti-government tactical voting would favour the Alliance, their change in vote share was on average 5.30 percentage points¹⁴ higher (5.29 by the unrestricted regression) than otherwise. Given an overall average vote share of under 25 per cent, this suggests that a considerable fraction of 1987 Alliance votes were tactical ones in constituencies where they ran second to the Conservatives in 1983. Other regressions (not reported) yielded a more conservative result of 10–12 per cent of votes. For the Labour party, the effect is smaller at 1.89 percentage points,¹⁵ but none the less not insubstantial as a proportion of that party's average share of the vote.

¹³ Regressions without the percentage majority variable, reported in an earlier version of this Note, show somewhat lower *t*-statistics on the tactical dummies: approximately 3.6 for TACTICL and 5.8 for TACTICA.

¹⁴ Standard error of this coefficient estimate = 0.45.

¹⁵ Standard error = 0.32.

Note also that the variables PCTMJ*TL and PCTMJ*TA are significantly negative, indicating that vote shares for the opposition parties increase less where the Conservatives hold a larger majority. This variable seems a likely candidate to discriminate party effort effects; insofar as parties devote extra effort to constituencies which they hope to gain, this effort should surely be correlated with the probability of success, and therefore (negatively) with the size of the majority held by the Conservative incumbent. This variable should therefore capture party effort to the extent that effort is correlated with the existing plurality.

It is important to note that tactical voting could display a similar correlation. However we would expect it to be much lower, and hence expect that the dummy variables TACTICA/L will capture that effect. There are two reasons for this view. Firstly, we would not expect voters to be nearly as well informed about the percentage majority in the last election as party campaign strategists would be; hence campaign efforts should respond much more than tactical votes to the 'closeness' of the race. Secondly, tactical voting may remain a rational strategy even if the margin is large; however unlikely it is to bring about an acceptable outcome, tactical voting will still be more likely to help than voting for a (preferred) third place candidate.

Hence, again, we would expect the tactical voting variable to pick out primarily tactical voting and not party effort, and the percentage majority variable to do the opposite. Needless to say, our interpretation of the 'tactical effect' that we have identified as tactical voting depends upon this supposition having at least some value. The opposing argument – that tactical voting is related to size of majority in the same way as is party effort – is of course not untenable. Empirical discrimination between the two arguments would be facilitated by, for example, accurate direct measures of party effort.

CONCLUSION

We thus conclude that anti-government tactical voting appears to have been a significant factor in both Labour and Alliance support in the 1987 general election (with some evidence also of an anti-Labour tactical-voting effect). Our method has been to deduce the presence of these effects from aggregate electoral data, and we await with interest results from the various survey analyses of the election which may yield further insights. We should add, moreover, that our analysis does not necessarily capture those who might vote 'tactically' on the basis of national rather than constituency considerations (leaving aside the question of whether or not this would be a reasonable tactic to pursue), and again we await survey evidence on this point.

Our results are similar to some recent conclusions of Curtice and Steed.¹⁶ By way of qualification, however, note that these authors and Johnston have argued that national party outcomes can be affected by the long-term concentration of party support in areas of prior strength; in Johnston's view, party success may be affected by prior strength for reasons other than tactical voting.¹⁷ Moreover Curtice and Steed argue that the effect of an anti-Conservative tactical voting campaign is likely to be stronger in those constituencies where the Conservative party is already weak. Clearly the effects of a given number of

¹⁶ John Curtice and Michael Steed, Appendix 2 in David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, eds, *The British General Election of 1987* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

¹⁷ John Curtice and Michael Steed, 'Electoral Choice and the Production of Government: The Changing Operation of the Electoral System in the United Kingdom Since 1955', *British Journal of Political Science*, 12 (1982), 249–98; R. J. Johnston, 'Regional Variations in British Voting Trends 1966–1979: Tests of an Ecological Model', *Regional Studies*, 15 (1981), 23–32; R. J. Johnston, *The Geography of English Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

tactical votes on the national outcome will depend upon their distribution across constituencies, and if they are inefficiently distributed, the overall effect on each party's strength may be small.

The existence of widespread tactical voting in 1987 is a further indication of the 'fluidity' in electoral choice in Britain hinted at in recent election studies.¹⁸ Those who believed that the 'voter-information problem' and the imponderable consequences of tactical voting for the national result would preclude widespread tactical voting in 1987 were apparently mistaken. As Britain is likely to persist (at least in the short term) with the unstable combination of three/four party politics in a plurality voting system, politicians, political scientists and political commentators will have to be even more aware of the possible implications of tactical voting.

¹⁸ See Himmelweit *et al.*, *How Voters Decide*, Crewe and Sarlvik, *Decade of Dealignment*, Heath *et al.*, *How Britain Votes*

Attitudinal Tolerance and Political Freedom in Britain

DAVID G. BARNUM AND JOHN L. SULLIVAN

Tolerance is an important concept in democratic theory and a recurring issue in British history. With rare exceptions, however, conclusions about tolerance in Britain have been based on impressionistic rather than empirical evidence. Only a few research studies have addressed the subject of tolerance in Britain, and none has collected nationwide data on attitudinal tolerance among the British.¹

This Note examines patterns of attitudinal tolerance in Britain and speculates about the impact of those patterns on the status of political freedom in Britain. The analysis is based on recently collected survey data on attitudinal tolerance among members of the public and Members of Parliament in Britain.

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

We define tolerance – with Crick – as 'the degree to which we accept things of which we disapprove'.² In particular, we define attitudinal tolerance in the political sphere as the

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¹ Previous studies include Herbert Hyman, 'England and America: Climates of Tolerance and Intolerance – 1962', in Daniel Bell, ed., *The Radical Right* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 227–57; Ian Budge, *Agreement and Stability of Democracy* (Chicago: Markham, 1970); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase *et al.*, *Political Action* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979). For additional analysis of data from the Barnes and Kaase Study, see Edward N. Muller, Pertti Pesonen and Thomas O. Jukam, 'Support for Freedom of Assembly in Western Democracies', *European Journal of Political Research*, 8 (1980), 265–88; Alan Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977).

² Bernard Crick, 'Toleration and Tolerance in Theory and Practice', in Bernard Crick, ed., *Political Theory and Practice* (London: Allen Lane, 1971), p. 63.

willingness of citizens to grant basic rights to disliked groups. We emphasize at the outset that tolerance, in our view, *presupposes* antipathy. Thus, we reserve the label 'tolerant' for those respondents who, in order to express support for the basic rights of particular groups, have had to overcome negative feelings towards the groups themselves.³

The present study is based on opinion surveys of the general public and Members of Parliament in Britain. The survey of the public was conducted in 1986 and consisted of personal interviews with a probability sample of 1,266 adults in England, Scotland and Wales. The survey of Members of Parliament was conducted in 1985 and consisted of 107 MPs, of whom seventy-seven consented to answer our questions.⁴

Respondents in the mass survey were presented with a list of groups and were asked to indicate their feelings towards each group on an eleven-point scale, with one corresponding to 'like very much' and eleven to 'dislike very much'. Ten groups were presented to the public: Pro-abortionists, Anti-abortionists, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Communists, Democratic Unionist Party, Fascists, Freemasons, Militant Tendency, National Front and Sinn Féin. After respondents had indicated their feelings towards each group, they were asked to choose, from among those groups to which they had given the highest score, the one they disliked the most.⁵ Each respondent's choice of 'least-like group' became the subject of subsequent questions designed to assess tolerance.

The Parliamentary survey was similar. MPs were presented with a list of ten groups, from which they were asked to select their least-liked and their second least-liked group.⁶ Each MP's least-liked group then became the subject of questions designed to measure their levels of tolerance.

There were six tolerance items. Respondents were asked whether a member of their least-liked group: (1) should be allowed to teach in a state school; (2) should be allowed to run for public office; (3) should be allowed to form a lawful organization; (4) should be allowed to hold a public rally; (5) should be allowed to make a public speech; and (6) should be free from governmental wiretapping.⁷ Tolerance was defined as an affirmative response to these questions.⁸

³ Previous studies of attitudinal tolerance have not always been careful to control for respondents' feelings towards the groups they were being asked to tolerate. As a result, it was always theoretically possible that some proportion of respondents who voiced support for the basic rights of a specified group did so not because they were 'tolerant' – as we define the term – but because they viewed the group itself with sympathy or indifference. For a critical assessment of previous studies of tolerance, see John L. Sullivan, James Piereson and George E. Marcus, 'A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases, 1950s–1970s', *American Political Science Review*, 73 (1979), 781–94. John L. Sullivan, James Piereson and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

⁴ Both surveys were conducted for the authors by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI).

⁵ Respondents were also given an opportunity to name a group they disliked even more than any included in our list. About 3 per cent of the citizen respondents named such a group.

⁶ The list of groups presented to MPs was identical to that presented to the general public except that it included the Workers' Revolutionary Party instead of Militant Tendency. About 2 per cent of MPs chose as their least-liked group one which had not been included in our original list.

⁷ For additional information about the format of the survey items, see Table 1.

⁸ We readily acknowledge that not everyone would agree that to be tolerant one must be willing to allow a member of Sinn Féin to teach in a state school or members of the National Front to hold a public rally. There is of course a profound ambiguity implicit in many issues of civil liberty. For purposes of the present analysis, however, the 'permissive' position is equated with 'tolerance'. In the meantime, we welcome any tendency of our analysis to stimulate further debate on the meaning of

The analysis which follows is divided into two sections. Firstly, we shall discuss the structure of attitudinal tolerance in Britain and the impact of that structure on the status of political freedom in Britain. Secondly, we shall compare levels of attitudinal tolerance among members of the public and Members of Parliament in Britain and explore the question of the role of political elites in maintaining political freedom in a majoritarian democracy.

ATTITUDINAL TOLERANCE AND POLITICAL FREEDOM

Scholars who conducted the first empirical studies of attitudinal tolerance among Americans in the 1950s were optimistic about what they would find. They assumed that popular support for democratic values was a prerequisite of democracy and that since the United States was a democracy, its citizens gave widespread support to those values.⁹ The early scholars were in for a shock. Their research, and that which followed, found evidence of widespread intolerance.¹⁰ Studies focusing on a broader array of democratic norms found a lack of consensual support for all but the most abstract statements of democratic principles.¹¹

Based on our measures of tolerance, citizens in Britain and the United States are strikingly similar. Table 1 presents data measuring respondents' tolerance in the United States in 1978 and 1987 and in Britain in 1986. The proportion of respondents who offer tolerant responses reaches or exceeds 50 per cent on only two items. On three critical items – whether respondents think their least-liked group should be banned from running for public office, banned altogether, or prevented from holding public rallies – support for the tolerant position ranges from a quarter to a third.¹²

If one makes the assumption that in a democracy public policy should, and to a degree does, reflect the majority's preferences, the survey results from Britain and the United States suggest that three critical democratic rights – to demonstrate in public, to form a

tolerance in a complicated world. See, e.g., the symposium, 'Toleration', *Government and Opposition*, 6 (1971), 144–242; David G. Barnum, 'Freedom of Assembly and the Hostile Audience in Anglo-American Law', *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 29 (1981), 59–96; Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*, Chap. 1; Lee Bollinger, *The Tolerant Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); David A. J. Richards, *Toleration and the Constitution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

⁹ Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamenatz and J. Roland Pennock, 'Cultural Prerequisites for a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium', *American Political Science Review*, 50 (1956), 101–37.

¹⁰ Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', *American Political Science Review*, 70 (1976), 80–100; Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*.

¹¹ James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 276–94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 58 (1964), 361–82; Dennis Chong, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, 'Patterns of Support for Democratic and Capitalist Values in the United States', *British Journal of Political Science*, 13 (1983), 401–40; Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, *Dimensions of Tolerance* (New York: Russell Sage, 1983).

¹² Independently of the research reported here, a cooperative project on Anglo-American attitudes was inaugurated in 1985. On fourteen items dealing with civil liberties, the attitudes of British and American respondents were very similar. See James A. Davis, 'British and American Attitudes: Similarities and Contrasts', in Roger Jowell, Sharon Witherspoon and Lindsay Brook, eds, *British Social Attitudes: The 1986 Report* (London: Gower, 1986).

TABLE 1 *Levels of Tolerance Among the United States' and British Publics*

Least-liked group should:	Percentage tolerant		
	Britain 1986*	US 1987	US 1978
Be allowed to teach in state schools	14%	18%	19%
Be banned from running for office†	27%	27%	16%‡
Be banned (outlawed)†	31%	32%	29%
Be allowed to hold a public rally	34%	33%	34%
Be allowed to make a public speech	51%	50%	50%
Have phones tapped by government†	62%	63%	59%
N	1,266	1,215	1,509

Sources. The survey of the British electorate was conducted for the authors by Market Opinion Research International in the autumn of 1986. The 1987 American results are from James L. Gibson, 'The Evolution of Intolerance in the United States' (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Convention, Chicago, 1987). The 1978 American results are from Sullivan *et al*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*.

*In the British survey, the tolerance questions were asked in two different formats to a split sample. Half of the sample was asked to agree or disagree with particular statements. The other half of the sample was presented with both sides of the issue and was asked to indicate the side with which they agreed. In this table, the results are pooled.

†For these three items, disagreement was the tolerant response.

‡Respondents in the 1978 US survey were asked whether a member of their least-liked group should be banned from 'being President' rather than banned from 'running for public office'. Presumably, this difference in question wording explains the lower percentage tolerant in that survey.

lawful organization, and to run for public office – might be in jeopardy. There is no evidence of 'consensual' appreciation among citizens that disliked groups should retain these basic rights. On the contrary, a majority expresses opposition to allowing their least-liked group to exercise these rights.

Levels of attitudinal intolerance are not, however, the whole story. Although tolerance is not widespread among the British, neither – we are assuming – is Britain a nation in which civil liberties are notably in danger. Evidently there are additional factors that play an important and 'compensatory' role in defining the content of political freedom in Britain.¹³

In this context it is useful to direct attention to aspects of the structure of public opinion which are distinct from *levels* of attitudinal tolerance. In particular, the consequences of high levels of intolerance may be mitigated by the extent to which the antipathy of citizens – and consequently the intolerance of at least some of those citizens – is dispersed among an ideologically heterogeneous set of groups. Some societies may exhibit 'pluralistic intolerance', that is, high levels of intolerance combined with ideological diversity among their target groups. Others may exhibit 'focused intolerance', that is,

¹³ For an argument that the ultimate purpose of social scientific research on attitudinal tolerance should be to gain a better understanding of the status of 'individual-level political freedom' in societies, see James L. Gibson and Arthur J. Anderson, 'The Political Implications of Elite and Mass Tolerance', *Political Behavior*, 7 (1985), 118–46.

TABLE 2 *Target Group Selection Patterns Among the British Public*

	Percentage selecting each group as least-liked
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament	3
Communists	12
Sinn Fein	25
Militant Tendency	5
Total (left-wing groups)	45
Democratic Unionist Party	1
Fascists	19
Freemasons	1
National Front	26
Total (right-wing groups)	47
Pro-abortionists	3
Anti-abortionists	1
Other	3

Source. MORI, survey of the British electorate, 1986.

high levels of intolerance whose impact is concentrated on one group or a category of groups.¹⁴

Table 2 shows the proportion of respondents who selected each of the ten groups on our list as their least-liked group. The data strongly support the conclusion that the negative feelings of the British are directed at a broad rather than a narrow spectrum of groups. Four groups – Communists, Fascists, Sinn Fein and the National Front – are particularly prone to be disliked. Each group, however, has its share of detractors. More important, if we exclude pro-abortion and anti-abortion groups and divide the remaining eight groups into two ideological categories, almost identical proportions of respondents choose left-wing and right-wing targets.¹⁵

Of course, Table 2 only establishes that the negative feelings of the British public, in the aggregate, are directed at an ideologically diverse set of groups. This evidence is hardly sufficient, in itself, to establish that dissident groups in Britain are likely to be insulated from the effects of high levels of intolerance. In particular, if left-wing groups are despised by citizens on the right, and right-wing groups are despised by citizens on the left – and if the levels of intolerance is high – then serious problems remain. Under these circumstances, if control of the government in a parliamentary system were to pass into the

¹⁴ See, e.g., Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*; John L. Sullivan, Michal Shamir, Patrick Walsh and Nigel S. Roberts, *Political Tolerance in Context: Support for Civil Liberties in the United States, Israel, and New Zealand* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); James L. Gibson, 'Pluralistic Intolerance in America: A Reconsideration', *American Politics Quarterly*, 14 (1986), 267–93.

¹⁵ American citizens also direct their antipathy at an ideologically diverse array of groups: see Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Israel, on the other hand, is a society in which high levels of intolerance are focused on a narrow spectrum of groups: see Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance in Context*; Michal Shamir and John L. Sullivan, 'The Political Context of Tolerance: The United States and Israel', *American Political Science Review*, 77 (1983), 911–28.

TABLE 3 *Target Group Selection Among Partisan and Ideological Groups in Britain*

Respondent's least-liked group is:	Respondent's party is:			Respondent's ideology is:		
	Cons. %	Other* %	Lab. %	Right-wing %	Middle %	Left-wing %
Left-wing	65	40	39	62	48	33
Right-wing†	35	60	61	38	52	67
N	336	197	309	273	465	188

Source MORI, survey of the British electorate, 1986.

*Includes Social Democrats and Liberals.

†The pro-abortion, anti-abortion, and 'other' groups were not included in this table.

hands of a political party which clearly represented one end of the ideological spectrum, the rights of citizens on the other end could be gravely endangered.

Previous studies have suggested that ideology might not be a prominent or deeply divisive factor in British politics. Klingemann argued that ideological awareness was in many respects less well developed in Britain than in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States.¹⁶ Butler and Stokes concluded that 'a large majority of the [British] electorate apparently [gives] left and right no political meaning at all'.¹⁷

Our data can be seen as consistent with these generalizations. Table 3 shows that party identification and ideological self-placement *are* related to respondents' selection of a least-liked group. These relationships, however, are not overpowering. A third or more of those who identify with the Conservative Party or with the right wing nevertheless choose a right-wing group as the one they like the least, and comparable levels of disdain for left-wing groups are found among those who identify with the Labour Party or the left wing. In one sense, then, there is no dramatic tendency among the British to direct their antipathy at those on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum.

Of course, the fact that respondents do not invariably direct their antipathy at groups on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum does not preclude the conclusion that target group selection has ideological roots. The primary fear of those with moderately left-wing views, for instance, may be that extremist groups on the left will discredit the entire left wing in the minds of the public. Thus, they may harbour more antipathy towards selected groups on the left than towards any group on the right.

In any event, Table 3 does not suggest a strong tendency among the British to direct their antipathy at those on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. None the less, there remains some potential for partisan or ideological mischief. Between three-fifths and two-thirds of respondents do locate their least-liked group on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum from themselves: thus a process could be set in motion which eventually posed a serious danger to political freedom in Britain.

¹⁶ Hans D. Klingemann, 'Measuring Ideological Conceptualizations', in Barnes and Kaase *et al.*, eds, *Political Action*, 215-54.

¹⁷ David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1974), p. 337. For an alternative view of the role of ideology in British politics, see Elinor Scarbrough, *Political Ideology and Voting* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

TABLE 4 *Partisanship, Ideology and Focus on Left-wing and Right-wing Groups*

Respondent chooses*	Respondent's party:			Respondent's ideology:		
	Cons. %	Other %	Lab. %	Right %	Moderate %	Left %
Only left-wing groups	14	5	11	11	11	9
Only right-wing groups	7	17	24	6	15	34
Both left-wing and right-wing groups	76	69	60	78	68	51
Neither	3	8	5	5	6	6
<i>N</i>	358	209	339	289	499	205

Source: MORI, survey of the British electorate, 1986.

*Focus is determined by the number of scores of '11' (extreme dislike) given by respondents to left-wing and right-wing groups. Respondents who assigned '11' only to left-wing groups are in the first row, those who assigned '11' only to right-wing groups are in the second row; respondents who assigned '11' to at least one group from each extreme are in the third row; and respondents who assigned no '11s' are in the fourth row.

The likelihood of such a process, however, may well depend on the degree to which target group selection on the part of *individuals* is ideologically homogeneous. We addressed this question empirically by providing respondents with an opportunity to rank all ten groups on our list on a scale from 1 to 11. This allowed us to identify the various groups which each respondent claimed to 'dislike very much'.¹⁸ Members of the public expressed maximum antipathy towards an average of 3.23 groups. However, relatively few respondents confined their choice of maximally disliked groups to one end of the ideological spectrum; in fact, most respondents exhibited maximum antipathy towards at least one group on *each end* of the ideological spectrum. Table 4 presents these data, controlling for respondents' party identification and ideological self-placement. Among each category of respondents, a majority expressed maximum dislike for at least one group from each end of the ideological spectrum.¹⁹

The data in Table 4 reinforce the conclusion that Britain is a society in which popular antipathy for dissident groups is fragmented rather than focused. Not only do respondents in the aggregate distribute their choice of a least-liked group across the ideological spectrum, but a majority of individual respondents professes maximum antipathy for an ideologically diverse subset of the ten groups. In at least two important respects, therefore, Britain would seem to be a society in which the ideological diversity among target groups could impede the translation of high levels of public intolerance into restrictions on political freedom.

¹⁸ 'Dislike very much' was operationalized as a score of 11. This scale was used only in the survey of the general public.

¹⁹ The data also show, of course, that large minorities of left-wing self-identifiers (34 per cent) and Labour party identifiers (24 per cent) direct their antipathy exclusively at right-wing groups. Even among the left, however, a majority includes at least one left-wing group among their choices. More surprising is the fact that 11 per cent of Labour party identifiers and 9 per cent of the left-wing identifiers direct their antipathy *exclusively* at left-wing groups.

However, optimism or relief may not be the most appropriate reaction to these findings. Evidence of ideological diversity among the public's target groups *could* support the inference that the impact of high levels of intolerance in Britain is neutralized. In the present context, however, the concept of 'neutralization' is ironic. Britain is a society in which a variety of groups on both the left and the right are despised by a substantial segment of the population. Under the circumstances – circumstances which also prevail, incidentally, in the United States – the stage is set for a consensus to form around the desirability of limiting the rights of groups on *both* extremes of the ideological spectrum. Before adopting this pessimistic assessment, however, it is imperative to examine the attitudes of a key sub-group of citizens – the political elites.

ELITE TOLERANCE AND POLITICAL FREEDOM

Many studies of attitudinal tolerance among Americans have collected comparative data on citizens who were exceptionally active in politics. Scholars have invariably discovered that attitudinal tolerance is more widespread among politically active citizens than among the general public.²⁰ These and other studies also demonstrated a positive correlation between education and tolerance.²¹ The discovery of widespread intolerance among the public, combined with the simultaneous discovery of greater tolerance among politically active citizens, led to the articulation of 'elite' or 'elitist' theories of democracy.²² The unexamined premise of these theories was that the United States was in fact a democracy with a history of concern for the basic rights of unpopular minorities. Given evidence of public insensitivity to basic rights, the mantle of 'carriers of the creed' or 'guardians of democracy' was inherited by those citizens who were more politically active, better educated, or both.

Our study of attitudinal tolerance and political freedom in Britain included a sample of Members of Parliament. As we acknowledge below, MPs hardly exhaust the category of citizens who are politically active in Britain. Clearly, however, Members of Parliament represent prime examples of political activists and prime candidates for the role of 'guardians of democracy'. It is therefore valuable to ascertain their levels of attitudinal tolerance.

Table 5 presents the pattern of target group selection among MPs, as well as the relationship between target group selection and partisanship, and between target group selection and ideology. As a group, MPs, like British citizens, choose left-wing and right-wing groups as their least-liked in approximately equal proportions. MPs are more likely than the general public, however, to base their choice of a least-liked group on their party identification and their ideological self-placement. Especially evident is the tendency of Labour party members, and those who place themselves on the left, to choose a right-wing target group. Within Parliament, therefore, there is some evidence that the rights of

²⁰ Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*; McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics'; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett, Jr, and J. Allen Williams, Jr, *Tolerance for Nonconformity* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); McClosky and Brill, *Dimensions of Tolerance*.

²¹ See, for example, Prothro and Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy'; Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance'; Sullivan *et al*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*.

²² Prothro and Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy'; McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics'; Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961); V. O. Key, Jr, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

TABLE 5 *Target Group Selection Patterns Among Members of Parliament*

Least-liked group is:**	All MPs* %	MPs' party		MPs' ideology		
		Cons. %	Lab. %	Right-wing %	Middle %	Left-wing %
Left-wing	52	76	10	72	69	11
Right-wing	48	24	90	28	31	89
N	63	41	21	29	13	18

Source: MORI, survey of Members of Parliament, 1985.

*Excludes two Social Democrats and Liberals.

**Abortion and 'other' groups were not included in this table. Twelve per cent of the MPs either selected other groups or selected multiple groups and declined to identify which particular group they disliked the most.

groups on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum from those who control the government could be in jeopardy.

This evidence of partisanship in target group selection is offset, however, by the data on attitudinal tolerance itself. Table 6 compares levels of tolerance among MPs and the public on the six items in our survey. On five of the six items, MPs are substantially more tolerant than members of the public.²³ Between two-thirds and four-fifths of MPs voice support for the right of members of their least-liked group to hold a public rally, run for office, form a lawful organization, or make a public speech. A third of the MPs would even permit a member of their least-liked group to teach in state schools.²⁴

The data in Table 6 raise the possibility that in Britain, as in the United States, the most politically active segment of the population plays a central role in ensuring the application of the fundamental principles of democracy. Indeed, we might go further and integrate our findings on elite tolerance with our findings on the structure of mass attitudes. Perhaps what is critical to the preservation of political freedom in Britain is not levels of elite tolerance, as such, but rather the fact that the fragmented structure of mass attitudes offers the political elites considerable latitude in formulating policies on issues of civil liberties. Disagreement among the public on the targets of their intolerance may allow the elites this autonomy. Of course, it is still possible that the public could induce Members of Parliament to suppress both the left and the right. It is more likely, however, that the failure of the public to focus exclusively on a particular set of target groups

²³ A major finding of Budge's study was that support for democratic principles was substantially more widespread among MPs and parliamentary candidates than among voters. See Budge, *Agreement and Stability of Democracy*.

²⁴ The general public registers a higher level of tolerance than the Members of Parliament on the governmental wiretapping question. The wiretapping item explicitly mentions 'the government' and apparently evokes images of 'Big Brother' among the public. Among the MPs, however, it apparently evokes more trusting images of concerned and responsible officials monitoring extremist groups to ensure the public safety. It is significant that in previous surveys of attitudinal tolerance among mass publics in the United States, Israel and New Zealand, ordinary citizens were also more likely to express tolerant views on the item on telephone wiretapping than on any other item. See Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance in Context*, p. 116.

TABLE 6 *Levels of Tolerance Among the British Public and MPs*

Tolerance item	Percentage tolerant	
	Public	MPs
Teach in schools	14%	36%
Run for office	27%	70%
Be banned (outlawed)	31%	75%
Hold rallies	34%	64%
Make speeches	51%	81%
Have phones tapped	62%	49%
Average	35%	63%
N	1,266	77

Source: MORI, surveys of the British electorate, 1986, and of Members of Parliament, 1985

allows Members of Parliament and other political elites to play a dominant role in defining political freedom in Britain.

We assert these conclusions with some trepidation. Social scientists have made relatively little progress in the years since the advent of survey research in refining and substantiating the 'elite theory of democracy'. McClosky noted in 1964 that 'whether a consensus among the influentials is either a necessary or sufficient condition for democratic stability is not really known'.²⁵ This observation remains true today. If the conditions of political freedom in Britain are in fact satisfactory – a judgement which itself is hardly beyond debate²⁶ – we cannot know for certain whether this state of affairs is due to the direct, autonomous involvement of relatively tolerant legislative elites. Primary responsibility for preserving democratic rights might be exercised, for instance, not by elected officials, but by auxiliary, non-legislative elites such as judges or unelected administrative officials.²⁷

Similarly, political freedom in Britain could be at risk even if legislative elites continue to be primarily responsible for policy making and continue to exhibit strong support for the application of democratic norms. Under certain circumstances, high levels of mass intolerance can result in the enactment of policies that more accurately reflect public than elite sentiments.²⁸ In addition, an exclusive focus on national-level elites obscures the

²⁵ McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', p. 377.

²⁶ See, for example, David G. Smith, 'British Civil Liberties and the Law', *Political Science Quarterly*, 101 (1986), 637–60; Peter Wallington, ed., *Civil Liberties 1984* (London: Martin Robertson, 1984); Harry Street, *Freedom, the Individual and the Law* (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin Books, 1982); David G. Barnum, 'The Constitutional Status of Public Protest Activity in Britain and the United States', *Public Law*, 1977 (1977), 310–44.

²⁷ See David G. Barnum, 'Constitutional Organization and the Protection of Human Rights in Britain and the United States', in John R. Schmidhauser, ed., *Comparative Judicial Systems* (London: Butterworths, 1987), pp. 183–99.

²⁸ See David G. Barnum, 'Decision Making in a Constitutional Democracy: Policy Formation in the Skokie Free Speech Controversy', *Journal of Politics*, 44 (1982), 480–508.

critical role of lower-level participants in the policy-making and policy-implementing process. Such officials – for instance, the police, magistrates, school administrators and local council members – are also ‘elites’. Unlike Members of Parliament, however, they are not necessarily more tolerant than the public. Moreover, their role in defining the content of individual-level political freedom may be as great or greater than that of national-level legislative officials.

On balance, however, it seems fair to conclude that political elites play a particularly significant role in protecting democratic rights in Britain. Our data indicate that high levels of attitudinal tolerance prevail among Members of Parliament. This finding confirms the existence of the principal factual prerequisite of a theory positing the special responsibility of political elites for preserving civil liberties. Given the critical policy-making role of Members of Parliament, it is reasonable to conclude that but for their active participation in the policy-making process, the status of political freedom in Britain would be less secure than it is.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing speculation may capture, in part, the dynamic process that defines the status of political freedom in Britain. A majority of citizens would not allow a member of their least-liked group to run for public office, form a lawful organization, or hold a public rally. At the same time, citizens direct their antipathy at a diverse rather than homogeneous set of groups. Moreover, attitudinal tolerance is substantially more prevalent among Members of Parliament than among members of the public. These findings, combined with objective evidence that the status of political freedom in Britain is satisfactory, are consistent with the conclusion that the political elites are primarily responsible for safeguarding and perpetuating the principles of democracy in Britain.

Citizen Forecasting: Can Voters See into the Future?

MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK AND ANDREW SKALABAN

‘Future known in advance is an absurdity.’ (Jacob Burckhardt)

‘Knowledge is knowing.’ (Gertrude Stein)

‘You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.’ (Bob Dylan)

Political science, unlike economics, does not have a long tradition of forecasting models. However, this is changing. Currently, there is considerable interest in election forecasting. The basis for the interest is a flurry of related publications on House, Senate and

presidential elections.¹ A common goal for these studies is the development of a model, inevitably based on aggregate time-series data, which predicts election returns. The resulting models, some of which are quite accurate, can differ a good deal in specification and estimation. Also, they vary in complexity, making them more or less accessible to the engaged voter.

Some forecasters suggest such models should be relatively easy to understand and use, in order that citizens can utilize them.² Nevertheless, this still implies working with prediction equations, a tall order to impose on the American public. But, fortunately, many citizens seem to know what is going to happen already, without resort to statistical formulas. After all, in everyday life, there are many things we 'know', even in the absence of experts or charts.

In politics, citizens assert they know things, as when they say 'everyone knows' Reagan will be re-elected. But, is such an assertion true? That is, before the 1984 presidential election, did 'everyone' (or 'almost everyone') say that Reagan would win? In general, can the American electorate forecast the presidential victor, well before the event? If so, why are American voters able to forecast presidential contests to the extent they can? Is it because of 'luck', 'bias', 'connections', 'education', 'closeness to election day', or some other reason? These questions, along with the general implications of citizen forecasting, will be explored below

CAN VOTERS FORECAST THE PRESIDENTIAL WINNER?

Data on the dependent variable come from a rather neglected item in the National Election Studies: 'Who do you think will be elected President in November?' This question has been posed in presidential pre-election surveys since 1956. The answers allow us to estimate how well the electorate forecasted the winner in each of these presidential contests. What should we expect the estimates to look like? In some ways, the null hypothesis is most plausible. That is, citizens do not possess crystal balls, therefore their guesses will be essentially random, with some having 'good luck' and others having 'bad luck'. Thus,

¹ Alan I. Abramowitz and Jeffery A. Segal, 'Determinants of the Outcomes of US Senate Elections', *Journal of Politics*, 48 (1986), 433-9; James E. Campbell, 'Forecasting the 1986 Midterm Elections to the House of Representatives', *PS*, 19 (1986), 83-7; James E. Campbell, 'Evaluating the 1986 Congressional Election Forecasts', *PS*, 20 (1987), 37-41; Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., 'President Reagan's Mandate from the 1980 Elections: A Shift to the Right?', *American Politics Quarterly*, 10 (1982), 387-420; Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983); Michael S. Lewis-Beck, 'Election Forecasts in 1984: How Accurate Were They?', *PS*, 18 (1985), 53-62; Michael S. Lewis-Beck, 'A Model Performance', *Public Opinion*, 9 (March-April 1987), 57-8; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, 'Forecasting US House Elections', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 9 (1984), 475-86; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, 'Forecasting Presidential Elections: A Comparison of Naive Models', *Political Behavior*, 6 (1984), 9-21; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, 'Are Senate Election Outcomes Predictable?', *PS*, 18 (1985), 745-54; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, James A. Stimson and Richard W. Waterman, 'Inter-227-47; S. J. Rosenstone, *Forecasting Presidential Elections* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983); Edward R. Tufte, *Political Control of the Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Evans Witt, 'A Model Election?', *Public Opinion*, 5 (December-January 1983), 46-9.

² Campbell, 'Forecasting the 1985 Midterm Elections to the House of Representatives', p. 85; Lewis-Beck, 'Election Forecasts in 1984: How Accurate Were They?', pp. 60-2.

in the sample as a whole about 50 per cent should guess right, the other 50 per cent wrong, given the basic two-candidate character of the races.

Do the data support this null hypothesis? Yes, for 1976, where there was an almost even split between Carter and Ford, with 52 per cent 'calling' Carter. However, evidence from other years suggests that citizen forecasting is anything but random (see Figure 1). In the most recent contest, 87 per cent correctly foresaw that Reagan would best Mondale. With certain other elections, the accuracy is even greater. For instance, in 1964 fully 92 per cent predicted that Johnson would triumph over Goldwater. This seems an extremely clear example of the talked-about pre-election situation in which 'everyone knows' the outcome. Overall, averaging across these eight surveys, an estimated 69 per cent of the voters correctly forecasted the presidential winner. Moreover, and more important, they made their forecasts well before the election. In fact, it is typically about a month before. (Looking at the median interview time for each survey, 7 October is the middle date.) Obviously, much more than 'luck' is behind these guesses. Below, we evaluate various hypotheses about the determinants of forecasting ability, looking first at political factors, then at social and situational ones.




Fig. 1. Correct citizen forecasts by election year
Source: American National Election Studies, 1956-84

SKILL AT FORECASTING: POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT DOES NOT HELP

What kinds of political actions or attitudes might enhance forecasting skills? Certainly not partisanship itself, which merely induces bias into individual forecasts (e.g., strong Republican identifiers tend to predict Republican winners). However, once party bias is controlled for, a politically active citizen might be at an advantage in various ways as a forecaster. According to political lore, 'insiders' know what is 'really going on'. Active political participants – those who work in campaigns, attend meetings, try to influence others, give money – are certainly more 'inside' the process than others. Even those whose participation is more passive, but who express much 'interest' in politics, ought to be more knowledgeable forecasters. Besides participation, political involvement manifests itself in information-seeking. We hypothesize that voters who follow (or are at least exposed to) election news in the media – television, radio, newspapers – are more likely to be able to forecast accurately. After all, they would seem to have more information, which should lead to more understanding. Indeed, to the degree voters see the electoral process as less complicated, we reason that they should be better forecasters.

TABLE 1 *A Political Model of Citizen Forecasting**

	Forecast = $b_0 + b_1(\text{PID}) + b_2(\text{Partic}) + b_3(\text{Interest}) + b_4(\text{Media}) + b_5(\text{Complic}) + e$						
	Constant	PID	Partic.	Interest	Media	Complic.	R ²
1956	0.729	0.35† (14.96)	-0.07† (-2.82)	-0.09† (-2.98)	0.07† (2.85)	-0.07 (-1.66)	0.15
1960	-0.294	0.46† (11.59)	0.02 (0.39)	0.02 (0.47)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (-0.10)	0.16
1964	0.754	0.14† (7.65)	-0.03 (-1.65)	0.01 (0.67)	0.02 (1.14)	-0.04 (-1.23)	0.05
1968	0.141	0.43† (13.25)	0.02 (-0.50)	0.09 (2.32)	0.02 (0.49)	0.07 (1.31)	0.15
1972	0.901	0.10† (5.14)	-0.03 (-1.50)	0.01 (0.39)	0.01 (0.56)	-0.07 (-1.88)	0.03
1976	-0.146	0.39† (12.92)	0.04 (1.40)	0.08† (2.25)	-0.03 (-1.00)	-0.07 (-1.28)	0.10
1980	-0.111	0.41† (11.39)	0.08 (1.85)	0.02 (0.51)	0.02 (0.47)	-0.04 (-0.60)	0.12
1984	0.780	0.20† (10.54)	-0.00 (-0.02)	-0.03 (-1.44)	0.06† (2.92)	-0.07† (-2.36)	0.07

* The codes, consistent across the surveys, are as follows: PID (+1 = partisan identification that coincides with that of the eventual winner, 0 = independent, and -1 = party identification that is the same as the eventual loser); Partic. (an additive index ranging from 0 to 4, in which respondents were assigned a 1 for doing any of the following acts of participation: contributing money, working for a candidate, trying to influence others, or attending a political meeting); Interest (3 = a great deal of interest in the campaign, 2 = some interest in the campaign, and 1 = little or no interest in the presidential campaign); Media (an additive index ranging from 0 to 3, in which each respondent was assigned a score depending upon whether or not he reported having watched news about the campaign on television, heard something about the race on the radio, or read about the campaign in newspapers); Complic. (1 = believes that politics are too complicated to understand, and 0 = does not believe that politics are too complicated). The dependent variable, 'Forecast', is coded +1 (a correct forecast) and -1 (an incorrect forecast). The numbers in parentheses are *t*-ratios.

† indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level, two tail.

The foregoing suggests a political model, where forecasting accuracy is a function of participation, interest, media use, and perceived complexity (after controlling for party identification bias). Table 1 shows the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates for such a model, for each presidential pre-election survey from 1956–1984. (Probit and logit procedures were also applied, yielding estimates which virtually duplicate statistical significance values arrived at herein.) Our global hypothesis – political involvement leads to better forecasts – fails to be supported. The coefficients of the relevant variables – participation, interest, media, complexity – are inconsistently signed, and seldom achieve statistical significance (at 0.05). These essentially null findings persisted, despite serious efforts to challenge them. (That is, the variables were also included singly and in different combinations; various interaction effects were explored; alternative indexes were tried; other controls, such as education and vote intention, were applied.) One conclusion seems hard to avoid: politically attentive publics do not distinguish themselves as political forecasters.³

SKILL AT FORECASTING: EDUCATION AND TIMING DO HELP

Political attributes may not help one's forecasting skills, but certain sociological ones do. In particular, educational attainment matters. The more formal education the voter has, the better at presidential forecasting he or she is. In almost all of these pre-election surveys, the education variable has a highly significant coefficient, even after the imposition of a rigorous control variable, 'vote intention'. (It could be argued that this control is essential, in order to avoid 'rationalization' of the forecast.) More particularly, for six of the eight elections, the education coefficient is decidedly significant, with an average positive *t*-ratio of about 4.0. Why does more education relate to a voter's forecasting ability? Certainly, it would seem to have little, if anything, to do with knowledge directly acquired in school. The process is more subtle. Greater education tends to bring a more extensive social network and thus more extensive social knowledge. When queried about the course of major national events like elections, those with more schooling can bring tools to bear, and yield up somewhat more accurate judgements. Furthermore, the more educated, because of their greater training, are perhaps more efficient seekers and gatherers of the relevant information. At bottom, of course, is Jefferson's notion that a better-educated citizenry makes for a better democracy.

In trying to account for individual forecasting ability, we have thus far focused on the activities and characteristics of voters themselves, especially their politics and sociology. We have ignored features of the task itself. But, it is obvious that certain situational variables can vary the difficulty of the forecast. 'Lead time' is a very important factor affecting political forecasting accuracy.⁴ How long is it until the event to be forecast? In these NES

³ Another possible variable to predict forecast accuracy would be whether a voter had been following the polls. Unfortunately, this question was never asked in these NES data (with the exception of a 1980 panel). However, we do have plentiful data on media usage, which would be the vehicle for poll-watching. The media variable (see Table 1) is significant in only two of the eight contests. Thus, while information about polls is available almost exclusively through the media, the tendency to be a heavy media consumer makes little difference in our model. Furthermore, and perhaps more important, there is evidence that, although poll stories have become a much more common news event over time (e.g., the number of poll stories on American network television news broadcasts more than doubled between 1972 and 1980), the overall ability of the electorate to predict the winner of presidential elections follows no such time trend (see Figure 1).

⁴ Lewis-Beck, 'Election Forecasts in 1984: How Accurate Were They?'

TABLE 2 *A Situational Model of Citizen Forecasting**

	Forecast = $b_0 + b_1(\text{PID}) + b_2(\text{Vote Intent}) + b_3(\text{Education}) + b_4(\text{Time}) + e$					
	Constant	PID	Vote Intent	Education	Time	R ²
1956	-0.125	0.07† (2.25)	0.80† (14.56)	0.04† (2.62)	0.04† (1.80)	0.29
1960	-0.889	0.15† (3.53)	0.97† (12.58)	-0.01 (-0.58)	0.13† (4.04)	0.36
1964	0.356	0.02 (0.86)	0.47† (12.69)	0.03† (2.98)	0.01 (0.85)	0.16
1968	-0.226	0.14† (3.91)	0.77† (12.73)	0.12† (6.57)	-0.03 (-1.03)	0.30
1972	0.496	0.02 (1.28)	0.35† (13.80)	0.03† (3.93)	0.01 (0.94)	0.13
1976	-0.746	0.01 (0.34)	1.23† (24.00)	0.02 (1.01)	0.05† (1.65)	0.38
1980	-0.915	-0.05 (-1.34)	1.18† (22.18)	0.04† (2.33)	0.06† (2.95)	0.38
1984	0.036	0.02 (0.93)	0.53† (15.05)	0.09† (7.40)	0.04† (3.15)	0.20

* The codes, consistent across the surveys, are as follows: PID (+1 = partisan identification that coincides with that of the eventual winner of the presidential election, 0 = independent, -1 = partisan identification that coincides with that of the eventual loser); Vote Intention (1 = respondent intends to vote for the candidate who will win the election in November, and 0 = the respondent intends to vote for the eventual loser); Education (5 = college graduate, 4 = attended some college, 3 = high school graduate, 2 = some high school, and 1 = grade school or less); and Time (date of interview, 1 = September 15 or before, 2 = after September 15 and before October 1, 3 = between October 1 and October 15, and 4 = after October 15). The dependent variable, 'Forecast', is coded +1 for a correct forecast of the election winner and -1 for an incorrect forecast. The numbers in parentheses are *t*-ratios.

† indicated statistical significance at the 0.05 level, one tail.

pre-election studies, interviews began as early as the first of September. We hypothesize that the nearer the National Election Study pre-election interview to the November vote, the more accurate the forecast. The results in Table 2 show there is some support for this hypothesis. In five of the eight elections, nearness of the interview to election day was significantly (if rather modestly) related to forecasting accuracy. More specifically, the average slope estimate (viewed as a linear probability coefficient) for the 'Time' variable implies that for every two weeks closer to the election, the likelihood of a correct forecast rises by almost 4 per cent.

INDIVIDUAL FORECASTS AND MACRO-DATA: EMERGENT PROPERTIES

Following the model specification in Table 2, the voter's presidential forecast is a function of educational attainment and lead time, plus partisanship and vote intention. These estimates indicate that individual forecasting is subject to explanation. When voters are asked to predict the presidential winner, many simply voice their biases, either short-term or long-term (i.e., either vote intention or party identification). Beyond that, though, they

draw on their advantages from education and proximity to the event. These are useful results, for they help locate a group of citizens who are more likely to 'know what is happening' politically. Clearly, some voters are more able forecasters than others.

These findings are enticing, but rather slim. While political biases are clearly important determinants, they are not attributes which actually enhance a voter's forecasting skill. On the contrary, these biases either pull voters in the wrong direction (e.g., the Democrat who consequently predicts Mondale), or in the right direction by coincidence alone (the Republican who consequently predicts Reagan). Once such biases are set aside, we know that educational attainment and time proximity make a difference. Still, these statistically significant differences are substantively modest. For example, the average standardized regression coefficient (beta weight) for the education variable is 0.07, and for the lead time variable it is 0.04.

In contrast stands the impressive data from Figure 1, where in several elections 'almost everyone' knew who was going to be elected president. Searching for an explanation of such accuracy, we have extensively probed the determinants of individual forecasting choice, using the National Election Studies. This search netted us some answers, but ones too weak to account for the dramatic forecasting abilities shown in most of these eight elections.

We therefore decided to look at the data in additional ways, from an aggregate perspective. Closer examination of the elections in which the public did extremely well in forecasting (e.g., 1964 and 1972) revealed they had something in common – they were lop-sided races. The following hypothesis suggested itself: The greater the popular vote share (S) of the presidential winner, the greater the forecasting accuracy of the public (F^*). Here are the OLS estimates for such an equation:

$$F^* = -130.85 + 3.63S \quad (1) \\ (-4.65) \quad (7.14)$$

$$R^2 = 0.895 \quad N = 8 \quad D-W = 1.97$$

where F^* = the percentage of the pre-election survey who correctly forecasted the presidential winner; S = the percentage of the popular vote total garnered by the presidential winner; the figures in parentheses are t -ratios; R^2 = the coefficient of determination; N = the number of observations, from the elections 1956–84; $D-W$ = the Durbin-Watson statistic.

These estimates strongly support the hypothesis. With an increasing margin of victory, it is easier for the electorate to forecast correctly. Voters seem quite responsive to a changing lead, with a 1 percentage point increase accompanying about a 3.5 percentage point advance in forecasting accuracy (see the slope for S). Moreover, the fit of the model is extremely tight, with popular vote share accounting for 90 per cent of the variation in forecasting ability.⁵

These results are statistically impressive, and say a good deal about the determinants of forecasting ability. In very close races (e.g., 1960), it is hard to tell who is going to win (even for well-educated voters). In a lop-sided race (e.g., 1984), it is easy to tell who is going to win (especially for well-educated voters). Other races are in-between, with re-

⁵ The results given in Equation 1, although based on a rather small sample, are quite robust; that is, they are not dependent upon one or two influential observations. Deleting each observation in turn, then re-estimating, never lowers the goodness-of-fit statistic (R^2) more than a few percentage points.

gard to forecasting difficulty. In carrying out the routines of daily life in the midst of an election campaign, voters pick up countless bits of information about which candidate is doing well, which poorly. As the information accumulates in favour of one candidate's prospects, the community arrives at some 'sense' that he will win. The more one-sided the accumulation, the more correct guesses are made about the future winner.

Why did the intriguing finding – closeness of race accounts for most of the forecasting differences – not come out of the individual-level analysis? The reason is because the critical variable – margin of victory (S) – has a fixed value with each election. Thus, it is not a simple contextual effect that can be modelled by assigning a 'margin' variable to respondents in each election survey, for such a variable would necessarily have a constant score in any given survey. Hence, the argument that individuals improve their forecasting ability as the race becomes more lop-sided is tested above on aggregate data. Clearly, the inference from the aggregate results of Equation 1 to individual forecasting behaviour suggests the limits of the 'ecological fallacy'. In this instance aggregate analysis is more telling than individual analysis, even when the concern is with explanation of individual behaviour. Interestingly, this result parallels the Kramer investigation, when he suggests that the impact of economic conditions on individual voters is better understood with aggregate than with survey data.⁶

CONCLUSIONS

Can the electorate forecast political events accurately? Pre-election voters are generally quite good at correctly guessing the presidential winner, at a fair distance in time from the election itself. This forecasting ability appears explainable by some variables but not others. Surprisingly, political involvement, no matter how measured (participation, interest, media attention, understanding), manifested no influence on forecasting accuracy. Contrary to popular notions, those who are politically on the 'inside' have no special insight about who is going to win. Politics, however, in its more partisan manifestations does help shape a citizen's forecast. In particular, party loyalty and vote intention lead to forecasts based on bias, rather than on judgement.

Nevertheless, there are social and situational attributes which do enhance forecasting ability. In particular, if voters have managed to place themselves high up the educational ladder, or stand not too far away from election day, then they significantly improve their chances of a correct presidential forecast. More important than these circumstances, however, is the tightness of the election contest. When a landslide victory is in the offing, virtually everyone knows it, and will tell you so. For closer races, accuracy is less than perfect. Still, barring those few contests that are neck-and-neck, citizen forecasts of presidential winners are much more than 'lucky guesses'.

Citizens see into the political future, at least along this simple dimension. Most voters 'know', before it is decided, who will be president. They do not need a statistical model to generate a reasonable forecast. About all they really need is regular membership of the American polity. What are the implications of this wide-spread forecasting ability? One is that American voters are not idiots. They can answer an important and complex political question: who will be elected president? Another is that American voters are not cynical: even though they 'know' who will win, they go and vote their convictions.

⁶ Gerald H. Kramer, 'The Ecological Fallacy Revisited. Aggregate- versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections and Sociotropic Voting', *American Political Science Review*, 77 (1983), 92–111.

Must Liberals Always Vote for Liberals and Need the More Competent Candidate Always Be Preferred?

AMIHAI GLAZER AND BERNARD GROFMAN

Anthony Downs's¹ model of voter choice is customarily interpreted to mean that each voter chooses the candidate whose positions are closest to the voter's.² Actually, however, this is too simple a picture of Downs's views. Downs anticipated ideas of prospective and performance-based retrospective voting. He recognized that voters evaluate candidates in terms of their past performances and expectations about future performance, and may discount issue proximity to a candidate if the candidate is not expected to be able to live up to his campaign promises on the issue in question.³

The aim of this Note is to demonstrate that a more sophisticated view of the Downsian model leads to some results that at first appear quite counter-intuitive. In particular:

- (1) a liberal voter may prefer the conservative candidate;
- (2) voters may sometimes prefer the candidate who is viewed as less able (or less likely) to carry out his campaign promises.

To understand why liberals need not always vote for liberals and why the more competent candidate need not be preferred, we need to understand how specification of the feasible set of outcomes affects voter choice, and how candidates communicate their views to voters. The set of feasible policy outcomes is known to economists as a possibility frontier. The importance of the possibility frontier for Downsian models has only recently been recognized.⁴ Goodin has done closely related work,⁵ with a probabilistic framework of choice where 'politicians with right-wing preferences can have more possibilities on the left wing than do leftist politicians themselves and vice versa.' Goodin's model, like the one we present, generates the two counter-intuitive results specified above. Our work, however, like that of McCubbins and Schwartz,⁶ uses a deterministic model. Also, our work is readily generalizable to multidimensional-issue space.

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¹ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

² See, e.g., Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society', *American Political Science Review*, 64 (1970), 426-48.

³ See discussion in Bernard Grofman, 'The Neglected Role of the Status Quo in Models of Issue Voting', *Journal of Politics*, 47 (1985), 231-37 and in Bernard Grofman, 'Models of Voting', in Samuel Long, ed., *Micropolitics Annual* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1987), pp. 31-61, of how Downs's views have been distorted.

⁴ See Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 'The Politics of Flatland', *Public Choice*, 46 (1985), 45-60, and William R. Keech, 'Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Optimization', *American Journal of Political Science*, 24 (1980), 345-67.

⁵ Robert E. Goodin, 'Voting through the Looking Glass', *American Political Science Review*, 77 (1983), 420-34, p. 424.

⁶ McCubbins and Schwartz, 'The Politics of Flatland'.

We suppose that each candidate concisely states his preferences by specifying a utility function over possible policy outcomes. As will be seen below, the combination of a utility function and a possibility frontier determines the policies a candidate will favour under different conditions. The simplest assumption about the utility function a candidate presents is that the candidate indicates his most preferred position in some n -dimensional policy space with utility decreasing with distance from that point. (Such a most preferred position is called a 'bliss point'.) The candidate's bliss point identifies the candidate's ideology.

Ideology is merely a shorthand for expressing positions on numerous issues. Ideology need have no psychological meaning, and ideology need not have any substantive consistency under this interpretation. Note further that we need not assume that a candidate simply wishes to maximize his own utility. The position of his bliss point and the set of indifference curves a candidate presents to voters is merely a way of explaining to them the policies the candidate would choose under different conditions. A candidate can, and often will, choose that bliss point (or equivalently that set of indifference curves) that he believes will attract the most votes.

Consider Figure 1, which for simplicity of exposition supposes that the preferences of voters and candidates can be represented by bliss points (indicating the most preferred set of issue positions) and circular indifference curves in a two-dimensional issue space.⁷ The voter must choose between candidates Smith and Jones. The possibility set, i.e., the set of feasible outcomes (as seen by the voters), is bounded by the possibility frontier, line PP. Again for simplicity, we assume that all voters see the same possibility frontier. The voter's own bliss point is at point Voter. The voter will support that candidate who will choose the *feasible* policy that is closest to the voter's bliss point; voters assume that each candidate will support the *feasible* policy closest to the candidate's own bliss point. In Figure 1, candidate Smith, with a bliss point at point Smith, will support policy S. Candidate Jones, with a bliss point at point Jones, will support policy J. Although point Voter is equidistant to points Smith and Jones, point Voter is closer to J than to S, and the voter will prefer Jones over Smith.

Suppose instead that the possibility frontier was line PP'. Candidate Smith would choose policy S' (that is, the point on PP' which lies closest to point Smith), and candidate Jones would choose policy J'. The voter would now prefer Smith over Jones since the distance from point Voter to point S' is less than the distance from point Voter to point J'.

We have now demonstrated how changing the set of outcomes a voter considers to be possible can change which candidate a voter prefers. Indeed, the perceived possibility frontier may lead a voter to prefer a candidate whose ideology is less attractive than his opponent's, but the *effects* of whose preferences will be expected to result in a *feasible* outcome closer to what the voter wants. Such an example is shown in Figure 2. Even though Jones is closer than Smith to the voter, for both PP and PP' the alternatives that Smith would choose are preferred by the voter to those that would be chosen by Jones.

The examples in Figure 1 and Figure 2 can be straightforwardly extended to the general case of convex indifference curves and multiple dimensions.⁸ We can also extend

⁷ Our analysis applies for more general specifications but is most easily illustrated under the specified simplifying assumptions. These assumptions are in the spirit of those made by numerous other authors.

⁸ However, in more than two dimensions there will usually not be an equilibrium outcome of majority-rule voting.

EVALUATING THE COMPETENCE OF CANDIDATES

We have so far assumed that the two candidates can attain outcomes that are on the same possibility frontier. Some candidates, however, are able to implement policies that others cannot. This point has been made most forcibly by Goodin.⁹ A number of other authors¹⁰ recognize the importance of candidate performance (or performance potential) and extend the standard spatial model to incorporate the performance component of voter choice. Enelow and Hinich analyse candidate competence in an additive fashion. Grofman follows Downs to argue that a voter will discount certain issue stands made by a candidate if the voter believes that the candidate will not be able to implement the policies he espouses. More specifically, Grofman supposes that a voter assigns each candidate a performance weight on each issue, so that the distance between the voter's ideal point and the candidate's position on each issue is multiplied (that is, discounted) by that factor: voters do not believe all campaign promises – especially when what is promised is a dramatic and immediate change in long-standing policy trends. Thus, Reagan's 1980 claim that he would dismantle the government bureaucracy and reduce federal spending should rightly have been suspect.

While Grofman's model yields some useful insights into the dynamics of two-party politics,¹¹ it is in need of modification. In particular, his model cannot account for the behaviour of voters who view a certain candidate (for example, Jimmy Carter in 1980) as unable to cope with the nation's problems: voters did not discount Carter's positions, they discounted him. Similarly, Goodin's article, while making an intriguing point about the ability of candidates to implement policies at a polar opposite to the preferences of their own supporters (e.g., Nixon's *rapprochement* with China), does not readily generalize to a consideration of alternative possibility frontiers that are not tied to this specific substantive insight.

In terms of our approach, we suppose that, in general, some candidates are able to implement policies others cannot; that is, different candidates choose among policies that lie along different possibility frontiers. For example, Republicans may be able to take certain initiatives in foreign policy (say, an opening to Communist China in the 1970s) that Democrats could not have taken as easily, or one candidate simply may be more competent than another.

Referring back to Figure 1, let Smith be the more competent candidate, i.e., let line PP be a possibility frontier that candidate Smith can reach but that candidate Jones cannot. Assume that Jones can carry out only policies that lie on the inferior possibility frontier PP', so that he would implement policy J'. Let Smith's bliss point be at point Smith*; note that points Jones and Smith* are equidistant from the voter's bliss point. Smith would implement policy S* on line PP, which the voter sees as inferior to the point J' chosen by Jones. Thus, the voter prefers the less competent candidate. Of course, this example depends upon the exact shape of the possibility frontiers and on the locations of Smith and Jones relative to the voter. None the less, it demonstrates that competence is not always a virtue.

⁹ Goodin, 'Voting Through the Looking Glass'.

¹⁰ See Grofman, 'The Neglected Role' and James Enelow and Melvin Hinich, *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 231–37.

¹¹ For example, Grofman ('The Neglected Role') uses his model to show that if the status quo goes too far to the left, voters with centrist and even left-centrist views who wish to move policy somewhat to the right will vote for right-wing candidates over left-wing candidates to whom they are closer in position. Note that sometimes this will lead to 'overshooting' the medium voter.

DISCUSSION

A further implication of our analysis is that, in contrast to the implications of the standard spatial model, candidates may not find it worthwhile to choose the same ideologies, and a challenger may not wish to choose positions that are very close to those of the incumbent. In particular, suppose candidate Jones is not as competent as candidate Smith, and suppose voters would prefer the more competent of otherwise identical candidates. Then the only chance that Jones has of winning is to present preferences which imply a set of positions that differ from those of Smith.¹²

Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate that a candidate who explains his positions indirectly, by means of a bliss point (or indifference curves), can thereby succinctly inform voters what policies he would choose under a host of different circumstances, or possibility frontiers. If instead a candidate specified his policies directly, he might have to do so for each of hundreds or even thousands of conditions that would arise during his term of office. The candidate would find it costly and difficult to do so, and voters may be reluctant to support a candidate whose positions under different circumstances are unclear.

It might seem that candidates could simply locate themselves at the point on the possibility frontier closest to the median voter. However, real political contests are apt to take place in an environment of imperfect information. In such an environment, voters need not be uniform in their estimate of where the possibility frontier lies, nor, even more importantly, need they see the same possibility frontier for each candidate. Moreover, voter expectations of what is possible may change over the course of a campaign both in response to 'learning' and in response to exogenous events (e.g., a market crash). While some form of probabilistic optimization by candidates is possible,¹³ the basic point of this Note, that voter choice is a function not just of what candidates say they are going to do but also of what voters think it is possible for them to do, remains unaffected. While this point, once clearly stated, may seem trivial, with only a few key exceptions (such as Goodin) it has been almost completely neglected by theorists in the Downsian tradition.

The analysis above also has implications for empirical research. For example, Miller and Shanks¹⁴ attempted to distinguish between policy preference and performance components of voter choice in the 1980 presidential election. They also recognized that preference for issue direction movement from the status quo can be more important in voter evaluations than the usual simple-issue proximity measures. None the less, thorough as their work is, it fails to depict voter choice appropriately. We have shown that whether a voter prefers one candidate's ideology over another's depends on the voter's beliefs about what policies will prove feasible. Similarly we showed that a voter evaluates the com-

¹² This is related to but distinct from the claim that a presidential candidate with foreign-policy experience will make foreign policy a campaign issue, and that one with management experience will emphasize efficiency in government

¹³ Cf. Peter Coughlin and Shmuel Nitzan, 'Electoral Outcomes with Probabilistic Voting and Nash Social Welfare Minima', *Journal of Public Economics*, 15 (1981), 113-22; A. Glazer, B. Grofman and G. Owen, 'A Model of Candidate Convergence Under Uncertainty About Voter Preferences', *Mathematical Modelling*, forthcoming. In two dimensions for a fixed possibility frontier an 'optimal' location is guaranteed, in multiple dimensions in general there will be no core even when the voting game is restricted to points on the possibility frontier. Even in two dimensions, in general there will be no single candidate location that is optimal for all possibility frontiers

¹⁴ Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, 'Policy Directions and Presidential Leadership Alternative Interpretations of the 1980 Presidential Election', *British Journal of Political Science*, 12 (1982), 299-356.

petence of candidates in the light of their ideologies; indeed, the voter may prefer the less able of otherwise similar candidates. It can thus be misleading to ask, as Miller and Shanks (1982, p. 351) did, whether policy preferences or performance evaluation was 'most important in the 1980 election'. The better question is 'How do voters *jointly* consider the policies and abilities of candidates in deciding whom to support?' This is the question that our model seeks to answer.¹⁵

¹⁵ It may also be the case that a candidate's expected performance can be anticipated as a function of the candidate's 'true' policy positions as distinct from those stated in order to maximize the likelihood of election. Some of what a candidate says must be taken as purely for 'public consumption'. But which part?

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
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Marxism–Leninism as Discourse: The Politics of the Empty Signifier and the Double Bind

RACHEL WALKER

This article employs a semiotic approach to investigate the meaning of 'Marxism–Leninism' with a view to clarifying our understanding of this term. Contrary to conventional interpretations it demonstrates that 'Marxism–Leninism' is an empty signifier which is subject to definition on a contemporary basis by the CPSU itself. However, it also demonstrates that 'Marxism–Leninism' is the central element in a mechanism of control which bears all the hallmarks of a classic linguistic double bind. It therefore concludes that while 'Marxism–Leninism' is referentially open to re-definition it is connotatively attached to the practices of the CPSU. It is both fixed and not fixed in meaning.

The resulting analysis leads to a critique of terms which are conventionally taken for granted by Sovietologists and introduces a new methodological approach to the study of 'Marxism–Leninism'.

The CPSU in all its activity proceeds from the fact that loyalty to the Marxist–Leninist teaching lies in its creative development on the basis of accumulated experience.

Mikhail Gorbachev, 27th Party Congress¹

Marxist–Leninist ideology is a vexing subject for anyone who tries to engage with it directly. Both the terms 'Marxism–Leninism' and 'ideology' are slippery and capacious, as the proliferation of definitions in the literature demonstrates.² And the issues to which the whole problematic pertains – questions of the relationship between thought and action, ideas and reality – are equally difficult to deal with. As a consequence, Sovietologists generally have tended on the whole to skirt round the subject where possible, making assumptions about Soviet ideology when they have been obliged to or when it suited them, remaining silent about it when the subject matter has allowed, which it often does.

This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs for two obvious reasons. Firstly, the general disorganization and fragmentation in the field that has resulted has inhibited the accumulation of understanding and knowledge, and has prevented

Department of Politics, University of Southampton. For their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article thanks are due to Randy Banks, Mary McAuley, Michael Urban, this Journal's anonymous referees, and the participants of the Graduate Seminar at St Hilda's College, Oxford, the International Relations Research Seminar at the School of African and Asian Studies, Sussex University and the SSRC First Annual Workshop on Soviet Domestic Politics and Society held at Toronto University. Responsibility for any remaining flaws in the argument is of course my own.

¹ Mikhail Gorbachev, 'The Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', *Pravda* (Moscow), 26 February 1986, 2–10 p. 9

² See, for example, the debates that took place on the subject of Soviet ideology in the pages of *Soviet Studies* and *Slavic Review* between 1965 and 1967.



the formulation of interesting and intelligent research questions in this area. It is hardly coincidental that the study of Soviet ideology (however defined) should have lagged behind research in other areas of the Soviet Union, particularly on the conceptual side. Secondly, and of equal importance, however, the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the Soviet scene and his clear determination to reform the system compels us to 'new thinking' on the subject of Marxism-Leninism. The leaders of the CPSU have always insisted on the centrality of Marxism-Leninism to the system that they have created, and Gorbachev's speeches suggest that he is no exception. If we wish to understand the problems he confronts and the solutions he attempts to adopt then we cannot continue to sidestep the question of Marxism-Leninism, unless we are willing to make do with a very partial grasp of developments.

The purpose of this article is to facilitate the search for heuristically fruitful alternatives in the analysis of Marxism-Leninism, by presenting a semiotic approach to its investigation which abandons all the terms of the conventional arguments and effectively begins with a *tabula rasa* of sorts. As will become evident, this approach does not exhaust the investigative possibilities inherent in this subject, nor does it seek to. On the contrary, the aim is to dismantle the term 'Marxism-Leninism' in order to make it amenable to the sort of interrogation previously rendered unthinkable by the terms of the debate.

SOME NOTES ON METHOD

The Tabula Rasa

The initial propositions are negative. In order to progress, the field might have to abandon its preoccupation with the problem of ideology as such *at least for the purpose of analysis*, and its tendency to reify the term 'Marxism-Leninism' as though it were a self-evident, self-contained and bounded object.

'Ideology' is a distinctly unhelpful term particularly when it comes to unravelling the logic of an alien discourse. To begin with, as Hamilton and Sumner have ably, if unintentionally, demonstrated, the word itself is amenable to almost endless stipulative definition according to the predilections of the analyst.³ As a consequence, to apply it at the outset of an investigation is to impose an arbitrary identity on the object of analysis, an identity which cannot itself be investigated since it is assumed by definition. Thus, for example, to begin an analysis of Marxism-Leninism in the way Dawisha does by stipulatively defining ideology as

the link between [the] generalized values of society and institutionalized actions of the state. It is both a set of assumptions about the nature of social reality and a system of guidance

³ M. B. Hamilton, 'The Elements of the Concept of Ideology', *Political Studies*, 35 (1987), 18-38; Colin Sumner, *Reading Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law* (London: Academic Press, 1979) pp. 4-5.

is to presuppose what she originally hoped to discover about the functions of Marxism–Leninism.⁴ This mode of procedure arbitrarily assigns meaning, function and identity to ‘Marxism–Leninism’ in a way which is not only *a priori* but which consequently prevents us from asking, for example, how the Soviets use and understand the term ‘Marxism–Leninism’, or for that matter the term ‘ideology’ itself.

Secondly, and equally problematic, is the fact that the questions to which the whole concept of ideology is fundamentally addressed are intrinsically epistemological ones. To engage with them is implicitly and unavoidably to engage with the problem of true versus false cognition and to engage with the justificatory exercise which is equally intrinsic to the grounding of knowledge claims. Any analysis which introduces the term, therefore, is liable to become bound up with questions of truth and the validity of knowledge,⁵ and is just as liable to introduce epistemological considerations where these might have no place. Thus, to call ‘Marxism–Leninism’ an ‘ideology’ from the very outset is to *assume*, however implicitly, that ‘Marxism–Leninism’ functions as some sort of knowledge, or conceptual framework, or belief system, and to ask what might be the ultimate question, namely is it ‘true’ or ‘false’ knowledge, when it is not at all clear that Marxism–Leninism *necessarily* functions as any sort of knowledge in the first place, and even less clear that there is such a ‘thing’ as Marxism–Leninism at all.

This last proposition is not as far-fetched as it might sound. Even a cursory examination of the Soviet and Western literature, suggests that the term ‘Marxism–Leninism’ is in fact nothing more than a name for a multiplicity of different practices. For its part, the CPSU quite simply associates the term with everything it does. This is what one might expect of it: if it is a Marxist–Leninist party, as it claims to be, then it would appear to follow that everything it does is Marxist–Leninist. Thus, in Soviet discourse ‘Marxism–Leninism’ appears as an ideology, a science, a morality, a theory, a philosophy, a political practice, a sociology, an economics, a party line, and so on. Equally, Western analysts not only tend to conflate the words ‘Marxism–Leninism’, ideology and theory, but also apply the first two fairly liberally, and often without any obvious reason, to whatever they happen to be studying. Foreign policy analysts are particularly prone to this. Thus they discuss Soviet theories of war, deterrence, correlation of forces analysis, policies towards the Third World, and so on, and call them all

⁴ Karen H. Dawisha, ‘The Roles of Ideology in the Decision-making of the Soviet Union’, *International Relations*, 4 (1972), 156–75, p. 158, emphasis given. Other representative examples of this type of approach include: Ray Taras, *Ideology in a Socialist State 1956–1983* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Daniel Bell, ‘Ideology and Soviet Politics’, *Slavic Review*, 24 (1965), 591–603, p. 595; Victor Zaslavsky, ‘Socioeconomic Inequality and Changes in Soviet Ideology’, *Theory and Society*, 9 (1980), 383–407, Christel Lane, *The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society – the Soviet Case* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). See Rachel Walker, ‘Soviet Marxism–Leninism and the Question of Ideology: A Critical Analysis’ (doctoral dissertation, Essex University, 1987), for an extended critique of Western approaches.

⁵ A classic example is provided by David Joravsky, ‘Soviet Ideology’, *Soviet Studies*, 18 (1966), 2–19.

'Marxism-Leninism' and/or 'ideology'.⁶ Indeed, this practice is sufficiently widespread that 'Marxism-Leninism' seems to end up having no identity whatever as a 'thing in itself'.

If this is so, and I hope to demonstrate shortly that it is, then the argument obviously has interesting implications for Western analysis. First of all, it clearly suggests that the labels 'Marxism-Leninism' and 'ideology' are otiose if what we are really interested in is, say, Soviet deterrence theory or nationalities policy (whether it be their epistemological entailments or their policy prescriptions).⁷ Secondly, it also suggests that to address questions of 'Marxism-Leninism' as *such* – to assume, in other words, that it is a self-evident and self-contained knowledge or theory, a 'thing in itself' which can be studied as a whole – is nonsensical, since plainly it is not.

The best course of action might therefore be to abandon these modes of procedure altogether and to start from another place entirely.

Marxism-Leninism as an Empty Signifier

Accordingly, the analysis presented here not only abandons the problematic of ideology but proceeds from the assumption that 'Marxism-Leninism' is not an integral ontological entity, as is conventionally assumed, but, on the contrary, that it is no more than a nominal unity – an all-encompassing name for a multiplicity of different practices all of which must be, and in fact are, studied in their own right. Put another way, the hypothesis which underpins the argument below is that 'Marxism-Leninism' is an empty signifier: a word which means everything and nothing, a word which has no intrinsic meaning, no ontological and epistemological entailments, no necessary and essential relationship with any of the ostensible objects with which it has been conventionally associated – whether these be a general 'body of ideas', a social value system, or the theoretical output of two historical individuals named Marx and Lenin. This is not to argue that the word is entirely incapable of meaning, but rather to suggest that any meanings predicated on it are contingent – they shift and change according to context and usage. They cannot therefore be assumed *a priori* but remain to be discovered.

This way of looking at the matter opens up all sorts of possibilities for investigation. For one thing, it allows us to enquire into the politics of definition. Rather than simply assuming from the outset that 'Marxism-Leninism' is a primitive term the meaning of which is axiomatically given by its label, this agnostic approach enables us to turn such assumptions into questions. For

⁶ See, for example, Stephen Clarkson, *The Soviet Theory of Development. India and the Third World in Marxist-Leninist Scholarship* (London: Macmillan, 1979); R. Judson Mitchell, *Ideology of a Superpower. Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982); Hannes Adomeit, 'Soviet Perceptions of Western Europe Integration: Ideological Distortion or Realistic Assessment?', *Journal of International Studies*, 8 (1979), 1–24.

⁷ Just because the CPSU uses the terms 'ideology' and 'Marxism-Leninism' does not mean, of course, that Western analysts have to.

example, it enables us to ask whether the meaning of 'Marxism–Leninism' is self-evident and unambiguous; whether Soviet philosophers, sociologists, scientists, party hacks in the CPSU's ideological apparatus or the leaders of other Communist parties all mean the same thing when they use the term; or whether its meaning (or meanings) shift from context to context. If it does, how is this battle over meaning fought out? And does this tell us anything about the operation of the Soviet political system or of the socialist commonwealth? Although this whole question of the politics of definition is necessarily implicit in the well-known Soviet phenomenon of reading and writing 'between the lines' of official discourse, the mechanics of the process are rarely spelled out.

By way of a beginning, this analysis is motivated by the obvious exploratory question, which is never asked, namely, how is the word 'Marxism–Leninism' defined in the official discourse of the CPSU? In other words, how is its meaning established in use?

Answers to this question require two things, a delimited corpus and a method of analysis.

Structure versus Narrative

The corpus, at least for these purposes, is easily specified. It consists of the Central Committee Reports, as these key-note speeches are formally known, delivered by Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev to the CPSU all-union Party Congresses, beginning with the 20th Congress in 1956 and ending with the 27th Congress in 1986. This corpus is a useful one for three reasons. Firstly, it spans an interesting time period which began with an enterprising General Secretary, declined into what the Soviet Union now calls the *zastoi*,⁸ and ends with the accession of a new reforming General Secretary. It might therefore offer some useful contrasts as well as highlighting any similarities which do exist between the speeches (and there are several). Secondly, each text consistently follows the same rules in terms of the audiences to which it is addressed, the forum from which it is delivered and its general availability, which greatly simplifies both access to them and the task of comparison. Finally, of course, these speeches represent the definitive statement of Soviet party policy for the contemporary period. It can therefore be assumed, at least provisionally, that they provide *the* authoritative examples of how the word 'Marxism–Leninism' is used by the CPSU leadership, at any rate in the public sphere.

The method of analysis, however, is less easily specified. In general terms this analysis of meaning (as established in use) requires us to see the word 'Marxism–Leninism' simply as a linguistic operator within these texts; and to examine how relations are established between it and other words within each text in order that we can discover how its meaning is cumulatively structured and elaborated within the logic of each text and of the corpus as a whole. This cannot be

⁸ The Soviet word for stagnation, which they now consistently use to describe the Brezhnev period.

achieved, however, purely on the basis of a simple reading of text as narrative but also requires a structural analysis which penetrates beyond the narrative surface of the text in order to examine the underlying relations in which 'the meanings of what is manifest [on the surface] are to be located'.⁹ In other words, it requires an approach to language which seeks to capture the fact that language is not simply a transparent 'vessel', which conveys pre-existing meanings from a sender to a receiver, which is how it is conventionally understood, but that it operates at multiple levels. The level that most immediately interests us here is one of the least obvious, namely, the level at which the meaning of a word, or words, is established by the internal rules which form the discourse itself. In short, we require a semiotic approach that does not read the language of a text for what it tells us about something else, but reads it for what it tells us about itself.

In the case of the corpus under discussion this task of discovering the meaning of 'Marxism-Leninism' is both a simple one and a difficult one to the extent that it engages both the 'manifest' level of these texts, and what might be called the 'deep' level of their underlying relations.

At the manifest level it is not very difficult to demonstrate, as suggested earlier, that the CPSU associates the term 'Marxism-Leninism' with everything it does. There are at least one or two occasions in each text on which the word is unambiguously defined, either by means of stipulative definition – of the '*a* is *b*' variety – or by means of associative definition in which the definition is achieved through the immediate contextual association of words. Nor is it very difficult to demonstrate that there is in fact a logic which underwrites this process of definition.

Unfortunately, however, this simple process of definition by no means exhausts the meaning of the term. As the opening quotation to this article exemplifies, the appearance of the word 'Marxism-Leninism' in these texts frequently engenders some very curious tensions in the language immediately associated with it. On the one hand, as in this example, 'Marxism-Leninism' is described in fairly reified terms as being a 'teaching', to which one can be 'loyal'. On the other hand, it is averred that this 'loyalty' consists in the 'creative development' of this 'teaching', 'on the basis of accumulated experience'. The cumulative ambiguities thus generated around the precise status of 'Marxism-Leninism' (since it is not manifestly obvious how one 'creatively develops' a 'teaching') and the fact that in this passage the word is only being described in the most general terms, all suggest that the analysis cannot rest at the manifest level. On the contrary, they suggest that what is required here is an exploration of those underlying textual dynamics which enable the simultaneous appearance of ambiguous and unambiguous references to the term 'Marxism-Leninism' in these texts. In short, the analysis must engage these texts at the 'deep' level since we are no longer concerned with unravelling their 'grammar' of definition so much as uncovering

⁹ Michael E. Urban, 'The Structure of Signification in the General Secretary's Address A Semiotic Approach to Soviet Political Discourse', *Coexistence*, 24 (1987), 187–210, p. 188.

the logic which enables the co-appearance of such contrary terms as 'teaching' and 'creativity'.

However, a caveat is in order. To uncover this 'deep' structure the semiotic approach has at least initially to engage in abstraction. It has to isolate the corpus from its social and political contexts so as to focus attention on the internal logic of the texts themselves. The texts therefore appear, at least to begin with, as autonomous entities within the framework of the investigation. However, no semiotic analysis which focuses exclusively on text can fully exhaust the meaning of a word, since extra-discursive context is integral to meaning and must therefore be reintegrated into the analysis as it proceeds. The primary purpose in abstracting a text from its context initially is simply to allow the text to 'speak for itself' irrespective of the 'interests' of the analyst.¹⁰

There is none the less a great deal of a-historicity in this approach, at least in its initial stages. However, this is necessary for the discovery and explication of structures, since, in contrast to historical or evolutionary approaches, it allows one to focus on the functional reciprocities which underlie historical events in a way that is abstracted from time. One could therefore say that the semiotic approach is the linguistic equivalent of functionalism in political science.¹¹ The initial a-historicism of the semiotic approach has proved immensely fruitful in the case of this corpus of speech texts. It has allowed analysis to examine the reciprocities that underpin the enormous and manifest differences between each text – such as are usually commented on in policy-relevant readings of them – and thus focus on the equally enormous but far less obvious similarities between these texts, as least as far as the use and meaning of 'Marxism–Leninism' and its related terms are concerned. In fact, in engaging with the meaning of the term 'Marxism–Leninism' it has enabled us to isolate a particular linguistic structure, namely the paradoxical communication which is characteristic of the structure of a double bind, which is consistently repeated with historical variations from text to text, for all that the corpus spans a thirty-year period.

The analysis is roughly divided into two parts. The first half of the investigation explores the texts independently of their extra-discursive contexts, since all we are concerned with is the dynamics of certain of their manifest relations. The second half of the investigation, however, must engage in a certain amount of tacking back and forth between each text and its context, in order to explicate the underlying textual dynamics which enable the appearance of certain of their ambiguities.

ANALYSIS

Manifest Definitions

Careful consideration of those occasions on which 'Marxism–Leninism' is clearly defined in each text reveals a number of interesting things. First of all,

¹⁰ Urban, 'The Structure of Signification in the General Secretary's Address', pp. 188–9.

¹¹ My thanks to Russell Faeges for making the comparison.

these passages demonstrate that what might be called the content of 'Marxism-Leninism' is very much what the CPSU itself says it is. Secondly, they also demonstrate that this 'content' is capable of enormous extension. It appears to have the potential to encompass an extraordinary number of contemporary practices in almost limitless fashion.

Stipulative Definition

Of the two forms of definition deployed – stipulative and associative definition – the former occurs more rarely and is most characteristic of Khrushchev's speeches. This is largely because he was very much concerned to co-ordinate 'theory more closely with life', as he was apt to put it, and because he attempted to establish an inclusive and generous definition of 'Marxism-Leninism' which would be consonant with his theoretical innovations, notably the concept of 'many roads to socialism'. Moreover, as will become evident, stipulative definitions are much more emphatic in their effect than their associative counterparts. A paradigmatic example of this process can be found in the following passage from the 20th Congress text presented in 1956:

Leadership by the Communist Party of China, by the Communist and Workers' Parties of the other people's democracies in the great cause of socialist transformation taking into account the peculiarities and specific features of each country – this is creative Marxism in action.¹²

In this passage an analytic relation has self-evidently been constructed between what is called 'creative Marxism' and what are in fact an enormous number of contemporary entities by means of a straightforward stipulative assertion that this is so. In other words, the definition effectively equates 'Marxism' not only with the general activities of the CPC, but with the on-going activities of the socialist commonwealth as a whole. Moreover, in the process it succeeds in re-affirming the leading role of the Communist Party, and in incorporating an oblique reference to the new concept of 'different roads to socialism', introduced for the first time in the same speech four paragraphs previously, both of which, of course, enter into the definition of what 'creative Marxism' is.

However, it should be noted that this statement is not an argument from any set of first principles, but consists of a flat statement of identity in which the CPSU itself as the 'stipulator' of the definition appears rather ambiguously. On the one hand, it is placed in a rather transcendental position relative to the rest of the socialist commonwealth to the extent that it is making a definitive judgement about what it considers to be the essential nature of 'Marxism'. On the other hand, it is drawn in as participant, since in order to make that judgement it

¹² Nikita Khrushchev, 'Summary Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the XX Congress of the Party', *Stenograficheskii Otchet*, I (Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1956), pp. 9–120, at pp. 38–9

has to know what the constitutive elements of that essential nature are. The CPSU is therefore a silent partner in the textual activity here, both participating in and judging the activities of others, as well as informing the world what 'Marxism' is about. The most curious thing about this process, however, is that it is not at all clear why this statement of identity should have been made in the first place, since one would have thought that the 'Marxist' identity of the socialist commonwealth should have been self-evident. The question arises, therefore, as to why the identity of the socialist commonwealth has to be explicitly named in this way – something we shall be returning to.

A similarly emphatic, and rather dramatic, example of stipulative definition, this time addressed to domestic issues, is to be found in this passage from the 22nd Congress text:

Our practical successes in the construction of communism are at the same time also successes in the development of theory. It is from precisely this point of view that it is necessary to examine the outstanding socio-economic measures carried out by our party in the past few years. These include: the reconstruction of the management of industry and construction . . . [a list of Khrushchev's major innovations] . . . the development of the public education system and a number of others. The measures implemented by the party constitute a great and truly revolutionary step in the development of Soviet society and at the same time a major contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory.¹³

Although the form is rather more elaborated, the principle of definition is the same as in the previous example. An analytic relation is established between 'theory' and the practical policy innovations of the CPSU as implemented under Khrushchev up to that point. Moreover, it is notable that these policies, including 'the reorganization of the machine-tractor stations . . . the further strengthening of the collective farm system, the perfection of the planning of the national economy' and so on, do not appear as contributions to 'Marxist-Leninist practice' but are named as contributing to 'Marxist-Leninist theory'. This extension of 'theory' might have been condemned by subsequent leaders as another example of Khrushchev's 'hare-brained' tendency to go 'over the top' in his zeal for change. However, it certainly demonstrates both the extent to which the Politburo considers it necessary to name its activities as being 'Marxist-Leninist', and the degree to which the CPSU considers it permissible to define the term as circumstances require.

Both extracts, therefore, present us with graphic illustrations of the extent to which 'creative Marxism' or 'Marxist-Leninist theory' can be defined to include not only the extensive activities of the CPSU itself, but also the very considerable activities of the socialist commonwealth. So much so, indeed, that the term 'Marxism–Leninism' appears to be no more than a name by means of which the CPSU leadership designates those activities and entities of which it approves.

¹³ Nikita Khrushchev, 'Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the XXII Congress of the CPSU', *Materialy XXII C'ezda KPSS* (Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1961), pp 3–120, at p. 114.

Associative Definition

Associative definition achieves similar effects but does so rather more obliquely. However, because the form of this definition is much more varied than that of its stipulative counterpart its demonstration will have to be restricted to a representative example. A particular instance, which is replicated almost exactly in the 25th, 26th and 27th Congress texts, takes the form of an opening statement of identity which sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of the party's contemporary preoccupations. The following passage from the 27th Congress text (in fact the continuation of the opening quotation to this article) is representative:

The CPSU in all its activity proceeds from the fact that loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist teaching *lies* in its creative development on the basis of accumulated experience. Today at the centre of the theoretical thought of the party is a complex network of problems arising out of the contemporary . . . character of development in our society and the world as a whole. The many-sided tasks of acceleration [*uskoreniye*] . . . are in need of further profound and all-embracing analysis. We are experiencing a pressing need for serious philosophical generalizations, well-grounded economic and social prognoses, profound historical researches.¹⁴

It does not require a great deal of analysis to appreciate the equivalences that are being established here. On the one hand it is being asserted that the CPSU's 'loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist teaching' is not to the 'teaching' as such but 'lies in its creative development on the basis of accumulated experience'. In other words, it is being implied that it is not enough to be a 'Marxist-Leninist' – one has to be a 'creative Marxist-Leninist'. On the other hand, it is also being asserted that the creative development of 'the Marxist-Leninist teaching' is effectively co-terminous with the 'party's theoretical thought' and that this is currently concerned with the 'many-sided tasks of acceleration', and so on. 'Acceleration', of course, is one of Gorbachev's conceptual innovations. Furthermore, it is also implied in both instances that this has always been the case. The way the passage is structured, opening with a reference to the CPSU followed by the phrase 'in all its activity', which is then followed by a sentence which opens with an emphasis on the word 'Today' followed by the phrase 'in the centre of the theoretical thought of the party', suggests that the phrase 'in all its activity' has a temporal as well as an actional meaning. That is to say, 'all' means 'all [the CPSU's] activity' going back to some unspecified point in time, as well as meaning everything it does at any one point in time. This, in turn, suggests that the burden of the CPSU's 'loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist teaching' has always been 'in its creative development' according to the 'accumulated experience' of the time. Thus 'Today' it confronts one set of problems, among them the 'many-sided tasks of acceleration', at other points in time it confronted other problems. All of this is a rather 'overdetermined' way of staging the subsequent discussion in the text so as to ensure that what is said is understood as being exemplary of the 'creative development of Marxism–Leninism'.

¹⁴ Gorbachev, 'Political Report to the XXVII Congress', p. 9, emphasis added.

The examples from the 25th and 26th Congress texts¹⁵ proceed along similar lines, although the relevant passage in the 25th Congress text is a particularly elaborated form in which the definition is quite explicitly extended over several paragraphs (see Figure 1). In this case, not only is there a clear link established to begin with between 'the elaboration of pressing problems of Marxist-Leninist theory' and 'Party documents' which 'have generalised the vast experience of the construction of a new society' but the definition is continued through the associative transfer of meaning from paragraph to paragraph. This is accomplished by means of the repetition of the words 'theory' and 'problems', both of which have already been associated with the word 'Marxist-Leninist'; and by means of the opening sentence of the immediately subsequent paragraph, which, with its open-ended reference to the 'creative elaboration of theory', effectively sets the stage for the extended list of contemporary problems that follows. Thus we discover that 'the pressing problems of Marxist-Leninist theory' also encompassed at the time 'general-theoretical, fundamental and applied research ... on the fringes of various sciences'; 'problems connected with the all-round development of production and the management of production'; 'environmental and population problems' and 'cardinal problems of world development and international relations' and so on.

In short, we discover that 'Marxism–Leninism' extended to just about everything that was bothering the Brezhnev leadership in the mid-1970s, just as it seems to have extended to just about everything that concerned the CPSU leaderships in the preceding and succeeding decades.

This conclusion inevitably suggests that much of the Western debate which raged in the 1960s – for example, over the definition of 'Marxism–Leninism', notably in the pages of *Soviet Studies* – was otiose. As it is defined in these texts 'Marxism–Leninism' effectively means whatever the CPSU at any point in time deems it to mean. After all, as the 25th Congress text stated:

neither the Party itself, nor the character of its activity, are immutable. At every stage the Party's work is filled with new content. It is natural therefore that the new tasks, which the XXV Congress will pose, will continue to demand the improvement of the forms and methods of Party work on a scientific basis.¹⁶

However, this does introduce an interesting temporal dimension into the question of definition. On the one hand, there has been a clear and very considerable shift over time in the content of 'Marxism–Leninism' as the preoccupa-

¹⁵ The following is the relevant passage from the 26th Congress text: 'Comrades! The Marxist-Leninist party cannot fulfil its role if it does not give the necessary attention to the comprehension of everything that occurs, to the generalization of new phenomena of life, to the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory. We have always considered this task to be extremely important, and have paid a great deal of attention to its resolution in the period under review

After the 25th Congress the theoretical arsenal of the party was enriched by a series of important generalizations ...' (Leonid Brezhnev, 'Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', *Stenograficheskii Otchet*, I (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 1981), pp. 20–99, at p 96)

¹⁶ Brezhnev, 'Report to the XXV Congress', p. 70

In accordance with the instructions of the XXIV Congress, a lot has been done on the elaboration of pressing problems of Marxist-Leninist theory. Party documents have generalised the vast experience of the construction of a new society and have made an analysis of the most recent processes of international development. There are important achievements in the philosophical, economic and historical sciences and in the study of social and political problems.

At the present stage of the country's development the necessity for the further creative elaboration of theory is not diminishing, but, on the contrary, is becoming still greater. New possibilities for fruitful general-theoretical, fundamental and applied research are opening up on the fringes of various sciences, in particular of the natural and social sciences. These possibilities must be used to the full.

The party and the state need research first of all into problems connected with the all-round development of production and the management of production, as well as recommendations that will make possible a substantial increase in production efficiency.

Of considerable importance is in-depth research on questions which relate to the tendencies of development of our society, of its productive forces. These questions include, for instance, the character and content of labour in conditions of mature socialism and changes in the social structure. The perfection of distribution according to labour, the combination of moral and material incentives, socialist everyday life and the development of our multifaceted culture – the examination of these problems demands a pooling of effort by representatives of the various sciences. Further study of problems of the development of our state system and of the forms and methods of upbringing and ideological work is also necessary. In this connection, the study of public opinion deserves a lot of attention.

Soviet scientists should not lose sight of environmental and population problems which have become exacerbated recently. The improvement of the socialist use of nature and the elaboration of an effective demographic policy are important tasks for a whole complex of natural and social sciences.

The importance of scientific research on cardinal problems of world development and international relations, the revolutionary process, the interaction and unity of its various currents, the correlation of the struggle for democracy with the struggle for socialism, and the confrontation of forces on the main question of our time – the question of war and peace – is increasing all the time.

It is obvious that the tasks confronting our social science can be resolved only if it is very closely linked with life. Scholastic theorizing can only retard our progress. Only ties with practice can increase the effectiveness of science, which is a central problem today.

Fig. 1 Paragraphs from the 25th Congress text

Source: Leonid Brezhnev, 'Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU', *Materialy XXV C'ezda KPSS* (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 1976), pp. 3–89, at pp. 72–3.

tions of the CPSU have altered. On the other hand, because it is the CPSU which stipulates what the content of 'Marxism-Leninism' is to be at any single point in time, this content of 'Marxism-Leninism' consequently has appeared to be fixed. This might go a long way to explaining the apparent 'flexibility and rigidity of Marxism-Leninism' intermittently remarked on and puzzled over by Sovietologists.¹⁷ 'Marxism-Leninism' is both 'flexible' and 'rigid' precisely

¹⁷ See, for example, Alfred Meyer, 'The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System: A Speculative Essay Designed to Provoke Discussion', *Soviet Studies*, 17 (1966), 273–85, p. 274; Zaslavsky, 'Socioeconomic Inequality', p. 395.

because its 'content' is not given *a priori* but is given contemporaneously by the CPSU.

The same conclusion, of course, also tends to confirm the hypothesis that 'Marxism–Leninism' is an empty signifier insofar as the signification of this term appears to be entirely indeterminate.

CREATIVITY AS ESSENCE

The analysis can be taken one stage further, however, since the indeterminacy of the word 'Marxism–Leninism' and the sovereign activities of the CPSU with regard to it are both considerably reinforced when one incorporates the question of creativity explicitly into the argument.

Most of the quotations examined thus far have demonstrated that the CPSU considers 'Marxism–Leninism' to be an *essentially* creative enterprise. Indeed, the passage from the 27th Congress speech emphasized the point most particularly when it stated that 'The CPSU in all its activity proceeds from the fact that loyalty to the Marxist–Leninist teaching lies in its creative development'. The principle hardly needs further textual elaboration therefore except to show that this creative identity is not always left implicit. On the contrary, the speeches of Khrushchev and Gorbachev in particular are noticeably preoccupied with the issue, as one might expect given that both were innovative General Secretaries. Thus, the introduction to the 27th Congress speech contains the following passage:

Any attempt to transform the theory by which we are guided into a collection of ossified schemes and prescriptions, valid everywhere and in all the situations of life, decisively contradicts the *essence*, the *spirit* of Marxism–Leninism. Marx and Engels, as V. I. Lenin wrote in 1917, justly mocked 'the rote-learning and simple repetition of formulae', capable in the best circumstances only of outlining the general tasks, necessary for the modification of the concrete economic and political situation of each particular stage of the historical process . . .

It is precisely this concrete economic and political situation in which we find ourselves, precisely this particular stage of the historical process . . . which demand from the party, from each Communist creativity, innovation, the ability to move beyond habitual but already out-dated notions.¹⁸

Quite clearly, this passage is not only telling us what 'Marxism–Leninism' is *not* – it is not 'a collection of ossified schemes and prescriptions'. It is also telling us by implication what 'Marxism–Leninism' *is*. It is in the 'essence' and 'spirit' of 'Marxism–Leninism', as 'V. I. Lenin' himself indicated, that all practice should be creative, innovative, and therefore in tune with the nature of the times. Interestingly, Khrushchev made an equally forceful demand for creativity at the 22nd Congress in 1961:

Creative Marxism–Leninism is implacable toward stagnation of thought, toward the worship of formulas which do not correspond to the actual state of affairs, to the objective

¹⁸ Gorbachev, 'Political Report', p 2, emphasis added, original emphasis effaced.

situation. Nothing contradicts the *essence and creative spirit* of revolutionary theory so much as the attempt to cling to propositions that life has proved to be untenable...¹⁹

Now if it is the case that 'Marxism-Leninism' can only be understood in terms of its creative essence, then this clearly has considerable implications for our argument.

Firstly, it obviously reinforces the hypothesized identity of 'Marxism-Leninism' as an empty signifier, since it would suggest that the scope of 'Marxism-Leninism' is potentially without limits except insofar as 'creative Marxism-Leninism' is supposed to 'correspond to the actual state of affairs'.

Secondly, however, it also theoretically legitimates and logically underpins the CPSU's right, at least in principle, to define and re-define 'Marxism-Leninism' as circumstances require and as it deems appropriate. Since creativity is by definition volatile and largely unpredictable, and since 'Marxism-Leninism' is a political strategy, not a narrowly theoretical project, Western assumptions, *pace* Adomeit or Zaslavsky for example,²⁰ that the CPSU ought to be consistent with 'what Marx and Lenin said', or with some concept of 'classical Marxism', rather misconstrue the point. As it is defined by the CPSU, 'Marxism-Leninism' places the CPSU under no theoretical obligations whatsoever. On the contrary, the point can be made even more strongly. As it is defined, 'Marxism-Leninism' actually places the CPSU under a powerful obligation precisely to be creative, to develop theory and practice in accordance with the 'actual state of affairs'. Both the passages quoted above make this point quite explicitly. Without a creative approach to theory and practice the Party would be entirely unable to intervene in the 'concrete situation', since this requires the ability to make *ad hoc* responses to the *ex cathedra*, which broad statements about 'general tasks', as Gorbachev quite rightly makes clear, cannot provide. As Banks has remarked, 'If Marxism-Leninism is to be universal it must allow comprehension of the particular' – of the concrete.²¹

In any case, since it is concrete practice and 'accumulated experience' which 'proves' the correctness of the creative development and application of 'Marxism-Leninism', and since it is this very creative development and application of 'Marxism-Leninism' which guides concrete practice, there is no need, in principle, for the CPSU to refer to any independent point of verification, or, for that matter, to any founding principles of a classical 'ism'. Its contemporary 'Marxist-Leninist' praxis proves itself. As Brezhnev remarked at the 25th Congress:

... The strength of Marxism-Leninism lies in its constant creative development. That is what Marx taught. That is what Lenin taught. Our Party will always be true to their behests!

As is known, practice is the criterion of the validity of any theory. The revolutionary struggle of the working class and all the working people and the Communists' entire

¹⁹ Khrushchev, 'Report to the XXII Congress', pp. 114–15, emphasis added.

²⁰ Adomeit, 'Soviet Perceptions', pp. 20–1; Zaslavsky, 'Socioeconomic Inequality'

²¹ Randy Banks, Essex University, private communication.

activity have demonstrated very convincingly the immutability of the theoretical propositions and principles that express the essence of Marxism–Leninism.²²

The Soviet emphasis on the importance of creativity and on the creative essence of 'Marxism–Leninism' has gone largely unnoticed by Western analysts; curiously so, given the extent to which the General Secretaries have belaboured the point and, more importantly, given the implications that it has for our understanding of 'Marxism–Leninism' itself. This is an indication, perhaps, of the extent to which Western analysts have failed to take *everything* that the CPSU says seriously enough, even those statements which appear to them to be nonsensical.

However, there is no doubt that this Soviet emphasis on creativity does present us with a singular linguistic paradox as far as the analysis of these texts is concerned, since it is clear from their language, witness the previous quotation, that the CPSU wishes to maintain the appearance of a continuity with Marx and Lenin, even as it is insisting on creativity. So much is obvious both from the frequent references to them and to their 'teachings' in these speeches, and from the fact that the CPSU evidently considers it necessary to keep insisting periodically on its 'loyalty' to, as well as the need for the creative development of, 'Marxism–Leninism'. Such ambiguous statements as the following, from the 21st Congress text, clearly structure the meaning of 'Marxism–Leninism' in a quite different way from the manifest forms of definition thus far investigated.

Scholars in the field of the social sciences . . . face the *task of the creative generalization and bold theoretical resolution of new questions raised by life*. It is necessary to analyze from all sides major processes taking place in the capitalist world, to expose bourgeois ideology, to struggle for the purity of Marxist–Leninist theory.²³

They therefore bring us to the second stage of the analysis, since it now becomes imperative to investigate the textual dynamics which make the appearance of such ambiguities possible.

CREATIVITY AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

In order to explore the issues involved here, the analysis must now shift its focus slightly. What is now required is not just an investigation of the empirical data of the texts, but an examination of some of the extra-discursive pressures that the CPSU has historically had to confront, since these have left their traces in the language of these texts. The analysis must therefore to some extent engage in the interpretative dialectic between text and context referred to above, at least in so far as this helps to explicate the texts themselves.

²² Brezhnev, 'Report to the XXV Congress', p. 72.

²³ Nikita Khrushchev, 'Concerning the Control Figures for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for the years 1959–1965: Report', *Stenograficheskiĭ Otchet*, I (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1959), pp. 12–120, at p. 61, emphasis added.

There are two distinct patterns in the way the phrase 'creative development of Marxism-Leninism' and its variations are deployed relative, on the one hand, to such reified terms as 'teaching', and, on the other hand, to categories like 'revisionism' and 'dogmatism'.

The Miraculous Properties of 'Marxism-Leninism'

To begin with, it is noticeable that assertions about the CPSU's 'creative development of Marxism-Leninism' are often prefaced by references to what might be called the 'miraculous properties' of 'Marxist-Leninist theory' which usually contain highly reified images of what this 'theory' is supposed to consist of. A good and reasonably succinct example is provided by the 27th Congress speech, the second half of which has already been quoted above:

Marxism-Leninism is the supreme revolutionary worldview. It founded the most humane goal that humanity has ever placed before itself – the creation on Earth of a just social system. It points the way to the scientific study of societal development as a process which is unified and law-governed in all its colossal many-sidedness and contradictoriness, it teaches how to investigate correctly into the character and interaction of economic and political forces, how to choose the right lines of advance, the forms and methods of struggle, how to feel confident at abrupt historical turning points.

The CPSU in all its activity proceeds from the fact that loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist teaching lies in its creative development on the basis of accumulated experience...²⁴

This passage, like others of its ilk,²⁵ is remarkable for the fact that it does not consist in statements of theoretical principle, nor the elaboration of hypotheses, from which arguments could be made to follow, but rather consists in an idealized and very general description of the putative scientific, predictive and moral properties of 'Marxism-Leninism' as a 'teaching', properties which are quite lacking in any substantive content. Indeed, such passages are so stylized in form that it is easy to dismiss them as being relatively meaningless. However, if attention is paid to the ways in which they are related to the subsequent text it becomes clear that their purpose is to establish a set of associative equivalences between the imputed scientific attributes of the 'Marxist-Leninist worldview', and its millenarian humanistic goal, and the CPSU's 'creative development' of it as elaborated in the succeeding paragraphs. As a result the CPSU's contemporary practice appears by (associative) definition to be a direct expression of the pure 'Marxist-Leninist' method and of the pure 'Marxist-Leninist' goal. The fact that it is not at all obvious in what this 'method' and this 'goal' *substantively* consist facilitates the plausibility of the equivalence since it means that in making this association the CPSU is not *actually* committed to anything in particular, at least within the ambit of the text itself. At best, we therefore appear to be con-

²⁴ Gorbachev, 'Political Report', p. 9.

²⁵ Khrushchev 'Report to XX Congress', p. 113–14, 'Concerning the Control Figures', p. 110; 'Report to XXII Congress', p. 115; Brezhnev: 'Report to XXIII Congress', p. 86; 'Report to XXIV Congress', p. 101; 'Report to XXV Congress', p. 72, also Gorbachev, 'Political Report', p. 2.

fronted with a relationship between form and content, both of which are stipulated by the CPSU: 'Marxism-Leninism' provides a singularly stylized and reified form of uncertain dimensions to which the CPSU adds its own substantive content.

The question that insistently arises, however, is why, if the CPSU is a 'Marxist-Leninist' party, it considers it necessary to keep asserting its 'Marxist-Leninist' credentials in this way.

One part of the answer to this question is now relatively obvious. If the content of 'Marxism-Leninism' is dependent on what the CPSU says it is then the 'Marxist-Leninist' identity of this content cannot be authenticated in any integrally theoretical way but has to be a function of the CPSU's own discourse (and practice). Moreover, the very same circumstance also means that anyone not privy to the policy-making forums of the CPSU cannot have the slightest idea what the current 'line' on 'Marxism-Leninism' consists in, unless explicitly told this by the CPSU leadership itself, through such means as these Congress reports (hence in part their authoritativeness). This explains the reiterated statements explicitly detailing what 'Marxism-Leninism' is about at a particular point of time in these texts. It also gives us one reason for their repeated and somewhat defensive insistence on the fact that the CPSU is steadfastly 'loyal' to the 'Marxist-Leninist theory', that all its 'creative' activities are endowed with the appropriate 'Marxist-Leninist' properties, and that it is 'loyal' to the 'behests' of 'Marx' and 'Lenin' themselves, since none of this is at all obvious otherwise. All of this at least partly accounts for the paradoxical co-appearance of such terms as 'teaching' and 'creative development' in the same context.

Nevertheless, this argument only partially answers the question, since it is still not entirely clear why the CPSU should be so defensive about its identity as a 'Marxist-Leninist' party in the first place.

Marxism-Leninism as a 'Catch-22'

The substantive issues which still have to be addressed are complicated, since they crucially have to do with the problematic nature of creativity and the ways in which it actually threatens the identity of the CPSU itself. Their exploration here will bring us by extension to the second linguistic pattern which is discernible in these texts, since the one is symptomatic of the other.

There is no doubt that the designation of creativity as an essential principle of 'Marxism-Leninism' causes enormous problems for the CPSU in its relationship with the fraternal Communist parties of the socialist commonwealth. The reason is simple. If this principle permits the CPSU to define and redefine 'Marxism-Leninism' as circumstances require, it also permits other Communist parties to do the same, since they not only have the 'theory' but now have their own 'accumulated experience' on the basis of which to develop it, as Khrushchev and every General Secretary after him has had to acknowledge. Certainly, the CPSU can and does assert an historical privilege in the very literal sense that it can claim to have led the first successful twentieth-century revolution, and can

also claim that it was led by the first and most famous 'tactician of revolution', namely Lenin. This partially explains the consistent emphasis on continuity with 'Lenin' in these texts, and certainly explains their constant return to the 'Great October Revolution'.²⁶ However, this historical claim to privilege is extremely fragile. Other socialist countries not only had their own wars of liberation, notably Yugoslavia and China, but their own 'revolutionary heroes' to lead them, notably Tito and Mao. Furthermore, at least two of these countries have produced apparently viable alternatives to Soviet industrializing socialism, in the form of Chinese agrarian socialism and Yugoslav self-management (and perhaps Albanian 'agrarian Stalinism').²⁷ In these circumstances it has inevitably proved extraordinarily difficult for the CPSU to demonstrate that its 'creative development of Marxism-Leninism' as theory *and* practice has had any validity at all, let alone to justify its claim that its creative version of 'Marxist-Leninist' praxis is entitled to a privileged position as *the* correct praxis *vis-à-vis* the rest of the socialist commonwealth. On the contrary, as these texts indirectly reveal and as we all know, its 'Marxist-Leninist' identity has been subjected to very severe challenge on both the theoretical and practical fronts by some powerful Communist parties with more recent and equally successful revolutionary antecedents. The tensions which have ensued are played out in these texts in the following way.

It is distinctly noticeable that the ambiguous dynamic between 'creativity' on the one hand, and such terms as 'revisionism' and 'dogmatism' on the other hand, becomes particularly acute at those points in time and text where the nature and identity of 'Marxism-Leninism' have been most crucially at issue, and the CPSU's creative version of it has been most heavily under attack, notably by the Yugoslav and Chinese Communist Parties. In fact, with the exceptions of the 20th and 27th Congress speeches, to which I shall return, each text displays a similar dynamic to a greater or lesser extent depending on the ferocity of the debates at the time of each Congress. However, the following passage from the 24th Congress text provides a subtle but succinct example of the linguistic processes involved.

Theoretical work is an important part of our common internationalist, revolutionary duty. The confrontation of the forces of capitalism and socialism in the world arena; as well as the attempts of various kinds of revisionists to emasculate the revolutionary teaching and to distort the practice of socialist and communist construction demand from us even greater attention to problems of theory and its creative development. The repetition of old formulas where they have become outdated, the inability or reluctance to approach new problems in a new way – all this harms the cause and creates additional possibilities for the dissemination of revisionist counterfeits of Marxism-Leninism.

²⁶ See, for example, Brezhnev's assertion at the beginning of the 25th Congress text: 'Today's accomplishments of the Soviet people are a direct continuation of the cause of October. They are the practical embodiment of the great Lenin's ideas. Our party is and always will be faithful to this cause, to these ideas!' (Brezhnev, 'Report to the XXV Congress', p. 5)

²⁷ My thanks to Mary Buckley who chided me for forgetting to mention the Albanians in an earlier draft.

[Our] criticism of bourgeois and revisionist attacks on our theory and practice increases enormously in its persuasiveness when it rests upon the active and creative development of the social sciences, of Marxist-Leninist theory.²⁸

This passage clearly presents any audience with a set of contrary possibilities. On the one hand, phrases like 'theoretical work', 'approach new problems in a new way', 'the active and creative development of the social sciences, of Marxist-Leninist theory', not to mention the emphatic injunction that an increase in 'attention to problems of theory and its creative development' is required, all suggest the possibility of an open-ended, genuinely creative approach to the question of theory and theoretical development. They do not in themselves specify limits and restrictions. On the other hand, phrases like 'emasculate the revolutionary teaching', the 'repetition of old formulas *where* they have become outworn', 'revisionist counterfeits of Marxism-Leninism', 'attacks on our theory and practice', all suggest that there are strict limitations on the possibility of 'creativity'. The phrase 'revolutionary teaching', for example, *implies* the existence of a set of 'fundamental principles' which cannot be materially altered without losing its identity. The use of the verb 'to emasculate' (*vykholostit'*) only reinforces this implication, since to emasculate something is to remove the source of identity and power. Likewise, the phrase 'revisionist counterfeits of Marxism-Leninism' has a similar effect, since it is only possible to counterfeit something that has a clearly defined and integral identity. Moreover, the sense generated by these two phrases, that there is only one true version of 'Marxism-Leninism', in theory, is reinforced by the implication that there is only one true version of it in practice, which is contained in the references to the distortion of 'the practice of socialist and communist construction', and to the 'attacks on our theory and practice'. All of this of course simultaneously renders the term 'Marxism-Leninism' highly ambiguous and suggests that 'creativity' is in fact very problematic, which it is.

It is obvious that the juxtaposition of such contrary demands in principle places would-be 'loyal' Marxist-Leninists in something of a quandary, since they have simultaneously to defend *and* creatively develop Marxism-Leninism without being either 'dogmatic' or 'revisionist' about it. Given clear guidelines which specified the difference between 'dogmatism' and 'defence' and between 'revisionism' and 'creative development', this task might not be impossible to fulfil. However, the fact of the matter is that it is logically impossible for anyone, except the source of the discourse, namely the CPSU itself, to specify *in advance* what these boundaries might be.

The result is a 'Catch-22' which keeps the whole community to which it is addressed in a state of perpetual tension since this community can never predict exactly what behaviour, what 'interpretation' of 'Marxism-Leninism', will be correct at any point in time. To defend the 'purity' of Marxism-Leninism is to

²⁸ Leonid Brezhnev, 'Summary Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXIV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', *Materialy XXIV Cezda KPSS* (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 1971), pp 3-106, at p. 103.

risk being labelled a 'pendant' or a 'dogmatist'. To creatively develop it is to risk being labelled a 'revisionist' or some sort of 'deviationist'. To be seen doing neither is to risk the accusation of not being a Marxist-Leninist at all. And, needless to say, some sort of sanction is attendant on all three possibilities, whether it be public criticism or, as a last resort, military invasion. The natural reaction of any community confronted with such a paradox is, ironically, to keep its collective head below the parapet, to react conservatively, since the safest course of action is to follow 'the Leninist party line'.

In this context it must be emphasized that the importance of the CPSU's 'Cult of Marx and Lenin' and 'Cult of the Revolution', already remarked on and very noticeable in these speeches, cannot be underestimated, since they simultaneously have a double function in this logic. On the one hand, they ground the CPSU's arrogated privilege in a certain historical truth which appears to endow it with a source of legitimation which is *external* to itself and to which the CPSU can and does appeal when challenged. On the other hand, they in principle eliminate any possibility for 'meta-communication' about this arrogated privilege on the part of subordinate Communist parties. That is to say, they prevent these parties from *speaking about* this privilege, from discussing and investigating the constituent relationships of this 'Catch-22', from a vantage point that is not *already trapped within* the double bind itself. They do this by suggesting that *only* the true 'Leninist' party, and, of course, there is only one, can know how to 'creatively develop Marxism-Leninism' in the proper way. Thus in the following passage from the 22nd Congress, it is quite clearly 'Leninism' which appears at the pivotal point between 'the defense and creative development of the principles of Marxism-Leninism', and which therefore enables the CPSU as *the* Leninist party to arbitrate the distinction:

The creative development of Marxism-Leninism is the cornerstone of the activity of the party, the decisive condition of our successes in communist construction. Guided by the Leninist principle of the unity of theory and practice, our party will continue to regard the defense and creative development of the principles of Marxism-Leninism as its most important duty to the peoples of our country and to the workers of the whole world.²⁹

The question of meta-communication is obviously a crucial one, since this linguistic 'Catch-22' is precisely premised on the elimination of any possibility for the subordinate parties to interrogate the CPSU about the logical futility of their position. To allow them to 'speak about' these contradictions would be to unravel the structure of the 'Catch-22' and provide them with an avenue of escape from it. It would effectively be for the CPSU to cede all the arguments concerning its leading role within the socialist commonwealth. In this respect, therefore, to put the argument in a slightly different way, the reification of 'Marxism-Leninism' – its appearance as an apparently transcendental and 'eternal teaching' – and the reification of 'Lenin', 'Marx', the 'Revolution' and so on, are all fundamental to the closure of this linguistic structure. They discursively enable the CPSU to appear as the chief proponent and faithful 'disciple' of

²⁹ Khrushchev, 'Report to the XXII Congress', p. 115.

'Marxism-Leninism', while mystifying its own role in relation to it. This means that should any subordinate party seek to interrogate the logic of the relationship, as, for example, the Yugoslavs, Chinese and Albanians did, the CPSU leadership can, and does, respond by saying that it is only doing what any faithful follower of 'Marx' and 'Lenin', what any true 'Marxist-Leninist', should do. To challenge its position in any way is therefore to be profoundly un-'Marxist-Leninist' and deserving of expulsion from the socialist commonwealth as of course these three parties were. The CPSU thus appears not as the dominant authority in the 'Catch-22' but as the 'faithful follower' of a 'teaching' along with all the other communist parties.

We have thus arrived at a more or less complete answer to the questions on identity originally posed. The CPSU has explicitly and continuously to insist on its 'Marxist-Leninist' identity, firstly, because it is not always manifestly obvious in what this identity substantively consists, since it lacks an integral theoretical authenticity, and, secondly, because the 'Catch-22' which linguistically underpins this identity can only work if the linguistic structure of ambiguities which constitutes it is consistently repeated whenever that identity is challenged. These texts, in short, present us with an enormously defensive discourse in which every attempt by the CPSU to creatively develop 'Marxism-Leninism' seems to call up a whole set of justificatory and exclusionary mechanisms. This is perhaps inevitable, since creativity as an essential and defining part of this linguistic structure cannot be banished altogether and therefore requires constant control.

However, this can only be achieved at enormous cost. For example, although creativity is built into this system it is highly problematic, since it is not at all clear what it means to be 'creative' in such a context. This is as much a problem for the CPSU as it is for the other Communist parties, since although the CPSU is supposed to be the sole source for 'official' creativity in the commonwealth, 'official' or 'permissible' creativity is clearly not creativity at all in any meaningful sense of the term. It might be reform according to plan, change according to order, but this self-evidently deprives the CPSU of the beneficial effects of spontaneous and unfettered creative activity, particularly in the generation of knowledge. It is undoubtedly no coincidence that the CPSU has been one of the most conservative parties in the world communist movement for all its reforming impetus. In its attempts to retain its leading role, it has had to reify the very theory that it claims to be creatively developing beyond all possibility of true creative development. Similarly, it has had to reify some of its practices, notably those of the leading role of the party in Soviet society, of central planning and of state ownership. All of this suggests that the concept of 'creativity' has itself become somewhat congealed as a reified category. Nor is it a coincidence, therefore, that the real sources of creativity are to be found in areas entirely outside the Party, whether in the black economy or in the ranks of the liberal intellectuals and dissenters. These sources of creative practice are undoubtedly made use of by the CPSU leadership but only on its own terms.

An equally crucial problem from an analytic perspective, however, is the fact that this linguistic structure has an enormously disorganizing effect on the

meaning of the term 'Marxism-Leninism' itself, at least as it appears in these texts. On the one hand, it names the socialist commonwealth, i.e. those Communist parties which at least pay lip-service to the CPSU's 'Leninist line'. It also names the theoretical and practical activities of the CPSU itself. On the other hand, it appears as an 'eternal teaching' which is directly traceable back to 'Marx, Engels and Lenin' and which is endowed with all sorts of immutable scientific and moral properties. Yet again, the term is so closely identified with the CPSU that one could almost say the two are synonymous. This hiatus in meaning can only be grasped if the term is conceptualized as being an empty signifier. In fact, the word 'empty' is something of a misnomer, however, because we are dealing here with a term which overflows with meaning – so much so that any attempt to 'fix' its meaning, while this might make analysis superficially easier, is bound to render the term itself and the processes of which it is part, largely unintelligible.

THE RE-ENTRY OF HISTORY

At this point a number of caveats are in order. Having isolated the textual dynamics which structure the meaning of the term 'Marxism-Leninism' in a way which is rather a-historical and which consequently makes the whole process seem rather immutable, it is now necessary to relax the simplifying assumptions somewhat in order to demonstrate that this is not entirely the case.

To begin with, it must be emphasized that the categories of 'revisionism', 'dogmatism' and 'creativity', rather like the term 'Marxism-Leninism' itself, are formal categories in the sense that they have no necessary pre-determined content. That is to say, although they consistently connote 'badness' and 'goodness' respectively, to put it crudely, their referential meaning alters as the battle-lines between the Communist parties are re-drawn and as the preoccupations of the CPSU alter. Thus, it is perfectly possible, for example, to have all sorts of creative innovations proposed for such central principles as the leading role of the party or central planning. The crucial point is, however, that it is the CPSU leadership which then determines whether these are creative innovations which are acceptable to the 'party line' (or an emerging 'party line'), or revisionist/dogmatic interpretations which are hostile to the 'party line'.

Similar considerations apply to the deployment of the terms 'revisionism' and 'dogmatism' themselves. There are some remarkable differences in the ways in which these two terms are used in the corpus as a whole. For instance, it is distinctly noticeable that neither the 20th nor the 27th Congress speeches use the concept of 'revisionism' at all. Both of them place great emphasis on the opposition between 'creativity' and 'dogmatism', and effect linguistic closure by this means, but clearly the concept of 'revisionism' makes no sense whatever in the context of 'maiden' congress speeches by reforming General Secretaries who are themselves attempting to revise some of the received wisdoms of the 'party lines' bequeathed to them. In Khrushchev's case the concept would have been particularly nonsensical given his introduction of the notion of 'different paths to

socialism' and given also his *rapprochement* with the Yugoslav League of Communists at the time. Equally, the concept would sit uncomfortably with Gorbachev's attempt to promote a new 'revolution'. However, just because the term 'revisionism' was not used in these two speeches, does not mean that it was not available in the Soviet political universe of what it is possible to say. On the contrary, Khrushchev used it with considerable venom in both the 21st and 22nd Congress speeches, notably against the Yugoslavs with whom the argument over the leading role of the party, amongst other things, had once more broken out. Moreover, there is nothing at the present time (mid-1988) to suggest that Gorbachev has managed to banish it entirely from the Soviet political lexicon. The crucial point is, however, that it is open to successive CPSU leaderships to change the terms of the debate. The extent to which they can do so is, of course, a moot question, the answer to which would require an investigation of political processes in the Soviet Union which would take us well beyond the remit of this particular analysis. Nevertheless, it is quite noticeable that the limits on debate have changed – that the boundaries established between 'creativity', 'dogmatism', 'revisionism' have altered quite considerably over time. Thus Khrushchev, for all his polemic against the revisionist Yugoslavs, was more emphatic about the need for creativity than Brezhnev, whose innate conservatism made him almost as hostile to the concept as he had to be towards the twin evils of dogmatism and revisionism.

The second point which needs to be made is that the linguistic processes of the 'Catch-22' in these texts is not always as subtle as this analysis, for the sake of brevity, has made them out to be. On the contrary, neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev were reluctant to name names. Nor did they make any bones about the fact that the Yugoslav and/or Chinese Communist Parties were promoting an 'anti-Leninist' or 'anti-Marxist-Leninist' line when the severity of the debate in their view necessitated saying so. Thus there was no mistaking his message when Brezhnev insisted at the 25th Congress that:

... It is no longer enough to say that the Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist teaching. They are openly hostile to it.

In its relations with China, our party firmly adheres to the course outlined by the XXIV Congress. The correctness of this course has been confirmed by life. We will continue the struggle with Maoism, it is a principled struggle, an uncompromising struggle.

At the same time... it can be declared with confidence that if Peking returns to a policy which is truly based on Marxism-Leninism... then this will find an appropriate response from our side. ...³⁰

Anyone hearing or reading this passage might, of course, choose to ignore it, but there is little doubt, I think, that certain of the fundamental principles of the linguistic double bind in these speeches are readily intelligible to anyone paying attention. This is, of course, a speculative assessment since there is no way of knowing, at least at this point, what the conditions of reception of these texts actually are. But there is no reason at all to suppose that these textual dynamics

³⁰ Brezhnev, 'Report to the XXV Congress', p. 11.

are without effect, even if the precise logic of their structure is not immediately accessible.

That said, and this brings us to the third point, it has to be acknowledged that a linguistic structure of this sort can only do so much to achieve drastic changes in behaviour. In this respect the 'Catch 22' present in these speeches does not constitute a double bind as such, but rather presents us with the paradoxical communication which is characteristic of, and necessary to, a double bind. As Urban has pointed out,³¹ a double bind to be complete requires not only paradoxical communication of this sort and the elimination of meta-communication, but also requires the very real threat of force and a relationship of active dependency between the super- and subordinate parties, to lock it into place.

It is self-evident that such a double bind exists in the CPSU's relations both with the Soviet population and with the socialist commonwealth. The threat of force is certainly present. If nothing else, political repression domestically and the Hungarian and Czechoslovak invasions of 1956 and 1968 attest to that. Equally, although this is not the place to go into it, there is also a relationship of varying degrees of active dependency both between individuals within the CPSU,³² and between the CPSU and other Communist parties. From the CPSU's perspective this latter dependency is manifested in these texts by the fact that both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev leaderships constantly sought the corroboration of the international Communist Party congresses for the correctness of their 'creative' interpretation of 'Marxism-Leninism' *vis-à-vis* their critics. This corroboration was necessary given that without it the CPSU could not justify its leading role at the head of the socialist commonwealth. However, once given, this corroboration also made participating Communist parties complicit in the maintenance of the CPSU's dominant position. Thus, for example, Brezhnev's statement in the 23rd Congress speech (given below) appeared in the context of a whole section in the speech in which he was inveighing against 'right- and left-wing deviations', 'manifestations of nationalism, great power chauvinism and hegemonism', most of which was directed against the Chinese.³³

In the opinion of the CPSU Central Committee, there is a good Marxist-Leninist platform for the rallying of the Communist ranks – the general line worked out by the Conferences of fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960. Life has put it to the most stringent test and it has passed that test.³⁴

Moreover, this section of text ended with the following assertions:

The CPSU will steadfastly struggle for the strengthening of the international unity of

³¹ Michael E. Urban, 'Conceptualizing Political Power in the USSR: Patterns of Binding and Bonding', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 18 (1985), 207–26, pp. 216ff

³² Urban, 'Conceptualizing Political Power', pp. 216ff.

³³ Leonid Brezhnev, 'Summary Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', *Materialy XXIII Cezda KPSS* (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 1966), pp. 3–94, at p. 17.

³⁴ Brezhnev, 'Report to the XXIII Congress', p. 17.

all the fraternal parties on the basis of the great teaching of Marx–Engels–Lenin, on the basis of the line collectively worked out by the world communist movement.

And we will continue to wage a relentless struggle against revisionism, dogmatism, against national manifestations, and to come out in support for the creative development of the Marxist–Leninist teaching.³⁵

This clearly suggests that a chain of equivalence was being completed between the ‘creative Marxist–Leninist line’ worked out by the CPSU and the ‘line collectively worked out by the world communist movement’ and legitimized at its international conferences.

It goes without saying, of course, that the relationship of dependency also works in the other direction between members of the socialist commonwealth and the CPSU, both in terms of economic dependency and in terms of the fact that those parties with the greatest lack of domestic political legitimacy, notably the Polish and the Czechoslovak Communist Parties, have been most dependent on Soviet political and military support. In this respect it is very noticeable that those parties which achieved their own domestic sources of legitimacy early on – the Chinese, Yugoslav and Albanian parties – have been those which succeeded in breaking away from the Soviet ambit.

Finally, it has to be stressed that even this vast panoply of control cannot keep creative tendencies totally in check.

At the macro-level of large events there is nothing to stop members of the socialist commonwealth from pushing against the barriers to creativity if they are willing to accept the risks. We could not, for example, explain the events of 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia and 1980–81 in Poland, if it were otherwise. Nor could we explain Khrushchev and Gorbachev themselves for that matter. Although we do have to confront the fact that, with the exception of Gorbachev on whom it is too soon to pass judgement, none of these experiments succeeded. Khrushchev was removed from office and most of his reforms overturned, and the developments in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland were suppressed by military force.³⁶ The fact that the Polish events of 1980–81 could be referred to as being a ‘self-limiting revolution’ precisely because of the *threat* of Soviet military intervention speaks volumes about the levels of force in the system and the possibilities for genuine creative change within the ambit of the ‘double bind’ thus far.

On the other hand, at the micro-level of small events and incremental change, there is potential opportunity for an enormous amount of creative innovation. For one thing, the political language of the CPSU is so ambiguous, its concepts on the whole so vague and capacious, that it allows a great deal of room for intellectual manoeuvre. This is a circumstance which Soviet intellectuals,

³⁵ Brezhnev, ‘Report to the XXIII Congress’, pp 18–19.

³⁶ The exception was Poland in 1956. But even here Gomułka had to persuade the Soviet Union that his brand of creativity was safe and the same of course applies to Janos Kádár in Hungary after 1956.

especially at the periphery of the system, are able to exploit to their own advantage. As Scanlan so perceptively remarked in the context of a discussion of Soviet philosophical developments in the theory of Materialism, ambiguity and 'illicit confusion' are:

an integral and mutually beneficial aspect of a perverse intellectual community in which science is freed to progress and even philosophy has a certain independence while nonetheless ideology is enthroned. Without the confusion this aim could not be achieved, and consequently there is no interest on any side in eliminating the confusion. It would be the death of the Soviet scientific and philosophical intelligentsia if, in endorsing materialism, all sides were compelled to talk about the same thing. And they must therefore insist that they *are* talking about the same thing and must vigorously reject [this] analysis...³⁷

It is, in other words, the massive ambiguities in Soviet political language which make possible the reading and writing 'between the lines' in which so many Soviets are forced to engage. For another thing, not everyone is equally dependent on, and subject to, the power of the CPSU's central leadership. Thus, for example, the party satrapies of the First Secretaries at Republican level and below within the CPSU have sufficient local power and sufficient autonomy from the central leadership that they are able subtly to interpret 'the Party line' at local level to the advantage of their own interests, as Gorbachev is finding out to his cost, as did Khrushchev and Brezhnev before him. Similarly, the *bezpartiiny* (non-party members) who constitute the vast majority of the Soviet population, at whatever level of the system they may be, have carved themselves out a private sphere of sorts in which they engage in a variety of illicit but frequently useful and creative activities. Although the CPSU's central leadership has frequently made examples of those whose 'creative' activities have proved to be pernicious, this has not prevented the various parts of the system from slipping further and further out of its grasp. The long line of failed reforms and failed central initiatives partially attests to this fact.

The tragedy of this system for all concerned is that the CPSU, because of its limited strategic vision, as demonstrated in these texts, has been largely unable to harness all this spontaneous micro-level creativity to its own purposes. Gorbachev may be trying to change this, and he may succeed. Certainly his policies of 'openness' and 'democratization' appear to be trying to re-establish debate in the public sphere in ways which may enable the re-emergence of genuine meta-communication between society and party about the relationship of party to society and of both to Soviet history, and about relationships within the socialist commonwealth as a whole. If this does occur, and becomes consolidated (and there are signs in the Soviet media that it is beginning to) then the days of the double bind might well be numbered. As Nikolai Shishlin, a senior Central Committee official, recently remarked,

We are going to learn not only from our allies, to know for example the experience of

³⁷ James P. Scanlan, *Marxism in the USSR. A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought* (London: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 99. Although for the term 'ideology' I would substitute the phrase 'political necessity'.

Hungary, Yugoslavia, China, Poland and so on. But we really are interested in the experience of Sweden ... Great Britain ... the United States. Marxism–Leninism is an open theory. It was closed during long decades and it is necessary to open it and to be open to different points of view.³⁸

However, if this opening-up is to be achieved then the CPSU cannot rely simply on individual will and on the reform of institutional practices. It will necessarily have to change drastically the ways in which it speaks about, conceives of and justifies itself. It will have to confront the question of its leading role, as it is beginning to do. But in doing so it will also have to confront the crucial problem that if 'Marxism–Leninism' is to be an 'open theory' then it will no longer be clear what it means to be 'Marxist–Leninist', nor will it be possible any longer for a single party to dictate its terms. The consequence might well be that the CPSU will have to open up its fragile identity to interrogation and debate in ways that may ultimately transform it, but which will certainly undermine the paradoxical power on which it has been based. Mikhail Gorbachev may well have started the process but there is a long way to go and the possible consequences are dangerously uncertain.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing has sought to argue that 'Marxism–Leninism' can only be rendered intelligible, both in Soviet terms and as an object of analysis, if the conventional debates on 'Soviet ideology' as they have been conducted to date are abandoned in favour of an agnostic approach to the question of meaning and a more exhaustive and subtle approach to the question of language than has generally been applied in communist studies.³⁹ The semiotic method adopted in this analysis, while not by any means exhausting the complexities of Soviet political discourse(s), has nevertheless demonstrated that it is complex and that the meaning of the word 'Marxism–Leninism' as an instance of that language is particularly complex, in ways that have been utterly underestimated by conventional analyses. This is either because they have sidestepped the issue altogether or because they have, on the whole, too easily assumed that the meaning of 'Marxism–Leninism' is straightforwardly objectifiable in epistemological and/or referential terms.

However, as the language of these texts has revealed the term 'Marxism–Leninism', at least at the level of the CPSU's official discourse, cannot be rendered intelligible by means of the categories which have been conventionally

³⁸ In interview with Charles Wheeler on *Newsnight*, BBC 2, 7 July 1988.

³⁹ However, this is changing. See, for example, the work by Patrick Seriot, *Analyse du discours politique soviétique* (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 1985); Alexander Bourmeyster in *Essais sur le discours soviétique*, 2, 3 (1982, 1983); Michael Urban and J. McClure, 'The Folklore of State Socialism. Semiotics and the Study of the Soviet State', *Soviet Studies*, 35 (1983), 471–86; Urban, 'The Structure of Signification in the General Secretary's Address'; Michael E. Urban, 'From Chernenko to Gorbachev: A Repoliticization of Official Soviet Discourse?', *Soviet Union* (forthcoming).

predicated of it. For instance, it cannot be an 'ideology' or an epistemology as Sovietologists have conventionally conceived it, since it displays none of the characteristics of a 'body of ideas', a 'guide to action', 'conceptual framework' and so on. On the contrary, while these texts contain a considerable number of unsupported assertions about the scientific brilliance of 'Marxist-Leninist theory', numerous injunctions about the need 'to develop and defend Marxism-Leninism creatively', and a variety of flat statements of identity, as well as relatively straightforward policy statements, they display nothing in the way of properly elaborated logical, or reasoned, argument. Yet argument of this kind is what one might expect in texts (including originally set-piece public speeches) which are at least partially concerned with the creative theoretical elaboration of ideas and the genuine application of theory to practice and which, moreover, precisely because they do originate as speeches, are presumably at least partially concerned to persuade their audience (however defined) of the merits of the case. Although the Soviets do indisputably refer to 'Marxism-Leninism' as being their 'guide to action' and their 'ideology', this sort of reification of the term is a necessary constituent of the linguistic double bind, which, paradoxically, structures the meaning of that term within these texts. It is expressive of the paradoxical and fragile identity which the CPSU has historically had to defend against the counter-claims of other Communist parties, internal critics and the 'bourgeois' critiques of its 'capitalist' opponents.

None of this is intended to suggest, of course, that the CPSU does not have an epistemology, or a systematic view of the world, which *in the nature of the 'Catch 22' it must, and does, call Marxism-Leninism*. It is merely to argue that this epistemology, these ideas, cannot be assumed or extrapolated from some *a priori* definition of 'Marxism-Leninism' and/or 'ideology', but have to be read out and derived from the way CPSU members actually and contemporaneously discuss the world. Thus if, for example, Communist party members do think in dialectical materialist terms, whatever that might mean, this can only be discovered by examining the way they speak and write. It cannot be discovered by extrapolating from what we think Marx and Lenin might have meant, or from some notion of 'classical Marxism'.

It is to argue, in short, that the concept of 'Marxism-Leninism' can only be rendered intelligible if Western analysts cease to reify it – reification being a Soviet problem which should be examined rather than imitated – and commence instead to deconstruct the term. They need to explore it in all its manifold contexts and relations and to investigate all the diverse practices which are said to constitute it in their own terms.

It should not be supposed, however, that the general approach advocated here is intended as a substitute for the traditional methods of analysing the social and political orders. On the contrary, its aim is to contribute to the conventional methods of social science employed by political scientists, first of all, by rendering the whole question of 'Marxism-Leninism' more amenable to analysis than it has hitherto been, and, secondly, by demonstrating that the paradoxical language frequently employed by the CPSU, and so frequently

dismissed by Western analysts as largely meaningless,⁴⁰ actually provides us with a wealth of readily accessible information about the CPSU, its identity, practices and purposes. In this respect, the investigation has been motivated by the fundamental assumption which informs all semiotic analysis, namely that all forms of language, even apparently contradictory, ambiguous or stylistically repetitive forms, are governed by rules and therefore have meanings which may not only be communicable but may also be informative. The analyst should therefore always remain open to the possibility that Soviet linguistic behaviour, like all human activity, has a rationality (regardless of whether one approves of it or not) which can be grasped once the initial premises, the rules and shared meanings governing it are understood. Lies and ambiguities will remain lies and ambiguities, but we have to confront the fact that even lies are usually logical. Certainly, if we wish to come to terms with the Gorbachev 'revolution' then it is beholden on us to pay serious attention to *everything* that the CPSU says.

⁴⁰ As Barghoorn and Remington remark on the general problem of interpreting official Soviet sources, 'Of course, one must weed out the elements of propaganda, distortion, outright falsification, doubletalk, fantasy, and ritual contained in the official Soviet media' (*Politics in the USSR*, 3rd edn (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1986), p. 34).

The Puzzle of Indian Politics: Social Cleavages and the Indian Party System

PRADEEP K. CHHIBBER AND JOHN R. PETROCIK

The social cleavage theory of party systems has provided a major framework for the study of Western party systems. It has been quite unimportant in studying other party systems, especially those of developing countries, where comparative development, and not mass electoral politics, has been the focus of study. This article reports the results of an attempt to bridge these traditions by analysing popular support for the Congress Party of India in terms of the expectations of the social cleavage theory of parties. This analysis illustrates the degree to which Indian partisanship conforms to the expectations of the theory. More importantly, this social cleavage theory analysis offers some new perspectives on (1) the inability of the Indian political system to develop national parties other than the Congress and (2) the 'disaggregation' of the Congress party.

INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF INDIAN POLITICS

India is, arguably, the most socially heterogeneous nation-state of modern times. It contains every major religion in the world, and a good many minor ones. In addition to 550 million Hindus, the population numbers 75 million Muslims, 13 million Sikhs, 16 million Christians (of several denominations), 5 million Buddhists, 3 million Jains, and uncounted millions in small sects which are offshoots of the major groups.¹ The 1961 Census identified 1,652 mother tongues, many of which made for differences within these religious communities.² Among the various Hindu linguistic divisions there are thousands of *jatis*, or caste divisions, each forming an autonomous unit of reference for social action on the part of its members. This diversity is illustrated by Powell who, citing data from the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, notes that the ethnic variety of India is so great that one has only an 11 per cent chance of picking two individuals at random and finding them to be of similar ethnic groups (in the

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¹ These figures are taken from the *Statistical Outline of India* (Bombay: Tata Consultancy Services, 1986).

² Jyotindra Das Gupta, *Language Conflict and National Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 33.

United States, there is a 50 per cent chance of randomly selecting two people from the same ethnic-linguistic group).³

These many religions, languages, ethnic and tribal groups, castes and classes of India provide friction points which frequently become occasions for inter-group conflict. During 1986–87, for instance, *religion* provided a basis for the struggle of the Sikhs in Punjab; in Uttar Pradesh the Hindu claim to a temple within a mosque sparked widespread Hindu–Muslim riots. Violence erupted over the status of the Konkani *language* in Goa, and Tamilnadu experienced a re-emergence of anti-Hindi agitation. *Ethnic* identity helped fuel the Tripura, Naga and Mizo insurrections and the Gorkha demand for a separate state. *Caste* ‘wars’ were prevalent in Bihar, with castes such as the Bhumihars, Rajputs, Kurmis and Yadavs forming *Senas* to protect their caste and economic interests.⁴ In Western India, *farmers* agitated for better terms of trade through the Shetkari Sangathan.

This litany of divisions and disputes is too easy to exaggerate. The uniqueness of India does not lie in the existence of these conflicts – equivalent social differences have occasioned inter-group conflict in most societies – but in the *variety* of salient differences: castes within religion, language within class, class within religion, class within language, class within caste, caste within language, etc. The puzzle, given all these cleavages and their divisiveness, is in the weak link that has been found between social cleavages and party support.⁵

From the perspective of the social cleavage theory of party systems, the Indian parties, especially the Congress, are anomalous. Religion, language, caste, class and ethnic differences fragment Indian society into groups which make relatively complete claims on individuals. Yet, one party – the Congress – wins the support of a large share of the electorate. Across four decades and eight general elections, both in terms of the percentage of the vote received and the seats captured in Parliament, the Congress has consistently dominated its rivals. It has lost control of the national government only once, and then only for a brief period. Its opponents have never forged a stable challenge. No party or coalition has been able to establish itself twice in succession as the Congress’s closest opponent in eight general elections. Only once, in 1967, did the Swatantra repeat as the third largest party in Parliament.

Most students of the structure and development of parties in other mass democracies would not have predicted, in the case of India, the dominance of the Congress. In the Western experience, religious, economic, ethnic, linguistic and regional differences provided social cleavages around which organizations,

³ G. Bingham Powell, *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 45; Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972)

⁴ *Senas* are groups of armed men.

⁵ Systematic sociological evidence for caste among the non-Hindus can be found in Harjinder Singh, ed., *Caste Among Non-Hindus in India* (New Delhi: National Publishers, 1977).

especially political ones, developed.⁶ In some cases social differences reinforced each other and provided demographic fault lines for the parties: a party's members and supporters were drawn from a few groups – sometimes only one group. Other societies with less sharply defined social divisions gave rise to less aligned party systems.⁷ In these systems, the supporters of any given party were religiously, ethnically, racially, linguistically and economically heterogeneous; no group, however defined, represented more than a fraction of a party's supporters.⁸

This correlation between social characteristics and partisanship varies with the number, salience and political significance of its cleavages, and it is from the perspective of this relationship that India is anomalous.⁹ Its salient and highly charged social divisions seem to play an insignificant role in determining party preference. The Congress appears to have surmounted the divisions of Indian society and achieved a commanding majority among virtually all segments of the electorate. Figure 1 illustrates how substantially India departs from the tendency for social diversity to produce parties with socio-demographically distinct clienteles. The horizontal axis measures the ethnic diversity of a society in terms of the probability that any two randomly selected individuals will be from different racial or ethnic groups. The larger the value of the measure, therefore, the greater the number of relatively large ethnic and racial groups there are in the society. The vertical axis uses the Alford index to measure the degree to which social differences correspond to party differences.¹⁰ The larger the value of the index, the more socially homogeneous are the supporters of the parties, or in our terms, the greater the alignment between partisan divisions and social cleavages. A quick inspection of the figure reveals that socially diverse societies tend to produce parties more closely aligned to social groups. Indeed, the general pattern is exactly as the theory would predict. We are not suggesting a monotonic relationship between ethnic fragmentation and party alignment. The figure merely illustrates that in the most diverse societies, social differences tend to be

⁶ For a fuller statement of the social cleavage theory of party systems, see Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966); Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967); Richard Rose and D. W. Urwin, 'Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes', *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 (1969), 7–67.

⁷ By 'aligned' party system we are referring to party systems in which there is a strong correlation between social and demographic variables and party preference. By 'less aligned' we mean to indicate weak correlations.

⁸ Arendt Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978) and Powell, *Contemporary Democracies*.

⁹ Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Working Class Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 77 (1983), 1–18.

¹⁰ These data, slightly modified, are drawn from G. Bingham Powell, 'Voter Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Effects of Partisan, Legal and Socio-Economic Environments', paper delivered at the Conference on Voter Turnout, San Diego, May 1979.




Fig 1. Comparison of degree of cleavage alignment of the party system with the degree of ethnic fractionalization of the society

* See text for a definition of the Index of Cleavage Alignment and the Ethnic Fractionalization Index

politicized and parties form to serve as political vehicles for the competing groups.¹¹ While India is the most obvious outlier, it is not the only one. The United States and Canada also do not fit the pattern well. But the magnitude of the 'discrepancy' between the observed and the expected is particularly pronounced for India and, as a result, deserves attention both for what it indicates about Indian politics and for the challenge India offers to the social cleavage theory of party systems.

A PUZZLE EASILY ANSWERED?

This demographic heterogeneity of the Congress has several probable explanations. One explanation emphasizes the Congress's role as a heterogeneous, catch-all, centrist party, which developed its support in the independence movement.¹² Existing as a coalition of interests, support for the Congress cuts across major ethnic, regional and class barriers, not because it was 'designed' as a

¹¹ To be sure, substantial social diversity is not necessary for the development of socially-based party systems (there are several European countries with relatively little ethnic or racial diversity but very homogeneous parties along religious, language or class lines), but it is (usually) sufficient, and as the data in Figure 1 indicate, the most socially diverse nations tend to have the most homogeneous parties.

¹² Rajni Kothari, 'The Congress "System" in India', *Asian Survey*, 4 (1964), 1161-73.

heterogeneous catch-all party, but because its role in the independence movement allowed it to sweep up and retain voters and groups who were first mobilized into mass politics during the independence movement. From this point of view the dominance of the party reflects the status and legitimacy of the State itself, while its opposition, unable to claim such a historic past, is left to represent the nuances of dissent and serve as political 'pressure valves' within the broad political consensus which the Congress party forged and now represents.¹³

An alternative explanation of Congress's dominance emphasizes the limitations of the leadership of the opposition parties. This account asserts that no opposition party can draw a significant level of support or serve as a vehicle for the interests of a group either because their leaders lack the requisite national standing to become prime minister or because they are preoccupied with personal ambitions. The break-up of the Janata coalition in 1979, for example, was widely attributed to the competing personal ambitions of the Janata leadership. A consistent, concerted Congress party initiative to project the Congress Prime Minister as the only national figure has reinforced the perception that opposition leaders – representatives of sectarian, and perhaps divisive, interests – are too limited to offer political leadership to the entire nation.

Both explanations have merit. From the perspective of the social cleavage theory, however, their strength is also their weakness: they invoke unique features of Indian political history to explain India's deviation from a general pattern. This may be an unnecessary exceptionalism. Our analysis, on the other hand, illustrates considerable consistency between the structure of party support in India and the social cleavage theory. The key to detecting the correspondence is in the level of the political system at which one examines the linkage between party preference and social characteristics.

A SOCIAL CLEAVAGE THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON CONGRESS SUPPORT

Our analysis will demonstrate that the social base of the Congress party conforms to the social cleavage theory of party systems. The Congress is a coalition of State and local parties which differ substantially among themselves in the groups and interests they represent. In terms of its supporters, the Congress is several parties, with a social base in some parts of the country that is at odds with its social foundations in other regions. Looked at from the national level (as in Figure 1), Congress supporters represent a variety of social classes, occupational groups, religions and languages. But community by community (and to a lesser extent State by State), the electoral support of the Congress is quite homogeneous. At the local level, the Congress and its opposition represent the social and economic conflicts of India as fully as the parties of the classic consociational democracies of Western Europe, e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands,

¹³ Kothari, 'The Congress "System" in India', p. 1164

Austria, Switzerland or Luxembourg, represented the religious, language and class cleavages of their societies.¹⁴

Our image of the Congress is of a political party that is a coalition of State (and ultimately local) groups, which rests upon the divisions and conflicts of the State and community in question.¹⁵ The modern Congress is a projection of its pre-independence past. In the pre-independence period the nationalist movement often depended upon factional politics which coalesced into provincial and national alliances. But, these coalitions were not held together by a 'passion for a common doctrine'.¹⁶ An interest in exploiting these issues for their own purely local purposes drew local factions to larger campaigns. C. A. Bayly, for example, in trying to understand why powerful local interests and the organizations they created associated with the early Congress, argues that the Congress was essentially a secondary organization which facilitated the persistence of 'circumscribed local and sectional aims which derived from lower levels of politics'.¹⁷

To describe the Congress as a heterogeneous, national party of consensus, representing all groups, is formally accurate but substantively misleading.¹⁸ A more accurate description comes from Sisson, who finds that the national Congress is 'organized into mutually exclusive factional coalitions which tend to nucleate around a dominant leader or faction which has its own regional base of

¹⁴ See Arendt Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*. Parenthetically, we would note that the social cleavage theory does not assume a 'deterministic' model of the Indian voter or the Indian party system. Beliefs and ideology have an autonomous role. People do express a vision of the public order in their vote, not just of group interests. However, we believe that social group conflicts are a major source of political beliefs and ideological orientations.

¹⁵ While State politics in India have been the subject of studies such as Myron Weiner, ed., *State Politics in India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Iqbal Narain, ed., *State Politics in India* (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1976), and John Wood, ed., *State Politics in Contemporary India: Crisis or Continuity?* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), we believe that there has been no systematic articulation of the consequences of this State focus for the Congress as a type of party within a particular type of party system.

¹⁶ Anil Seal, 'Imperialism and Nationalism in India', in John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal, eds, *Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics 1870-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 25.

¹⁷ C. A. Bayly, *The Local Roots of Indian Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 4. Sumit Sarkar, in his *Modern India 1885-1947* (Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 1983), tacitly accepts the local bases of Congress support, but criticizes the Cambridge school for downplaying the role of ideology and patriotic motivation in the nationalist movement. While that debate has not been resolved we can fairly characterize the pre-independence Congress as a factional coalition tied together by an anti-colonial ideology that identified the Congress with the nation-state.

¹⁸ For this interpretation of the Congress see Kothari, 'The Congress "System" in India'; D. L. Sheth, 'Partisanship and Political Development' in D. L. Sheth, ed., *Citizens and Parties: Aspects of Competitive Politics in India* (Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1975); Larry Diamond, S. M. Lipset and Juan Linz, 'Developing and Sustaining Democratic Government in the Third World', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1986; and Bashiruddin Ahmed, 'Dimensions of Party Support in Contemporary India', paper presented at the Conference on the Comparative Dimensions of Indian Elections and Party Politics held at UCLA, June 1987.

political support'.¹⁹ The key to identifying the Congress's support is to look below the national level. The divisions of Indian society are clearly evident there, where mass political mobilization occurs. They are masked at the national level, allowing the Congress to appear (inaccurately) as a heterogeneous, centre, 'party of consensus'.²⁰

This interpretation offers important insights into Indian politics. It formulates questions about the social base of Congress party support that, when answered, help us to understand (1) the continuing electoral success of the Congress party, (2) the corresponding fragmentation and weakness of Congress's opponents nationally, and (3) the 'disaggregation' of the Congress party. This article considers empirical evidence, drawn from election surveys, to test the viability of this alternative hypothesis.²¹

Data: The 1971 Election as a Test Case

This analysis rests upon a 1971 survey of the electorate. Two factors, which should have suppressed the influence of local conflicts on national politics, make that general election a particularly appropriate window for observing the link between social cleavages and partisanship. Firstly, in 1971 Indira Gandhi departed from prior practice by calling a national election without simultaneous State government elections, thereby ostensibly minimizing the influence of local considerations on the national vote. Secondly, Indira Gandhi campaigned across 'regional, parochial and caste lines with a direct class appeal to "abolish poverty"'.²² This appeal was designed to bypass the local and particularistic conflicts that had been forged into national coalitions in the past. To the extent that we find a State and local based alignment structure of the sort predicted by the social cleavage theory of party systems, we can be confident that a persistent feature of the Congress party has been observed.²³

Social Cleavages and Congress Support: The 1971 Election

In 1971 the Congress party drew majority support from every class (understood in this article as economic groupings), every religion and every caste (Table 1).

¹⁹ Richard Sisson, *The Congress Party in Rajasthan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 212.

²⁰ For more on the concept of the 'center' see Hans Daalder, 'In Search of the Center of European Party Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 78 (1984), 92-109.

²¹ The data used in the analysis were culled from three post-election surveys covering the 1967, 1971 and the 1977 elections. The surveys were conducted under the auspices of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. We are grateful to the Centre and the Department of Political Science at UCLA for permission to use the surveys for our analysis.

²² Francine Frankel, 'Compulsion and Social Change: Is Authoritarianism the Solution to India's Economic Development Problems?' in Atul Kohli, ed., *The State and Development in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 167.

²³ Moreover, the pattern in comparable earlier data from the 1967 election and later data from the 1977 campaign (see Appendix) is so similar to the 1971 pattern that it is unreasonable to believe that Indira Gandhi's election strategy significantly reformulated the way in which the parties converted traditional social conflicts into electoral support.

TABLE 1 *Percentage Vote for Congress by Social Cleavages, 1971*

Religion		Caste		Class
Hindus	62	High status	64	<i>Rural areas</i>
Muslims	74	Upper	53	Low 68
Sikhs	65	Merchant	57	Middle 62
Christians	52	Middle	65	High 66
Other religions	62	Upward mobile	54	<i>Urban areas</i>
		Lower	58	Low 65
		Harijans	68	Middle 62
		Scheduled Tribes	62	High 50

Its coalition was exceptionally heterogeneous, not a massing of 'have-nots'. The Congress received more support from Muslims (three out of four) than from any other religious group, but its success was not built on an endorsement by Muslims. The Sikhs, too, gave it widespread support (65 per cent) and the Hindus were not far behind at 62 per cent. Christians, Buddhists and Jains did not vote as heavily for the Congress, but it is obvious from the data in Table 1 that the Congress was elected with majority support from every religious group.

Caste distinctions played even less of a role than religion in structuring the vote in 1971.²⁴ Harijans voted most heavily for the Congress (68 per cent) but the other castes were not far behind. The high and middle-status castes voted almost as heavily for the Congress as the Harijans (approximately 65 per cent).

²⁴ Class is a measure of the relative economic status of the respondents in the election surveys. This economic classification was based on the reported education, income and occupation of the respondents. A preliminary factor analysis revealed that these three variables could be used in conjunction with one another. The respondents were classified into three literacy categories dependent upon their years of schooling. With occupation, the algorithm was more complex. Since rural occupational hierarchies are based on land-holding those who lived in the rural areas were classified according to the amount of land they held. In the urban areas profession determined the respondent's position. Housewives were accorded the occupation of the head of the household. As a cross-check, we found no difference in the reported family income of housewives (whose occupation was categorized by that of the head of the household) and that of respondents of similar occupation. We used family income as a measure of the financial status of the household. However, the division of the sample into income categories was based on family size as well. These three variables – education, occupation and income – were then standardized and added. The sample was then divided into thirds giving us the three categories of the composite variable we call class.

Caste is a measure of the social, not ritual, status of the respondent. Caste as *Jati* is the major form of social organization and identity at the local level. Caste, in our formulation, does not refer to the *Varna* categories, which are merely structural modes of organizing *Jati* categories and do not constitute self-conscious social groups. *Jati* is geographically bounded and rarely transcends the dominant linguistic culture of which it is a part. For purposes of comparison *Jati* had to be collapsed into an analytically useful form. The classification we have used was defined during an informal workshop held at UCLA during the summer of 1985. At that workshop, Ramasharaj Roy of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi, Richard Sisson, William Vanderbok and Pradeep Chhibber went through archival material on most of the *Jatis* in each State and classified them into categories that reflected commonality of status in the State and simultaneously constituted meaningful social and analytical categories.

Clearly, no caste group alone formed the social foundation on which the Congress based its massive majority in that election.²⁵

The weak correlation of the vote with religion and caste is not evidence of the importance of class in 1971. Class was less correlated with the vote than either religion or caste, especially in the rural areas where over 60 per cent of all class groupings voted for the Congress. In the urban areas, the vote did vary with status: the Congress vote among high-status urban dwellers was over 10 percentage points below that of the middle and lower classes. Indira Gandhi's class appeal may be responsible for this difference. If a class appeal would be effective anywhere one would expect urban dwellers, who are less physically isolated and psychologically 'committed' to segmental cleavages such as caste and religion, to be the most responsive to class appeals. But, that established, the most striking feature of the reported 1971 vote is how poorly it correlates with any of the social distinctions presented in Table 1. Support for Congress is slightly above average with some groups and slightly below average with others, but, overall, inter-group differences are small. The occasional deviation from the average is too small to represent anything more than a modest departure from the essentially high support for the Congress among all groups.

The Territoriality of Social Cleavages

We believe that one of the keys to the 'anomaly' of Congress's heterogeneity is the territorial organization of the Indian political system. The Indian parties, like those of the United States, Canada, Switzerland and other federal systems which build parties *up to the nation* rather than extend them *down* to localities are likely to be heterogeneous coalitions when viewed from the national level but much more homogeneous when examined at the local level, where the social cleavages represented by the parties are salient. The difference between the national and local level will vary with the geographic concentration of the groups and the parties. The federal structure will not mask a strong link between social groups and parties where both the groups and the parties are geographically concentrated. But, the federal structure can confound the group-party linkage when a party crosses geographical lines and represents different groups in different areas. This is precisely the situation in India, where conflicts are geographically specific but the Congress rallies support across the nation. Because of the possession of 'historical homelands' under the 1956 linguistic reorganization of the States, language gave geographical boundaries to religious, caste and ethnic divisions. Geography, in brief, became (and remains) as politicized as the 'segmental pluralism' it encapsulated.²⁶

²⁵ There is evidence that the electoral coalition that formed the basis of Mrs Gandhi's victory was not only the minorities and the disadvantaged sectors, but also high caste, upper-status respondents in the rural sectors of the Hindi heartland who voted at higher levels for the Congress than in previous elections

²⁶ Ironically, although the linguistic reorganization of States removed language as a 'grievance', the reorganization made language a permanent feature of the political landscape in India



As a result, intergroup conflicts, across India, became more geographically specific. Not surprisingly, both the identity of social groups and the intensity with which these groups oppose each other varies by State and community. Consider, for example, the purely local dimension of intercaste competition. It is a unique State-specific patchwork quilt of conflict: in Tamilnadu conflict divided Brahmin and non-Brahmin, while in Rajasthan it was Rajput versus Jat and in Andhra Pradesh the Kammas against the Reddis. The resolution of a caste polarization does not do away with caste conflict: new ones replace them much as the conflicts between Kshatriyas and Patidars in Gujarat supplanted divisions between Baniya-Brahmin and Patidars.²⁷ In brief, caste, while a feature of national political life, is politically meaningful (mostly, if not only) at the local level.²⁸

Consequences for the Party System

As mass parties came to represent groups and appeal to voters in terms which evoked genuine concerns, segmental divisions such as caste acquired a partisan significance. They were – and remain – a natural basis for mobilizing votes. Every party, whether avowedly communal or ideologically opposed to such vertical segmentation (such as the Communists), turned to segmental cleavages such as caste to mobilize electoral support.²⁹ Inter-State differences in the nature of cleavages – religion in some places, caste in others, and different castes even where caste was important – created inter-State differences in the social group constituency of the same party. In Rajasthan, for example, the Congress drew more support from the Jats while the Rajputs were represented by opposition parties; in neighbouring Haryana the Lok Dal depended for its electoral successes largely on the Jats while the Congress drew support from Punjabi Hindus and upper castes.

²⁷ Rajni Kothari, 'Introduction: Caste in Indian Politics', in Rajni Kothari, ed., *Caste in Indian Politics* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1970), p. 24.

²⁸ There is both sociological and electoral evidence to substantiate our assertion that religious differences do not travel well across regional boundaries. Harold Gould in 'Modern Politics in an Indian District "Natural Selection" and "Selective Cooptation"', a paper presented at the Conference on the Comparative Dimensions of Indian Elections and Party Politics held at UCLA, argued that in Faizabad district electoral mobilization operates along local communal lines – the level and point of intergroup conflict – and not along national ones. The 1971 post-election survey results provide further evidence of this phenomenon. In the 'Hindu heartland' the Muslim vote for Congress among those living in the urban areas was 16 percentage points higher than among their rural counterparts (79 per cent compared to 63 per cent). Moreover, only half of all Muslims in the South voted for Congress, whereas the corresponding percentages for the West and the East are 91 and 84 respectively. In no other region of India but the North do we really find evidence of this urban-rural divide among the Muslims, although this could in part be due to the not so large samples in other areas. Further corroborative evidence can be found in Table 5.

²⁹ M. N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

Consequently, a nation-wide political party like the Congress has an exceptionally heterogeneous social base from the perspective of the nation; but, when looked at State by State the Congress – no less than its opponents – has a definable, and more homogeneous, clientele. Given the territorial nature of social cleavages in India, we expect that:

- 1 At the national level, where a voter lives – his or her State – should be a far stronger predictor of the vote than such social factors as caste, religion or social class observed nationally.
- 2 However, because caste, class and religion are major points of conflict within India, each will have a strong correlation with party support when examined at the level at which these social factors are politically significant; that is, within each State.
- 3 The political significance of group conflicts varies by State so the strength of the link between particular social cleavages and party should vary across the States.
- 4 The heterogeneity of the Congress reflects variation among the States in commitments of the Congress party to the inter-group conflicts. Consequently, there will be considerable State by State variation in the social groups which are aligned with the Congress party.

The Regional Basis of Congress Support

The data in Table 2 confirm the first expectation: support for the Congress is structured by the State far more than it is by caste or class. As the hypothesis predicts, religion, caste, and class turn out to be poor indicators of the Congress vote at the national level. Religion and caste each accounted for about 1 per cent of the variance in the Congress vote; class was the poorest indicator among the traditional cleavages, able to explain less than half of 1 per cent. State, by contrast, explained over 26 per cent of the variance in the Congress vote. Clearly, regional differences are critical for understanding the dynamics of mass support for the Congress.

TABLE 2 *Percentage Variance of Congress Vote Accounted for, 1971*

<i>Social cleavages</i>	Percentage variance*
Caste	1.16
Religion	0.90
Class	0.30
Caste, religion and class	2.00
State	26.10

* Table entries are based on zero-order correlation ratios.

Table 3 confirms the second prediction of our interpretation of the vote for the Congress party: the political significance of these social cleavages is State-specific. When looked at within each State, the Congress is less of a heterogeneous, catch-all party, and much more a party of representation in a divided society. The zero order correlation between the Congress vote and religion, caste and class is, for the nation as a whole, 0.09, 0.11 and 0.06 respectively. The ability of these variables, taken together, to explain the variance in the Congress vote is quite poor. Collectively, they account for 2 per cent of the variance when looked at without regard to the State in which the individual lives.

Within each State, however, the zero order correlations, with only a couple of exceptions, are substantially higher than the national figures, providing strong evidence for their importance as a determinant of support for the Congress despite the low across-State correlations reported in Table 2. The average within-State correlation between religion and party was twice as large as the corresponding national figures (0.19 compared to 0.10); the average within-State correlation between caste and Congress support was 0.30 (the across-State

TABLE 3 *Within-State and Across-State Associations between Congress Vote and Religion, Caste and Class, 1971**

State	Zero order correlations			Percentage of variance explained	Cases
	Religion	Caste	Class		
Andhra Pradesh	0.14	0.22	0.20	10	232
Assam	0.29	0.69	0.17	51	71
Bihar	0.08	0.30	0.05	7	233
Gujarat	0.30	0.29	0.22	18	299
Haryana	0.16	0.76	0.47	59	46
Himachal Pradesh	—	0.14	—	—	21
Jammu and Kashmir	0.17	—	0.38	15	76
Kerala	0.17	—	0.18	6	198
Madhya Pradesh	0.23	0.24	0.04	10	290
Maharashtra	0.22	0.28	0.03	14	215
Karnataka	0.09	0.29	0.13	10	229
Orissa	—	0.58	0.32	37	94
Punjab	0.28	0.30	0.28	15	173
Rajasthan	0.10	0.45	0.25	24	143
Tamilnadu	0.12	0.37	0.10	14	218
Uttar Pradesh	0.21	0.11	0.08	8	444
West Bengal	0.10	0.24	0.09	10	177
Delhi	0.23	0.39	0.36	27	127
Average across States	0.19	0.30	0.20	20	
National figures	0.10	0.11	0.06	2	

* The figures in the first three columns are correlation ratios while the figure in the fourth column is the coefficient of determination obtained through a dummy variable regression analysis.

values was 0.11); and for class it was 0.20 compared to a national, across-state coefficient of 0.06.

*Social Groups and Partisanship: A Closer Look*³⁰

The particularly large correlations associated with the four small states (Assam, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, and Orissa) offer a further opportunity to illustrate the linkage between politics and social divisions.³¹ The survey which provided these data employed a cluster design that was stratified by State: polling booths (that is, the polling places) represented the primary sampling units. Since the survey interviewed respondents in proportion to the State's contribution to the national electorate, a relatively small number of polling booths were sampled in these four States (compared, for example, to Uttar Pradesh). The substantive significance of this design is that the polling place has physical boundaries which more nearly correspond to the geographic unit within which such social divisions as caste and religion are lines of conflict. In short, just as the State is a more appropriate environment for assessing the link between social divisions and political conflicts, the polling booth is a more appropriate environment than the State. A State like Haryana produces larger correlations than large States such as Uttar Pradesh because fewer polling booths are represented and the geographical specificity of the cleavage alignment (as we discussed it above) is less attenuated: otherwise similar castes are linked to different parties in different booths because of the geographical specificity of group conflicts.

There are two ways to illustrate this effect. The first is to assess the party-social cleavage alignment at a polling booth. The second is to compare the number of polling booths in a State with the ability of the social divisions to explain variance in the Congress vote. If the preceding observations are correct one should expect to find (1) very high levels of alignment between the vote and caste and religion within a polling booth, and (2) a strong correlation between the ability of social divisions to explain the vote and the number of polling booths in a State.

The political homogeneity of groups within a polling booth was assessed by calculating the proportion of all respondents of a social group in a given polling booth who voted for the same party. This was done for two States: Uttar Pradesh, which displayed a low correlation by virtue (according to this

³⁰ We would like to thank John Zaller, whose comments made part of the following discussion possible

³¹ The greater across-State average in the alignment of social and political differences (represented by the ability of religion, caste and class to explain 19 per cent of the variance in the vote among the States) is not a function of the exceptionally large explained variance in the four small-sample States. Of course these four States affect the average. Without them, the average across-State explanation of the variance is only 13 per cent. Our point, however, is that there is more structure within each State than there is at the national level. Consequently, the important feature of the data is not the absolute value of the correlations, but their significant differences.

argument) of the large number of polling booths sampled for this large State, and Haryana, whose small size yielded few polling booths. At the level of polling booth analysis Uttar Pradesh and Haryana are essentially identical in the degree of alignment of groups with parties. Specifically, respondents voted homogeneously by their subcaste, religious or tribal group at the polling booth. In Haryana 96 per cent of all groups in each polling booth and in Uttar Pradesh 89 per cent were politically homogeneous. Put differently, for any given polling booth there was a 96 and 89 per cent chance, respectively, that sociologically similar respondents voted virtually unanimously for a party. At the level at which social conflicts are the most salient, they are, it is clear, quite fully mobilized by the parties.

The second prediction – which explains why the correlations for a State vary as they do in Table 3 – is also confirmed with a 0.49 correlation between the alignment of a State's electorate and the number of polling booths in the State. The corresponding regression slope indicates that the explained variance declines about 0.6 per cent for every increment in the number of polling booths in the State.

Thirdly, not only are the within-State correlations between the Congress vote and social cleavages much larger than the national, across-State values, but they also, as predicted (Table 3 above), vary among the States. Religion correlates more highly with the Congress vote in Assam (0.29), Gujarat (0.30) and Punjab (0.28) than it does in, for example, Karnataka (0.09), Rajasthan (0.10), and West Bengal (0.10). Caste follows a similar pattern. In Haryana (where the correlation is 0.76), Assam (0.69) and Orissa (0.58) it is a much stronger predictor of the Congress vote than in Uttar Pradesh (0.11). The partisan relevance of religion, caste and class also varies among the States. These factors played a larger role in Congress support in Jammu and Kashmir, and Haryana than in Madhya Pradesh or Maharashtra, where the Congress vote seems to have little to do with whatever class differences exist. In Haryana (where they account for 58 per cent of the variance in the vote), these social differences seem to be highly politicized cleavages; they play less of a role in structuring the Congress vote in Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh (where they account for less than 10 per cent of the variance in the vote), exactly the results one would expect if the configuration of forces within a State not only determine what divisions will be represented by the parties, but how fully they will be represented.

Finally, consistent with the fourth prediction of the model, the configuration of support for the Congress by religion, caste, and class varies among the states (Table 4). In Uttar Pradesh, for example, the Congress forged a coalition of high-caste Hindus, Harijans and Muslims. In Gujarat, on the other hand, the electoral success of the Congress was dependent on support from the disadvantaged sectors of the populace, that is, the lower caste Hindus, Harijans, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims. The class coalitions that formed the basis of Congress support also varied across States, although not as much as caste and religion. In Rajasthan the Congress vote was more dependent on the lower class

TABLE 4 *Percentage Deviation from Average State Vote for Congress, 1971**

Social cleavage	Karnataka	Uttar Pradesh	Bihar	Madhya Pradesh	Gujarat	Tamilnadu	Rajasthan
High caste		0	-14	3	13	-8	
Upper caste	7						
Merchant caste		-5		-2		8	
Middle caste	-10					20	7
Upwardly mobile caste		-7	12		-21	-8	
Lower caste	4	-15	-11	-7	4	-4	
Harijans	1	1	4	10	5	3	23
Scheduled Tribes				-18	0		
Muslims		25	6		22	-8	
<i>Classes</i>							
Low	4	2	3	1	5	-3	12
Middle	-3	-3	-2	0	1	3	-9
High	0	8	-4	-3	-39	-3	-29

* The figures in the table are the percentage deviations of the social group vote from the average vote for the Congress in the State.

than in Tamilnadu or Madhya Pradesh. The opposition had a larger constituency among the upper classes in Gujarat than in other States.

Table 5 provides further evidence of the geographical specificity of the linkage between social differences and party preference. Consider the high caste Hindus in the first row of Table 5. Nationwide, the Congress party received about 63 per cent of their votes. In Madhya Pradesh, high-caste Hindu support for the Congress was 11 percentage points above this norm, in Uttar Pradesh it was slightly above this average (by 4 points) and in Bihar slightly below it (by 5 points). In Tamilnadu, no high-caste Hindus supported the Congress, preferring instead to vote for a Congress affiliate or an anti-Congress party. Similar patterns can be observed for other castes, religious groups or classes. These data, perhaps more effectively than those in Table 4, illustrate the extent to which social divisions are defined by State political forces.

In brief, the electoral support and success of the Congress depends upon distinct social groups, but the groups vary by State. An aggregation at the national level masks a cleavage alignment which is almost precisely what the social cleavage theory of party systems expects to find. With the link between party preference and social differences calculated as an average of the correlations within the States, India is much less of an outlier in terms of the cleavage theory of party systems (see Figure 2).³²

³² The 'adjusted' score is an unweighted average of the degree of alignment within each State. A regression analysis of the relationship between the variance explained and the Alford alignment score (used in Figures 1 and 2) allowed us to obtain the adjusted value. Details of the procedure will be provided upon request.

TABLE 5 *Percentage Deviation from National Average for Congress by Social Group, 1971**

Social cleavage	Karnataka	Uttar Pradesh	Bihar	Madhya Pradesh	Gujarat	Tamilnadu	Rajasthan
High caste		4	-5	11	-5	-64	
Upper caste	44						
Merchant caste		7		11		-38	
Middle caste	14					-36	14
Upwardly mobile caste		7	34		-3	-54	
Lower caste	39	-3	5	3	14	-55	
Harijans	26	1	13	10	6	64	23
Scheduled Tribes				-10	6		
Muslims		-5	8		16	-74	
<i>Classes</i>							
Low	30	4	12	2	7	-62	15
Middle	27	4	14	8	7	-52	0
High	33	17	13	4	-39	-55	40

* The figures in the table are the percentage deviations of the social group vote from the average vote of the group for the Congress nationally.




Fig. 2 Comparison of degree of cleavage alignment of the party system with the degree of ethnic fractionalization of the society

See p. 4 for a definition of the Index of Cleavage Alignment and the Ethnic Fractionalization Index. See footnote 32 for a discussion of the raw and adjusted cleavage alignment scores.

CONCLUSION

This account of the link between the cleavages of Indian society and the Congress party offers several insights into Indian politics. Firstly, the Congress emerges as a party that is rooted in local, not national, divisions. It is a collection of State-based factions linked not by a common constituency, but by elites who co-operate in the pursuit of office. The State basis of the Congress party is its defining characteristic. The groups represented by the Congress vary from State to State: the caste, class, and ethnic groups which constitute the Congress constituency in one State (e.g., Uttar Pradesh) may, quite easily, support Congress's opponents in another (e.g., Kerala). The issues which are the occasion for party conflict similarly vary among the States. This may be the most meaningful interpretation of the 'centrist' nature of the Congress. The Congress occupies the 'centre' because of its diversity. Lacking a distinctive class, caste or language constituency, it is the party appealing to most groups and their (often) diverse and competing agendas.³³

Secondly, this interpretation of the party system may also help to explain why India never developed a coherent national opposition party, even when the Congress was more unified than it is today. Each State has its own peculiar social cleavages that provide a basis for party alignments for both the Congress and its opponents. Since these ascriptive cleavages do not translate across States, no party can have a consistent social basis of support across States. Political parties form constituencies that are limited by regional boundaries. The Congress conquered this difficulty initially by exploiting its symbolic and organizational linkages to the independence movement and subsequently to the nation-state. These links, in turn, provide the Congress with a national framework for mobilizing votes. Lacking such a resource, none of the other parties which have opposed the Congress since independence have been able to forge stable alliances across both the regional boundaries and the social divisions that parties represent (with the exception of Janata alliance of 1977, the history of which illustrates our point). No comparable national opposition can emerge because there is no national position for any party to oppose, and no regional opponent enjoys a national resource comparable to Congress's history as the party which brought independence.³⁴

Consequently, even the national opposition parties are really geographically specific.³⁵ While many have nationwide organizations, they are really competitive only within regional boundaries. For example, the Bharatiya Janata Party is

³³ See Daalder, 'In Search of the Center of European Party Systems'.

³⁴ It could be argued that in 1977 there was a national position to oppose and the various opposition parties did form a coalition. Even then, there was a clear north-south divide, with the southern states, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamilnadu opting in favour of the Congress or its allies, thus revealing the regional basis of the Janata coalition. The fact that the Janata party leader, Ramakrishna Hegde, has been talking of a federation of opposition parties, instead of a united opposition, testifies to the territoriality of the party system in India.

³⁵ We are referring to the parties that are recognized as national parties by the Election Commission of India.

really a Hindi-heartland party as is the Lok Dal; the Communist Party of India (Marxist) has cells in each State but is an electoral force only in West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura. It is no surprise, therefore, that the nine states in which the Congress is out of power are all run by different parties.³⁶ Jammu and Kashmir is governed by a Congress and National Conference alliance. In Punjab a faction of the Akali Dal was in power while Tamilnadu is still with the All India Anna-DMK. Andhra Pradesh is dominated by the Telugu Desam, and in Assam a local alliance is running the State government. Karnataka is still with the Janata. In West Bengal and Kerala, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) is in power, but even there, the coalition that the Communist Party of India (Marxist) has forged in each State is different. In Haryana a faction of the Lok Dal, in alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party, trounced the Congress in June 1987.

Lastly, this model of the Congress party may also help to explain its 'disaggregation', i.e. the increasing separation of the State party from the national party in terms of electoral competition and outcomes. This disaggregation of the Congress reflects the character of its electoral alignment. Consider the following interpretation: the primary purpose of the national Congress was and is the formation of a national government. Collaboration (sometimes half-hearted) among State and local leaders is provided to select a national leader, whose appeal to the voters reflects his or her personal assets and connections to the symbols of the national party. The national executive's political power reflects his or her control of the institutions of the national government. Local political figures are secure and influential by virtue of their command of the divisions and conflicts within their constituencies. Since retaining political power depends largely upon personal leadership, there is a 'weak' need for organization, and the ability of local party leaders to mobilize local divisions limits the political consequences of organizational decline. The Congress can continue to win elections as long as the local political elite mobilizes votes for the national executive and the national executive, in turn, meets the political needs of the local figures, for example by dispensing patronage.³⁷

Defections, which produce competing party organizations are an outcome of the withdrawal of support for the 'national' party by 'State' leaders whose interests are threatened or ignored by the central apparatus.³⁸ The primary effect of these conflicts is to loosen further the organizational connection that the national leadership has with State/local leaders. Its secondary effect is to transform the national organization into an institution of personal leadership. Always an executive-centred party, elite fragmentation turns the State-based leadership back to their diverse constituencies while the 'national' Congress rallies around the Prime Minister.

³⁶ We are referring only to those States which we dealt with in the body of the text

³⁷ It is this organizational form that may explain the patron-client nature of the Congress today.

³⁸ 'State' leader implies not political leaders active in State politics but the fact that most national politicians have 'State constituencies'.

There is a great deal about Indian politics and the Indian parties unaddressed by this highly thematic analysis. We have nothing to say about the changing face of the Congress party or about the role of parties in comparative development. Our concern is more limited: to test the limits of the social cleavage theory of parties in a political system that is outside the set of systems which gave rise to the theory. We believe the Indian party system is not *sui generis*, that it can be understood in terms of this theory. An additional benefit of the model is the insight it provides into some enduring puzzles of Indian politics. It 'explains' the electoral success of the Congress; how a society as fractured as India has only one national political party; and why there has not, as yet, emerged a viable national opposition party to the Congress.

APPENDIX TABLES COMPARING 1967 AND 1977

TABLE A1 *Percentage Vote for Congress by Social Cleavages, 1967 and 1977*

Religion	Caste		Class			
	1967	1977	1967	1977	1967	1977
Hindus	58	40	High status	n.a.	35	<i>Rural areas</i>
Muslims	50	52	Brahmin	50	n.a.	Low 54 41
Sikhs	66	77	Upper	45	54	Middle 53 37
Other religions	45	10	Dominant	79	n.a.	High 43 39
Christians	82	38	Merchant	n.a.	34	<i>Urban areas</i>
			Middle	61	45	Low 52 52
			Harijans	64	39	Middle 55 46
			Upward mobile	n.a.	53	High 53 36
			Lower	58	40	
			Scheduled Tribes	59	53	

TABLE A2 *Percentage Variance of Congress Vote Accounted for, 1967 and 1977*

<i>Social cleavages</i>	1967*	1977*
Caste	3.30	1.74
Religion	1.10	1.77
Class	0.02	0.13
Caste, religion and class	3.50	3.30
State	7.10	18.90

* Table entries are based on zero-order correlation ratios.

TABLE A3 *Within-State and Across-State Associations Between Congress Vote and Religion, Caste and Class, 1967 and 1977**

State	Zero order correlations			Percent variance explained
	Religion	Caste	Class	
<i>Statistics for 1967</i>				
Andhra Pradesh	0.19	0.22	0.10	7
Bihar	0.11	0.32	0.16	16
Gujarat	0.24	0.28	0.12	7
Haryana	—	0.19	0.11	7
Kerala	0.53	0.27	0.15	31
Madhya Pradesh	0.10	0.25	0.24	16
Maharashtra	0.29	0.16	0.04	6
Karnataka	0.18	0.45	0.09	24
Orissa	0.23	0.25	0.20	16
Punjab	0.27	0.51	0.23	16
Rajasthan	0.35	0.49	0.23	38
Tamilnadu	0.07	0.08	0.08	2
Uttar Pradesh	0.07	0.15	0.05	3
West Bengal	0.14	—	0.06	2
Average across States	0.24	0.27	0.13	14
National figures	0.07	0.09	0.03	0.7
<i>Statistics for 1977</i>				
Andhra Pradesh	0.03	0.29	0.17	18
Bihar	0.20	0.25	0.08	11
Gujarat	0.38	0.35	0.22	29
Haryana	0.12	0.38	0.04	21
Kerala	0.31	0.47	0.06	33
Madhya Pradesh	0.20	0.36	0.07	16
Maharashtra	0.15	0.14	0.22	8
Karnataka	0.20	0.34	0.33	20
Orissa	0.16	0.14	0.11	9
Punjab	0.32	0.38	0.28	35
Rajasthan	0.46	0.30	0.03	9
Tamilnadu	0.11	0.29	0.18	15
Uttar Pradesh	0.13	0.22	0.10	9
West Bengal	0.08	0.26	0.08	8
Delhi	0.18	0.35	0.24	29
Average across States	0.20	0.29	0.15	17
National figures	0.13	0.13	0.05	3

* The figures in the first three columns are correlation ratios while the figure in the fourth column is the coefficient of determination obtained through a dummy variable regression analysis

British Parties in the Balance: A Time-Series Analysis of Long-Term Trends in Labour and Conservative Support

WILLIAM MISHLER, MARILYN HOSKIN AND
ROY FITZGERALD

The electoral domination of the Conservative party during the past decade has been interpreted by many as evidence of a long-term shift in the balance of public support from Labour to the Conservatives. This article argues that such a shift has not occurred. Rather, the stability apparent in recent election results disguises considerable underlying volatility. The balance of public support between the major parties continues to be highly unstable and subject to large and precipitous fluctuations in response to relatively small economic changes and ordinary political events. Recent Conservative victories appear to be the results more of good timing and luck than of any fundamental, long-term dynamic in British politics.

The landslide re-election of Margaret Thatcher in June 1987 to a historical third successive term as Prime Minister is but the most recent evidence that 'the mould of British politics has been broken'. The traditional view of Britain as a highly stable two-party system whose political cleavages are class-based, but largely devoid of ideological conflict and muted by an overarching societal consensus, probably always was exaggerated. However, it certainly has been contradicted by developments of the past decade. The decline in the class basis of voting, the rise of a politically significant third force in electoral politics, the increasing tendency towards extremism in both major parties, the erosion of public support for all parties, and now the dominance for more than a decade of the Conservative party in Parliament are well documented, and clearly indicate that traditional patterns of British politics no longer obtain.

Although there is consensus that the traditional mould is broken, considerably less agreement exists on the patterns that have taken its place. With respect to British electoral behaviour, in particular, scholars generally agree that long-term partisan loyalties are weakening and that class is no longer as dominant a force in determining party support as it once was. They also agree that nothing resembling a fundamental realignment of partisan loyalties is in evidence. What is not apparent, however, is how the decline of class, the dealignment of partisan ties, and the advent of the SDP and Alliance have affected the long-term balance of public support between the Labour and Conservative parties. Neither is it clear what the principal dynamics are of Britain's new and presumably more volatile electoral environment.

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This article undertakes to describe and explain long-term fluctuations in the balance of public support for the two parties that have dominated British electoral life throughout the post-war period. Specifically, we use time-series methods and aggregate public opinion data, firstly, to examine whether and to what extent the differential pace of partisan dealignment in the Labour and Conservative parties has contributed to long-term shifts in the balance of public support for these parties and, secondly, to explore the impact on the balance of party support of a variety of political and economic circumstances, personalities and events.

BACKGROUND

Although speculation about the ebb and flow of party fortunes is common journalistic fare, relatively little scholarly research considers explicitly the nature and determinants of long-term trends in the balance of public support for Britain's major parties. The research most directly relevant to our interests is that concerned with the question of partisan realignment.¹ Relying primarily on survey data collected during general election campaigns (and, thus, at widely scattered and irregular intervals), an impressive body of research documents a substantial decline in the class basis of British voting over the past two decades and a gradual but significant erosion of partisan attachments among traditional Labour, Conservative and even Liberal supporters.²

¹ Throughout this analysis we distinguish between partisan realignments and shifts in the balance of public support between major parties. As Crewe reminds us, the concept of realignment, as defined originally by V. O. Key, refers to more than a landslide victory or a temporary shift in public support from one party to another. Realignment requires a fundamental and enduring shift in partisan loyalty and party identification usually accompanied by a transformation in the social structure of party support and a permanent shift in the balance of power among political interests and ideas. 'A truly realigning election crystallizes a structural change in the mass basis of political order, much as an earthquake is both cause and effect of a geological shift in the landscape' (See I. Crewe, 'How to Win a Landslide Without Really Trying: Why the Conservatives Won in 1983', in A. Ranney, ed., *Britain at the Polls, 1983* (New York: Duke University Press, 1985), pp. 155-96 at p. 187.) Although a shift in the balance of public support among parties usually accompanies a partisan realignment, it is not a necessary feature of realignment. Neither is a shift in the balance of party support sufficient evidence that realignment has occurred. Although we touch upon realignment issues in this article, our principal concern is with understanding and explaining shifts in the balance of public support between the major parties.

² Representative works include D. Butler and D. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1976), pp. 155-208; I. Crewe, B. Särilvik, and J. Alt, 'Partisan Dealignment in Britain, 1964-1974', *British Journal of Political Science*, 7 (1977), 129-90; M. Franklin and A. Mughan, 'The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Problems of Analysis and Interpretation', *American Political Science Review*, 72 (1978), 523-34; B. Särilvik and I. Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 30-115; J. Alt, 'Dealignment and the Dynamics of Partisanship in Britain', in R. J. Dalton et al., eds, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 289-329; M. Franklin, *The Decline of Class Voting* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), and P. Dunleavy and C. T. Husbands, *British Democracy at the Crossroads: Voting and Party Competition in the 1980s* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

Concerned primarily with describing and explaining the decline in support for individual parties rather than assessing the net effects on the balance of party preferences, the literature recognizes explicitly that the different pace of dealignment among the several parties – what we describe elsewhere as ‘dealignment by different degrees’³ – can produce shifts in the balance of public support, the effects of which, on electoral patterns, can appear very similar to those of a realignment.⁴ Indeed, although there is little evidence anywhere that party realignment is in progress, several studies point to differential dealignment, observing that dealignment began much earlier and has proceeded somewhat faster among traditional Labour supporters than among Conservatives.⁵ This is reinforced by research indicating that increased support for third parties, the Social Democrats in particular, has been achieved disproportionately at the expense of Labour.⁶ The evidence in these regards is inconclusive not only because the number of elections is small but also because the relatively short time period encompassed by these studies and the volatility of recent British voting patterns make identification of long-term trends very difficult. Still, in the absence of more direct evidence, a reasonable working hypothesis is that recent trends have resulted in a long-term shift in the balance of public support from Labour to the Conservatives.

Another body of literature that bears on recent trends has less to say about the nature and extent of partisan change in Britain than its potential causes. The Nuffield election series and the several editions of *Britain at the Polls* typify this approach. Because these studies focus on individual elections, they favour idiosyncratic explanations emphasizing the importance of issues, personalities, and events specific to one election. Thus, Labour’s 1979 defeat is attributed variously to its radical policies, discord and violence during the ‘winter of discontent’, the Conservative party’s popular positions on the issues most salient to voters (specifically taxes and law and order) and the decision by the Prime Minister, Mr Callaghan, to schedule elections in the autumn rather than the following spring.⁷ Similarly, the Conservative landslide in 1983 is tied to Labour’s internal

³ W. Mishler, M. Hoskin and R. Fitzgerald, ‘“Hunting the Snark” or Searching for Evidence of that Widely Touted but Highly Elusive Resurgence of Support for Conservative Parties in Britain, Canada, and the United States’, in B. Cooper, A. Kornberg and W. Mishler, *The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 54–95.

⁴ If, for example, public support for the Conservative party declines by 5 percentage points during a period in which Labour support also declines but by 10 percentage points, the result obviously is a 5 percentage point net ‘swing’ in public support in favour of the Conservatives. The practical effect of such a swing in the short term would be much the same as that produced by a realignment of 2.5 per cent of the electorate from Labour to the Conservative party.

⁵ For a discussion of this literature, see H. Clarke and M. Stewart, ‘Dealignment of Degree: Partisan Change in Britain, 1974–1983’, *Journal of Politics*, 46 (1984), 689–718.

⁶ W. Miller, ‘There Was No Alternative: The British General Election of 1983’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 38 (1984), 364–84.

⁷ See, among numerous others, I. Crewe, ‘Why the Conservatives Won’, in H. R. Penniman, ed., *Britain at the Polls, 1979* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 263–305; D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1979* (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 315–51, and Sarlvik and Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment*, pp. 247–80.

strife, the Conservative party's more effective use of the media and more appealing campaign message, the strength and popularity of Mrs Thatcher in comparison to the Leader of the Opposition, Michael Foot, the Falklands war, and simple good luck.⁸ Early reviews of the 1987 Conservative victory also emphasize election-specific causes. Crewe, for example, attributes the outcome to public perceptions of 'prosperity at home and peace abroad'.⁹

A more recent approach to political support in Britain uses time-series methods and aggregated survey data on public support for British governments, parties and prime ministers. Such studies typically examine very short time periods and focus principally on the impact of economic trends (usually inflation, unemployment and per capita income) on government popularity.¹⁰ Methodological disputes have led to disagreements about results, but most researchers now generally agree that economic trends can have substantial effects. There is also increasing evidence that public *perceptions* of the recent economic past and *expectations* about the short-term economic future can have even greater effects on government support than actual economic performance.¹¹

A few studies have extended this approach to include a variety of political as well as economic variables. Among the most notable are Norpoth's investigation of the impact of the Falklands war on the British election of 1983 and that of Clarke *et al.* linking variations in public support for the Conservative party during the tenure of Margaret Thatcher to public satisfaction with the Prime Minister, levels of conflict within the Labour party, the incidence of strikes, and the creation of the SDP and its Alliance with the Liberals.¹² Among other lessons, these studies indicate that even relatively ordinary events can have substantial effects at least on short-term fluctuations in party popularity. How-

⁸ Representative citations include: D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1983* (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 269–98; Crewe, 'How to Win a Landslide Without Even Trying', pp. 186–96; Dunleavy and Husbands, *British Democracy at the Crossroads*.

⁹ I. Crewe, 'What's Left for Labour: An Analysis of Thatcher's Victory', *Public Opinion*, July/August (1987), 52–6.

¹⁰ Useful summaries of the literature include M. Paldam, 'A Preliminary Survey of the Theories and Findings of Vote and Popularity Studies', *European Journal of Political Research*, 9 (1981), 181–99, and H. Clarke, M. Stewart and G. Zuk, eds, *Politics, Power, and the Economy: Canada, Great Britain, and the United States* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1988, forthcoming), Chapter 1.

¹¹ See, in particular, J. Alt, *The Politics of Economic Decline* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); D. Hibbs, 'Economic Outcomes and Political Support for British Governments among Occupational Classes', *American Political Science Review*, 76 (1982), 259–79; P. Whiteley, 'Inflation, Unemployment and Government Popularity: A Dynamic Model for the United States, Britain and West Germany', *Electoral Studies*, 3 (1984), 25–46; P. Whiteley, 'Macroeconomic Performance and Government Popularity in Britain – the Short Run Dynamics', *European Journal of Political Research*, 14 (1986), 45–61; and D. Sanders, H. Ward and David Marsh (with T. Fletcher), 'Government Popularity and the Falklands War: A Reassessment', *British Journal of Political Science*, 17 (1987), 281–313.

¹² H. Norpoth, 'Guns and Butter and Government Popularity in Britain', *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1987), 949–59; and H. Clarke, M. Stewart and G. Zuk, 'Politics, Economics, and Party Popularity in Britain, 1979–1983', *Electoral Studies*, 5 (1986), 123–41.

ever, the impact of such events on longer-term variations in party support remains unexamined.

Although limited in what it can tell us about long-term and enduring shifts in the balance of public support for the Labour and Conservative parties, the literature suggests that the potential sources of such change are numerous and diverse and include both idiosyncratic personalities and events as well as more systematic social, economic and political trends. More specifically, the literature suggests that support for the Conservative party probably increases during periods of rising inflation and declines in response to rising unemployment. Labour unrest, violent disorder at home, and international conflict and instability are also hypothesized to increase public support for the Conservatives at the expense of Labour, as are various specific political and economic events – although perhaps none so dramatically as the Falklands war. Finally, public perceptions of the performance of parties and their leaders both in government and opposition are widely viewed as having influenced the balance between the major parties. Given the limitations inherent in much of the research on which these observations are based and the frequently ambiguous evidence produced, it probably stretches the point to label these suggestions as research hypotheses. Nevertheless, they provide the foundation on which this study builds.

METHODS AND MEASURES

The data used in this study consist of quarterly measures of public support for political parties, national economic trends, public satisfaction with the performance of the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition, and domestic and international political events from 1964 to 1988.¹³ The specific measures are described in the appendix. Although, as noted above, recent research suggests the importance of public *perceptions* of the economy in addition to objective indicators, data on economic perceptions are not available in consistent time series until about 1978 and thus cannot usefully be included in our analysis of long-term trends.

The data on party support are derived from Gallup surveys asking respondents, 'If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you support?'. Given our interest in examining fluctuations in the *relative balance* of electoral support between the Labour and Conservative parties, our analyses focus on the Conservative *share* of two-party (i.e. Conservative plus Labour)

¹³ There is some debate about the relative advantages of using monthly versus quarterly measures of political support and economic performance. Although we collected monthly measures for these variables, the small sizes of some of the early monthly samples combined with the extreme volatility in the party support data led us to use quarterly averages. This has the effect of smoothing some of the sharper spikes in the monthly data that result variously from sampling error and exogenous shocks. This enables us better to distinguish true change from error and to focus more clearly on longer-term trends.

support.¹⁴ In effect, this measure disregards the 'don't knows' and supporters of one of the several minor parties. By tracking this ratio over time we are able to measure changes in the *balance* of public support for the Labour and Conservative parties while using support for minor parties as an independent variable to explain changes in this balance over time. This also enables us to consider the possibility, previously discussed, that the differential pace of dealignment between the parties has upset the traditional balance of support and produced a significant and enduring shift towards one party or the other.

Our decision to begin the analysis in 1964 was prompted by a desire to identify a period both sufficiently long to allow us to distinguish long-term trends in party support from short-run drift, and sufficiently varied to include a range of plausible economic and political sources of change. The period since 1964 fits both criteria. During these years Britain has experienced both economic growth and recession, periods of domestic and international disorder as well as relative stability, and witnessed a broad array of political leaders and events.¹⁵

Although vital for understanding change, the use of time-series data introduces special problems. In particular, such analyses are complicated by the tendency of time-related observations to be autocorrelated such that the value of a variable at one time is dependent significantly on one or more previous values of the same variable. This is very much the case with the data on party support and economic performance.

A number of strategies have been developed to cope with autocorrelation. The one we employ is a variant of the approach developed by Box and Jenkins and Box and Tiao.¹⁶ Greatly simplified, it involves the development of an Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model to identify the nature and extent of time-dependent trends in a series and then to estimate statistically whether and to what extent hypothesized independent variables are associated with significant changes in the series after time dependencies have been removed. In this study, we apply ARIMA procedures to time-series data on the Conservative share of two-party support in Britain so that we can better assess

¹⁴ Although we focus explicitly on fluctuations in the Conservative party's share of public support, it should be obvious that Labour's share of support changes in exactly the opposite direction and by an identical amount. Therefore, the models used to explain Conservative support below apply equally to Labour support but with the signs of the coefficients reversed.

¹⁵ It should be noted, however, that although our data on party support in Britain extend from the first quarter of 1964 to the third quarter (June) of 1988, complete data for all of the independent variables used in our analyses were available only up to the end of 1986. Consequently, although our descriptions of trends in British party support extend to the middle of 1988, our analysis of the causes of those trends necessarily ends eighteen months earlier.

¹⁶ G. E. P. Box and G. M. Jenkins, *Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control* (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1976); and G. E. P. Box and G. C. Tiao, 'Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic Environmental Problems', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 70 (1975), 70-9. For an unusually readable discussion of the procedures involved in identifying, estimating and analysing such models see R. McCleary and R. A. Hays, *Applied Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences* (Beverly Hills, Calif. Sage, 1980).

the impact on the balance of party support of fluctuations in the economy and of various political personalities and events.

RESULTS

Consistent both with previous studies and the political dealignment thesis, the evidence in Figure 1 clearly indicates that public support for both political parties has declined substantially over the past decade. Unlike previous studies which indicate that dealignment began in the early to mid-1970s, however, our data suggest that the brief and relatively shallow decline in support for both parties visible in the early 1970s was a prelude to a much longer and steeper decline beginning in about 1979. Since 1981, in fact, support for the Labour party has consistently fallen below its post-1964 average, while support for the Conservative party has equalled or exceeded its average level of the past twenty-four years in only nine of the thirty-seven quarters since it returned to power in May 1979. Although there is some evidence of a surge in Conservative support in the three quarterly periods leading up to the 1987 general election, the Conservatives recovered only about half of the support lost since 1984 and only about one-third of the support lost since the first quarter of 1979. Moreover, shortly after the 1987 elections Conservative support fell again, and by the second quarter of 1988 stood well below its long-term mean. In contrast, Labour support rallied early in 1988 having fallen precipitously in late 1986 and 1987 following a previous resurgence of support in 1984 and 1985. It is impossible to tell whether these most recent fluctuations signal the beginning of enduring trends. What is apparent is that support for both parties is consistently lower in the 1980s than in any comparable period during the past quarter century.

Table 1 presents these trends in a slightly different light but with the same effect. Dividing the period into five-year intervals (with shorter periods at the beginning and end of the series), we find that public support for both parties reached its lowest ebb during the first half of the 1980s and has rallied only




Fig. 1. Public support for the British Labour and Conservative parties, 1964 to 1988

TABLE 1 *Mean (and Standard Deviation) of Public Support for the British Labour and Conservative Parties, 1964 to 1988*

Period	Conservative party	Labour party	Conservative share of two-party support
1964-65	42% (2.4)	48% (2.2)	47% (2.3)
1966-70	48% (5.0)	41% (6.4)	54% (5.8)
1971-75	40% (2.9)	46% (6.4)	46% (5.8)
1976-80	45% (4.8)	43% (3.9)	51% (4.6)
1981-85	37% (5.8)	33% (4.0)	53% (5.5)
1986-88(2)	39% (4.7)	35% (3.2)	53% (4.0)
Overall	42%	41%	51%

slightly since. Even with the recent recovery in major party fortunes, support for both parties remains about 10 percentage points below their post-1964 peaks. Unexpectedly, the standard deviations reported in Table 1 demonstrate that the volatility characteristic of party support in recent years is nothing new. Recent trends have been subject to sudden and substantial change, but this was true for much of the period before 1975 as well. Indeed, the greatest fluctuations across the period occurred during the five-year interval beginning in 1966. Overall, the standard deviation of public support for the Conservative party is somewhat higher in the post-1975 period (5.2 per cent) than earlier (3.7 per cent). However, the variation in Labour support is higher in the earlier period (5.7 per cent *vs* 3.8 per cent). Thus fluctuations in the Conservative *share* of support are slightly higher before 1976 (5.2 per cent) than later (4.8 per cent).

The trends charted in Figure 2 are derived from those in Figure 1 and reflect changes in the *balance* of major party support since 1964. To help assess their significance we have drawn lines on the graph indicating the mean share of Conservative support from 1964 to 1988. We have also drawn lines one and two standard deviations above and below this mean. If it is true that recent changes in Labour and Conservative support in Britain signal significant differential dealignment, these data ought to reflect it. Specifically, if the past decade has witnessed a fundamental shift in the balance of major party support in favour of the Conservatives, we should find that recent increases in the Conservative share of support have been relatively *enduring* (lasting more than a year or two), generally *monotonic*, and significantly *greater* than the normal variation in the




Fig. 2 Conservative share of major-party support in Great Britain, 1964 to 1988

Conservative share of support that has occurred across the period. In fact none of these conditions obtains.

The late 1970s and early 1980s have witnessed three separate periods during which the balance of public support shifted noticeably towards the Conservatives (from 1975 to 1977, from 1981 to 1983 or 1984, and from 1985 or 1986 to 1987). However, in none of these cases was the increase sustained for more than two-and-a-half to three years; in none of the cases did the Conservative party regain the share of support it enjoyed as recently as 1969; and in each case, with the possible exception of the most recent period where the evidence is inconclusive, the increase in the balance of Conservative support was followed by a countervailing shift to Labour of equal or greater size.

As indicated, the evidence from Figure 1 clearly supports the dealignment thesis. Figure 2 suggests, however, that far from consistently favouring either one of the major parties, dealignment has occurred in fits and starts. The balance of power has fluctuated dramatically in a way that favours first one party then the other without apparent long-term trend.

MODELS OF POLITICAL SUPPORT

Although it does not appear that any enduring shift has occurred in the long-term balance of two-party support, it is clear that there has been considerable ebb and flow over time. To understand the causes of this pattern, ARIMA procedures were used to identify, estimate and analyse shifts in the balance of major party support – specifically, the Conservative share of major party support – from 1964 to 1987.¹⁷

Following standard Box–Jenkins procedures the noise model for the data on Conservative support was identified as an autoregressive process of order (1)–(10). This means that in addition to the effect that a change in the Conservative

¹⁷ The data on the Conservative share of public support are not stationary in their original form (i.e. they trend upward and downward over time). The usual solution is to difference the series by subtracting the observation at time, $t-1$, from the observation at time, t . However, this procedure resulted in what appeared to be 'over-differencing' of the series, producing illogical and uninterpretable results. The problem was resolved by centring the series (i.e. removing the mean) before constructing the noise model.

share of support in one quarter has upon the change in Conservative support in the next quarter, there also is a seasonal pattern in the data that recurs with diminishing effect every ten quarters or two-and-a-half years. Although we cannot explain the seasonal term in any systematic or rigorous fashion, it is tempting to speculate that it is linked to British election cycles, specifically, the traditional mid-term decline in the popularity of the party in government. The negative coefficient for the seasonal terms means that an *increase* in Conservative support at one quarter has a *negative* effect on Conservative support ten quarters or two-and-a-half years later. However, since seasonality indicates a cyclical pattern, the negative coefficient also means that the Conservative share of support has a *positive*, although dampened, effect on the level of Conservative support twenty quarters or five years later, the constitutional limit for a British government.

It is interesting that an autoregressive noise model of order (1)–(8) fits the data nearly as well. The seasonal term in this formulation suggests that an increase in the Conservative share of support in one quarter is linked to a smaller decrease in the Conservative share after eight quarters followed by a still smaller increase in the Conservative support after four years, or about the average time between British general elections since 1964 (counting the two elections in 1974 as one). Although there is considerable debate about the validity of the ‘mid-term effect’ in British politics,¹⁸ it does appear from these data that some sort of election-related cycle of roughly four to five years duration is at work. We cannot say with this evidence whether the congruence between the seasonality in the data and the timing of British elections is coincidental or reflects some underlying determinant such as the much debated political business cycle. What we can say is that since 1964 there appears to have been an election-related cycle in the balance of party support in Britain which, since 1979, has been exploited effectively by, or at least worked to the comparative advantage of, the Conservative party over Labour.¹⁹

Having identified a preliminary noise model for the party support data, we proceeded to develop the model in stages. Because ARIMA models are sensitive to specification error, we began by identifying separate bivariate models for the several hypothesized independent variables, then used these results to specify an initial multivariate model. This facilitated the testing of plausible alternative time lags and intervention functions for several of the independent variables for which little theory is available.

The initial multivariate model is reported in Table 2.²⁰ The ω coefficients in

¹⁸ For a recent review of the literature on mid-term effects in Britain, see J. Hudson, ‘The Relationship Between Government Popularity and Approval for the Government’s Record in the United Kingdom’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 15 (1985), 165–86.

¹⁹ A recent study which supports the business cycle interpretation for at least one recent British government is Sanders, Ward and Marsh, ‘Government Popularity and the Falklands War’, which argues that the strong revival of Conservative support in the spring of 1982 was substantially due to public economic expectations created through ‘intelligent (or cynical) macroeconomic management’ by the Thatcher government.

²⁰ In estimating the multivariate model it proved necessary to revise the noise component to ensure that the residuals remained appropriately free of autocorrelation. This was done by adding a

TABLE 2 *Economic and Political Predictors of the Conservative Share of Two-Party Support, 1964–1987 (Initial Model)*

Predictor	ω	t
Inflation (logged and differenced)	0.25	1.78*
Unemployment (logged, differenced and lagged one quarter)	-16.12	-5.30*
Domestic disorder	-0.50	-1.24
Soviet adventurism	-0.04	-0.06
International crises	0.56	0.57
Falklands war	7.14	6.14*
Strikes (logged and differenced) ω_0	0.89	4.32*
δ_1	0.59	2.71*
Comparative leadership satisfaction (differenced)†	0.13	11.52*
Minor party support (differenced)	0.08	1.69*
AR (1)	0.68	8.27*
AR (10)	-0.25	-2.41*
MA (5)	-0.58	-5.49*
RMS	6.56	
Q (25 lags)	19 (ns)	
R^2	47%	

* $p \leq 0.05$, one-tailed test

† Coded positive during Conservative governments, negative under Labour governments

the model can be interpreted roughly as non-linear regression coefficients and indicate the average impact on the Conservative share of major-party support associated with a unit change in the intervention variable. The t coefficient is a traditional measure of statistical significance. The statistics at the bottom of the table provide summary measures of the model's performance.²¹ The Residual Mean Square (RMS) is low and is significantly reduced over the univariate

moving average (MA) term of order (5). Unlike an autoregressive process, the impact of which persists over extended periods, moving average processes reflect short-lived 'shocks' to the time series and can be conceived as representing the effects of politically significant events not explicitly included in the multivariate model. Although important for estimating the effects of variables included in the model, the MA term has no substantive significance of its own.

²¹ The Residual Mean Square is a standard 'goodness-of-fit' measure and indicates the amount of variance remaining in the data after the model has been applied. In contrast, the Ljung-Box Q statistic measures 'badness-of-fit', indicating whether significant autocorrelations remain in the model's residuals after the noise components and interventions are applied. Finally, the pseudo R^2 statistic reported here is a measure of the success with which the intervention terms 'explain' the variance in the Conservative share of support after the noise model is applied. It is calculated simply as one minus the ratio of the residual sum of squares from the final model (including both noise model and intervention terms) over the residual sum of squares from the noise model only.

model; the LBQ coefficient is not statistically significant across twenty-four lags (indicating that the residuals are 'white noise' as required); and the pseudo- R^2 statistic indicates that the model accounts for 57 per cent of the variance in the Conservative's share of public support over the past twenty years, after time dependencies (i.e. the noise model) are removed.²²

Economic Models

Examination of the impact coefficient in the model supports, in varying degrees, most of the various explanations advanced to account for recent trends in British party politics, while indicating that none is sufficient, by itself, to explain recent trends. Rather, the conclusion that emerges is that balance of support among British parties is highly volatile and responds to a variety of both systematic and idiosyncratic political and economic circumstances, personalities and events. For example, consistent with the literature on economic effects, the model indicates that both unemployment (at a lag of one quarter) and inflation have had significant effects on the balance of major-party support since 1964. As expected, the Conservative share of two-party support has tended to increase during periods of rising inflation and decrease during periods of rising unemployment. Surprisingly, however, the size of these effects has been quite small, especially in the case of inflation.

Since the economic data were logged and differenced to achieve stationarity (standard econometric procedures), their interpretation is not straightforward. We can, however, illustrate their effects with characteristic examples. Assume, for example, that in the mid-1960s, when the average rate of inflation was in the low single digits, the annualized rate of inflation increased by a full percentage point in a single quarter – a substantial increase for that time. According to our estimates, the Conservative share of public support would have increased during that quarter in response to inflation by a trivial 0.1 percentage points if all other variables in the model remained constant. A decade later when inflation was near its peak, a much larger, though characteristic, quarterly increase in the annualized rate of inflation from 15 to 20 per cent would have increased the Conservative share of support by a still smaller and imperceptible 0.03 percentage points. Although statistically significant, the effects of inflation on the balance of party support are of little substantive importance.

Unemployment, by contrast, appears to have had more substantial effects. For example, a typical quarterly increase in the unemployment rate in the middle 1960s from 2.4 to 2.6 per cent would have produced, by these estimates, a

²² It should be noted that the pseudo R^2 statistic we employ measures only the extent of variance 'explained' by the substantive variables included in the model. It explicitly excludes the variance explained by the noise model. In this regard it is a much more conservative measure than the traditional R^2 used in Ordinary Least Squares analyses. The latter, when used in time-series analyses, can be highly inflated by autocorrelation. Indeed, if we include the variance accounted for by the noise component, our model accounts for 84 per cent of the total variance in party support – a figure that corresponds very well with regression estimates using similar data.

small but perceptible shift in support to the Labour party in the next quarter of about 1.3 percentage points. More strikingly, a typical quarterly increase in the rate of unemployment in the early 1980s, from 8 to 10 per cent, would have produced a 3.5 percentage point swing to Labour in the following quarter, other variables held constant. Although unemployment's effects appear small at the moment, their cumulative effect can be substantial. Between the beginning of 1980 and the end of 1981, during which time unemployment increased from 5.3 per cent to 11.2 per cent, the cumulative effect was to tilt the balance of support by more than 12 percentage points in favour of Labour.

In specifying the effects of unemployment and inflation in the model we have assumed that the public responds to economic change according to an 'issue priority' model.²³ This assumes that voters: (a) make relatively sophisticated judgements about the past performances of the parties under different economic conditions, and (b) support the party they believe best able to handle the economic issue (inflation or unemployment) of highest priority at the time. Assuming voters generally perceive the Conservative party as more responsible in dealing with periods of high inflation, the model predicts that voters will tend to shift their support to the Conservative party during periods of rising inflation *even if the Conservatives are the party in government at the time inflation is rising*. The Conservatives are not held responsible for rising inflation while in government, according to this model, because the public, based on past experience, believes inflation would be worse under a Labour government. On the counterpoint assumption that voters generally consider the Labour party more responsive to rising unemployment, our model predicts that Labour's share of two-party support will increase during periods of increasing unemployment, again, even during a Labour government.

Although the statistically significant coefficients for inflation and unemployment in Figure 2 lend credence to this thesis, their small size requires that we consider a rival hypothesis, and one more popular in the literature. The more conventional hypothesis about the effects of unemployment and inflation assumes a 'reward/punishment' model in which voters ignore the past performance or characteristic tendencies of the two parties with respect to the economy and focus simply on current economic problems, rewarding (i.e. increasing support for) the party in government when the economy (inflation or unemployment) improves, and punishing the party in power during periods of economic decline.

To test this possibility, we replaced the original unemployment and inflation variables in the ARIMA model, experimenting, in turn, with three alternative formulations which control in different ways for party in power. In the first, we

²³ An excellent summary of the differences between the issue priority model and the standard reward/punishment model is provided by Clarke, Stewart and Zuk, 'Politics, Economics, and Party Popularity in Britain, 1979-1983', pp. 127-30. See, also, K. R. Monroe, *Presidential Popularity and the Economy* (New York: Praeger, 1984); M. Peffley, 'The Voter as Juror: Attributing Responsibility for Economic Conditions', *Political Behavior*, 6 (1984), 175-294, and Alt, 'Dealignment and the Dynamics of Partisanship in Britain', pp. 289-329.

assess the impact of unemployment (and inflation) during Labour governments by setting unemployment to zero when the Conservatives are in power. We then reverse the procedure to isolate the effects of the two economic variables during Conservative governments. Finally, in a third measure, we reverse the sign of unemployment and inflation during Conservative governments thereby predicting that the Conservative share of public support will *increase* both: (a) as inflation and unemployment *rise* during Labour governments and (b) as inflation and unemployment *decline* during Conservative governments. We then re-estimate the model with all other variables specified as before.

TABLE 3 *Alternative Estimates Within the ARIMA Model of the Impact of Inflation and Unemployment, Controlling for Party in Power*

Predictor	ω	t	RMS
Inflation (logged and differenced)			
(a) during Labour governments	0.28	0.74	10.7
(b) during Conservative governments	-0.16	-0.54	10.8
(c) entire period controlling for party†	0.14	0.73	10.7
Unemployment (logged, differenced and lagged one quarter)			
(a) during Labour governments	-0.76	-0.72	8.71
(b) during Conservative governments	-1.49	-1.36	8.53
(c) entire period controlling for party†	-0.55	-1.05	8.62

* $p \leq 0.05$, one-tailed test.

† Coded positive during Conservative governments, negative under Labour governments

The results, summarized in Table 3, clearly reject the reward/punishment model. Specifically, of the six coefficients reported in Table 3, none is statistically significant. More importantly, the signs of the coefficients consistently accord with the issue-priority thesis. Both the reward/punishment model and the issue-priority model predict that rising inflation during Labour governments should increase Conservative support and that rising unemployment during Conservative governments should benefit the Labour party. The results are consistent with these predictions. However, the reward/punishment and issue-priority models differ in their predictions of the effects of rising unemployment under Labour governments and of rising inflation during Conservative governments. The reward/punishment model predicts the government party will lose support in both cases whereas the issue-priority model predicts increasing support for the government party in both cases. The results support the issue-priority predictions. Thus, although the impact of the economy on the balance of party support appears relatively modest, the form of those effects is more complex than is usually believed. From this analysis it appears that voter reactions to the economy may be considerably more subtle and sophisticated than conventional political lore allows.

Political Event Models

The evidence in Table 2 is mixed with regard to the conventional wisdom that the Conservatives have benefited from increasing public anger over the rising tide of domestic violence and strikes, from concern about international threats including Soviet adventurism, and from public frustration with the powerlessness of Britain and the West to cope with international crises such as the Arab oil embargo. Although our measure of domestic disorder approaches statistical significance, its effects are very small and dissipate quickly following the event. Moreover, the direction of the relationship runs contrary to expectations. International crises and Soviet adventurism also have very small effects and are not statistically significant. They appear to have little bearing on the balance of public support between the major parties.

By contrast, the Falklands war had a substantial impact on the balance of support between the Conservative and Labour parties. Consistent with the recognition generally accorded the war as the single most important event in staunching the decline of Conservative fortunes in the early 1980s, and paving the way for the party's landslide victory in 1983, our model indicates that the invasion of the Falklands resulted in an abrupt, temporary increase in the Conservative share of public support of more than 7 percentage points after controlling for the condition of the economy and the other political variables in the model. Our use of quarterly data prevents us from replicating Norpoth's study of the onset and gradual decay of the Falklands effect over successive months or estimating its residual effects on the outcome of the 1983 general election.²⁴ Nevertheless, our results are consistent with those that he and others report using similar procedures but different controls, different measures and shorter time periods.²⁵

²⁴ Norpoth, 'Guns and Butter and Government Popularity in Britain', uses monthly data and estimates that the Falklands war had a gradual temporary effect on Conservative support of 11 percentage points, about half of which effect persisted up to the May 1983 election. Clarke, Stewart and Zuk, in 'Politics, Economics, and Party Popularity', also use monthly data and a different control model in estimating that the Falklands war produced an abrupt, permanent (i.e. up to the election) increase in Conservative party support of about 7 percentage points. Our study differs from these previous ones in several respects. Specifically, we use quarterly averages rather than monthly data and focus on the balance of major-party support rather than simple party support. We also use a more extensive control model than other studies and focus on a much longer time period. Although we experimented with various specifications of the Falklands effect including both the abrupt-permanent model used by Clarke and the gradual-temporary model used by Norpoth, the formulation that was most effective in accounting for variation in the balance of party support was an abrupt-temporary model in which the Falklands effect began in the second quarter of 1982 and ended in the second quarter of 1983.

²⁵ Our estimate of the Falklands effect is much higher than that of Sanders, Ward and Marsh in 'Government Popularity and the Falklands War', pp. 298-312, who use monthly data and ordinary least squares procedures in estimating the Falklands effect as about 3 percentage points over a period of about three months. In discounting the effects of the Falklands war they attribute the surge in Conservative fortunes in 1982 to rising personal economic expectations, the unemployment rate, the exchange rate twelve months earlier and public sector borrowing requirements at time $t-6$.

(cont. overleaf)



The level of strike activity also has considerable bearing on the balance of party support. However, its effects are generally modest and take a different form from other variables in the model. Specifically, whereas the other variables are modelled as having abrupt, permanent effects, strikes are modelled as having gradual, permanent effects. This means that in addition to the immediate boost in Conservative support that occurs in response to an increase in strikes, there are significant delayed or lingering effects that continue to increase the Conservative share of support for several quarters after the initial increase in strike activity. In Table 2, the impact coefficient, ω_0 , measures the extent to which the balance of party support is affected by industrial disorder in the quarter the strikes occur. The delayed effects of labour discord are reflected by the dynamic coefficient, δ_1 , which measures the rate at which Conservative support increases in successive quarters over and above any previous effects of an increase in strike activity.²⁶

To illustrate these effects, we estimated the impact of strike activity on the balance of party support during the four quarters leading up to the 1979 elections – a period including the Winter of Discontent. Table 4 reports the number of man-days lost to strikes and the immediate, lingering and cumulative effects of labour discord on the Conservative share of public support in each quarter during the period. It demonstrates, for example, that the nearly 150 per cent increase in strike activity in the fourth quarter of 1978 had the effect of increasing public support for the Conservative party in that quarter by only 0.82 percentage points, controlling for other variables. Since there was little increase in strikes in the previous quarter, the residual effects in the autumn of 1978 of earlier labour strife are negligible. Thus strikes increased the Conservative share of support in this quarter by slightly less than 1 percentage point, other causes remaining constant.

Strike activity increased, again in the first quarter of 1979, albeit by a smaller amount. The immediate effect was to increase Conservative support by a trivial 0.39 percentage points. However, the lingering effects of the increase in strikes in the two previous quarters brought the total benefit to the Conservatives in the winter of 1979 to about 1 percentage point. This means that the cumulative swing to the Conservatives caused by the increase in strikes during the nine-month period up to March 1979 was about 2 percentage points. The level of strike activity fell dramatically in the spring of 1979, the quarter in which the election was held. Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the immediate

Although highly provocative, their analysis is suspect in several respects, not least because of severe multicollinearity among their independent variables and the curious specification of their control model. For further discussion of these points, see H. Clarke, W. Mishler and P. Whiteley, 'Re-capturing the Falklands: Models of Conservative Support, 1979–83', *British Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming).

²⁶ Thus the impact of industrial strife increases in the first quarter *after* the disorder occurs by an amount equal to $\delta_1\omega_0$. In the second quarter after the occurrence, it increases again, by the smaller amount, $\delta_1^2\omega_0$. It continues to increase, asymptotically, in successive quarters, at an increasingly diminished rate.

TABLE 4 *The Effects of Strikes on the Conservative Share of Two-Party Support, 1978-79*

Year	Quarter	Man-days lost in strikes (‘000)	Log (man- days)	Immediate impact	Residual effects*	Total impact	Cumulative effect
1978	3	1,729	0.10	0.09%	—	0.09%	0.09%
1978	4	4,317	0.92	0.82%	0.06%	0.88%	0.96%
1979	1	6,724	0.44	0.39%	0.57%	0.96%	1.93%
1979	2	1,965	-1.34	-1.19%	0.60%	-0.59%	1.34%
1979	3	16,481	2.13	1.90%	-0.44%	1.46%	2.80%

*Effects from previous quarters.

effect was to *reduce* Conservative support in this period by more than 1 percentage point. However, the lingering effects of the high level of strikes in earlier quarters reduced the total cost to the Conservatives in this quarter to only 0.59 percentage points, thus leaving them with 1.3 percentage point cumulative advantage over Labour as a result of strikes during the twelve months preceding the 1979 elections. Interestingly, strikes provided an even greater advantage to the Conservatives in the quarter following the election when a 700 per cent increase in strikes produced an immediate swing to the Conservatives of nearly 2 percentage points – an advantage dampened only slightly by the delayed effect of the reduction in strikes during the previous quarter.

From this evidence, it appears that the Winter of Discontent was worth about a 1.5 to 2 percentage point swing to the Conservative party in the 1979 election – a small advantage but potentially a significant one. Moreover, to the extent that the Winter of Discontent contributed in late 1978 and early 1979 to the public's rapidly improving perception of Mrs Thatcher as a leader compared to Mr Callaghan, it may have contributed indirectly to the Conservative tide as well.

Leadership and Minor Party Models

The effects of leadership rank among the strongest in the model. On the assumption that the balance of party support would most probably be influenced by the public's *comparative* assessment of the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition, we measured leader satisfaction as the difference between the percentage of the public who report they are 'satisfied' with the Prime Minister and the percentage who believe that the Opposition leader is 'proving a good leader of the party'. The measure is constructed so that a net advantage for the Conservative leader (whether Prime Minister or Leader of the Opposition) is scored positively, whereas a net advantage for the Labour leader is registered negatively. Although the questions about the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition are not identical, their use in this fashion provides a barometer of

changes in the public's comparative assessment of the two leaders over time.²⁸

Given the visibility of party leaders in British politics and the similar method by which the party leadership and support measures are constructed, it is not surprising that the relationship between leader satisfaction and party support is highly significant. What is surprising is that the relationship is not even stronger. The impact coefficient for the leadership variable indicates that a 10 per cent quarterly increase in net public satisfaction with the Conservative leader produces only a 1 percentage point increase in the Conservative share of two-party support.

To explore this result, we developed separate measures of public satisfaction with the Prime Minister and Opposition leader. These were coded positively for Conservative leaders and negatively for Labour. These variables were then substituted for the more general leadership variable in a separate Arima model.²⁸ The results are summarized in Table 5 and indicate, contrary to expectations, that evaluations of the Prime Minister have little or no bearing on the balance of support between the parties. Indeed, the coefficient is not statistically significant. In contrast, public assessments of the Leader of the Opposition do have significant effects on the party balance. The size of the opposition effect is about twice as large as that of the Prime Minister, although still smaller than the effects produced by the measure comparing Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.

Also included in Table 5 are the results of separate analyses of public satisfaction with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, disaggregated by periods of Conservative and Labour government. Of the four coefficients, all are significant except the one relating to variations in public satisfaction with Conservative Prime Ministers. Moreover, the three significant coefficients are virtually identical in size. This means that the balance of support for the two parties is significantly, and about equally, influenced by fluctuations in the public's evaluations of Conservative Leaders of the Opposition and of Labour leaders whether in opposition or in government. However, the balance of support for political parties is unaffected by variations in public satisfaction with Conservative Prime Ministers.

The latter observation applies equally to Mrs Thatcher's popularity, which also was modelled separately. Considered independently, variations in public satisfaction with Mrs Thatcher's performance as Prime Minister do not significantly influence the Conservative share of support. Only when her performance is judged in comparison to the Leader of the Opposition does it tip the balance of public support between the parties. It is also interesting that the impact of the public's comparative judgement of Mrs Thatcher and the Labour Leader of the

²⁷ Although similarly constructed and obviously related, our measures of leadership satisfaction and party support are far from being identical. The zero-order correlation between the two is only 0.54 and that probably is inflated by autocorrelation, which the ARIMA models remove.

²⁸ Because of multicollinearity, the measures of public satisfaction with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition could not be estimated simultaneously. Thus their effects were estimated in separate but otherwise identical models.

TABLE 5 *Alternative Estimates Within the ARIMA Model of the Effects of Leadership Evaluations*

Predictor	ω	t	RMS
Prime Minister satisfaction (differenced)			
(a) entire period†	0.014	0.63	12.3
(b) during Conservative governments	0.006	0.21	12.2
(c) during Labour governments	-0.038	-1.73*	12.2
(d) during Thatcher government	0.004	0.07	12.3
Leader of the Opposition approval (differenced)			
(a) entire period*	0.030	1.70*	11.5
(b) during Conservative governments	0.044	1.89*	11.4
(c) during Labour governments	-0.037	-1.67*	11.8
Comparative leader satisfaction (differenced)			
(a) Thatcher v. Foot	0.122	2.38*	11.6
(b) Thatcher v. Kinnock	0.120	1.26	11.8

* $p \leq 0.05$, one-tailed test.

† Coded positive during Conservative governments, negative under Labour governments

Opposition is virtually identical whether the Leader of the Opposition is Michael Foot or Neil Kinnock. In both cases a 10 per cent swing toward Mrs Thatcher produces about a 1 percentage point increase in the Conservative share of support. The difference, of course, is that Michael Foot suffered much more by the comparison. In the quarter before Mr Foot became party leader, public evaluations of Mrs Thatcher lagged about 2 percentage points behind those of Mr Callaghan. However, in Mr Foot's first quarter as Leader of the Opposition, the public's comparative assessment of Mrs Thatcher surged nearly 9 percentage points ahead of Mr Foot. This occurred in spite of the fact that public approval of Mrs Thatcher declined by 4 percentage points during this period. Two years later, at the end of Mr Foot's tenure as party leader, the gap in the public's assessment of Mrs Thatcher compared with him had increased to 42 per cent – a 44 percentage point swing in all. Thus, during Michael Foot's tenure, the public's comparative judgement of the two party leaders produced a 5 percentage point swing in support of the Conservative party. By the end of 1986, Neil Kinnock had more than reversed the trend and enjoyed an 8 percentage point lead over Mrs Thatcher – a shift of 50 percentage points during his two years as leader, which translates into a 6 per cent swing in public support to Labour.

Two observations merit particular consideration in these regards, one rather apparent, the other more speculative. What is apparent is that public evaluations of leadership performance are based primarily on comparative judgements of Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition rather than on assessments of either leader in isolation. Public assessments of Mrs Thatcher have fluctuated considerably during her tenure but have been of consequence

only to the extent that her performance has been judged better or worse than that of the Leader of the Opposition. She simply was fortunate that during the critical middle years of her tenure as Prime Minister she was opposed by the Opposition leader with the lowest overall public evaluations of any leader since opinion poll data have been collected.

A second and more speculative observation derives from the evidence that public evaluations are relatively more important for Labour leaders than the Conservative leaders. Evaluations of Conservative leaders matter principally when the party is in opposition, but evaluations of Labour leaders are important both in government and opposition. A possible explanation is that the public has relatively greater confidence in the stability, predictability and perceived moderation of the Conservative party, its policies and behaviour. This is not to say that the public necessarily or consistently prefers Conservative policies or leaders. It is, rather, to speculate that the public *perceives* the Conservative party as being relatively more homogeneous and consistent, both internally and over time. Thus, it feels more confident that it knows how future Conservative governments will behave, whoever the Conservative leader might be. This is particularly likely when the Conservatives are in government. When they are in opposition, public uncertainty about the party's future behaviour grows, thus increasing also the importance of leadership as a clue to that behaviour, or at least so it appears from this analysis.

In contrast, given the widely publicized divisions within the Labour party and the acrimonious battles for party control, the public probably feels less confident of the Labour party's identity at any moment, much less what it will be in the future. The identity and performance of the Labour leader therefore assumes added importance as one of the few tangible indicators the public has of 'which Labour party' is ascendant or how it will behave if elected. Even when Labour is in government, discord within the party can combine with public concerns about the party's extremist factions to undermine public confidence, thereby increasing the importance of public judgements of the competence, moderation and strength of the Labour Prime Minister.

A final political variable in our model that appears to have had significant effects is the level of public support for minor parties, the Liberals and Social Democrats in particular. Far from being neutral in their effects, the increasing strength of minor parties has provided a small but significant advantage to the Conservative party over Labour. On average, for every 10 percentage point increase in public support for minor parties, the Conservatives have benefited by a slightly under 1 percentage point increase in their share of two-party support.

Finally, we re-estimated the model in Table 2 deleting non-significant variables one at a time until only statistically significant variables remained. This resulted in the deletion of the measures of international crises, Soviet adventurism and domestic disorder. Although the measure of minority party strength declined in significance in the revised model, it was retained because of its theoretical interest. The final model is reported in Table 6. The Residual Mean Square for the model is further improved; the residuals are acceptably free from

TABLE 6 *Economic and Political Predictors of the Conservative Share of Two-Party Support (Final Model)*

Predictor	ω	t
Inflation (logged and differenced)	0.35	2.25
Unemployment (logged, differenced and lagged one quarter)	-16.50	-5.57*
Falklands War	6.71	6.14*
Strikes (logged and differenced) ω_0	0.82	4.42*
δ_1	0.59	2.76*
Comparative leadership satisfaction (differenced)†	0.13	11.44*
Minor-party support (differenced)	0.06	1.48
AR (1)	0.67	8.44*
AR (10)	-0.22	-2.19*
MA (5)	-0.55	-5.38*
	RMS 6.32	
	Q (25 lags) 19 (ns)	
	R ² 47%	

* $p \leq 0.05$, one-tailed test.

† Coded positive during Conservative governments; negative under Labour governments.

autocorrelation; and the R^2 indicates that the economic and political variables included in the model account for slightly more than half of the variation in the Conservative share of major party support after time dependencies are removed.

TEETERING STEADILY ON THE BALANCE

The coefficients in the final model are very similar to those already discussed and require little additional comment. On balance, they reinforce our observations about the importance of both economic conditions and political events in shaping the distribution of public support for political parties. They also underscore the volatility of contemporary British politics. Regarding the latter, the model makes apparent that even relatively modest changes in the economy and rather ordinary political events, especially when they occur in combination, can rapidly and substantially alter the balance of public support between long-established political parties. Although such effects are often ephemeral, their strength and political significance at any particular time can be considerable, affecting not only the outcome of elections but also control of the government and, thus, the direction of public policy for extended periods.

Although it is tempting to attribute the volatility in public support for British parties to the destabilizing effects of the decade-long dealignment of party loyalties in Britain, such volatility is not a new phenomenon in British politics.

Notwithstanding the presumably stabilizing effects of stronger party loyalties in the 1960s and early 1970s and of stronger party-class alignments, fluctuations in the balance of public support between the Labour and Conservative parties were about as large and occurred as precipitously prior to 1975 as subsequently.

Given the remarkable instability in the balance of public support for the Labour and Conservative parties taking place below the surface of British political life an obvious question is why there appears to be so much stability on the surface. After all, Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative party have won three successive general elections, the last two by landslides; the Conservatives' share of the popular vote across those three elections has varied hardly at all from a low of 42.2 per cent in 1987 to a high of 43.9 per cent in 1979; Labour's share of the popular vote increased by only 3 percentage points in the 1987 election having fallen nearly 10 percentage points in 1983; and minor party support has held relatively constant at about 20 to 25 per cent in four of the five elections since February 1974.

Two potential explanations of this apparent paradox can be eliminated rather quickly. First, notwithstanding the wishful thinking of some political activists there is little evidence either in the literature or in the analyses reported here of any fundamental realignment of the party system favouring the Conservative party. If such a realignment were in progress, we would expect to find evidence of decreasing volatility in the balance of public support over time and of a substantial and sustained increase in the Conservative share of support. Neither is evident either in our data or elsewhere.

Similarly, there is little evidence that Conservative successes in the past decade stem from what we have called dealignment by different degrees. It is true that if we focus only on election results Conservative support appears to have held relatively steady since 1979 whereas Labour lost about a quarter of its support in 1983 and regained very little in 1987. However, if we focus more broadly on the entire period since 1979, not just at elections, Conservative support has been just as volatile as Labour's and has declined, on average, just as much. Although it is possible to build a case, based on the data presented earlier (see Figure 1 and Table 1), that the differential pace of dealignment in the late 1970s contributed to the Conservative victory in the 1979 general election, a longer perspective indicates that whatever advantage the Conservative party initially enjoyed in this regard has long since dissipated or ceased to have substantial effect. Certainly, the Conservative share of public support has not increased across the past decade in the substantial and sustained way we would expect if the Conservatives had benefited fundamentally from either realignment or differential dealignment.

A third and more promising explanation for the successive Conservative victories is suggested by the evidence of the increasing importance of issue voting in recent British elections.²⁹ Franklin explicitly links the rise of issue voting to the

²⁹ Among the many who rely on an issue-voting model are Crewe, 'Why the Conservatives Won', pp 282-96, Crewe, 'How to Win a Landslide Without Really Trying', pp 176-81, Sarlvik and Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment*, pp 247-80, and Franklin, *The Decline of Class Voting*.

weakening of traditional party-class alignments, arguing that the available evidence, 'points to the causal primacy of the decline of class voting in opening the way to an increase in the importance of issues in determining the electoral choice of British voters'.³⁰ The suggestion is not only that issues have become more important in determining voter choice, but also that for most of the past decade public opinion on the most salient issues has sided with the Conservative party's positions. This certainly was the case in the 1979 and 1983 elections, although the size of Conservative victory in 1983 far exceeded its net advantage on salient issues. Crewe argues that issues hold the key to the 1987 Conservative victory, as well, although in somewhat less obvious fashion. His analysis of the 1987 election indicates that 'the final balance sheet' of those issues considered most important by voters favoured the Labour party by a small margin. However, he demonstrates that the Conservative party led overwhelmingly in voter perceptions on two 'non-issues' in the campaign, 'prosperity at home and peace abroad', whose salience proved overwhelming.³¹

An issue-voting model is appealing in many respects, not least its ability to explain recent election outcomes. However, like the realignment and dealignment models, it cannot account for the great volatility in party support between elections. Although public perceptions of issues and their salience can undoubtedly change, sometimes precipitously, the issue-voting model does not contain an explanation of how such rapid and dramatic changes occur. If public perceptions of peace at home and prosperity abroad produced the Conservative victory in the 1987 general election, how do we explain the fact that the Conservatives trailed Labour in the polls in five of the eight quarters leading up to the election? Even if public perceptions of Conservative positions on these issues were substantially less popular during most of 1985 and 1986 (a dubious proposition, at best) or if the salience of peace and prosperity were overshadowed by other issues during this period, the issue-voting model would not explain how or why perceptions changed in such a way as to cause the dramatic reversal on Conservative fortunes that occurred during the year preceding the election.

Miller makes something of the same point in analysing the 1983 election.³² While acknowledging the importance of issues in the Conservative victory, he argues that public perceptions of issues and their salience are influenced by exogenous factors. His particular concern was to demonstrate the importance of leaders in articulating issues and 'selling' party positions to the public, but his arguments are easily extended to a variety of other exogenous influences, including economic conditions and political events. Indeed, we suspect that the same set of economic conditions, political personalities and events that underlie fluctuations in public support for political parties probably underlie and provide the dynamics for the public's issue perceptions as well. We are suggesting, in other words, that the public's perceptions of issues are no less volatile or subject to

³⁰ Franklin, *The Decline of Class Voting*, p. 146.

³¹ Crewe, 'What's Left for Labour', p. 55.

³² Miller, 'There Was No Alternative', p. 375.

rapid change than public support for political parties. Indeed, the two are probably closely linked.

How then do we account for the apparent stability of recent election outcomes? The answer, we believe, is that the appearance of stability is fundamentally misleading. There simply is much less stability in British electoral politics than the results of recent elections appear to suggest. Nor is there any evidence that Conservative successes stem from some underlying long-term dynamic in British politics. Neither realignment nor differential dealignment can account for recent trends. Nor can the tendency towards increased issue voting. Even if there were evidence of a fundamental long-term shift in public support toward the Conservative party, the apparent impact of a variety of idiosyncratic and largely uncontrollable events on fluctuations in the balance of party support would call into question the durability of the trend.

Indeed, the evidence indicating that the balance of public support has at times been affected both suddenly and profoundly by normal fluctuations in economic conditions and relatively ordinary political events suggests that the recent string of Conservative victories owes as much to good timing and luck as to any underlying dynamic. It is not possible, of course, to predict how an election would have turned out had it been held a year earlier or later. The act of calling an election and the subsequent campaign alter the political environment in unpredictable ways that can significantly affect public opinion trends. Nevertheless, our analyses certainly support the interpretation of those who suggest that Prime Minister Callaghan erred in postponing elections from the autumn of 1978 to the spring of 1979. The decision failed to anticipate the subsequent rise in the inflation rate, the Winter of Discontent, and the decline in his public popularity compared with Mrs Thatcher – and Labour suffered a net loss of between 4 and 6 percentage points in the balance of support as a result. Conversely, Mrs Thatcher has done a masterful job teetering on the volatile balance of public support between the parties, exploiting the opportunities provided by the leadership problems in the Labour party, public reaction to the Falklands war, the formation of the SDP, and an improving economy. She called the elections in 1983 and 1987 at what in retrospect appear to have been almost optimal times. Had she called either election from six months to a year earlier, the balance of party support would have been far less advantageous to the Conservatives. The same would have been true had the 1983 election been postponed six months.

Nevertheless, although timing is important, the role of chance is critical as well. Had the Falklands war not revived Conservative fortunes in 1982 it is at least questionable whether Mrs Thatcher could have found an advantageous time over the next two years to call an election much less to win a landslide. Notwithstanding the impact on party fortunes of inflation and unemployment, whose effects parties can at least try to anticipate and control, the balance of support has also been influenced, significantly at times, by a variety of sudden, largely unpredictable, and certainly uncontrollable events ranging from the Falklands war, to strikes and the formation of the SDP and the Alliance.

Although parties can exploit, with varying adroitness, the opportunities created by such chance occurrences, there are inherent limitations in their ability to do so. Moreover, the evidence that the effects of such occurrences, however large at the moment, are extremely short-lived, adds to the volatility and unpredictability of contemporary British politics and suggests that support for the Labour and Conservative parties will probably continue teetering in the balance for the foreseeable future.

APPENDIX

Listed below by major categories are the variables used in the analyses, their sources, and, where appropriate, measurement and coding procedures. All variables are measured monthly, where available, and aggregated quarterly.

I. Economic Variables

Unemployment: registered unemployment as percentage of the civilian labour force.

Inflation: percentage change in consumer prices over previous twelve months.

(Source: OECD, *Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics 1964–1987*)

II. Public Opinion Variables

Labour Party Support: percentage responding 'Labour' to question, 'If there were a General Election tomorrow, which party would you support?', including the answers for the 'don't knows' to the additional question, 'Which would you be most inclined to vote for?' but excluding those who remained 'don't knows' after the probe.

Conservative Party Support: percentage responding Conservative to the above party preference question.

Minor Party Support: percentage mentioning a party other than Labour or Conservative to the party preference question.

Prime Minister Satisfaction: percentage responding 'Satisfied' to the question, 'Are you satisfied with — as Prime Minister?'

Opposition Leader: percentage responding 'Good leader' to the question 'Do you think — is or is not proving a good leader of the — party?'

(Source: *Gallup Political Index*, 1945–1982, updated to 1988)

III. Political Event Variables

Strikes: time lost (thousands of man-days) in labour disputes through work stoppages excluding stoppages involving fewer than ten workers or lasting less than a full day.

(Source: OECD, *Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics 1964–1987*)

Domestic Disorder: dummy variable registering presence or absence during quarter of major instances of domestic unrest. The measure consists almost entirely of incidents of Irish violence, although a few instances of bombings and internal terrorist activities are recorded as well.

Soviet Adventurism: dummy variable registering major instances of Soviet aggression world-wide including the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and the destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 007.

International Crises: dummy variable registering the presence or absence of significant international events sufficient to create a sense of national urgency or concern such as the OPEC oil embargo.

Falklands War: dummy variable coded 1 beginning in the second quarter of 1982 until the second quarter of 1983 and 0 otherwise.

(Source: Events were coded based on their listing in two sources: *Facts on File* and the *Britannica, Books of the Year*.)

Review Article: The International-National Connection

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

One of the positive contributions attributed to the 'dependency' movement by its defenders as well as many of its critics is its stress on the importance of the international context in the explanation of internal politics and political development. The dependency writers rejected the development research of the 1950s and the 1960s on the grounds that it failed to consider the constraints imposed on Third World development by the context of international capitalism which penetrated, controlled and distorted the political economies of these countries. These constraints were viewed as so complete as to reduce internal variables to insignificance. The Third World was condemned to backwardness or distorted development by virtue of this international class system. This position is no longer seriously advanced, but the dependency experience is credited with the large heuristic contribution of having turned development studies around by bringing the international dimension into the development picture.

Thus, Theda Skocpol expresses a common contemporary point of view about the 'national-society-centeredness' of contemporary development theory: 'the theoretical approaches that have been dominant until recently – structural-functional evolutionism, and unilineal Marxism – have generalized too specifically from the apparent logic of English development in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Essentially modernization has been conceived as a dynamic internal to a nation'.¹

And Atul Kohli commends the dependency approach for having drawn attention 'to world economic conditions as constraints on contemporary developing countries'.² Andrew Janos develops a similar argument in a review and critique of political-sociological theory of the nineteenth and present centuries.

Another and perhaps still more crucial point of criticism arises out of what may be called the structural parochialism of conventional political sociology. This parochialism is expressed in a tendency to seek explanations for political phenomena solely within the structure and culture of the 'underlying' society. In this mode of analysis French politics is explained by French culture, German politics by configurations among social classes in Germany, Russian politics by the mode of production in Russia, and so on.³

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¹ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge. University of Cambridge Press, 1979), p. 19.

² Atul Kohli, 'Introduction', in Atul Kohli, ed., *The State and Development in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 15.

³ Andrew Janos, *Politics and Paradigms* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 66.

Tony Smith makes the same case, arguing that mainstream modernization and developmentalist theory must do penance for its parochialism. 'Still another frank admission must be that these concerns are not limited to the field of comparative study, but involve international relations as well'.⁴

I shall argue in this article that this characterization of the comparative politics literature as having neglected national-international interaction is an exaggeration. In a series of original papers which searched and evaluated this literature, Peter Gourevitch comments in a more discriminating way.

We all know about [international-national] interaction; we all understand that international politics and domestic structures affect each other. Having recently read, for a variety of purposes, much of the current literature which explores this interaction, I think the comparativist's perspective has been neglected, that is, the reasoning from the international system to domestic structure.⁵

Gourevitch is correct in pointing out that research on the international impact on national development has lagged, although there is more there than Gourevitch reports, and the pace has been picking up in the last decades. While the dominant paradigm of political sociology from Marx to Barrington Moore has stressed the importance of internal social structure and culture in the shaping of politics and the state, there is a minor tradition from Otto Hintze to Charles Tilly, Peter Gourevitch and Peter Katzenstein which stresses the impact of international factors on internal political structure and process, a tradition quite independent of the dependency movement. It is this minor tradition that I present in this article.

It is relevant to point out that research on the impact of national factors on international politics was the first of these interdisciplinary genres to thrive. Since the interwar period there has been a preoccupation among American diplomatic historians, political scientists and international relationists with the impact of national politics and policy on international relations growing out of historical American isolationism – particularly by the experience between the world wars which was widely interpreted as leading to the diplomatic breakdown of the 1920s and 1930s, and to the Second World War. The struggle between President Wilson and Senator Lodge, culminating in the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty, was the historical trauma which obsessed the scholars of the interior period. And for post-Second World War scholarship the fear continued to nag and rankle that, as the enthusiasm of Second World War mobilization subsided, America would withdraw into its isolationist shell.

This scholarly mood coincided with the expansion and professionalization of political science; and within a decade or two after the Second World War a sizeable literature had accumulated, dealing with domestic constraints on foreign

⁴ Tony Smith, 'Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies', in Ikuo Kabashima and Lynn T White, eds, *Political System and Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 376.

⁵ Peter Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed; The International Sources of Domestic Politics', *International Organization*, 32 (1978), 881–912, p. 882.

policy – Congress (Dahl),⁶ the bureaucracy (Cohen),⁷ interest groups and political parties (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter),⁸ public opinion and political culture (Markel,⁹ Almond),¹⁰ and foreign-policy decision making (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin).¹¹ It is primarily an American literature, dealing with American foreign policy, although there are a few comparative items (Waltz, Hanrieder).¹² The studies included in this category vary in their explanatory strategy. Some are relatively specific in their definition of the consequences of domestic factors on international politics; others define the dependent variable more diffusely as international stability, cosmopolitanism–isolationism, cold war effectiveness and the like. The more recent literature of this genre has been concerned with explaining foreign economic policy in terms of domestic constraints (Katzenstein).¹³

The movement in recent decades toward exploring the impact of the international environment on domestic politics primarily through historical study could have no better patron saints than John Robert Seeley, the Cambridge historian of the late nineteenth century, and Otto Hintze, the German constitutional historian of the Wilhelminian and Weimar period. Seeley cautioned his students,

never be content with looking at states purely from within; always remember that they have another aspect which is wholly different, their relation to foreign states. This is a rule which it is particularly necessary to impress upon English students, for there is no nation which has disregarded it so much as our own. We have an inveterate habit of regarding our own history as self-contained, and of assuming that whatever has happened in England can be explained by English causes. So much so, that I think the English history still remains to be written which shall do anything like justice to foreign or continental influences which have contributed to determine the course of English affairs.¹⁴

For Otto Hintze, remedying this neglect of international factors in the explanation of national development was almost an obsession. Out of more than fifty monographs, articles and review articles reprinted in the three volumes of

⁶ Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950).

⁷ Bernard C. Cohen, *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1972).

⁸ Raymond Bauer, Ithiel Pool and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963).

⁹ Lester Markel, ed., *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1949).

¹⁰ Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950).

¹¹ Richard Snyder, Henry Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, Organization Behavior Section, 1954), Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

¹² Kenneth Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: American and British Experience* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1967), Wolfram Hanrieder, *Comparative Foreign Policy* (New York: David McKay, 1971).

¹³ Peter Katzenstein, *Between Power and Plenty* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

¹⁴ John Robert Seeley, *Introduction to Political Science* (London: Macmillan, 1886), p. 133.

his *Collected Papers*¹⁵ more than a dozen contain sharp – even passionate – criticisms of those political and sociological theorists who seek to explain the structure of states purely in terms of internal forces, social structure, religious tendencies and the like. Indeed, Hintze attacked the entire discipline and corpus of political theory from Aristotle through Machiavelli, Montesquieu to Marx, for this fixation on internal causes and constraints.

The turn of the nineteenth century was a fertile period for large-scale historical political demographies such as Woodrow Wilson's two volume, *The State*.¹⁶ Seeley's *Introduction to Political Science*, quoted above, was a pocket version of such a treatise. In a review article of the largest such compendium, by Wilhelm Roscher, Hintze tells us that Roscher's theory of political development breaks down because

It looks at the state essentially from an internal perspective, in relation to social development. He has not given enough consideration to the fundamental fact that the domestic life of individual states is in large part dependent on the relation of states with each other, on the push and pull amongst them, on the rise and collapse of neighbor states, on variations in international pressure, in brief what Ranke called the larger world context.¹⁷

In his first major essay on this theme, published in 1902, translated as 'The Formation of States and Constitutional Development', Hintze attacks Marx on the ground that he fails to appreciate the importance of the development of the state in relation to its neighbours. He does not reject Marx out of hand. He attributes a 'germ of truth' to the Marxist argument that a 'people's political constitution is in effect shaped by its social structure'. He faults it for wrenching the 'single state from the context in which it was formed; the state is seen in isolation, exclusive in itself, without raising the question whether its peculiar character is co-determined by its relation to its surroundings'.¹⁸

Hintze also takes a discriminating position on the issue of the importance of idealist and materialist forces in political explanation. It would be worth the while of our structuralists to pay close attention to his 'plague on the houses' of Hegel and Ranke on the one hand and Marx on the other, as he comments,

It used to be thought that everything could be explained in terms of individual will power, planning and calculation; and nowadays it is equally widely held that the driving forces of history are to be found in the natural conditions of each country or in the relations of economic production. . . The impact of the outside world must pass through an intellectual medium; and the only question is how strong is its refraction, to what extent it possesses independent vigor and can exert a counterweight. With this reservation we can – indeed, must – stress that in the life of peoples external events and conditions exercise a decisive

¹⁵ Otto Hintze, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, Vols. I, II, III (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962–1967)

¹⁶ Woodrow Wilson, *The State. Elements of Historical and Practical Politics* (Boston, Mass.: Heath, 1895).

¹⁷ Otto Hintze, *Soziologie und Geschichte* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964), pp. 19–20.

¹⁸ Otto Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 159.

influence upon the internal constitution. History does not permit progressive spiritual development, following its own laws, as was supposed by Hegel; there is rather a constant collaboration of the inner and outer world.¹⁹

Seeley's and Hintze's strictures had little resonance in political research until the nation state explosion in the post-Second World War decades posed with special urgency the question of how states 'grow'. And even then the dominant tradition of explaining state structure and process continued to stress domestic factors. In an article written some twenty years ago (1971) I forecast a movement away from what might be described as the biological model of the political system in which comparativists

classify species of political structure, and attribute to them a degree of stability and a relationship to environment comparable to that of biological organisms. But political systems and societies are not organisms in relatively stable relationship to their environments. The exchanges between political systems and their environments may be massive, for the boundaries between them are highly porous, and both the structure of the system and its environments may undergo gross transformations quickly. We are at the beginnings of significant curricular adaptations which will get us away from this biological model and enable us to deal more effectively with the interaction of the domestic society, the international environment, and the political system.²⁰

A trail-breaking article by Peter Gourevitch published some ten years ago,²¹ pointed out the 'circular' character of causality in national-international interaction. He argued that 'in using domestic structure as a variable in explaining foreign policy' as we have done above, 'we must explore the extent to which that structure itself derives from the exigencies of the international system'. He then analyses the ways in which domestic politics and policy are influenced principally by the international economic and international security environments. He refers to other aspects of the international environment such as ideology and religion, but the burden of this section of his article deals with the impact of war and trade on domestic politics in the sense of specific events or decisions, political regime characteristics and coalition patterns. In a recent book as well as in earlier articles,²² he deals systematically and in detail with the impact of the international economy on domestic policy-cum-politics. Gourevitch's work is the most rigorously formulated and well-researched treatment of the international-national relationship that has thus far been produced. We shall report some of his findings on the international economy below.

¹⁹ Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, p. 162.

²⁰ Gabriel A. Almond, 'National Politics and International Politics' in Albert Lepawsky, Edward Buehrig and Harold Lasswell, eds, *The Search for World Order* (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1971), pp. 284-5.

²¹ Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed', p. 882.

²² Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Peter Gourevitch, 'International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Responses to The Crisis of 1873-1896', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 8 (1977), 281-313; Peter Gourevitch, 'Breaking With Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930's', *International Organization*, 38 (1984), 95-129.

THE SEELEY-HINTZE LAW

It is a matter of some interest that the early formulations of Seeley and particularly Hintze anticipated the findings of the more recent literature dealing with the international impact on political development. Indeed it is in Hintze's work that one first finds the relationship formulated as a theory, which he attributes to his Cambridge mentor, John Robert Seeley. As the Cambridge historian had put it,

It is reasonable therefore to conjecture that the degree of government will be directly proportional, and that means that the degree of liberty will be inversely proportional, to the degree of pressure. In other words, given a community which lives at large, in easy conditions and furnished with abundant room, you may expect to find that community enjoying a large share of liberty; given a community which has to maintain itself against great difficulties and in the midst of great dangers, you may expect to find in it little liberty and a great deal of government.²³

And at a later point and more succinctly, 'we see that intense government is the reaction against intense pressure, and on the other hand liberty or relaxed government, is the effect of relaxed pressure. This is the general rule; as a matter of course it will suffer many exceptions.'²⁴

Seeley briefly documents this proposition by reference to the 'intensity of government' in France and Prussia-Germany by contrast to Britain and particular the United States. But it is Hintze who takes Seeley's law and tests it against world political history. His first major essay on the subject (1902)²⁵ argued that:

All the great empires of ancient times and of the non-European world were despotic in their form of government . . . free constitutions emerged only where a number of states existed next to each other on equal terms, the independence of each one being recognized by the others . . . Such a society of states has always been the exception, if we look at the past of the human race . . . it is a phenomenon that emerges only once on a large scale – namely in the European system of states, which owes its rise to a wholly individual historical process

Hintze attributes this unique historical development to the rivalry of Papacy and Empire in the middle ages, a rivalry which made it possible for individual nations to attain autonomy; and the common cultural and religious traditions in the European area which fostered a comity of nations and a balance of power.

Hintze developed this theme of the effect of the external setting on the internal characteristics of states in connection with three major political organizations – the armed forces, ministerial government and representative institutions. In each case he seeks to explain differences in these institutional patterns in terms of two sets of constraints 'which conditioned the real organization of the state. These are first, the structure of social classes, and second, the external ordering of the

²³ Seeley, *An Introduction to Political Science*, p. 131.

²⁴ Seeley, *An Introduction to Political Science*, p. 134.

²⁵ Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, p. 164

states – their position relative to each other, and their over-all position in the world'.²⁶

He compares the military organization of Sparta, Rome and on up to Prussia and England, demonstrating the complex interplay between social structure, military technology, political structure, foreign policy and the international context. In a similarly rich analysis of the origins and variety of ministerial government Hintze draws a sharp contrast between continental and particularly German patterns with the 'cabinet responsible to parliament' of the British system. Writing in 1908 he expresses great pessimism about the prospects of a responsible parliament-cabinet system in Germany in view of her exposed strategic situation, which had historically required the development of a large and costly standing army, maintained and managed by a powerful and efficient bureaucracy within the framework of an authoritarian monarchy.²⁷

In a series of four essays beginning on the eve of the First World War and continuing during the life time of the Weimar Republic, Hintze sought to explain the differing development of political authority and representative institutions in the occident. He wrote self-conscious, comparative history informed by the methodological ideas of John Stuart Mill and Max Weber. In his 1913 essay on 'Power Politics And Government Constitutions' he poses the question, 'how does it happen that England and America have a quite different kind of constitutional system than the continental European states; and France has a very different system than Germany and Prussia, or Austria-Hungary, and Russia?'²⁸ Attacking the exponents of race, national character and socio-economic structure as the principal explanation of constitutional differences, Hintze asks how it is possible for sociological and political theorists to advance such mono-causal internal explanations of constitutional differences, not only in the light of the historical development of political institutions in the Christian West but in the light of the contemporary pulling and hauling of world politics. The reason, he argues, why sociological and political theorists overlook the influence of international power politics, is that it is very difficult to grapple with these influences in terms of general laws. These connections tend to have a singular character, which historians are more likely to observe than political theorists who tend to abstract particular states from their environment and context. He points to comparative history as the methodological approach likely to produce a more systematic treatment of international-national interaction in the development of modern states.

In this essay, and one that followed in 1914 entitled 'The Constitutional Life of Contemporary States',²⁹ he presents a theory of European state formation which has not been excelled in its sharpness of formulation and the richness of the body of historical evidence presented in its elaboration and defence. He points out that the systems of government of the major European powers consist

²⁶ Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, p. 183

²⁷ Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, p. 266.

²⁸ Hintze, *Staat Und Verfassung*, p. 424.

²⁹ Hintze, *Staat Und Verfassung*, p. 390 ff.

of two types – the English and the continental European. Although there were important differences between England and the continental states already in the middle ages, by the mid-seventeenth century the state on the continent took on the form of military absolutism with a strong bureaucratic administration, while in England monarchic authority was greatly diminished and a parliamentary regime had been instituted.

What caused this sharp differentiation in the historic European state-building process? He points out that there were autonomous local institutions and estate assemblies on the European continent quite similar to those in England. Why in the English case did they develop into a parliamentary and locally autonomous system, while on the continent the estates and autonomous towns were set aside and destroyed through a process of bureaucratic centralization and local penetration? Similarly, there were aspiring monarchs in England (e.g. Henry VIII and Elizabeth), just as there were in France and Prussia. But the monarchic power was checked in England.

The explanation for this striking difference in governmental institutions lay in the geostrategic situations of England and the continent. England could carry on an effective diplomatic-political role substantially by means of maritime power. Continental European countries with their exposed frontiers could only survive and expand through large standing armies which called for large extractive and regulative powers and organizations. Hintze elaborates 'the whole history of the European state system is a chain of attempts of the one or the other powers to win supremacy, while the other powers sought to defend their independence or their very existence.'³⁰ Out of this tense equilibrium extending through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries emerged

the centralized great power, the military and official state. . . . The soul of this new state is the will to power, the backbone is the large standing army, in this form a previously unknown phenomenon. It is astonishing how this institution of the standing army transformed and determined the structure and life of the most remote organs and functions of the state³¹

England escaped this development and underwent a mostly gradual process of balancing monarchic, aristocratic and bourgeois powers within a relatively decentralized administrative framework. And this was attributable to the fact that she could play a major international strategic role relying primarily on naval power.

This contrast between continental European and Anglo-American historical development, and its significance, is now a cliché of comparative politics. But its first sharp and explicit formulation is to be found in these pre-First World War essays of Hintze, elaborated in a comparative historical context which includes not only England, France and Prussia-Germany, but Russia, Poland, Austria-Hungary, the Scandinavian countries and the United States as well.

³⁰ Hintze, *Staat Und Verfassung*, p. 428.

³¹ Hintze, *Staat Und Verfassung*, p. 429

Hintze applies his thesis of the mutual interaction of international and domestic factors to the Polish case, and to the situation in the Weimar Republic in the mid-1920s. He points to the Polish case as suggesting a corollary to Seeley's law, that if there is too much internal resistance to centralizing authoritarianism in a situation of external threat, then the state may be gobbled up by its neighbours. The Weimar Republic in the mid-1920s is another exception to Seeley's law. When the autonomy of a state is limited by foreign powers, the law loses its applicability. The state is unable to respond to external threat; through losing this capacity it loses much of its 'stateness', becomes an object of international politics. But these exceptions to Seeley's law lead Hintze to the more general law of politics of which Seeley's law is simply a special case. 'This general law holds that the spirit and essence of internal politics is dependent on the external conditions of a state.'³² He points out that any government which carries out the terms of the Versailles Treaty and of the reparations agreements is bound to lose its legitimacy among its own people. In this case external pressure and penetration results in the delegitimation and breakdown of authority. Hintze did not foresee the triumph of National Socialism in Germany and the ultimate confirmation of Seeley's insight, although he lived to experience it, and to withdraw from active academic life because of it.

Seeley's law and Hintze's corollaries are history-bound generalizations. They pertain to the European state-building processes of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. We can hardly explain the centralization and concentration of power in Communist regimes, or the alternation of authoritarian and populist regimes in the Third World as simply attributable to the operations of the power-political dynamics of Seeley's law. External pressure conspired with internal pressure in Chile to produce an authoritarian regime. But external pressure contributed first to an authoritarian trend and later to a loosening and democratizing trend in Argentina, Brazil, the Phillipines, Korea, Taiwan and other countries. For today's world the simple dialectics of power politics of Seeley's law cannot explain political development. The contending powers have ideologies which direct the kind of influence which they exert on the internal affairs of other powers. Thus the pressure of the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe has tended to perpetuate internal power concentration, but the counter-pressure generated within these countries is pluralistic. American external pressure on other countries is often pluralistic in its internal consequences.

And yet there is something to be said for the Seeley-Hintze formulation as long as it is not taken to be the only explanation of internal power concentration or diffusion. The great world depression of the 1930s produced power concentrations but of substantially different kinds among the major powers. The two Great Wars of this century have been associated with power concentrations among the democracies, and it is a principal thesis regarding the prospects of reducing power concentration in the Soviet Union that international *détente* would have this effect.

³² Hintze, *Soziologie Und Geschichte*, p. 202.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

Our search of the literature uncovered a substantial number of research genres in the Seeley–Hintze tradition. These include a number of different approaches to the theme of war and state building, the international economic environment and national political development, the impact of the international environment on revolutions, and political crises; and the influence of international politics and economics on the structure and process of democratic regimes, in particular consociationalism and neo-corporatism.

War and State Building

Some three decades were to elapse after the work of Hintze before the theme of the impact of war and international pressure on state building was resumed in serious research terms. In the mid 1960s the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council initiated a research programme on this topic, and some early hypotheses were formulated.³³ Charles Tilly's study of the formation of states in Western Europe, discussed below, was a major product of this programme.

A year before the publication of the Tilly volume, Perry Anderson's two-volume study of the origins of the absolutist state system in Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries appeared.³⁴ Anderson also places great weight on international conflict and war in the state-building process. But as a Marxist he gives prior honours to class phenomena. He offers a two-stage theory of the causality of the European state system. The emergence of strong states in Western Europe was to be explained by the crisis of feudalism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, particularly in such countries as Spain, France and England.³⁵ In these early stages of state-building, the centralization of authority in monarchies and the development of powerful bureaucracies and armies are explained by an aristocracy no longer capable of coping with a mutinous peasantry without centralization and concentration of power. Once these tools – armies and bureaucracies – had been constructed, the more developed states proceeded to threaten and invade the less developed societies of Eastern Europe. The development of modern state organizations and standing armies in such countries as Prussia and Austria was in reaction to this aggressive pressure primarily from Spain, France and Sweden.³⁶ Although Anderson concedes the importance of international conflict and warfare in the development of the Western European states, his principal argument is the priority of internal conflict

³³ Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 314 ff.

³⁴ Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (New York: The Humanities Press, 1974), Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (New York: The Humanities Press, 1974).

³⁵ Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, pp. 15 ff.

³⁶ Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, pp. 197 ff.

between aristocrats and peasants as the triggering mechanism of the whole sequence of state-building developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In this respect Anderson's analysis differs from the approach of Charles Tilly and his collaborators, who produced the major contemporary study of European state-building.³⁷ While Hintze stressed the institutional aspects of the development of the Western European state system, Tilly and his associates focused on the substantive problem areas and challenges confronting the state builders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the successful surmounting of which resulted in the great nation-state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These challenges were to develop the military means capable of countering external threat, to extract the resources required for these security needs, to cope with problems of internal order and supply, and to recruit, train and organize the personnel for these tasks. The historical contributions to this volume included Samuel Finer's comparative study of the growth of armed forces in France, Britain and Prussia-Germany; Gabriel Ardant's and Rudolf Braun's studies of the development of tax policy in France, England and Brandenburg-Prussia; David Bayley on internal order and policing in Western Europe; Tilly's own study of the regulation of the food supply; and Wolfram Fischer and Peter Lundgreen on the recruitment and training of administrative personnel.

In his effort to draw together a coherent logic of state-building from these and other researches, Tilly proposed a sequence more elaborate than, although consistent with, Seeley's law. Tilly writes that under the pressure of international conflict 'Recurrently we find a chain of causation running from (1) change or expansion in land armies to (2) new efforts to extract resources from the subject populations to (3) the development of new bureaucracies and administrative innovations to (4) resistance from the subject population to (5) renewed coercion to (6) durable increases in the bulk and extractiveness of the state'.³⁸

War and Public Expenditures

A number of political econometricians have dealt with the relation between the incidence of war and state-building, operationalizing state-building according to the level of public revenue and expenditure. The English economists, Peacock and Wiseman, were the first to challenge the conventional wisdom that government activities would expand in roughly linear response to the emergence of social problems stemming out of economic growth and industrialization. The most influential theory of this sort, advanced at the turn of the century by the German economist, Adolph Wagner – referred to as 'Wagner's Law' – asserted that government expenditures in industrial societies will grow at a more rapid rate

³⁷ Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

³⁸ Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, p. 73.

than the national economic product.³⁹ Wagner explained this tendency towards increasing state activity by the pressure of social progress and the values of modern industrial societies. Peacock and Wiseman, in a study of public expenditure in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth and present centuries, challenge this proposition, showing that the growth of public expenditure in England was not a linear, incremental process, but rather was sharply influenced by the impact of war.⁴⁰ They argue that national crises, and particularly war, changed public expectations about the legitimacy of levels of taxation. Government found popular uses for these increased revenues, and thus public expenditures having been ratcheted up by costly wars, never returned to their pre-war levels.

A more recent quantitative analysis of this relationship between war and state-building, by Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, reviews the historical-statistical record of British, American, French and Japanese revenues and expenditures, and concludes that war, and particularly global war 'must be considered one of the more important sources of the growth and expansion of the modern state'.⁴¹ If we view this war and public expenditures literature along with the historical state-building literature, we may attribute a central role to warfare in both the original state-building process in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and to the continued rapid growth of the state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Wars and Occupations

Warfare has usually been associated with boundary changes, annexations, limitations on the autonomy of the defeated states, the levying of tribute, reparations and the like. In some cases it has involved religious penetration and conversion; in the last centuries it has resulted in changes in internal political organization. Thus the advancing Napoleonic armies carried revolutionary constitutions and legal codes along with them. And the armies of the 'Holy Alliance' re-established legitimate constitutions as they advanced. The wars of the nineteenth century and the First World War were largely limited to boundary changes, national unification and the like; although the Allied occupation of Germany after the First World War was intended not only to guarantee reparations, but to ensure an acceptable German regime. During and after the Second World War the advances of Nazi armies, Soviet armies and Western armies were all associated with political changes of the most significant sort. The eastern European countries were sovietized; the Nazi-occupied territories were 'nazified'; in the post-war period the German and Japanese constitutions were in considerable part drafted by American authorities.

³⁹ Adolph Wagner, *Finanzwissenschaft*, Vol. II (Leipzig: Duncker und Humboldt, 1890).

⁴⁰ Alan Peacock and Jack Wiseman, *The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).

⁴¹ Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, 'War-Making and State-Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars', *American Political Science Review*, 79 (1985), 491-507, p. 504.

There is little comparative literature on occupations; most of the work is in the form of monographic, single-country studies. Two symposia deal with some of these themes. One, edited by Robert Wolfe,⁴² compares German and Japanese experience. A second, edited by John Herz,⁴³ examines the transformation of the political systems of Germany, Italy, Japan, France and Austria, and the role of occupations in these transformations.

The phenomena of military conquest, occupation and the direct introduction by the victors of political institutions, constitutions and legal codes, social policies, etc., is, of course, a different form of international penetration than that contemplated in Seeley's physics-like rule of pressure intensity. It suggests the limitation of Seeley's metaphor. The variety and forms of intervention by foreign actors in the internal affairs of states cannot be captured by this simple model. Hintze's historical treatment of these themes extracts the heuristic value of the metaphor without being limited by it.

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND NATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Timing of Industrialization

The impact of the international economic environment on national political development is treated in a number of research genres. Historical timing in industrialization as a factor affecting internal political-economic tendencies is treated in the work of the European economic historian, Alexander Gerschenkron, in the work of Albert Hirschman which focuses upon Latin American experience, and more generally in the work of the economic development theorists.

In his historical accounts of industrial development in Europe, Gerschenkron points out that the later developers in Europe confronted different international competitive conditions than the earlier developers.⁴⁴ Only through protectionist measures, greater economic concentration, and a more important role for the state were they able to develop industries and compete in international markets. Thus the uneven development of the world economy offers part of the explanation of differences in the scope and depth of government penetration of the society and economy in the later developers.

Albert Hirschman compares Latin American experience with Gerschenkron's picture of 'late' development in Europe, particularly that of Germany, Italy and Russia. The 'late, late' industrializing Latin American countries also resorted to government power in protecting indigenous industries supplying capital,

⁴² Robert Wolfe, *Americans as Proconsuls: U.S. Military Government in Germany and Japan* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984).

⁴³ John Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).

⁴⁴ Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1962).

controlling consumption and providing entrepreneurial guidance. Three collections of his essays contain analyses and evaluations of various governmental development projects and approaches undertaken in a number of Latin American countries.⁴⁵

The foreign aid and development experience of the last decades has generated a large literature of country studies, and studies of specific economic sectors and projects, as well as a theoretical literature of both an analytic and prescriptive variety. The history of ideas on economic development in the last half-century is told in a collection of retrospective lectures by the development theory pioneers, edited by Gerald Meier and Dudley Seers,⁴⁶ and in a small book on the history of development ideas and approaches by Meier.⁴⁷ In agreement with Gerschenkron and Hirschman on the importance of the state of government policy among late developers, Meier criticizes mainstream economic development theory of the last decades for its resistance to this basic reality.

International Economic Crises and National Politics

Over the last ten years Peter Gourevitch has published a series of articles, and more recently a book, dealing with the impact of world economic crises of the last century on the politics of a number of European nations and the United States.⁴⁸ These studies represent a high point in rigour and theoretical sophistication in this international-national research tradition, and deserve to be treated in detail. He traces the political and policy responses of five Western industrial nations (Germany, France, Great Britain, Sweden and the United States) to the three world economic crises of 1870–90, 1930–40, and 1975–85. His major purpose is to explain why these five countries made different choices. And in the course of doing this Gourevitch seeks to test the explanatory power of competing theories in the social sciences such as those emphasizing 'state structure, social forces, ideology, international state rivalries, leadership, and the like'.⁴⁹ He examines the impact of the three crises on different components of business, labour and agriculture for each country, tracing the preferences and coalition responses of interest groups, their interaction with political parties, through to the choice of policies. Gourevitch's analytical scheme posits that there were five possible ways of coping with these crises; (1) a classical free-trade market option; (2) a socialist-collectivist option; (3) a protectionist option; (4) a

⁴⁵ Albert Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1965); Albert Hirschman, *Development Projects Observed* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1967); Albert Hirschman, *A Bias For Hope* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1971).

⁴⁶ Gerald Meier and Dudley Seers, *Pioneers in Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

⁴⁷ Gerald Meier, *Emerging From Poverty The Economics That Really Matters* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

⁴⁸ Gourevitch, 'International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty'; Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed'; Gourevitch 'Breaking With Orthodoxy'; Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times*.

⁴⁹ Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times*, p. 10.

-demand stimulus 'Keynesian' option; and (5) a 'mercantilist' 'industrial policy' option.

He tests a number of different theories seeking to explain the choice of policy option within individual countries. What he calls the 'production profile explanation' attributes major explanatory power to the actual 'situation' of the economic interests in the domestic and international economy. This theoretical approach starts with the impingement of the crisis on individual industrial sectors and groupings, then moves to pressure groups forming coalitions and interacting with political parties, through to policy choice and implementation. The particular structure of a national economy in relation to the international economy explains the outcome.

A second explanatory theory places emphasis on the characteristics of associational interest groups, their size, extent of membership, organizational characteristics, relationships to parties and the like. As Gourevitch puts it 'Interest groups manage the evaluation of options, the articulation of opinions, the mobilization of collective action, and a variety of functional tasks, some in the economy, some conferred by the state . . . The difficulty with this argument is the problem for any mediating variable – its effects require linkage to the terms of either side, to society and to the state'.⁵⁰

The third theory is the state structural explanation, the argument that policy outcomes are explained principally by the structure of the state, its centralization and concentration of authority, the characteristics of the bureaucracy, the powers of the judiciary and so on. Here the main advocates of state-centred explanation are Krasner,⁵¹ and Skocpol.⁵² For Gourevitch the attribution of full explanatory power to state structure has the same problem as the argument from economic structure and intermediate associations. It is only a part of the explanation.

The fourth explanation is that of economic ideology. Countries differ, and individual socio-political groupings differ, in the way in which they analytically model the costs and benefits of economic policies.

Some have traditions of active government involvement to promote economic development; others emphasize laissez-faire. In some countries traditions of free trade are strong, unemployment is feared, and social services are accepted. Other countries are protectionist, fear inflation more than unemployment, and dislike social service systems . . . The economic ideology interpretation of economic policy choices explains outcomes in terms of national traditions, and values concerning the economy.⁵³

Finally, the international system explanation in its sweeping form would explain economic policy choices as completely constrained by international

⁵⁰ Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times*, pp 60–1

⁵¹ Stephen Krasner, 'Approaches to the State Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics', *Comparative Politics*, 16 (1980), 223–46.

⁵² Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1985)

⁵³ Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times*, p. 63.

forces. And there are indeed situations – defeat in war, for example – where policy is fully constrained or limited. But Gourevitch argues that one needs all five variables to explain outcomes, and such variables as leadership, entrepreneurship and chance as well.

Gourevitch does not claim that his studies have provided definitive answers as to the relative power of these explanatory variables. He describes his work as essentially a historical-sociological analysis of national responses to fluctuations in the international economy. Not only does the power of the variables change over time, but their relationships are not constant. His work is a strong argument for an eclectic, dynamic and indeterminist approach to the interaction of economy, society, polity and international system in which human choice may be an important part of the explanation of the outcome.

INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS ON INTERNAL POLITICAL STABILITY

Social Revolutions

The international environment impinges on domestic politics not only through war and international economic crises, but in a number of other respects. Theda Skocpol in *States and Social Revolutions* stresses the importance of international strategic factors in explaining the classic revolutions of France, Russia and China.⁵⁴ For Marx and his followers, political change was to be explained by internal changes in class and social structure. It was in Lenin's work that the international arena explicitly entered into revolutionary causality, but then only in a special way through conflicting capitalist imperialisms, and the wars generated by them. Skocpol frees herself from this Marxist perspective by explaining the great social revolutions according to a three-way logic. She points out,

In France, Russia, and China, class conflicts – especially between peasants and landlords – were pivotal during the revolutionary interregnums. But both the occurrence of the revolutionary situations in the first place and the nature of the new regimes that emerged from the revolutionary conflicts depended fundamentally upon the structures of state organizations and their partially autonomous and dynamic relationships to domestic class and political forces, as well as their positions in relation to other states abroad.⁵⁵

Thus Skocpol departs from Marxism by stressing the causal significance of the 'relative', or 'potential' autonomy of the state *vis-à-vis* class forces. Class struggles are necessary conditions of social revolutions, but the efficient causes are the breakdown of the state attributable to the pressure of international crises and war. Skocpol points to the enormous costs of the military adventures of France under the *ancien régime*, the disintegration of the Russian army and the Russian economy under the impact of the First World War, and the breakdown of Chinese political and economic cohesion under the impact of Japanese aggression and the Second World War, as the efficient causes of these revolutions.

⁵⁴ Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*.

⁵⁵ Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 284

Skocpol makes progress over earlier Marxist analyses and the work of her teacher, Barrington Moore. But what is absent from her work is the appreciation of politics and political leadership in the explanation of revolutions. Her 'structural perspective on social reality', which she views as essential to the analysis of social revolutions, leads her to downplay the explanatory significance of a Lenin, a Mao or a Napoleon in the Russian, Chinese and French revolutions. Leadership qualities and choices, political coalition making and chance are eliminated from a causal scheme which explains social revolutions by a combination of class struggle and group conflict, military pressure and threat, and deteriorating government effectiveness.

Political Crises

The international environment has an important impact on national political development in less dramatic ways than through impingements on revolutions. Regime and major policy changes other than by revolutionary and military means may also in part be explained by international factors. Gourevitch's careful tracing of the impact of the economic crises of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the politics of the major European nations and the United States, has already made this point.⁵⁶ In a collaborative undertaking edited by Almond, Flanagan and Mundt eight historical episodes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were analysed according to a common research design.⁵⁷ These were the British Reform Act of 1832, and the British Cabinet Crisis of 1931, the formation of the Third French republic, the formation of the Weimar republic, the Cardenas phase of the Mexican Revolution in the early 1930s, the Meiji restoration of 1868, the fall of the parliamentary regime in Japan in 1932 and the Indian language and famine crises in the 1960s.

The central concern of these studies was a methodological-theoretical one. The prevailing theories explaining political development in the 1960s and 1970s were structural-functionalism, social mobilization theory, coalition theory and leadership theory. The case studies demonstrated that these four approaches were essential parts of a more comprehensive logic of historical explanation. For the purposes of this article the most important finding was the discovery that 'the interchanges between the international security environment and political systems would seem to have been the most powerful exogenous variable in explaining system stability and change'.⁵⁸ The theoretical framework used in analysing the impact of international events on domestic politics, distinguished between stabilizing and destabilizing effects, and differentiated between military, economic, and psychological impacts. The historical case studies in *Crisis, Choice, and Change* illustrated the variety of ways military factors can affect stability and change.

⁵⁶ Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times*

⁵⁷ Gabriel A. Almond, Scott Flanagan and Robert Mundt, *Crisis, Choice, and Change* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973).

⁵⁸ Almond, Flanagan and Mundt, *Crisis, Choice, and Change*, p. 628.



In Britain in 1832, a decline of military threat after the Napoleonic wars unsettled the British polity. In France in 1870–71, and Germany 1918–1919, it was catastrophic military defeat; in the Meiji restoration in 1868 it was the threat of invasion and colonization by the Western powers that triggered revolutionary change. In Japan in 1930–36 it was the opportunity for expansion in China that united the Japanese behind militaristic goals, contributing to the fall of party government and stabilizing the polity under military control.⁵⁹

The international economic environment entered into the historical case studies in the British crisis of the 1930s, when a generally deteriorating international trade situation peaked into a severe balance of payments crisis, and in the Indian case when the reduction of foreign aid intensified the risk of famine; and indirectly in the Japanese crisis of the 1930s, when the collapse in foreign trade set off a depression.

In four of the cases there were significant international demonstration effects. During the crisis of the 1830s in Britain, the French revolution of 1830 had a mobilizing effect on British opinion. In Germany in 1918 the revolution in Russia contributed to political polarization. In mid-nineteenth century Japan the European invasion and colonization of China dramatized the foreign threat. And again in the 1930s in Japan, opportunities for conquest in China and the international trend toward military and totalitarian regimes, contributed to the collapse of the parliamentary party system.

This study makes the case that the penetration of domestic politics by the international environment is not only a matter of dramatic events, but is a constant process at medium and lower levels of visibility, affecting political, economic and social stability in both positive and negative ways.

Consociationalism and Democratic Corporatism

Two recent contributions to empirical democratic theory are consociationalism and neo-corporatism. Both refer to types of democratic regime common among the smaller European nations, the characteristics of which are in part explained by the international vulnerability of small nations to military invasion and fluctuations in the international economy. Consociationalism, first discussed in the late 1960s, refers to regimes in which internal accommodation is negotiated by party leaders. Neo-corporatism, or democratic corporatism, first discussed in the early 1970s, refers to regimes in which internal economic accommodation is negotiated by interest groups, party leaders and government officials.

Arend Lijphart is the principal consociational theorist,⁶⁰ while neo-corporatism is the product of a number of scholars, including Philippe Schmitter,

⁵⁹ Almond, Flanagan and Mundt, *Crisis, Choice, and Change*, p. 628.

⁶⁰ Arend Lijphart, 'Typologies of Democratic Systems', *Comparative Political Studies* (1968), 3–44, Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

Gerhard Lehmbruch,⁶¹ Peter Katzenstein⁶² and others. Arend Lijphart suggested a typology of democratic systems which went beyond the threefold classification then common in the discipline – two-party consensual, multi-party consensual and multi-party fragmented and conflictual. Lijphart identified a fourth variety, which he called ‘consociational democracy’. This type of democracy had the properties of conflictual multi-partism, but a pattern of elite accommodation resulted in overcoming these divisions and maintaining stability. There were some five cases that fitted this pattern – the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon, prior to its tragic breakdown of the last decade. In explaining the historical origins of these consociational systems, Lijphart pointed out:

In the five principal consociational systems, the crucial steps toward this type of democracy were usually taken during times of international crisis or specific threats to the nation’s existence. In Austria, Lebanon, and the Netherlands, the inception of consociational democracy can be traced plainly to a particular short span of time in their political histories, and it occurred without exception during, and also partly because of an international emergency. Austria’s government by grand coalition was primarily a response to the civil strife of the First Republic, but it was inaugurated, significantly, while Austria was occupied by the Allied Powers after the Second World War . . . And the comprehensive peaceful settlement of internal differences that paved the way for consociational democracy in the Netherlands was concluded in 1917 when the First World War was raging near its borders. In Belgium and Switzerland, consociational practices were adopted more gradually, but also under the influences of foreign threats. Belgian ‘unionism’ (Catholic–Liberal grand coalitions) began during its struggle for independence, but became more infrequent when the nation’s existence appeared to be secure. It was resumed again after the First World War, soon followed by the important step of admitting the Socialists to the consociational government. This final step of admitting the Socialists to the grand coalition was not taken until much later in Switzerland, but it also happened during a World War: in 1943.⁶³

Consociational political arrangements follow the predicted Seeley–Hintze pattern. But here the response to external threat is the acceptance of policy accommodation, compromise and power sharing, and the adoption of institutions to that end, rather than bureaucratic and authoritarian centralization.

There are a number of definitions of corporatism. Peter Katzenstein’s definition is the least restrictive and captures its different aspects. He describes it as ‘distinguished by three traits; an ideology of social partnership expressed at the national level; a relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups; and voluntary and informal coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political bargaining between interest groups, state

⁶¹ Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, *Trends Towards Corporate Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979).

⁶² Peter Katzenstein, *Small States and World Markets* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

⁶³ Lijphart, ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, pp 28–9.

bureaucracies, and political parties.⁶⁴ He argues that 'the interlocking crises of the 1930s and 1940s – depression, fascism, and World War II – fundamentally reorganized the politics of the small European states. The democratic corporatism that emerged has been reinforced since the 1950s by the pressures of a liberal international economy'.⁶⁵ Since the economies of these small democracies are particularly dependent on international trade, the need for quick and efficient adaptation strengthens these patterns of bargaining and co-ordination. Here again, democratic corporatism can be interpreted in ways consistent with the Seeley–Hintze formulations. The response to external threat is an institutionalized accommodative pattern among interest groups and political parties, and between these and the economic bureaucracy; and the emergence of supportive institutions.

Ilja Scholten in a recent volume dealing with the relationship between corporatism and political stability is the first writer to develop the consociationalism–corporatism connection systematically.

It may not be merely a coincidence or spurious correlation that the co-called 'consociational democracies' are together with the Scandinavian countries, most frequently cited for being examples of strong or well-entrenched neo-corporatism, or that 'social pacts' are most frequently advocated as an efficacious means of overcoming crises during regime of political transitions. To juxtapose these cases will, it is hoped, facilitate further insight into the broader question of system stability in 'cleavaged' societies.⁶⁶

Scholten argues that the adoption of consociational accommodative patterns may have made the social pacting of democratic corporatism possible. He also makes the point that both consociational and corporatist practices may be responses to similar preconditions. But in the literature thus far produced by the consociational and neo-corporatist writers only Lijphart and Katzenstein explicitly place the emergence of these arrangements in the context of international military, economic and political insecurity.

CONCLUSION

The literature we have reviewed shows that the contemporary interest in international–national interaction has a substantial ancestry, and it was not influenced in any observable way by dependency and world systems theory. One looks in vain for references to Cardoso,⁶⁷ Wallerstein,⁶⁸ *et al.* in the works of Lijphart, Schmitter, Lehmbruch, Tilly, Skocpol, Katzenstein and others. The

⁶⁴ Katzenstein, *Small States and World Markets* p 33.

⁶⁵ Katzenstein, *Small States and World Markets*, p 9

⁶⁶ Ilja Scholten, *Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism: Corporatist Integration and Societal Cleavage in Western Europe* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1987)

⁶⁷ Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

⁶⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 2 vols (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980).

international environment has been treated in the dependency and world systems literature in as exaggerated a way as the domestic social structure was treated in the reductionist comparative politics of the late nineteenth century, against which Seeley and Hintze polemicized so vigorously. In Wallerstein there is perhaps a twofold reductionism. Both international and domestic factors are reduced to a global class struggle.

The arguments of the dependency theorists and of the researchers who sought to test their theories boil down to the very simple notion that the stagnation and 'underdevelopedness' of Third World countries is explained simply and only by the exploitiveness of the dominant capitalist economies. By contrast the research tradition reviewed here is based on an interactive analytical model – that international security, economic, political and cultural environments shape and are shaped by the internal politics, economics and culture of individual nation states. The picture which emerges from the work of Hintze, Gershenkron, Peacock and Wiseman, Hirschman, Lijphart, Almond and his collaborators, Tilly and his collaborators, Skocpol, Gourevitch and Katzenstein is one of a complex dynamic process which offers no simple answers or solutions.

It is a mistake to underestimate the quality of the earlier part of this work. Hintze's rich and analytically sharp comparative analysis of the origins of the modern Western states has still to be fully translated from the German and appreciated. His work focuses more sharply on institutions than does that of Tilly, and is sounder in its explanatory logic than Perry Anderson. The 'ratchet' theory of war, public expenditures and the growth of the state was first developed by Peacock and Wiseman in the early 1960s. Gershenkron and Hirschman were writing about the consequences of lateness in economic development in the early 1960s. Rupert Emerson wrote about imperialism and decolonization in these same early years. Lijphart's insight into the role of international threat in the consociational democratic solution in the small democracies of Europe dates back almost two decades; and the case study research for *Crisis, Choice, and Change* was being done at around the same time. The search for the logical structure of political development dates back to the nineteenth century and reaches a high point in the work of Hintze, who also employed a sophisticated and quite modern comparative methodology.

What one can say about the more recent literature is that it seems to have eliminated more thoroughly the 'black boxes' which served as convenient boundary markers for some of the earlier literature. What one encounters in the work of Gourevitch, Skocpol, Lijphart, Katzenstein and others is a model of political processes in which the boundaries between the national and the international, the political and the economic have been removed, and important research programmes demonstrating the improved explanatory power of this research strategy are now under way.

Without so much as the flicker of an eyelid, Peter Gourevitch crosses state boundaries, following the fluctuations of world prices of agriculture and industrial commodities as they affect the policy propensities of pressure groups and political parties in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden and the United States,

producing different political coalitions and different economic and security policies. Theda Skocpol, in her vivid efforts to reconstruct the onset and triumph of social revolution in France, Russia and China, moves fluently from the wars of the eighteenth century, the First and Second World Wars, and their impacts on the internal political-economies of those countries. The entities that she deals with are armies and other military formations, bureaucracies, party and government organizations, economic groups, social classes and the like. While she speaks of the decline and collapse of the Bourbon, Romanov and Kuomintang states, it is the army, the party, the bureaucracy, the assembly (or parts of any and all of these), that are the political actors who carry her narrative. When Lijphart and Katzenstein describe how the international environment in the 1930s to 1950s entered into the adoption of consociational and corporatist arrangements and practices in the smaller European democracies, they encounter no bulky 'states' between the external and the internal processes that they are describing. And in his work on imperialism and decolonization Miles Kahler describes how the French and British experience with decolonization spills back into French and British internal politics.⁶⁹ He similarly needs no research passport to cross over from the events in Indo-China and Algeria, India, Burma, and Malaya into the politics of France and Britain.

This is what makes it perplexing that some of these same writers, who had pioneered this cross-disciplinary work, should now be insisting on the re-introduction of the concept of the state, in the 'black box' sense of the state, as an inclusive actor which may be either 'strong' and 'weak'. This is a movement which sets aside the earlier effort to disaggregate the concept of the state, an effort which was by and large successful in reaching a higher level of analytic resolution in observing, measuring and explaining things political. There is an egregious contradiction in arguing on the one hand for a cross-disciplinary perspective in order to observe the flows of actions and transactions across the international and national arenas, and mounting a campaign intended to 'bring the state back in' as Skocpol⁷⁰ and Krasner⁷¹ and their collaborators have done.

In speculating about the prospects of this interdisciplinary movement it may be useful to return to Otto Hintze's explanation for the neglect of international factors by political and social theorists.⁷² He points out that it is very difficult to grapple with these factors in terms of general propositions and regularities. At any given time during the past several centuries there has been one central, international system, consisting of the interactions of the principal European states. Given variations in the political organization of these states in a singular international environment, it was the course of least resistance to assume the international environment to be a constant *vis-à-vis* all states, or simply to extract the

⁶⁹ Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁷⁰ Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In*.

⁷¹ Krasner, 'Approaches to the State'.

⁷² Hintze, *Staat und Verfassung*, p. 424.

state from its international environment, and explain national political variation by internal economics, social structure and culture. It was the virtue of Hintze to attribute spatial and temporal variability to the international environment, and to find in these variations some significant part of the explanation of internal variation. Those writers whose work I have summarized above treat the international environment as varying over time and in its incidence on individual states. Hence they are able to generate propositions which systematically include aspects of the international environment as important variables.

This new generation of comparativists and international relationists has systematically and explicitly reintroduced this large comparative historical perspective. They select their problems and do their research with a historical consciousness which includes (1) the state-building processes of the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries; (2) the French Revolution and its national and international repercussions; (3) the economic growth, modernization and economic fluctuations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; (4) the growth of empires and their later dismantlement; (5) the Great Wars, their origins and their consequences; (6) the Russian Revolution and its repercussions, still in such vivid evidence today. With this large historical perspective it is difficult for a scholar to evade the complex cross-penetration of national and world politics.

It is out of the crucible of international and internecine war that the Western state system emerged. The French and Russian revolutions are inescapable demonstrations of how individual national explosions can transform the world system and its component parts. The Great Wars confront us with the ways in which international interaction transforms the political characteristics of nation-states. Economic growth and crises transform the politics and policies of nation-states, which may in turn produce further changes in the condition of the international political economy. The 'First' and 'Second' Worlds through their internal and external policies, and through their interactions one with the other, transform the environments which constrain but do not determine the responses of 'Third World' countries. This new generation of scholars draws its problems from these larger perspectives, and in addition brings to its work conceptual self-consciousness and methodological virtuosity. There is a record of substantial accomplishment and greater promise.

Review Article: Bringing the State Back In?

PAUL CAMMACK

Numerous recent discussions of theories of political development or comparative politics have called for or identified a process of convergence between hitherto mutually hostile non-Marxist and Marxist or neo-Marxist approaches. Behind this *rapprochement*, I would argue, there lies an ulterior motive: a recognition that radical critiques can no longer be ignored, and an attempt to assimilate them into non-Marxist approaches, thus distorting and neutralizing them.¹ In this sense, comparative political theory, particularly as practised by the leaders of the field in the United States, continues to play a fundamental ideological role: to wage what might be termed 'class war by other means'. Both because it is centrally concerned with the proclamation and shaping of the 'new consensus' and because it bears the official seal of approval of the Social Science Research Council of New York, the 1985 collection edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol and flaunting the title *Bringing the State Back In* is the most important recent contribution to the debate.² My purpose here is to provide a detailed examination of the double process of assimilation and distortion which the proclamation of 'convergence' involves by reference to this composite text, and thus to reveal the mechanisms at work in the latest attempt by representatives of US social science to exorcise the threat posed by Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives.

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¹ P. Cammack, 'Dependency and the Politics of Development', in P. F. Leeson and M. M. Minogue, eds, *Perspectives on Development* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 89-125. For discussions and accounts of the 'new consensus', see R. Higgott, *Political Development Theory* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), Chap. 4 and Conclusion; V. Randall and R. Theobald, *Political Change and Underdevelopment* (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 171-7 and 187-8; L. Binder, 'The Natural History of Development Theory', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 21 (1986); T. Bossert, 'The Promise of Theory', in P. Klaren and T. Bossert, eds, *Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin America* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1986), and T. Smith, 'Requiem or Agenda for Third World Studies', *World Politics*, 37 (1985), 532-61.

² P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, eds, *Bringing the State Back In* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). The collection originated in a conference on 'Research Implications of Current Theories of the State', held at Mount Kisco, New York, in February 1982. In April 1983 a group of scholars (P. Evans, A. Hirschman, P. Katzenstein, I. Katznelson, S. Krasner, D. Rueschemeyer, T. Skocpol and C. Tilly) proposed to the SSRC the setting up of a Research Planning Committee on States and Social Structures; the proposal was accepted in August 1983. The volume is further sponsored by two previously established SSRC Committees, the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies, and the Joint Committee on Western European Studies.

BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN

The field of comparative politics has been dominated since its emergence in the late 1950s out of the prevailing orthodoxy of modernization theory in the United States by the successive committees funded, organized and supported by the Social Science Research Council of New York. The stream of publications arising out of or related to research programmes supported by the Council runs from Gabriel Almond and James Coleman's *The Politics of Developing Areas* (1960) to the collection examined here, passing such landmarks on the way as the collections edited by Binder (1971), Almond, Flanagan and Mundt (1973), Tilly (1975), and Grew (1978).³ However, this apparent continuity conceals fundamental discontinuities in approach. The Parsonian traditional-modern dichotomy and the structure-functionalist framework of the early years has been dropped, as has the optimistic pluralist orientation of the early 1960s. The 'modernization revisionism' of the middle 1960s which attacked it, associated above all with Huntington, was just as staunchly anti-communist, and just as clearly shaped by Cold War perceptions and rhetoric, but it reflected the view that communism should be fought with centralized and authoritarian rule rather than with the introduction of democratic systems.⁴ This significant shift of emphasis was one of many factors making for increasing cacaphony behind the label of 'political development': reviewing the field for posterity in 1981, Riggs listed dozens of mutually incompatible working definitions of the term, concluding, as others had before him, that one was more than enough.⁵

At the same time, critical responses to the early volumes, and disenchantment with the structure-functionalist framework and its grand theoretical designs, led to a turn to historical case studies, many of them focused on Western Europe from the seventeenth century onwards, rather than upon the contemporary Third World. This evolution was described by Almond in 1973 as 'taking the historical cure'.⁶ In one sense, *Bringing the State Back In* stands clearly in that

³ See G. Almond and J. Coleman, eds, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), L. Binder, ed., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); G. Almond, S. Flanagan and R. Mundt, eds, *Crisis, Choice and Change. Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), C. Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); R. Grew, *Crisis of Political Development in Europe and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

⁴ For 'modernization revisionism' see Randall and Theobald, *Political Change and Underdevelopment*, Chap. 4; for general discussions of the shifts of perspective identified, see R. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World. Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); M. Kesselman, 'Order or Movement: the Literature of Political Development as Ideology', *World Politics*, 26 (1973), 139-54, D. O'Brien, 'Modernisation, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal. American Political Science, 1960-1970', *Journal of Development Studies*, 8 (1972), 351-78; and I. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1985).

⁵ See F. Riggs, 'The Rise and Fall of "Political Development"', in S. C. Long, ed., *The Handbook of Political Behaviour* (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), Vol. 4.

⁶ See G. Almond, 'Approaches to Developmental Causation', in Almond, Flanagan and Mundt, eds, *Crisis, Choice and Change*, pp. 22-4.

tradition: Tilly contributes an article on 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', harking back to key themes of the 1975 collection; and alongside articles on Africa, Latin America and Taiwan are others on Britain, the United States, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. A new concern with the state (entirely absent from the early volumes) can also be detected in the 1970s. But with this volume it moves in from the wings to 'its proper central place in explanations of social change and politics'.⁷ A further element of continuity with the collections from the 1970s is a becoming modesty which leads to the adoption for the conclusion of the title 'On the Road Toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State', and an explicit renunciation of 'more grand theorizing about the state in general'.⁸ But the second significant characteristic of the volume (its central emphasis on the state being the first) is its explicit attempt to incorporate neo-Marxist perspectives into its analysis, and it is the manner in which that is proposed and carried out to which I wish to direct attention. I shall proceed, for the most part, by detailed textual analysis. For convenience, therefore, having once identified a contribution to the Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol collection, or other texts requiring close examination, I shall make subsequent page references in parentheses in the main text. I shall examine three contributions in particular: Skocpol's introduction, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', the joint conclusion of the three editors, the title of which is given above, and the contribution by Alfred Stepan, 'State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America'. The importance of the first and second of these is clear. They are major theoretical statements setting out the character of the state-centred approach and reviewing the contributions made by the different case studies. The third is of particular significance both for the way in which it uses secondary sources from Latin American neo-Marxists, and for the way in which it is 'used' in turn by the editors in their conclusion.

I shall argue that Skocpol gives a false account of the origins and nature of the debate on the state, that her own definition of the state itself is one-sided, and that she misreads the significance of her own work and that of others; that Stepan's argument is internally inconsistent; that his introductory and concluding framing of his own material further distorts the significance of the cases he studies; and that further serious distortion takes place in the way in which his contribution and others are 'read' by the editors in their conclusion. These inconsistencies and distortions are not casual, as they make it possible to present as damaging to a Marxist or neo-Marxist analysis of the state and its relation to social classes material which in fact strongly confirms the validity of such an analysis. In particular, I shall argue that Skocpol and Stepan tend to present 'state' and 'society' as separate polar opposites, denying in practice the presence

⁷ T. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, eds, *Bringing the State Back In*, p. 28.

⁸ P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, 'On the Road Toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State', in *Bringing the State Back In*, p. 363.

of classes and class struggle within the state, and that this is the source of their inability to cope with the theoretical and empirical material they examine.

SKOCPOL'S INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

Skocpol's introductory essay asserts that 'A sudden upsurge of interest in "the state" has occurred in comparative social science in the past decade', and claims that although no explicitly shared research agenda or general theory links the various studies she examines, 'many of them have implicitly converged on complementary arguments and strategies of analysis' (p. 3). She goes on to chart this re-emergence of interest in the state, and trace its Weberian roots. She then focuses on 'two . . . important tendencies in current scholarship' that will concern her: 'First, we shall examine arguments about *state autonomy* and about the *capacities of states* as actors trying to realize policy goals. Then we shall explore arguments about the *impacts of states on the content and workings of politics*' (p. 8). A number of issues relating to these two themes are then explored in detail, with reference to numerous recent case studies. In conclusion, she identifies 'two alternative, though complementary, analytical strategies . . . for bringing the state back in to a prominent place in comparative and historical studies of social change, politics, and policy making' (pp. 27-8):

On the one hand, states may be viewed as organizations through which official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals, realizing them more or less effectively given the available state resources in relation to social settings. On the other hand, states may be viewed more macroscopically as configurations of organization and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society. (p. 28)

She closes with the hope that a new theoretical understanding of states in relation to social structures will emerge in the future, but asserts that 'this new understanding will almost certainly not resemble the grand systems theories of the structure-functionalists or neo-Marxists', as 'we shall be forced to respect the inherent historicity of sociopolitical structures, and we shall necessarily attend to the inescapable inter-twinings of national-level developments with changing world historical contexts'; finally, rather than a new or refurbished grand theory of the state, 'we need solidly grounded and analytically sharp understandings of the causal regularities that underlie the histories of states, social structures, and transnational relations in the modern world' (p. 28).

There are three features of Skocpol's analysis which demand close attention. The first is her version of the origins of the debate on the state; the second is her endorsement of a view of the state itself as 'truly autonomous'; and the third is her interpretation of the case studies she examines. All three have implications for her assessment of neo-Marxist theories of the state.

(a) *A (Per)version of Intellectual History*

Skocpol launches her account of the genesis of renewed interest in the state with

the assertion that 'not long ago the dominant theories and research agendas of the social sciences rarely spoke of states' (p. 4); but it immediately becomes clear that for the purpose of this judgement the social sciences are those of the United States in the 1950s: 'Despite important exceptions, society-centered ways of explaining politics and governmental activities were especially characteristic of the pluralist and structure-functionalist perspectives predominant in political science and sociology in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s' (p. 4). This is, of course, perfectly accurate: that which is now to be brought back in was sent out in the first place by her illustrious forebears in the post-war US social science establishment, many of them funded and promoted by the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics. This point would be of minor and ironic interest only, were it not that by taking pluralist and structure-functionalist perspectives as her starting-point, she grossly distorts the legacy of Marxist and neo-Marxist writing on the state. Neo-Marxist writing appears in her story not out of the Marxist tradition, but *within* the process of critical appraisal of recent US perspectives. Having noted the shift within the mainstream to 'case-study and comparative-historical evidence' (p. 5), she states that 'From the mid-1960s onward, critically-minded "neo-Marxists" launched a lively series of debates about "the capitalist state"' (p. 5). Having thus arbitrarily detached these writers from the Marxist heritage, she is able to make the assertion that 'Neo-Marxists have, *above all*, debated alternative understandings of the socioeconomic functions performed by the capitalist state' (p. 5: emphasis added), thereby glossing over the central preoccupation of Marxists and neo-Marxists alike with class, and in this connection with the relationship *between* class forces and the state. These apparently innocuous moves are by no means innocent. Within two paragraphs, Marx himself is presented as being diametrically opposed, on this question and implicitly in the whole orientation of his understanding of societal dynamics, to the state-oriented perspective with which neo-Marxists have been associated. The modern social sciences, Skocpol tells us,

emerged along with the industrial and democratic revolutions of Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their founding theorists quite understandably perceived the locus of societal dynamics – and of the social good – not in outmoded, superseded monarchical and aristocratic states, but in civil society, variously understood as 'the market', 'the industrial division of labour', or 'class relations'. Founding theorists as politically opposed as Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx (who now, not entirely inappropriately, lie just across a lane from one another in Highgate Cemetery, London) agreed that industrial capitalism was triumphing over the militarism and territorial rivalries of states. (p. 6)

She goes on to argue that this 'society-centred' perspective is outdated in the light of the Keynesian revolution and the present direct involvement of the state in both Britain and the United States in the shaping of economic development and international economic policies. The line of argument is completed in the following section, in which 'continental students of social life, especially Germans' are praised for having 'refused to accept the de-emphasis of the state'

and 'insisted on the institutional reality of the state and its continuing impact on and within civil society' (p. 7), citing as examples Max Weber and Otto Hintze.

This rounds off a series of strategic moves which create a version of intellectual history that is both perverse, and essential to Skocpol's purposes. Let us review it. First, the pertinent debate is described as having its origins in responses to approaches to the social sciences dominant in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. Secondly, neo-Marxist writing is seen as making its appearance in this context in the 1960s. Thirdly, it is seen as concerned primarily with the character of the capitalist state, rather than directly with class analysis. Fourthly, Marx is described in contrast as a 'society-centred' thinker whose founding contribution to modern social science is now obsolete. Fifthly, Weber and Hintze are described as the founding fathers of the new state-centred approach. A simple refusal to acknowledge the existence of the Marxist tradition is no longer possible. Instead, Marx himself is to be placed in the pantheon of revered ancestors, but dismissed as anachronistic for his concern with 'society'. In this connection, the parenthetical reference to Highgate cemetery cited above is no more innocent than the argument as a whole – Marx and Spencer are acknowledged as the twin deities of *laissez-faire* industrial capitalism and left to rest in peace. Once detached from their Marxist roots, the neo-Marxists can be incorporated into the Weberian tradition, praised for their concern with the state, chided for their lingering and anachronistic concern with class and neutralized as a consequence. The most telling detail in this bizarre account is the resurrection of a tradition upheld by 'continental students of social life, especially German', and the simultaneous exclusion of Marx, despite his numerous writings and constant preoccupation with the state, from that tradition.⁹

So far, then, we have seen how Skocpol attempts to drive a wedge between Marxist and neo-Marxist writing. Now we may turn to the one-sided yet strategically ambiguous view she adopts of the state.

(b) *Skocpol's View of the State*

The two quotations given above reflected a twofold vision of the state as (a) an organization through which an official collectivity may pursue distinctive goals (the theme of state autonomy and the capacity of the state as an actor to realize policy goals), and (b) a configuration of organization and action that influences the meanings and methods of politics (the theme of the impact of the state on the content and workings of politics). The double formulation is characteristic and recurs throughout the essay. At the outset, Skocpol says that 'Whether as an object of investigation or as something invoked to explain outcomes of interest,

⁹ See R. Miliband, 'Marx and the State', in T. Bottomore, ed., *Karl Marx* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1973), an essay of particular interest, as Skocpol herself refers readers to it in her *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 300, fn. 65. Interestingly, she does not refer directly, there or here, to what Marx has to say about Bonapartism. However, she does venture the view, in the earlier work (p. 26), that 'Classical Marxist theorists do not analytically collapse state and society'.

the state as an actor or an institution has been highlighted in an extraordinary outpouring of studies' (p. 3). The same two options are offered: the state is either an actor, and as such directly an object of investigation, or an *institution* that shapes outcomes. Further along the same pairing occurs when Skocpol mentions 'studies that have considered states as weighty actors and probed how states affect political and social processes through their policies and their patterned relationships with social groups' (p. 3). More succinctly, the formulation is later repeated in a reference to 'states as social actors and as society-shaping institutional structures' (p. 6). It appears again in her conclusion, where she refers to 'states as actors and as institutional structures with effects in politics' (p. 27). This view of the state is clearly deliberate, considered and consistent. It entails a rejection of a contrasting view of it as 'a mere arena in which social groups make demands and engage in political struggles or compromises' (p. 6). Skocpol's claim is apparently not that the state is to be seen as an actor and a shaper of outcomes as much as a neutral arena, but that the alternative conception is to be dropped entirely. She approaches the 'relative autonomy' of the state in the same brisk spirit. Having once identified neo-Marxist preoccupation with the functions performed by the capitalist state and granted that 'valuable concepts and questions have emerged from these neo-Marxist debates', she regretfully announces that

at a theoretical level, virtually all neo-Marxist writers on the state have retained deeply embedded society-centred assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt that, at base, states are inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production. Many possible forms of autonomous state action are thus ruled out by definitional fiat. (p. 5)

Lest any doubt should remain about her own position, she refers once again to the 'unwillingness even of critically minded neo-Marxists to grant true autonomy to states' (pp. 5–6), immediately before discussing Marx's commitment to a purely 'society-centred' perspective. Two points require attention. The first is that Skocpol here implicitly rejects out of hand the idea that states might be 'inherently shaped by classes or class struggles', or 'function to preserve and expand modes of production'. This ties in with the consistent formulation discussed above, in which the state was seen as an autonomous actor or a 'society-shaping institutional structure', but *never* as a neutral arena, or as itself penetrated or shaped *to any degree* by societal or class forces. The second concerns the manner in which neo-Marxist writing, having been uprooted initially from the Marxist tradition, is simultaneously assimilated and neutralized. Insofar as it focuses on the state it is healthy and helpful. But approval is only partial, as it has not entirely thrown off its preoccupation with class, and its 'society-centred' heritage. Most telling of all is the imputation that the position neo-Marxists adopt is a consequence not of rigorous analysis, but of an irrational refusal to abandon out-moded preconceptions which they will 'not allow themselves to doubt'.

In the wake of these comments, a second strategic line of attack is opened. We

are told that 'neo-Marxist theorists have too often sought to generalize – often in extremely abstract ways – about features or functions shared by *all* states within a mode of production, a phase of capitalist accumulation, or a position in the world capitalist system' (p. 5). In this manner neo-Marxist writing is once again closely associated with the structure-functionalist grand theory of the 1950s and 1960s against which this work is directed. This makes it possible to claim in the conclusion, as we have seen, that respect for inherent historicity and solidly grounded and analytically sharp understandings entails a rejection of neo-Marxist approaches. It avoids confrontation, therefore, not only with the strong classical Marxist tradition of such work, but also, for example, with the neo-Marxist tradition associated with the Brazilian dependency theorist Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which emphasizes historicity, variety of regime forms, and a comparative method based on case studies.¹⁰ It is no longer a question of ignoring Marxist and neo-Marxist thought entirely. It is to be rendered harmless by subjecting it to an hegemonic re-ordering that disrupts its internal unity, rejecting some of its elements and reappropriating others in a way that fundamentally alters their significance. At its centre is an attempt to drive a wedge between state and society as analytical categories.

Just as we noted above that Skocpol's persistent description of the state as an actor and a society-shaping institution entailed the rejection of an alternative view which sees it as a neutral arena, so it appears here that it entails the rejection of the view that the state is shaped by classes, or that its character can be derived from the dominant mode of production. But before we can proceed to an analysis of Skocpol's own reading of the case studies upon which she draws after her theoretical exposition, there is one crucially important ambiguity in her position that must be noted. It is not clear in fact whether she believes (a) that the state can and sometimes does act autonomously, or (b) that the state *always* acts autonomously. The latter would seem to be implied in practice in the resolutely one-sided formulation to which she consistently recurs, and may be described as a *strong* formulation of state autonomy; the former, which may be described as a *weak* formulation, may seem both more reasonable at first sight, and consistent with such statements as the following, which precedes her discussion of 'The Autonomy and Capacity of States':

'states conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people *may* formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society. This is what is usually meant by 'state autonomy'. Unless such independent goal formulation occurs, there is little need to talk about states as important actors ... (p. 9: emphasis added).

Clearly, if Skocpol subscribes to the weak formulation, she can only fault neo-

¹⁰ This is the central theme of my article cited in footnote 1. For brief accounts of Cardoso's approach which bear out the point made here, see P. O'Brien, 'Dependency Revisited', in C. Abel and C. Lewis, eds, *Latin America, Imperialism and the State* (London: Athlone Press, 1984), and I. Roxborough, 'Unity and Diversity in Latin American History', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 16 (1984), 1–26.

Marxist accounts of the state if they argue that the state never has any autonomy from class forces; if, on the other hand, she wishes to argue that neo-Marxists are at fault when they deny the possibility of long-run or stable or persistent state autonomy from classes, then she commits herself, in this respect at least, to the strong formulation in order to establish her case. We shall see after examination of her own work and her reading of that of others, that her work tends to reflect the weak formulation, while her theoretical critique of neo-Marxist writing rests upon the strong formulation. She does not overcome this ambiguity, and it is in fact essential to her enterprise: the use of the notion of 'true autonomy' as a weapon against neo-Marxist writing.

(c) *Contemporary Alchemy: From 'Case Study' to 'Theory'*

The third significant feature of Skocpol's introduction is the use it makes of case-study material in support of her view of the state. It is my contention that her argument here systematically distorts much of the material drawn on in support of her case, and that frequently it offers, on closer examination, better support for a straightforward neo-Marxist argument. I shall demonstrate this with two detailed pieces of analysis, the first of her use of Krasner's work on US state policies regarding supply of raw materials from abroad, and the second of her use of her own work with Finegold on US agricultural policies in the New Deal period.

Skocpol offers Krasner's *Defending the National Interest*¹¹ and her essay with Finegold on government intervention in the New Deal¹² as 'two works that argue for autonomous state contributions to public policy making even in the United States' (p. 12). My discussion of them will necessarily be somewhat lengthy, because of a double characteristic which they share with Stepan's contribution. This is that, firstly, the arguments that they make for the superiority of a state-centred or statist approach are themselves seriously flawed; and, secondly, that they undergo a further process of distortion when transmuted into material for the case for a state-centred approach here. It is necessary to make a critique of the original texts, as well as to examine the reading of them made here.

Skocpol on Krasner's 'Defending the National Interest'

Commenting on Krasner's work, Skocpol argues that given his choice of topic – US foreign policy regarding issues of international investments in the production and marketing of raw materials – he 'can ask whether the short-term push

¹¹ Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

¹² Skocpol refers to a conference paper, K. Finegold and T. Skocpol, 'Capitalists, Farmers, and Workers in the New Deal – The Ironies of Government Intervention' (presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 1980), and to T. Skocpol and K. Finegold, 'State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal', *Political Science Quarterly*, 97 (1982), 255–78. The latter, on which I have relied, is a part of the conference paper.

and pull of business interests shapes the definition of the US "national interest" with respect to raw materials production abroad or whether an autonomous state interest is at work' (p. 13), and states that 'he finds the latter pattern'. Her formulation is characteristic. By posing the choice in these misleading terms, as between domination by short-term business interests and autonomy (not, as we shall see, the choice posed by Krasner), she rules out in advance the 'structural Marxist' perspective, from which the state acts, at times against the short-run interests of even dominant capitalists, to secure the long-term survival of the system as a whole. Commenting further, she notes that Krasner shows 'that public policies on raw materials have been most likely to diverge from powerful corporate demands precisely when distinctively geopolitical issues of foreign military intervention and broad ideological conceptions of US world hegemony have been involved'. Thus, she argues, his study 'suggests that distinctive state-like contributions to US policy-making occur exactly in those instances and arenas where a Weberian-Hintzean perspective would insist that they should occur, no matter how unpropitious the overall government potential for autonomous state action' (p. 13).

If we turn to Krasner, we find that he does indeed advance the claim that a 'state-centric or realist paradigm' (p. 12) proves superior to both Marxist and liberal alternatives as a basis for understanding the issues of public policy he wishes to explore. Furthermore, he expresses the hope in his preface that 'this book ... will be part of a general movement to take the state seriously again' (p. xii). So far, so good. But in his theoretical remarks in defence of this perspective he draws on Meinecke and Pareto, not on Weber or Hintze at all, quotes Meinecke pointedly on the need for the ruler to 'serve the interests of the subjects in some way' in support of the claim that the state's objectives in a democracy are inextricably bound together with the needs of its society (p. 11), and concludes with a reference to his analytical perspective as one 'that treats the state as an autonomous actor, but one constrained by domestic as well as international structures' (p. 13). It is immediately apparent that his working perception of the state is somewhat more balanced than that adopted by Skocpol. Secondly, he treats Marxist approaches with far greater respect. He identifies two variants in this area (quite conventionally), *instrumental* and *structural* respectively. On the first, he says (on p. 21):

Instrumental Marxist theories view governmental behaviour as the product of direct societal pressure. In its most primitive form, this kind of argument emphasizes personal ties between leading capitalists and public officials. In its more sophisticated form, instrumental Marxist arguments analyze the general ties between the capitalist sector and public officials.

As to the second (on pp. 21-2):

Structural Marxist arguments ... do not attempt to trace the behavior of the state to particular capitalists or the capitalist class. Instead, they see the state playing an independent role within the overall structure of a capitalist system. Its task is to maintain the cohesion of the system as a whole. At particular times this may require adopting policies opposed

by the bourgeoisie, but generally official action and the preferences of leading elements in the capitalist class will coincide.

Similar definitions of these well-known positions abound. I quote them here because they show that he poses the issues in a more sophisticated manner than Skocpol allows, and because I shall have occasion to refer back to them later. The latter definition is of particular relevance, as in his conclusion Krasner finds that some of the cases studied (including all those in which investments were actively promoted by the state) were 'more or less compatible with all three [liberal, Marxist, and statist] theories' (p. 332). Of a second major group, of cases that showed 'a clear divergence between corporate and state preferences', he comments: 'they support statist and structural Marxist positions over interest-group and instrumental Marxist ones' (p. 332), and concludes at this point with an observation that sets him quite clearly apart from the stance adopted consistently by Skocpol: 'The two approaches whose relative merits are most difficult to assess are structural Marxism and statism. Both see the state as an autonomous actor concerned with long-term objectives' (pp. 332-3).

Up to this point, Krasner has been admirably balanced and fair, and has departed on significant issues from stances adopted by Skocpol (an inconvenient fact which she has chosen to gloss over). If we reflect back on the elements of Skocpol's approach reviewed above, Krasner does not share her view of the history and structure of the debate, or her view of the state, or her view of neo-Marxist writing. So far, then, I have been able to demonstrate the limited extent to which his work can be held generally to support her positions, and specifically to exemplify, as she would have it, 'autonomous state contributions to public policy making even in the United States'. Before I can proceed further, a critical account is required of the attempt Krasner makes to arbitrate between the statist and structural Marxist positions.

He rests his argument that the statist paradigm is more powerful on two cases. The first is the attempt by the American government to buy Aramco during the Second World War; the second is 'instances where the United States was prepared to use overt or covert force' (p. 333). The case of the government attempt to purchase Aramco need not detain us long. Krasner notes here, in his conclusion, that 'the state failed, and this case could be explained away, albeit with some sacrifice of elegance, as an aberration based upon individual peculiarities' (p. 333). And in his fuller discussion of the case above (pp. 189-97), he concedes that the alternative Marxist framework he identifies covers it: 'Looked at in isolation, it gives strong support to either liberal or instrumental Marxist arguments. For here . . . central decision-makers were consistently frustrated by the private sector: they were not able to implement their policy preferences' (p. 189). The outcome, then, does not offer much support for the existence of state capacity to over-ride the desires of capitalist interests. The focus is on the ability of the state to generate an autonomous policy in the first place. And as Krasner accurately notes, the issue here was one of security of oil supplies in time of war, and the purchase plan was pressed by Harold Ickes, Secretary of Commerce and

Petroleum Administrator for War, and supported by Army and Navy Chiefs, but opposed by the State Department, and dropped very rapidly in the expectation that the oil lobby in Congress would block it anyway. As his concluding remark suggests, Krasner himself is not inclined to make too much of it. If there is a weakness in his treatment of the case, it is that he examines the roles of the 'state' on the one hand, and the oil companies on the other, but does not explore the possibility that capitalist interests other than oil were pressing for assured oil supply through government intervention or purchase. If Ickes was being lobbied by oil consuming industries to assure supply, his pursuit of the purchase plan in question says nothing as to the ability of the state to pursue a project autonomously from capitalist interests.

We are left with the cases of US use of overt or covert force, and here Krasner is on the shakiest of ground. These cases (intervention in Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Chile, and the Vietnam War) say nothing with regard to conflicts between state goals and the goals of private capitalists over raw materials supply, for none opposed the initiatives in question. Indeed, the most vociferous pleas for intervention in these cases generally came from corporations with interests at stake. They all take us away, then, from the ostensible concern of the book, and they are not covered by the phrase 'issues of international investments in the production and marketing of raw materials' with which Skocpol introduces it. As we have seen, Krasner himself cannot find convincing cases in this area. Further, he concedes of the cases of use of force that 'After 1945 all of these were clearly associated with the goal of preventing communist regimes from assuming or holding power. This aim can be comprehended from a structural Marxist perspective: communism does not enhance capitalism's long-term prospects' (p. 333). Here, he seems to have painted himself into a corner: the notion of a state able to take the view that the survival of capitalism as a system depended upon the defeat of a rival system out to abolish it, and to act in order to prevent such an outcome, seems ideally fitted to a structural Marxist perspective in which the state is seen as acting in the long-term interests of capitalism as a system. His escape route involves two strategic moves which detract considerably from the otherwise creditable scholarship of the book as a whole. First of all, he abandons the four Latin American case studies, and settles on the Vietnam War as the crucial case. Then he argues backwards from the failure of the war and the domestic unrest to which it gave rise, reversing the emphasis on policy to an emphasis on outcomes (p. 333):

The nonlogical manner in which American leaders pursued their anticommunism is not compatible with a structural Marxist position. The absence of means-ends calculations, coupled with misperception, led to policies that undermined the coherence of American domestic society, particularly in Vietnam. This is the very opposite result from the one predicted by a structural Marxist argument, but it is compatible with a statist view that sees the state as capable of defining its own autonomous goals.

It is immediately apparent that this will not do. There is nothing in Marxist theory to suggest that capitalist states will always be successful in pursuing their

goals (particularly in direct conflict with international communism!), or that they will identify with perfect foresight the strategies to be pursued, or *always* prevail in imposing such strategies against the immediate interests of capitalists. And if outcomes rather than intentions are decisive, Krasner's view that this outcome is compatible with a statist perspective seems to commit him to the conclusion that the autonomous state *desired* defeat in Vietnam and unrest at home. I shall not pursue his tortuous argument in detail here. Two brief comments are in order, though. Firstly, the case he seeks to make would require a quite different book, primarily devoted to the Vietnam War (he gives it sustained consideration only in six pages, pp. 320–6), and would need to take up precisely the kind of conflicts that emerged as it became apparent to capitalist interests that the continuation of the war was having counter-productive consequences, and not achieving the desired goals. Secondly, Krasner's claim that the pursuit of the war was nonlogical proves to rest on his own (very reasonable) assumption that there is not much sense in the ultra-Cold War perspective which sees every local conflict in global terms, as an episode in a never-ending East–West struggle. But he does not and cannot demonstrate that the makers of state policy in the period took the same view.

Krasner's own argument is weakest, then, precisely when he seeks to distinguish between statist and structural Marxist points of view. Where his arguments seem reasonable, they do not support Skocpol; where they might support Skocpol, they are themselves badly flawed. Nor is that all. Skocpol herself finds Krasner's case for the superiority of the statist perspective unconvincing, and says so. Having commented in the main text that 'he cannot fully dispel the suspicion that the Presidency and the State Department may simply be subject to class-based rather than interest-based business influences' (p. 13), she comments in a discreet footnote that 'Krasner has the most difficulty in distinguishing his argument for "state autonomy" from the structural Marxist perspective according to which the state acts for the class interests of capital as a whole. His solution, to stress "nonrational" ideological objectives of state policy as evidence against the class-interest argument, does not strike me as being very convincing' (p. 34, fn. 36).

So Skocpol herself rejects the only argument that offers her any support! She suggests, as I have done, that an imperialist ideology might be evidence of class consciousness, and proposes that 'One might stress, instead, the perceived geopolitical "interests" at work in US interventions abroad. "Free-world" justifications for such interventions are not obviously irrational, given certain understandings of US geopolitical interests' (p. 34, fn. 36). Of this limp conclusion it need only be said that those same 'certain understandings' provide no better ammunition against the 'class-interest' argument: state defence of perceived US geopolitical interests in a context of Cold War perceptions of international conflict provides strong support for a structural Marxist perspective.

All in all, then, Skocpol's claim that Krasner's study 'suggests that distinctive state-like contributions to US policy making occur exactly in those interests and arenas where a Weberian-Hintzean perspective would insist that they should

occur' seems extremely weak. The defence that Krasner mounts in relation to those interests and arenas owes nothing to positions derived from Weber or Hintze, or to those adopted by Skocpol (ironically, a large part of his case for the nonlogical argument rests on the lack of state capacity to devise a clear policy relating ends to means in a coherent manner); and in any case, Skocpol herself rejects the grounds on which his claims in these areas are made.

Skocpol on Skocpol and Finegold

I now reach the most damning piece of evidence of misrepresentation in the essay: Skocpol's use of her own work with Finegold. She introduces it as follows (pp. 13–14):

My own work with Kenneth Finegold on the origins of New Deal agricultural policies ... suggests that autonomous state contributions to domestic policy making can occur within a 'weak state'. Such autonomous state contributions happen in specific policy areas at given historical moments, even if they are not generally discernible across all policy areas and even if they unintentionally help to create political forces that subsequently severely circumscribe further autonomous state action. Finegold and I argue that, by the period after World War I, the US Department of Agriculture was 'an island of strength in an ocean of weakness'. We attribute the formulation of New Deal agricultural interventions – policies that responded to a long-standing "agrarian crisis" but *not* simply in ways directly demanded by powerful farm interest groups – to the unique resources of administrative capacity, prior public planning, and practical governmental experience available to federal agricultural experts at the dawn of the New Deal ... In addition, however, we trace the political fate of the New Deal's administrative interventions in agriculture. We show that, in the overall context of the US state structure, this initially autonomous state intervention inadvertently strengthened a particular lobbying group, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and gave it the final increments of electoral and administrative leverage that it needed to 'capture' preponderant influence over post-1936 federal agricultural policies. Subsequent state planning efforts, especially those that implied redistribution of economic, racial, or social-class power, were then circumscribed and destroyed by the established commercial farming interests championed by the Farm Bureau.

She concludes, immediately after this enlightening account, that 'in short, "state autonomy" is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system. It can come and go' (p. 14). We should remind ourselves at this point that Skocpol is presenting in this section evidence of 'autonomous state contributions to policy making', and that the intent of the essay as a whole is to demonstrate the superiority of a state-centred over a neo-Marxist approach. Before we examine in more detail the study of which this lengthy summary is made, we should note a number of points. Firstly, Skocpol accepts that such examples of autonomous state action as this are the exception for the United States rather than the rule, and never permanent or all-pervasive anywhere. This confirms her adherence in her own work to a weak version of state autonomy. Secondly, she accepts that such autonomous interventions may create opportunities for political forces to

destroy the autonomy achieved, and her closing comments make it clear that these forces may be class forces. Thirdly, she comes closest to a direct confrontation with neo-Marxist views when she notes that New Deal policies responded to the agrarian crisis 'not simply in ways directly demanded by powerful farm interest groups': we have seen this formulation before, in her discussion of state autonomy and in her introduction to Krasner, and noted that it ignores the possibility of a structural Marxist interpretation. Fourthly, in attributing these policies to unique resources of administrative capacity, prior public planning, and practical governmental experience, she gives evidence of her concern with state capacity as a necessary condition for state intervention, but does not address directly, let alone eliminate, the possibility that such policies might *also* have been in the best interests of the farmers concerned. In other words, we have as yet no idea whether in fact this particular state intervention was autonomous in a sense which would disqualify a structural Marxist interpretation. With these points in mind, let us turn to the *Political Science Quarterly* article where the case is discussed at greater length.

The article in question has two central characteristics, one to be expected, and one a surprise. As expected, it is an attack upon Marxist (and liberal) explanations of the state. Surprisingly, though, the agricultural policy of the New Deal (specifically the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933) is only one of two cases considered and compared; the other is the National Industrial Recovery Act of the same year. Skocpol and Finegold ask why 'the New Deal's initial effort to intervene in agriculture was institutionalized . . . much more successfully than its effort to regulate industry', and claim that 'This question becomes all the more intriguing when we realize that neither conventional pluralism nor conventional Marxism offers much help in answering it' (p. 259). The 'conventional Marxist' view is then characterized as follows (on p. 259):

Its various adherents would all tend to agree on one conclusion: capitalists as a class should benefit most from politics in capitalist society. Some Marxists would attribute this to capitalists' direct control over the state or political resources; other neo-Marxists would say, instead, that the state can be expected to intervene 'relatively autonomously' for the objective interests of the capitalist system (and class), regardless of whether or not capitalists control political decision-making. Either way, however, political outcomes (short of revolution) should work disproportionately to the benefit of capitalists.

One could object to certain aspects of this formulation: it elides intentions and outcomes, and fails to recognize that Marxists see capitalism as a system inherently subject to crisis, and do not expect schemes promoted by or on behalf of capitalists to succeed in every case. The point is pertinent, as the 1930s represented a period of crisis for the global capitalist system, and for the United States in particular, as Skocpol and Finegold note at the outset. On the positive side, though, it does contain, in the distinction it makes, the *instrumental* and *structural* positions respectively. I intend to show that contrary to Skocpol's and Finegold's claims, the cases they examine confirm precisely the validity of these perspectives. As we shall see, in the case of the NIRA the legislation was

requested, framed and instituted by the industrial capitalists themselves, and ditched only when an emerging autonomous state project appeared to threaten their class interests. The AAA, in contrast, organized the commercial farmers for their own collective good, and was eventually taken over by them. The cases thus demonstrate the usefulness of structural and instrumental perspectives. As this may seem a somewhat provocative claim, I shall illustrate it by direct quotation, despite the cumbersome nature of the method of exposition.

The NIRA, passed on 16 June 1933, was intended to assure 'a reasonable profit to industry and living wages for labor' (p. 256). Through it, in Skocpol and Finegold's words, 'industrial capitalists got pretty much what they asked for – and their control over the implementation of the recovery program was even more complete than was their influence in the legislative process that produced the NIRA' (p. 260). They note elsewhere that the key officials of the NRA (National Recovery Administration, set up by the law) were 'deputy administrators drawn almost invariably from the ranks of business', and that they were 'strongly sympathetic to the needs of the industrialists' (p. 265); they also quote a contemporary observer who described the NRA as a 'bargain between business leaders on the one hand and businessmen in the guise of government officials on the other' (p. 266). Their concern (like Krasner's over the Vietnam War) is with outcomes, rather than with intentions, and it is these that Marxism is held unable to explain. The outcome was detrimental to the interests of capitalists: 'Yet, this programme of government intervention, although tailored to the industrialists' specifications, nevertheless led or contributed to very unwanted outcomes for the capitalists: internecine political quarrels, threats of increased government supervision, and the legalization of independent labor unions' (p. 260). As this all took place in the midst of the deepest crisis US capitalism had known, it is not surprising that the NRA did not immediately bring about a Utopia. And we have already argued that Marxist analysis cannot be held responsible for the outcome of the schemes of capitalists or of the bourgeois state. But that is not all. If we examine the collapse of the NRA we shall see that it reveals an attempt at an autonomous state project arguably suited to the long-term needs of capital but against its perceived immediate interests, brought down by direct capitalist opposition. Skocpol and Finegold state later (p. 267) that:

By the time expert administrators with their own ideas on how government intervention could induce recovery emerged within the NRA, they were seen as very threatening by capitalists, because they were acting as spokesmen for consumer and labor interests and were advocating social reforms as a concomitant of increased state regulation of certain aspects of business performance. Under these circumstances, even industries that might have benefited from more state planning – or at least from more effective state backing for their own attempts at market regulation – simply shied further away than ever from the notion of 'governmental interference in industry'.

As a consequence, no attempt was made to revive NIRA after the Schechter decision of May 1935 found its Title I unconstitutional. Far from being impenet-

rable by the logic of the structural or instrumental Marxist arguments, this is a perfect example of the type of case they illuminate. In a period of deep crisis, a 'relatively autonomous' state, acting as an 'ideal collective capitalist', proposes a programme of reform which offers the prospect of restoring the battered hegemony of the capitalist classes whose fortunes and authority have been hit by the crisis. The capitalists, who still retain substantial direct access to much of the state and legislative machinery, block the programme in view of the threat they see to their own immediate interests. The case does confirm Skocpol's suggestion that state autonomy does not operate all the time, but it confirms it in precisely the way a Marxist approach which treats instrumental and structural perspectives as complementary would predict. The omission of the NRA from Skocpol's essay in *Bringing the State Back In* is worrying. Even on a simplistic reading, it offers considerable evidence in favour of an instrumental view of the state. One wonders why it is absent from what appears to be such an exhaustive account.

By this instructive route we have arrived at the case of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Skocpol and Finegold begin with the assertion that it 'proved much more successful in organizing commercial farmers for their own collective good than did the NRA at organizing industrial capitalists' (p. 258). Later (p. 260) they draw attention to the initial divisions between the class associations representing the farm interest:

Farmers in the United States were not as highly organized as industrialists at the beginning of the 1930s. And, perhaps even more important, competing 'national' farmers' associations were pushing quite different programs for farm recovery as late as 1932. During Roosevelt's presidential campaign and in the months between his election and inauguration, the major farm organizations – the Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the Farmers' Union – had to be coaxed into supporting the innovative production-control provisions that eventually became embodied in the Adjustment Act. (The Farmers' Union, in fact, ultimately refused to go along.) Yet, even though the ideas for key AAA programs did *not* originate with farmers or their interest-group representatives, farmers still ended up doing well, both economically and politically, under the New Deal's venture of government intervention in agriculture.

The AAA was a price support programme which worked. Our authors remark that during 1934 'the AAA's programmes – except for special cases like dairy products – became consistently oriented to raising farm prices by making payments to farmers to curtail their production' (p. 269). It is hard to see how the acceptance of a scheme which provides capitalists with money for not working, on the strength of the assets they hold, demonstrates a degree of state autonomy from those same capitalist interests. Finally, as Skocpol states in *Bringing the State Back In*, those capitalists very soon captured the AAA machinery anyway. As the original essay reports (p. 258):

Commercial farmers, especially those of the South and the Midwest, gained important political benefits as a by-product of AAA activities. A major farm lobby organization, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), was able to expand its operations in tandem

with the local administration of production control programs under the AAA. In turn, from the mid-1930s on, the AFBF became pivotal in defending its own organizational interests and the class interests of commercial farmers.

It turns out, then, that during the phase of recognizable state autonomy the efforts of the state were directed wholeheartedly to furthering the interests of the capitalist class concerned, and that this much-vaunted phase lasted in any case only for a couple of years, whereupon the commercial farmers took it over. On both counts – the lack of conflict with capitalist interests, and the brevity of the autonomous phase – it seems hard to argue the case for substantial or stable autonomy. This conclusion is strengthened by Finegold's own separate account of the origins and early history of the AAA, which expresses the following balanced opinion:

Taken together, business opinion, the Democratic Party, the federal agricultural complex, and the farmer organizations explain the enactment and successful implementation of the agricultural adjustment program. The same factors served as conservative influences upon the AAA, ensuring that it addressed the problem of farmer prosperity without challenging the position of the dominant class interests within agriculture.¹³

The idea that the two cases taken together reveal the limitations of Marxist perspectives on the state, then, or even say much about 'autonomous state contributions to domestic policy', is genuinely baffling. To use her own words, advanced as a critique of neo-Marxist perspectives, they might be said to suggest 'that states are inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production'. The case of the AAA is so clearly one of an 'ideal collective capitalist' acting in the interests of a divided and weakened capitalist class that the recurrence throughout Skocpol's essay of formulations which exclude a structural Marxist perspective through the posing of a false choice (short-term business interests/simple reflection of class interests versus autonomy) begins to appear calculated. One's doubts with regard to the spirit in which Skocpol has approached her task deepen on noting that Hamilton's excellent study of Mexican politics in the 1930s, focused directly on the theme of state autonomy, written from a sophisticated neo-Marxist perspective and containing a thorough discussion of the relevant theory, is cited here in a footnote,¹⁴ but otherwise comprehensively ignored, while Stepan's work on the state in Peru, from a perspective closer to Skocpol's own, is quoted at length.

The doubts that are aroused by the treatment given to the case studies on which Skocpol draws are confirmed if we finally examine her concluding section on 'States and the Political Capacities of Social Classes', where the various strategies we have seen at work come together in an attempt to pass off as going

¹³ K. Finegold, 'From Agrarianism to Adjustment: The Political Origins of New Deal Agricultural Policy', *Politics & Society*, 11 (1982), p. 25.

¹⁴ N. Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy. Post-Revolutionary Mexico* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). Hamilton states in her preface that 'my conceptual framework is Marxism, based on the belief that Marxist theory raises the most important questions and provides the most promising method for finding the answers' (p. viii).

beyond Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives approaches drawn from sources directly grounded in those perspectives. Turning at last to the question of states and social classes, Skocpol cannot avoid a showdown with Marxism. She makes two arguments against Marxist preoccupations with classes and class tensions, and suggests that they make it necessary to correct Marxist political sociology (p. 25):

Marxists may be right to argue that classes and class tensions are always present in industrial societies, but the political expression of class interests and conflicts is never automatic or economically determined. It depends on the capacities classes have for achieving consciousness, organization, and representation. Directly or indirectly, the structures and activities of states profoundly condition such class capacities. Thus, the classical wisdom of Marxian political sociology must be turned, if not on its head, then certainly on its side.

This is breathtakingly naive. The argument that the political expression of class interests and conflicts depends upon class capacity is *directly* from Marx himself, and the distinction between classes in themselves and classes for themselves. And not only is the argument that 'states profoundly condition such class capacities' central to Poulantzas's view of the state, but Skocpol cites earlier in her essay, on more than one occasion, an article by Katznelson and Prewitt which draws explicitly on Marxist and neo-Marxist theory, and quotes Poulantzas directly as espousing the view that 'it is the state that manages the tensions between capitalism and democracy by functioning as the "factor of political organization of the dominant classes" and as the "factor of political disorganization" of the working classes'.¹⁵ In addition, she quotes in direct support of this 'advance' on Marxist perspectives an article by Shefter subtitled 'The Organization and Disorganization of the American Working Class in the Late Nineteenth Century', a contribution to a forthcoming collection edited by Katznelson himself. Finally, the Katznelson and Prewitt article cited argues specifically that it is the interaction of the processes of class and state formation that produces the consequences Skocpol discusses, and seems to advocate an application of Poulantzas's general argument to specific cases, rather than an abandonment either of grand theory or of neo-Marxist perspectives.¹⁶ Katznelson's own contribution to *Bringing the State Back In*,¹⁷ also, engages with neo-Marxist accounts of working-class formation in a sympathetic, scholarly and honest manner, by no means rejecting them out of hand.

Much more could be said on Skocpol's introduction. But my purpose has been to demonstrate how her contorted account of the debate on the state and its relation to Marxist and neo-Marxist traditions, her one-sided definition of the state itself and her appeal to a strong and a weak formulation alternately as

¹⁵ I. Katznelson and K. Prewitt, 'Constitutionalism, Class, and the Limits of Choice in US Foreign Policy', in R. Fagen, ed., *Capitalism and the State in US-Latin American Relations* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979), p. 28.

¹⁶ Katznelson and Prewitt, 'Constitutionalism, Class, and the Limits of Choice', pp. 27-33

¹⁷ I. Katznelson, 'Working-Class Formation and the State Nineteenth Century England in American Perspective', in Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, eds, *Bringing the State Back In*, pp. 257-84

it suits her purposes, and her profound misrepresentation of her sources (even her own work) and indifference to their flaws and inconsistencies all tend together to one single end: the advocacy of a state-centred over a neo-Marxist understanding of state-society relations and an incorporation and neutralization of neo-Marxist accounts within that perspective. I hope to have argued successfully that she fails in her endeavours. As the flow of scholarly literature increases, it is increasingly tempting, if not necessary, to take second-hand accounts at face value, and to rely on introductions to composite works to capture the flavour of the whole. And if such works become standard points of reference, as *Bringing the State Back In* may do, the danger is all the greater. When it is not just a matter of scholarly integrity that is at stake, but the class struggle at the level of ideas, there is all the more reason for warning signs to be posted.

STEPAN ON THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA

The current attempt to assimilate and neutralize Marxist writing has not come out of a blue sky. It is a response to the serious challenge it has mounted to orthodox US social science since the 1960s, and represents the forced emergence of social science disciplines there from a degree of parochialism that would be unthinkable elsewhere. What is more, it is a risky operation. As always in struggles of this kind, it will at times appear, and may in the end prove, more a penetration by Marxism of the defences of bourgeois social science than a repulsion of a radical challenge.

This last consideration is particularly appropriate to Alfred Stepan's contribution, as it flirts most dangerously with orthodox Marxist sources and perspectives before renouncing them arbitrarily and retreating into a Weberian haven, doing enormous violence in the process to the coherence of the analysis, but enabling him to avoid a direct confrontation with the vigorous tradition of Latin American neo-Marxist analysis upon which he draws. Because it makes direct use of neo-Marxist sources and uncompromisingly forces them into a Weberian framework, Stepan's article provides a particularly clear case of the assimilation/neutralization process at work. I propose to demonstrate this by looking briefly at his introduction, examining his four case studies in varying degrees of detail, and finally discussing the way the case studies are handled in his conclusion.

Given the slant of Skocpol's introduction, there are two refreshing features of Stepan's own: he opens it with a candid correction of Skocpol's version of the recent rebirth of interest in the state, and he shows willing to take class analysis (and Marx's conception of Bonapartism!) as a point of departure. His opening statement (p. 317) entirely undercuts much of Skocpol's elaborate account of the debate on the state:

Society-centred views of political and economic transformation have never held the unchallenged sway in Latin America that they have in North America ... Beginning in the late 1960s, focus on the state became particularly intense. The erosion of the intellectual credibility of the society-centred 'modernization' model of political and economic

development coincided with the apparent exhaustion of both industrialization based on import substitution and the associated populist and parliamentary political regimes that were associated with it.

A footnote at this point refers to us the classic Latin American dependency study, Cardoso and Faletto's *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, which represents the tradition of neo-Marxist, historically-oriented comparative analysis. Skocpol's simplistic formulations allow her to ignore.¹⁸ Significantly, though, Stepan then goes by way of the Argentine social theorist O'Donnell to his own work, describing a tradition in which 'analysis of the actions and initiatives of groups operating within the state apparatus became a central focus of social science research' (p. 317). O'Donnell, no doubt largely involuntarily, has served as a bridge between neo-Marxism and non-Marxism in work on Latin America over more than a decade, to the extent that one of the minor characters in the building of the new consensus, Thomas Bossert, has recently praised him specifically for his eclecticism and put him forward as the best exponent of a synthetic account incorporating the best of competing traditions of social science analysis of the region.¹⁹ In this case, he leads Stepan to the firmer territory of a wholly state-centred approach. The structure of Stepan's work, with its incorporation and obliteration of neo-Marxism by turn, is already laid out here in microcosm; as we shall see, class analysis and Bonapartism are similarly swallowed up.

Stepan sees the origins of authoritarian regimes in Argentina (1966 and 1976), Brazil (1964), Chile (1973) and Uruguay (1973) in straightforward class terms (p. 318):

The new authoritarianism in all four countries followed periods of extensive but faltering industrialization and was installed in an atmosphere of growing class conflict. In each country the bourgeoisie provided the social base for the new authoritarian regimes, whose first political acts were the use of the coercive apparatus of the state (located institutionally in the army) to dismantle and disarticulate working-class organizations. In all four countries there was a major effort to restructure capitalism, though the concrete means of achieving such restructuring varied greatly from country to country.

However, this appraisal of the rise of authoritarian regimes is sandwiched between the announcement and elaboration of a thoroughly Weberian research agenda. Thus it is preceded by the statement that his aim 'is to look at the reciprocal relations between the power of the state and the power of civil society' (p. 318), and a sketching out of four possible relations between them: the power of civil society declines as that of the state rises; or vice versa; or they rise together; or they decline together. Immediately after the paragraph quoted above, he reverts to this same problematic: 'All four of these regimes began with periods in which the institutions of civil society were emasculated while the state enhanced its ability to pursue its own goals, but the subsequent history of

¹⁸ F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

¹⁹ T. Bossert, 'The Promise of Theory', especially pp. 384-5

relations between the authoritarian state and civil institutions has differed considerably among the four cases' (p. 318). Briefly, he will suggest that the four cases display different permutations of the possibilities noted above, and 'provide some heuristically fruitful suggestions as to the ways in which variations in the nature of the state apparatus and in the structure of civil society have led to such different outcomes' (p. 319). As in his brief review of recent Latin American debates, then, class analysis appears briefly and is swiftly spirited away: now you see it, now you don't. In the following lines the trick is repeated, and this time the attempted effect is even bolder, as Marx himself is summoned up, and made to disappear. Stepan poses a series of questions which first raise an explicitly Marxist perspective, and then smother it beneath the broad cloak of 'civil society' (p. 319).

By discussing four authoritarian states that share some important characteristics, I also hope to illuminate how the relative autonomy of the authoritarian state apparatus is highly fluid and is affected by certain factors. For example, how much direct political (or, in extreme cases, economic) power are the state's bourgeois-allies willing to abdicate in a *brumairian* sense in return for domestic protection? Since coercion is a major component of an exclusionary authoritarian regime such as BA, why and how can some types of fused or divided power among the chief executive, the three branches of the military, and the major intelligence forces increase or decrease relative state autonomy? How and why can struggles within these elements of the state apparatus create space for the opposition? Since bureaucratic routines and statutes are an important dimension of state control of civil society, is it possible that some routines or statutes adopted for a particular set of state purposes in fact also facilitate new forms of collective action and power creation in civil society?

In the course of this paragraph, Stepan moves from a genuinely Marxist perspective in which state and social classes are seen as inter-related, to one in which 'the state' confronts 'civil society'. We have seen before how the creation of this artificial state-society dichotomy is central to the enterprise of caricature of neo-Marxist approaches. In three successive moments of his introduction Stepan incorporates and then departs from Marxist or neo-Marxist perspectives, setting them in a what I am loosely calling a Weberian context. The tension that this orientation creates, and the manner in which he seeks to resolve it, gives his essay its interest. We turn to see now how, having released the genie, he is going to force it back into the lamp.

Stepan's account of relations between state and civil society in Chile is conducted throughout, in fact, with a primary focus on relations between the state and social classes, and reflects the work of such Chilean scholars as Garretón, Moulian and Vergara, which he draws upon and acknowledges. It argues that the intensity of previous class conflict won acceptance from the upper and middle classes for an authoritarian project with both a defensive element (protection against the resurgence of the left) and an offensive or 'foundational' element (the long-term rebuilding or restructuring of Chilean capitalism and civil society to create the possibility of stable liberal democracy in the future). He recognizes that the regime has particular allies, and explains the basis upon

which the alliance rests: 'In any regime, but especially in a BA regime, the capacity to lead the regime's political allies depends upon the degree to which the regime has both "defensive" and "offensive" projects that potential allies consider to be feasible, crucial for the preservation and advancement of their own interests, and dependent upon authoritarian power for their execution' (p. 320). He documents the apparently unanimous support of capital in Chile for this authoritarian project, despite the fact that it centred upon ultra-liberal economic measures which hurt the immediate interests of many of those concerned: 'The persistence of fear within the upper bourgeoisie was an important element in the bourgeoisie's willingness to accept individual policies that hurt the upper class ... but were seen to be the necessary cost of protecting its overall interests' (p. 321).

He goes on to discuss aspects of state policy and the social, economic and political situation which tended to unite the state and divide the opposition, thus accounting for the strengthening of the state and the weakening of civil society, and suggests that 'the Chilean state represents a step beyond Bonapartism. Instead of exchanging the right to rule for the right to make money in the classic Bonapartist transaction, significant fractions of the Chilean bourgeoisie abdicated the right to rule and severely jeopardized their right to make money in the short run in the hope of preserving class privilege in the long run' (p. 324).

There may be empirical difficulties here, in that Stepan's analysis underestimates the major restructuring of capital that took place in the period, and its consequences in depriving those sectors losing most heavily of a political voice. He assumes, for example, that producers' associations represent the genuine convictions of representative groups of freely associating capitalists, when in fact they may be much more closely shaped by the state: ironically, as an investigation along these lines would provide some evidence for the ability of the state to shape social and political forces in much the same way that Laitin, in the preceding essay, shows for British colonial rule among the Yoruba in Nigeria. It may be, in other words, that the 'bourgeoisie' supporting the government was the minority that was enriching itself hand over fist as loan capital flooded into the country and speculation proliferated.²⁰ But if we leave aside the empirical accuracy of Stepan's case, what is striking about it is its absolute fidelity to a simplistic structural Marxist position: the state acts in the long-term interests of capital, against the short-term interests of some capitalists, and they *all* support it as a consequence. Noting a similar situation in the early years in Brazil, Stepan goes on to suggest that 'What is unusual about the Chilean case is that the state was able to persist in this strategy for almost a decade' (p. 324). Having faithfully followed a Marxist argument through to this point, Stepan now tries to escape from it: 'The question raised by the Chilean case, then, was how long the state

²⁰ For some support for these points see J. S. and A. Valenzuela, eds, *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Chaps 1-3, and P. O'Brien, 'Authoritarianism and the New Orthodoxy: The Political Economy of the Chilean Regime, 1973-1982', in P. O'Brien and P. Cammack, eds, *Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).

could continue to find support for a project that stood in objective contradiction to the requirements of local capital accumulation. The fact that it did so for as long as it did must be considered a strong challenge to theories of the "capitalist state" (p. 324).

Given the thoroughly Marxist logic of all that has gone before, the bare-faced cheek of this escape is almost incredible. A number of objections might be raised. Firstly, ten years is not a very long time. Secondly, as Stepan tells us, bourgeois fear that only Pinochet stood in the way of the return of the Marxist left had led them to offer unanimous support to his 1980 plebiscite for the extension of his powers. That was all of two years before the time elapsed became, apparently, so great as to invalidate a structural Marxist interpretation. Thirdly, bourgeois leaders had told him explicitly that a long-term period of authoritarian rule was necessary if their interests were to be protected, and he quotes one of them to that effect. Fourthly, as he makes perfectly clear, the authoritarian project did not stand 'in objective contradiction to the requirements of local capital accumulation', at least not in the eyes of the groups concerned – it stood in contradiction with the ability of *certain* capitalists to make profits *for the time being*. Fifthly, his perplexity is in part a consequence of his belief, noted above, that all capitalists supported the regime (which may not be true) and that all were suffering economically (which certainly was not true). Sixthly, the years from 1976 to 1980 were years of such rapid recovery that claims were put about at the time that an economic miracle was under way; many capitalists must have thought that the lean years were over. Seventhly, as Stepan points out immediately following the statement quoted above, when a shattering economic downturn came in 1981–82, there was sufficient pressure from capital to secure a change of course. Eighthly, there is nothing in a Marxist structural perspective to suggest that if an authoritarian state is created at a moment of political and economic weakness for capital, it will not survive for a while even against the wishes of capital; one might expect, as with Franco's Spain, a slow re-orientation of its policies to bring them into line with capital's demands, as has to some extent been the case in Chile. Stepan talks as if capital were politically sovereign in Chile, whereas the advent of the Pinochet regime was evidence of its deep-rooted crisis. He fails to distinguish, as do Skocpol and Finegold, between normal times and times of crisis, whereas the notion of recurrent crisis is central to a Marxist perspective. In other words, one needs to consider the capacity of the bourgeoisie, as well as the capacity of the state. All in all, Stepan is well served by his Chilean sources, but when he steps beyond them in an attempt to wriggle out of the Marxist logic they impose upon him, he sinks without trace.

I do not intend to deal in similar detail with the following three cases of Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. Beyond the differences Stepan finds between them, they have, on his account, one thing in common – the fall of the authoritarian regime when the bourgeoisie which had solicited it in the first place withdrew its support. Thus they support a crude version of Marxist views of the state: the moment the bourgeoisie withdraws support, the authoritarian regime fails. In Uruguay, the bourgeoisie was not persuaded that there was so serious a

threat from the left, it defended its interests more forcefully, and it came to see continued military rule as likely to undermine the viability of a party system that could still serve its interests. By 1980, 'the regime seemed to have completed its initial agenda', Stepan remarks, adding in Sybilline fashion: 'If this is so, on theoretical grounds it would seem that the bourgeoisie would not see a continued need to abdicate to the military the direct articulation of its interests' (p. 326). Although he does not say so, the theoretical grounds seem to be those of Bonapartism. By the early 1980s the Uruguayan bourgeoisie favoured military withdrawal; by the mid-1980s, the process of withdrawal was complete. There appears to be support here for Marxist views of the state, on Stepan's account at least.

On Argentina, he argues that the bourgeoisie initially feared the left enough to accept economic hardship of the kind experienced in Chile, but by 1980–81 the government was foundering, as its economic policy fell apart at the seams. Ever resourceful, Stepan finds here another stick with which to beat a Marxist perspective: 'The Argentine case, even more than the Chilean case, also posed serious problems for conventional theories of the capitalist state. Argentina was a state that was clearly "relatively autonomous" in a society that was clearly capitalist; yet the state was not "organizing capitalist interests" and overcoming problems of capitalist accumulation, as some theories presuppose' (p. 330). We have already seen this misunderstanding in the work of Krasner, and of Skocpol and Finegold: an argument from outcomes, as if capital were not experiencing a deep crisis, and as if the exceptional regimes it backed were all-powerful. Firstly, the 'open economy' model imposed by the military regime intended precisely to restore the workings of the market and thus recreate the long-term conditions for healthy capitalism, although it signally failed to do so; and secondly, the bourgeoisie very swiftly withdrew its support after the armed forces opted for military adventures in the Malvinas, and the collapse of military rule came shortly after.²¹ On both counts, a Marxist analysis is vindicated. Stepan himself notes that 'the high bourgeoisie, with its extensive ties to English commercial and financial networks, ... realized that its alliance with the military was extremely dangerous' (p. 330), although he prefers to emphasize the divisions created within the armed forces and the state. His brief account here has little theoretical impetus of any kind, largely because he does not draw on such good sources as he finds for other cases.

Finally, in a longer discussion of Brazil, intended to show that the power of civil society and the state increased simultaneously, Stepan shows that in the early years the regime delivered the goods for the bourgeoisie in terms of repression and economic growth, but that its successes in these areas gave rise to new social movements that could not so easily be contained in an authoritarian framework. In the later 1970s the bourgeoisie began to find the elaborate statism

²¹ For a detailed account, see W. Smith, 'Reflections of the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Capitalist Reorganization in Contemporary Argentina', in O'Brien and Cammack, eds, *Generals in Retreat*, pp. 37–88.

of the regime oppressive, economic growth faltered, and business took the lead in the search for a gradual transition to civilian rule which would enable them to keep resurgent trade-union and popular movements at bay. The analysis reflects throughout the direct influence of Brazilian neo-Marxist scholarship, and again confirms a straightforward Marxist perspective.

It remains to be seen how Stepan will handle the implications of his material in his conclusion. In fact he resorts to the same sandwiching of a class-oriented analysis (as overwhelmingly confirmed by his case studies) between formulations in which the issue of class is not directly addressed. He announces at the outset that he will discuss 'the way in which the character of the state affects the evolution of opposition politics', but comes towards the end to a clear statement which conveys the gist of his case studies and reveals the workings of bourgeois perceptions of their class interests behind the trajectory of authoritarian regimes (p. 340):

In Chile, where the possibility for a fundamental reordering of the class structure seemed real to the bourgeoisie, the latter accepted unquestioningly many state policies that were detrimental to its economic interests and acquiesced completely in the state's project of relatively autonomous domination of the political sphere. In Uruguay and in Argentina (until after Malvinas), fear of opening the door to changes in the class structure kept dominant civilian elites from pressuring more strongly for an opening in the political system. In Brazil, it was only after private elites became convinced they could manage their economic and political future more effectively within a more open political environment that they began to mount a serious attack on the degree of autonomy that the state had achieved.

Even here, Stepan does not explicitly draw the lesson that military rule in each case lasts as long as it suits the bourgeoisie, nor does he address the question of the implications of his findings for Marxist or neo-Marxist theory or issues of state autonomy. He can do little more, in a concluding paragraph (p. 340), than translate the language of class into bourgeois euphemism, and attempt to direct attention once more to the state itself:

Overall, the most important lesson to be derived from these cases may be a methodological one. The power of the state as an actor and institution cannot be analyzed in isolation from an understanding of the nature of the cleavages that rend civil society, on the one hand, or the growth of horizontal ties that bring different sectors of civil society together on the other hand. At the same time, the evolution of opposition to the state within civil society is shaped by the way in which the state defines its project and by the contradictions and conflicts that emerge inside the state apparatus itself.

Overall, then, Stepan draws deeply upon Marxist and neo-Marxist sources, and applies class analysis in his case studies. But he seeks to deny the validity of a Marxist perspective, or remains silent where it seems to fit the facts, casting his material into a Weberian state versus civil society mould in his introductory and concluding discussions. I shall open my brief discussion of the conclusion to the book (which is the joint work of the three editors) by examining the use made of Stepan's contribution.

GET OUT, AND SAY WE WON!

The conclusion claims that the studies which precede it 'draw research questions, concepts, and causal hypotheses from a variety of existing theoretical debates, especially from the juxtaposition of Weberian understandings of the state with propositions drawn from recent neo-Marxist theories', and 'explore such ideas through comparative and historical research' (p. 348). It argues that no pre-existing grand theory of the state seems adequate, compares the variations on the historical and comparative method reflected in the several contributions, then reviews arguments relating to determinants of state autonomy and state capacities, after sketching out neo-Marxist and Weberian approaches. Two further sections set out new ideas for research in the areas 'Social Knowledge and State Interventions' and 'The Formation and Reorganization of States' respectively. Finally, the editors offer 'Some Concluding Thoughts on Analysis and Prescription', in which they eschew grand theory altogether. The outcome, then, is that the juxtaposition of neo-Marxist and Weberian ideas leads to an abandonment of both, and of any kind of coherent theoretical framework at all, in favour of middle-level enquiries into a multiplicity of issues in a multiplicity of settings in the hope that something will turn up. Studies pitched in the middle of nowhere are not likely to lead anywhere. As between Marx and Weber, though, these still show evidence of Weberian paternity. As for the great debate with Marxism and neo-Marxism, the attitude of these representatives of US social science reminds one of that displayed by the military advisor in the closing months of US defeat in Vietnam, who urged his government to 'get out, and say we won'. I do not intend to examine their conclusions in detail, but simply to focus on two issues. What light does the use they make of Stepan's contribution throw upon their ways of coping with the challenge of Marxist and neo-Marxist analysis? And what do they say about neo-Marxist approaches in general? I shall conclude that they come to bury Marx, not to praise him. And I should state here that my comments apply to those against whom they are directed. They are not to be read as including all the contributors to the volume, nor as necessarily including the editors, in so far as they appear in other capacities as authors of substantive contributions.

(a) The Transformation of Alfred C. Stepan

As we have seen, Stepan's contribution to the volume gives ample evidence of the vigour of Latin American neo-Marxist writing, and its ability to provide sophisticated analysis of concrete cases; and Stepan himself, given the nature of his sources, is barely able to separate himself from a type of class analysis that would fit easily into a neo-Marxist framework. It will be instructive, therefore, to make and examine an inventory of the references made to Stepan in the conclusion. In addition to a remark that his investigatory tactic is one of in-depth case study, falling between the 'analytically controlled comparisons of Weir and Skocpol and the more holistic contrasts and overlaps of Katzenstein' (p. 369),

these consist of a series of statements in a single theme. It is noted that he shares with Tilly, on the issue of different kinds of state capacities, an interest in relationships between the state's capacity to deploy violence and its fiscal capabilities and means for intervening in the economy; that he argues in the Chilean case that the regime's strengthening of its repressive capacities has gone along with deliberately dismantling state capacity for economic intervention; that the Chilean case is one of 'internal repression in an internationally subordinate country with well-established state bureaucracies facing mobilized social groups' (p. 352); that (this time in comparison with Amsden) he argues that 'Chile's military rulers deliberately reduced their state's capacities to intervene in market outcomes in order to protect the state's repressive coherence and make state policies and organizations less likely to be a target for groups with economic grievances' (p. 354); that in Brazil, in contrast, 'as the Brazilian state became increasingly involved in the process of capital accumulation ... the working class mobilized to engage the state directly and fight for a reduction of its autonomy' (p. 354), and, lastly, that 'one of the important determinants of reduction in the autonomy of the Brazilian state ... was the conviction of the executive-branch leaders that they themselves could rein in sections of the security apparatus only if the autonomy of the state apparatus as a whole in relation to civil society was reduced' (p. 355).

Thus every substantial point which they draw from Stepan's account deals with the single issue of the capacity of the state as an autonomous actor, enhanced in the area of repression in the case of Chile by abstention from economic intervention, and weakened in Brazil by economic intervention and by the escaping of the repressive apparatus from central state control. On the question of the relationship between the state and the dominant classes, which is the central substantive element in Stepan's essay, despite his misleading introduction and conclusion, nothing at all is said. Nor indeed is any remark addressed to the issue in the whole of the conclusion. In the end, Marxism and neo-Marxism is dismissed by dismissing its agenda and supporting empirical material out of hand. Stepan wraps Marxism in a Weberian shroud, and the editors jointly bury it. The nature and the editorial treatment of Stepan's contribution thus demonstrate the selectiveness and misrepresentation involved in the incorporation and neutralization of Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches. In this respect, the joint conclusion finishes the work that Skocpol began in her own introduction. The state-society dichotomy which Stepan conjured up out of neo-Marxist discussions which saw the state as differentially related to social classes in struggle is made the central point of his analysis.

(b) The Dismissal of Neo-Marxism

The editors conclude their brief review of neo-Marxist approaches to the state as follows: 'Most of the discussions about the fundamental character of the capitalist state have been carried on at the level of theoretical absolutes meant to apply universally to all societies with capitalist relations of production' (p. 350). This

enables them to dismiss neo-Marxism as grand theory insensitive to variations in time and place: 'Further refinement of definitions of "advanced", or "monopoly" or "dependent", cannot advance our understanding. As the studies presented here demonstrate, telling variations in state structures and capacities often occur among states that appear to belong to the same broad type' (p. 355). First the Marxist tradition is reduced to recent neo-Marxist theorizing on the state; then it is argued that *most* recent writing is excessively general in nature; and finally, the whole tradition is abandoned on the grounds that further abstractions will lead nowhere. This patent subterfuge, as always, is strategically necessary. It ignores the concrete analyses provided by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and Gramsci of the state in their own countries and elsewhere and its relation to social classes; it ignores the considerable body of concrete historical case study-oriented work currently being produced by neo-Marxist writers or strongly influenced by them (some of them, to be sure, have had the misfortune to write in languages other than English), and it ignores the possibility that the analyses they dismiss as abstract, and the concepts they develop, might themselves fruitfully be applied to historical and comparative case studies. Far from an exploration of Marxist and neo-Marxist ideas, then, we have a point-blank refusal to explore them at all. Instead they are caricatured and rejected on the most dubious of grounds. This in itself is not new, but the song and dance made about it all decidedly is. As with the US state after the Vietnam War, US social science is on the defensive, bereft of grand visions, and digging in for the duration.

Throughout this discussion I have taken the authors concerned on their own terms. I have not challenged the empirical validity of the case studies offered for consideration. Nor have I sought to advance a more sophisticated notion of Marxist views of the state than is reflected in current distinctions between instrumental and structural perspectives. Even on these terms, though, I have shown that the accounts of Skocpol and Stepan are full of inconsistency, and that the cases they provide, on the terms in which they provide them, are best explained by direct reference to these perspectives. From all this, one final conclusion of particular significance can be drawn. Skocpol began by drawing a false contrast between the 'society-centred' perspective of classical Marxism, and the 'state-centred' perspective she endorses and affects to find in neo-Marxist writing. This was the basis for the argument for convergence between non-Marxist and neo-Marxist traditions. I argued that this false distinction was not innocent. Stepan similarly forces his own material into a state-society framework. In their conclusion, the editors built upon these orientations. In each case, the result is the same. A two-stage process takes place in which first social classes are dissolved into 'society', then this undifferentiated 'society' is counter-posed to 'the state'. As a consequence, the idea that the state is differentially penetrated by conflicting classes, and incorporates, reflects and affects the struggle between them, becomes literally unthinkable. Clearly, the state has to be taken seriously. Clearly, too, an institutional and organizational perspective must be part of a coherent analysis. There are pertinent questions to be asked about 'state

Notes and Comments

The Comparative Analysis of Coalition Formation and Duration: Distinguishing Between-Country and Within-Country Effects

BERNARD GROFMAN

Dodd is generally credited with providing clear empirical support for the proposition that, in the period after the Second World War, minimal winning coalitions in European party governments will tend to last longer in office than non-minimal winning coalitions.¹ There has been a considerable body of research on this and related questions. Dodd, as well as most other authors treating cabinet coalition formation, has attempted to model features of cabinet formation such as cabinet duration or cabinet type (e.g. minimal winning v. minority government v. oversized coalitions) largely or entirely using data pooled from all cabinets in each of a number of different countries over some considerable time period. One difficulty with this method is that system-level variables (such as number of parties, or the presence of large anti-system parties), which might be able to explain aggregate-level *between-country* variations in cabinet type or cabinet durability, are not likely to be the same variables that are useful in explaining *within-country* differences. A second difficulty is that certain system-level characteristics such as effective number of parties or number of cleavage dimensions are highly correlated with both cabinet type and cabinet duration² and, as a consequence, these variables are highly correlated with one another when pooled cross-national data are used. Thus, if the analyst is not very careful, results of pooled cross-national data may lead to mistakes about causal structure and a confusion of within-country and between-country effects.

For example, Taylor and Herman,³ studying *individual* cabinet durability in nineteen

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¹ Lawrence D. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

² See, for example, Paul Warwick, 'The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, 11 (1979), 465-98; Hans Daalder, 'Cabinets and Party Systems in Ten European Democracies', *Acta Politica*, 6 (1971), 282-303; David Sanders and Valentine M. Herman, 'The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Democracies', *Acta Politica*, 12 (1977), 346-77; Kaare Strom, 'Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies', *American Political Science Review*, 79 (1985), 738-54; Arend Lijphart, *Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984); Arend Lijphart, 'Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation', *Comparative Political Studies*, 17 (1984), 265-79; Arend Lijphart, 'A Note on the Meaning of Cabinet Durability', *Comparative Political Studies*, 17 (1984), 163-6.

³ Michael Taylor and Valentine M. Herman, 'Party Systems and Government Stability', *American Political Science Review*, 65 (1971), 28-37.

stable democracies in the period after the Second World War find a correlation of only -0.44 between the Rae fractionalization index⁴ and cross-national pooled data on cabinet durability. In contrast, Lijphart⁵ finds a much higher correlation of -0.80 between *mean* cabinet duration and *mean* effective number of parties in a virtually identical set of twenty-one countries for the period after the Second World War. The effective number of parties is equal to the inverse of one minus the Rae fractionalization index.⁶ The difference in fit between Taylor and Herman⁷ and Lijphart⁸ is not due to differences in the countries examined or in the time period considered, but almost certainly to the fact that Lijphart,⁹ by looking at mean duration and mean effective number of parties, is 'smoothing out' the within-country variations. This would tend to lower the correlation because the principal effect of the Laakso-Taagepera index is to specify a variable which effectively predicts cabinet durability in terms of a *country*-level attribute such as party system.

The central aim of this Note is to demonstrate that it is largely the *cross-country* variation in number of parties and in type of party system that is the underlying 'cause' of the observed correlation between cabinet longevity and effective number of parties. I look at the relationship between cabinet longevity and cabinet type, controlling for effective number of parties and controlling for number of ideological cleavages (using Lijphart's 1984 specification of the number of ideological cleavages in the same set of twenty-one post-Second World War democracies). I argue that the well-known correlation between minimum winning size of cabinets and cabinet durability¹⁰ largely vanishes once system-level variables temporally antecedent to cabinet type are controlled.

A REFORMULATION OF DODD'S (1976) MODEL

Dodd proposes that 'minimum winning cabinets will be quite durable. Oversized and undersized cabinets will be more transient'.¹¹ He tests this hypothesis by 'examining the covariation of relevant variables'.¹² However, he explicitly rejects the strategy of examining either between-country variation or temporal patterns. Rather, all cabinets in all countries are to be simultaneously analysed regardless of within-country sequence. In pooling the data in this fashion it is easy to miss confounding effects of cross-national variation in system-level characteristics.

⁴ Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, 2nd edn (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1971).

⁵ Lijphart, *Democracies*.

⁶ See Marku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, 'Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 12 (1979), 3-27; Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman, 'Effective Size and Number of Components', *Sociological Methods and Research*, 10 (1981), 63-81; Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law. Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems - Parties Minus Issues Equals One', *European Journal of Political Research*, 13 (1985), 341-52.

⁷ Taylor and Herman, 'Party Systems'.

⁸ Lijphart, *Democracies*.

⁹ Lijphart, *Democracies*.

¹⁰ Dodd, *Coalitions*.

¹¹ Dodd, *Coalitions*, p. 18.

¹² Dodd, *Coalitions*, p. 24.

Dodd has five central propositions.¹³ Here we focus on the first four, which we restate as follows:

Proposition 1: Minimum winning cabinets tend to form in multi-party systems that are defractionalized (stable) and not extremely polarized

Proposition 2: Oversized cabinets tend to form in multi-party systems that are fractionalized (unstable) and non-conflictual.

Proposition 3: Undersized cabinets tend to form in multi-party systems that are fractionalized (unstable) and highly conflictual.

Proposition 4: Minimal winning coalitions will tend to be more durable than either undersized or oversized cabinets.

The first three of these propositions deal with type of cabinet. The fourth links cabinet type to cabinet durability. I shall begin with the first three of these propositions. For reasons that will become clear, I prefer to omit the stability–instability clause in these three propositions and to focus on the 2 × 3 table in Table 1 as a way of summarizing Propositions 1–3 in Dodd.¹⁴

TABLE 1 *A Simplified Restatement of Three Propositions about Cabinet Size**

		Conflict level		
		Consensual	Intermediate	Polarized
Fractionalization	High	Oversized cabinets 1	2	Undersized cabinets 3
	Low	4	Minimum winning coalitions 5	6

* In Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*

In Table 2 we classify the twenty-one post-Second World War democracies analysed in Lijphart¹⁵ according to their effective number of parties (less than three, more than three) and according to degree of conflict (using a classification based in part on Luebbert¹⁶ and in part on the presence of anti-system parties with blackmail potential). In Table 3 I show the percentage of minimal winning coalitions and the percentage of minority governments for each of these countries. It is apparent from inspection of Table 3 that while Dodd's first proposition is supported (cell 5), his last two propositions are not.

¹³ Dodd, *Coalitions*, pp. 28–9

¹⁴ Dodd, *Coalitions*.

¹⁵ Lijphart, *Democracies*.

¹⁶ G M Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)

TABLE 2 *Location of Countries in Cells of Table 1 and Effective Number of Parties in Each**

		Conflict level		
		Consensual	Intermediate	Polarized
Fractionalization	High	Denmark (4.3) Norway (3.2) Sweden (3.2) Mean 3.6 1	Belgium (3.7) Israel (4.7) Netherlands (4.9) Switzerland (5.0) Luxem- bourg (3.5) Japan (3.1) Iceland (3.5) Mean 4.1 2	France IV (3.3) France V (4.9) Italy (3.5) Finland (5.0) Mean 4.2 3
	Low		Germany (2.6) United Kingdom (2.1) Ireland (2.8) Canada (2.4) Austria (2.2) Australia (2.5) New Zealand (2.0) Mean 2.4 5	
		4	6	

* Numbers in parentheses are effective number of parties (inverse of one minus Rae fractionalization index) for post-Second World War period.

Source: Fractionalization data from Lijphart, *Democracies*, p. 125. Conflict classification is the author's own, based in part on Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy*.

With respect to Proposition 2, we find that (in cell 1) consensual systems with high fractionalization tend to have *undersized* cabinets, not *oversized* cabinets. With respect to Proposition 3 we find that conflictual systems with high fractionalization (in cell 3) do not manifest a preponderance of undersized cabinets. Indeed, the contrary is true. Thus, I was led to the following revised set of propositions:

Proposition 1': Multiparty systems with high fractionalization which are consensual tend to give rise to minority cabinets.

Proposition 2': Multiparty systems with high fractionalization which are highly conflictual tend to give rise to a mix of undersized and oversized cabinets, and few minimal winning coalitions.

Proposition 3': Party systems with low fractionalization tend to have minimal winning coalitions. (Note that we have data only for those countries with high fractionalization which are intermediate on the conflict variable.)

In support of Proposition 1', see cell 1 in Table 3.

TABLE 3 *Minimal Winning Coalitions and Minority Governments of Total Cabinet Duration for Countries as Located in Cells of Table 1**

		Conflict level					
		Consensual		Intermediate		Polarized	
High	Fractionalization	Denmark	(0.32, 0.68)	Belgium	(0.75, 0.03)	France IV	(0.00, 0.40)
		Norway	(0.67, 0.33)	Israel	(0.17, 0.01)	France V	(0.37, 0.00)
		Sweden	(0.32, 0.65)	Netherlands	(0.25, 0.04)	Italy	(0.17, 0.36)
				Switzerland	(0.0)	Finland	(0.25, 0.25)
				Luxembourg	(0.96, 0.00)		
				Japan	(0.77, 0.08)		
				Iceland	(0.86, 0.04)		
		Mean	(0.43, 0.55)	Mean	(0.54, 0.03)	Mean	(0.20, 0.25)
		1		2		3	
		Low				Germany	(0.78, 0.00)
				United Kingdom	(0.90, 0.10)		
				Ireland	(0.78, 0.22)		
				Canada	(0.73, 0.27)		
				Austria	(0.84, 0.04)		
				Australia	(0.86, 0.00)		
				New Zealand	(1.00, 0.00)		
				Mean	(0.70, 0.09)		
4				5		6	

* First entry in vector is proportion of minimal winning coalitions; second entry is proportion of time minority governments are in power (in months).

Source. Cabinet type data from Lijphart, *Democracies*, p 61

In examining Proposition 2', we find that France IV had 0 per cent minimal winning coalitions (mwc), France V had only 37 per cent mwc, Italy had only 17 per cent mwc, and Finland had only 25 per cent mwc. Thus, Proposition 2 is supported.

In testing Proposition 3' we note that the percentage mwc among the countries in cell 5 of Table 3 ranged from 78 per cent to 100 per cent. Thus, Proposition 3 is supported.

Note that multiparty systems with high fractionalization and an intermediate level of conflict tend to give rise to a mixed pattern. Belgium, Luxembourg, Iceland and Japan do, however, appear different from the three other countries in that cell.

Luebbert has proposed a model which can account for the predictive fit of our revised hypothesis 1'-3'.¹⁷ He proposed that consensual governments (cell 1) can 'afford' minority governments since consensus politics continues to operate much as usual regardless of the size of the governing coalition. In contrast, in polarized politics (cell 3) the existence of anti-regime parties tends to lead to oversized coalitions in order to enhance the legitimacy of the actions taken by the governing coalition. (Of course with consensual politics the plurality party is likely to be relatively centrist *vis-à-vis* the ideological spectrum in the country.) Finally, when fractionalization is low and competition is at an intermediate

¹⁷ Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy*, pp. 85-6

level (cell 5), with legitimacy not threatened, 'ordinary politics' operated to minimize concessions and create a bare winning coalition in the manner of Riker.¹⁸

Now we turn to Dodd's fourth proposition and look at cabinet durability. I show in Table 4 the mean cabinet durations for each of Lijphart's twenty-one democracies, again arranged according to the categories of Table 1. A very different way of conceptualizing the link between cabinet type, party system, and cabinet durability from that found in Dodd's Proposition 4 is suggested by an analysis of the data reported in Table 4. In particular, I propose:

Proposition 4'(a): Countries with low fractionalization will tend to have durable cabinets (cell 5 in Table 4). Countries with fractionalized party systems but without polarization will have intermediate cabinet durability (cells 1 and 2 in Table 4). Cabinet durability will be least in countries characterized by both high fractionalization and high polarization (cell 3 in Table 4).

Clearly Proposition 4'(a) is supported by the data. mean cabinet duration ranges from 17 months in cell 3, to 39 months and 54 months, in cells 1 and 2, respectively, to the high of 81 months for the low fractionalization countries in cell 5.

The important point to appreciate about Proposition 4'(a) (as contrasted to Proposition 4) is that Proposition 4'(a) makes no mention of any link between cabinet type and cabinet durability. Rather, the hypothesis is expressed in terms of fractionalization (effective number of parties) and degree of polarization of the party system.¹⁹

I believe it is sensible to take party system to be a determinant of both cabinet type and cabinet durability. Thus, the well-known direct relationship between cabinet type and cabinet durability should essentially vanish as spurious; i.e., I posit the relationship shown in Figure 1.

It still might be the case, however, that within a given country, cabinet type might affect cabinet durability, *but it could only do so relative to the average durability of cabinets in that country*. In fact in only four of the twenty-one countries we examined – Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway – was cabinet type (1 = mw, 0 otherwise) a statistically significant predictor of cabinet duration. In only two countries, Denmark and the United Kingdom, was the effective number of parties a statistically significant predictor of cabinet durability in the country.²⁰ Thus, the principal variation in cabinet durability

¹⁸ William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962)


¹⁹ While we might propose Hypothesis 4'(b): 'Countries with either oversized or undersized coalitions will tend to be low in cabinet durability, and cabinet durability will be least in countries where both oversized and undersized coalitions are common. In contrast, countries with minimum winning coalitions will tend to have durable cabinets', we find that Proposition 4'(a) fits the data marginally better than Proposition 4'(b) because Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg and Belgium, which belong to cell 2 due to fractionalization, are, unlike the other countries in cell 2, not characterized by either undersized or oversized coalitions. Thus, according to Proposition 4'(b), we should expect them to have long-lived cabinets. In fact, cabinet longevity in these countries is at an intermediate level.

²⁰ Instead of regressing the variable 'cabinet duration' on cabinet type, we might be better advised to regress a variable which expressed cabinet duration *relative to a country's own norm* against cabinet type. Pooling data for seven countries (from Finland to Israel) we obtain a correlation of 0.14 between relative cabinet duration and cabinet type compared to a correlation of 0.434 for the non-normalized bivariate relationship between cabinet duration and cabinet type. Thus, this line of approach does not seem promising.

TABLE 4 *Mean Cabinet Duration of Twenty-One Countries as Located in Cells of Table 1**

		Conflict level		
		Consensual	Intermediate	Polarized
Fractionalization	High	Denmark (34) Norway (55) Sweden (74) Mean 1 54	Belgium (26) Israel (28) Netherlands (34) Switzerland (30) Luxem- bourg (58) Japan (58) Iceland (37) Mean 2 39	France IV (9) France V (29) Italy (17) Finland (13) Mean 3 17
	Low	4	Germany (47) United Kingdom (81) Ireland (70) Canada (104) Austria (100) Australia (102) New Zealand (64) Mean 5 81	6

* Numbers in parentheses is mean post-Second World War cabinet duration in months.
Source. Cabinet duration data is from Lijphart, *Democracies*, Table 5 3, p 83.

Fig 1. *A spurious relationship between cabinet type and cabinet longevity*

appears to be generated by *between-country* effects which are a function of party-system variables such as the effective number of parties.²¹

EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES AND PARTY CLEAVAGE STRUCTURE

Lijphart has sought to identify key aspects of party systems.²² He focuses on (1) prevalence of minimal winning cabinets, (2) cabinet durability, (3) effective number of parties, (4) number of issue dimensions and (5) electoral disproportionality (which is related to type of electoral system). Lijphart finds that these variables tend to be highly interrelated, but he has not sought to establish a causal sequence among them. I believe that, at least among the first four, the number of issue dimensions is temporally antecedent to the other variables;²³ although the effective number of parties may, over time, affect the dimensionality of issue conflict within a polity, since not all potential conflicts will be fought out within the political arena.²⁴

Lijphart finds a correlation across his twenty-one countries of 0.8 between mean effective number of parties and number of issue cleavages.²⁵ Taagepera and Grofman²⁶ point out that the relationship between effective number of parties (N) and number of issue dimensions (I) is very nicely fitted by the linear relationship

$$N = I + 1. \quad (1)$$

Taagepera has suggested that one model to account for this relationship is in terms of the creation of a new party orthogonal to the existing issue dimensions when new issue cleavages arise in the society.²⁷

Taagepera and Grofman also point out that the electoral system is highly correlated with number of issue dimensions;²⁸ the more dimensions of issue conflict within a society, the more likely the polity is to make use of a PR or semi-PR electoral system. Of course, as they note, the causal direction of this sequence is not clear and probably involves reciprocal causation. They argue that the evidence for the link between electoral system and number of parties posited by Duverger's Law and Duverger's Hypothesis can better be interpreted in terms of a system-level relationship between number of issue cleavages and effective number of parties.²⁹ They claim that the relationship between electoral sys-

²¹ For an alternative approach see Rein Taagepera, 'Reformulating the Cube Law for Proportional Representation Elections', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), 489-504, which proposes a new model to account for parameter values of a posited non-linear relationship.

²² Lijphart, *Democracies*.

²³ Taagepera and Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law'; Giovanni Sartori, 'The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?' in B. Grofman and A. Lijphart, eds, *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986).

²⁴ See E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1968).

²⁵ Lijphart, *Democracies*.

²⁶ Taagepera and Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law'.

²⁷ Taagepera, 'Reformulating the Cube Law'.

²⁸ Taagepera and Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law'; (personal communication, February 1987).

²⁹ See Maurice Duverger, 'The Influence of Electoral Systems on Political Life', *International Social Science Bulletin*, 3 (1951), 314-52; Maurice Duverger, 'Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later', in Grofman and Lijphart, eds, *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*; William Riker, 'The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science', *American Political Science Review*, 76 (1982), 753-66; and Giovanni Sartori, 'Political Development and Political Engineering', *Public Policy*, 17 (1968), 261-98.

tem and number of parties is in large part spurious and disappears when the number of issue dimensions is controlled. They also assert that the standard rationale for Duverger's Hypothesis (the 'mechanical effect' plus the 'psychological effect') only makes sense in a one-dimensional setting.

Taagepera and Grofman's argument that the link between electoral system and effective number of parties disappears when the number of issue dimensions is controlled suggests that, in similar fashion, the observed bivariate correlation between mean cabinet durability and effective number of parties might disappear when the number of issue dimensions is controlled.³⁰ However, number of parties has a more substantial effect in accounting for variation in cabinet duration than number of issue dimensions. The bivariate correlation between mean effective number of parties (N) and mean cabinet duration (for the Lijphart data set)³¹ is, as previously noted, -0.80 . The bivariate correlation between number of issue dimensions (I) and cabinet duration (D) for that data set is -0.70 . The multivariate relationship between two variables (I and N) and cabinet duration (D) is given by

$$D = -16.5 N + -10.1 I + 133.49 \quad (2)$$

and has an R^2 value of 0.82 (adjusted $r^2 = 0.63$).

Table 5 shows a correlation matrix for a number of variables that have been posited to

TABLE 5 *Correlation Matrix of Variables Related to Mean Cabinet Duration for Twenty Democracies in the Post-Second World War Period*

	Duration	Effective number of parties	Number of issues dimensions	Polarization	Consensus	Percentage MWC	Percentage minority governments
Duration	x	-0.80	-0.70	-0.61	0.03	0.67	-0.13
Effective number of parties		x	0.76	0.43	0.09	-0.80	0.27
Number of issue dimensions			x	0.58	0.19	-0.70	0.25
Polarization				x	-0.21	-0.63	0.19
Consensus					x	-0.21	0.76
Percentage						x	-0.52
Percentage minority governments							x

Source: Coding for all variables except Polarization and Consensus is Lijphart, *Democracies*. Polarization and Consensus values were assigned by the author (cf. Powell and G. Bingham, *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982); Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy*). France IV and France V are treated separately, Switzerland and the United States are omitted. All countries other than Denmark, Norway and Sweden are 0 on the Consensus variable. All countries other than Italy, Finland, France IV and France V are 0 on the Polarization value.

³⁰ Taagepera and Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law'.

³¹ Lijphart, *Democracies*.

be linked to cabinet durability.³² Entering these variables into a stepwise regression with duration as the dependent variable, effective number of parties (N) and polarization (P) are the only significant variables:

$$D = -20.3 N + -23.1 P + 124.8,$$

with a correlation of 0.85 and an adjusted r^2 of 0.69.

When we include data from four additional countries (Switzerland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, with data taken from Lijphart *et al.*)³³ N and P remain the only significant variables:

$$D = -18.4 N + -24.9 P + 117.7$$

with a correlation of 0.85 and an adjusted r^2 of 0.70.

DISCUSSION

The approach in this Note is similar to that of Lijphart, Luebbert, and Schofield.³⁴ Luebbert's position is that the most promising approach to understanding cabinet formation is 'typological-rational', in which country-specific differences in political motivation and political context are recognized. However, like Lijphart, Schofield, and Taagepera,³⁵ I find that quite general features of party systems, such as the effective number of parties, allow one to account well for much of the cross-national variation in both cabinet duration and cabinet type.³⁶ The other variable of independent importance seems to be the existence of polarized politics as signalled by the presence of anti-system parties with blackmail potential. The number of issue cleavages is a further potentially important factor, one which has been neglected in previous work on cabinet durability. Although it has no independent effect once we control for effective number of parties, it appears to be a variable at least in part temporally antecedent to, and highly correlated with, effective number of parties. Thus, there may be theoretical reasons why we should use it rather than effective number of parties as our major explanatory variable – since we sacrifice only a few hundredths of a point in r^2 .³⁷

³² There are other ways in which the cabinet duration variable might have been operationalized, but it is not likely that such differences would have affected our results (see Lijphart, 'Measures of Cabinet Durability'). However, like Lijphart ('A Note on the Meaning of Cabinet Durability'), I would caution against 'the facile assumption that cabinet durability necessarily spells regime stability' in some broader meaning of the latter term. Like Lijphart, I find cabinet duration to be a variable of sufficient intrinsic interest to be worthy of study.

³³ Arend Lijphart, Thomas C Bruneau, P. Nikifors Diamandouros and Richard Gunther, 'A Mediterranean Model of Democracy. The Southern European Democracies in Comparative Perspective', *West European Politics*, 11 (1988), 7–25

³⁴ See Lijphart, *Democracies*; Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy*, and Norman Schofield, 'Coalitions in West European Democracies: 1945–1986', in N Schofield, ed., *Coalition Models* (Boston, Mass., Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1989, forthcoming)

³⁵ Taagepera, 'Reformulating the Cube Law',

³⁶ See also Jean Blondel, 'Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1 (1968), 180–203

³⁷ If I replaces C , and with D (as usual) the dependent variable, we obtain a multivariate equation with I , MWC and P which has a multiple correlation of 0.77. If the mean vote share of the largest party replaces N (with data for twenty countries, 1945–80, from Manus Midlarski, 'Political Stability of Two-Party and Multiparty Systems: Probabilistic Bases for the Comparison of Party Systems', *American Political Science Review*, 78 (1984), 929–57, p 944), we obtain a multiple correlation of 0.8,

If the central thesis of this Note is correct, we currently lack an adequate theory to account for *within*-country variations in cabinet duration. None the less, I remain sceptical that the process of cabinet dissolution is best described purely in terms of a random-events, Poisson-type model.³⁸ One plausible possibility is that the answer is in terms of a model which characterizes the set of alternatives to the prevailing coalition – the more such alternatives and the more viable they are on balance, the more likely that the coalition in place will be replaced when some exogenous shock affects its ability to govern.³⁹ Moreover, the high correlation between system-level variables which tap the effective number of parties and the dimensionality of issue conflict with cabinet durability is a finding in need of an explanation. Very recent theoretical work on spatial games suggests ways of characterizing the extent to which a governing coalition is vulnerable to dissolution because of the temptation of competing coalitions.

One possible approach is inspired by the work of Richard McKelvey and his colleagues. McKelvey, and Ferejohn, McKelvey and Packel have introduced the concept of the *yolk*.⁴⁰ In two dimensions the *yolk* is the minimum circle which intersects all median lines. (Median lines are those which cut the plane so that the preferred policy positions of at least half the legislators are on or to either side of the line.) The larger the radius of the *yolk* relative to the area occupied by the set of party/legislation locations, the further away we are from a single *core* element (i.e., an alternative that can defeat all other possible issue locations). Properties of the *yolk* have been investigated by Feld *et al.* and by Feld, Grofman and Miller.⁴¹ I conjecture that the greater the size of the *yolk* (relative to

again with *P* as the second significant variable. If mean total number of parties in the legislature replaces *N* (data for eighteen countries for the period 1964–74 taken from Mayer, 'Party Systems and Government Stability', in Peter H. Merkl, ed., *Western European Party Systems Trends and Prospects* (New York: Free Press, 1980), pp. 335–57, p. 342), we obtain a multiple correlation of 0.77, with *i* rather than *P* as the second significant variable. In a stepwise regression with eight independent variables available, *N* and *P* are the two variables which enter as significant at an *F* cutoff of 2.0.

³⁸ See Eric C. Browne, John Frendreis and Dennis Gleiber, 'An "Events" Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability', *Comparative Political Studies*, 17 (1984), 167–97; Eric C. Browne, John Frendreis and Dennis Gleiber, 'Dissolution of Governments in Scandinavia. A Critical Events Perspective', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 9 (1986), 93–110; Eric C. Browne, John Frendreis and Dennis Gleiber, 'The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies', *American Journal of Political Science*, 30 (1986), 628–50; Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 'The Political Reliability of Italian Government. An Exponential Survival Model', *American Political Science Review*, 78 (1984), 318–37; and John P. Frendreis, Dennis Gleiber and Eric C. Browne, 'The Study of Cabinet Dissolutions in Parliamentary Democracies', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11 (1986), 619–28.

³⁹ See John D. Robertson, 'The Political Economy and the Durability of European Coalition Cabinets: New Variations on a Game-Theoretic Perspective', *Journal of Politics*, 45 (1983), 933–57; and John D. Robertson, 'Toward a Political-Economic Accounting of the Endurance of Cabinet Administrations: An Empirical Assessment of Eight European Democracies', *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1984), 693–709.

⁴⁰ Richard McKelvey, 'Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice', *American Journal of Political Science*, 30 (1986), 283–315; and J. A. Ferejohn, R. D. McKelvey and E. W. Packel, 'Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Models', *Social Choice and Welfare*, 1 (1984), 45–67.

⁴¹ Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartley, Mark O. Kilgour and Nicholas Miller, 'The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games', *Theory and Decision*, 23 (1987), 129–56; and Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman and Nicholas R. Miller, 'Limits of Agenda Control in Spatial Voting Games', *Mathematical Modelling* (1988, forthcoming).

the Pareto set), the greater the instability of any given winning coalition. In particular the size of the yolk (relative to the Pareto set) should be inversely related to cabinet longevity. *Ceteris paribus*, the higher the number of issue dimensions, the larger the expected size of the yolk.⁴²

Another potential explanation of the inverse link between number of parties and cabinet durability is based on the relationship between dimensionality and the relative size and location of the largest party. Schofield, Grofman and Feld show that the higher the number of issue dimensions, the less the likelihood of a political party large enough to be a 'stable core' party.⁴³ A *core party* is located at an issue position which cannot be defeated by any majority coalition. A core party is *stable* if small changes in party locations do not change its status as a core party. They regard the absence of a stable core party as leading to cabinet break-up because, if exogenous events change party preferences even slightly, there are competing winning coalitions that could form with outcomes preferred to that produced by the present coalition. Taagepera and Grofman show that, empirically, the higher the effective number of political parties, the higher the expected number of issue dimensions;⁴⁴ thus this line of approach suggests why a large number of political parties may be associated with low cabinet durations.

Testing models such as those of McKelvey or Schofield, Grofman and Feld requires data on spatial maps of party/policy dimensions which have only recently become available as a result of the efforts of the European Party Manifesto Project.⁴⁵ Thus, the next few years should be exciting ones in terms of new developments in cabinet coalition research.

⁴² See Norman Schofield, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld, 'The Core and Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games', *American Political Science Review*, 82 (1988), 196–211.

⁴³ Schofield, Grofman and Feld, 'The Core and Stability'.

⁴⁴ Taagepera and Grofman, 'Effective Size'; 'Rethinking Duverger's Law'. Taagepera, 'The Inverse Square Law', offers a similar sort of explanation, although its inspiration is not in game theoretic models but in terms of his own earlier work on seats–votes relationships (see Taagepera, 'Reformulating the Cube Law').

⁴⁵ See Ian Budge and Michael Laver, 'Party, Ideology and Party Distance. Analysis of Election Programmes in 19 Democracies', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11 (1986), 607–17; and Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl, eds, *Ideology, Strategy and Party Movement: A Comparative Analysis of a Post-war Election Programme in Nineteen Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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Controlling Theatre Nuclear War

DESMOND BALL

Over the past decade, official defence establishments and independent strategic analysts have devoted increasing attention to the command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) systems which support the US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and to the role of these systems in crises and in strategic nuclear war-fighting. However, theatre C³I systems have received relatively little attention. This article addresses certain aspects of command and control in the European theatre – which, notwithstanding the magnitude of the threat, has a more developed, extensive, comprehensive, sophisticated and practised C³I architecture than that of any other theatre. The primary concern is the implications of the complexity and vulnerabilities of the theatre C³I system for the control of escalation during a major conflict in Europe. It also explores some connections between the theatre and global/strategic C³I systems which suggest that a major war in Europe would greatly impede the transition to any limited or controlled strategic nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Over the past decade, both official defence establishments and independent strategic analysts have devoted increasing attention to the command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) systems which support the US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and to the role of these systems in crises and in strategic nuclear war-fighting. In particular, specific consideration has been given to such critical issues as the extent to which current strategic C³I systems enhance crisis stability or instability, and whether or not they would serve to control escalation in the event of a strategic nuclear exchange or, because of their vulnerabilities, would in fact contribute to the dynamics of the escalation process.

Several publications have now directly addressed the central issues concerning strategic command and control systems, capabilities and processes. Paul Bracken's *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* argued persuasively that the dynamic interaction of US and Soviet C³I systems in a crisis could well serve to exacerbate the situation and, indeed, as the systems are generated to increasingly higher alert levels, could lead to irresistible pressures for pre-emption.¹ Bruce Blair's *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat*,² together with John Steinbruner's article on 'Nuclear Decapitation',³

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University. An expanded version of this article will appear in Carlo Schaerf, Brian Holdon Reid and David Carlton, eds, *New Technologies and the Arms Race* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1989). The author and Editors gratefully acknowledge the permission of the editors and publishers of that collection to use much of the same material here.

¹ Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1983).

² Bruce G. Blair, *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985).

³ John Steinbruner, 'Nuclear Decapitation', *Foreign Policy*, No. 45 (Winter 1981-82), 16-28.

demonstrated that, historically, the US strategic C³I system has been much more vulnerable than the strategic forces which it supports, and hence has provided an extremely lucrative target set – with unfortunate consequences for crisis stability. Indeed, as Steinbruner has argued, the vulnerability of the US C³I system offers the ‘only imaginable route’ by which the Soviets might hope to achieve ‘decisive victory in nuclear war’.⁴

My own work has been concerned with the functioning of C³I systems *during* a strategic nuclear exchange and, in particular, with the ability of such systems to provide continued, informed and responsive control over the strategic nuclear forces beyond the very early stages of a strategic nuclear exchange. It would be extremely difficult to maintain control over such an exchange beyond several hours or several tens of nuclear detonations. Limited nuclear war or controlled nuclear war-fighting is more a chimera than the basis of a sound national strategic policy.⁵

Daniel Ford’s *The Button* offers a further perspective. It argues, at least implicitly, that the inability of the US strategic C³I system to survive any first strike against it, or to provide any subsequent responsive control over the strategic nuclear forces, derives from conscious or more likely subconscious design – i.e., that neither the US Air Force nor the Navy have ever accepted the basic US national strategic policy of flexible response and controlled escalation but, rather, the Air Force continues to adhere to a preferred policy of massive pre-emption while the Navy remains committed to massive retaliation.⁶

No similar studies have been published with respect to theatre C³I systems. There have, of course, been numerous official (classified) analyses of the vulnerability of the various theatre C³I systems to nuclear effects and, more recently, to attacks by Soviet special forces (i.e. Spetsnaz operations). However, such critical issues as the extent to which these theatre systems are designed to support crisis management and to function across the spectrum from peacetime operations through various levels of conflict to the large-scale employment of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons, and whether in fact their inability to perform as planned would actually exacerbate the dynamics of the escalation process, have not been addressed.⁷

This is especially remarkable since the likelihood of theatre nuclear war is somewhat greater than that of strategic nuclear war. Indeed, it is difficult to envisage any strategic nuclear exchange which has not been preceded by very extensive use of nuclear weapons in one or more theatres.

⁴ Steinbruner, ‘Nuclear Decapitation’, p. 19.

⁵ Desmond Ball, *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?* Adelphi Paper No. 169 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

⁶ Daniel Ford, *The Button: The Nuclear Trigger — Does It Work?* (London: Unwin, 1986).

⁷ Some noteworthy exceptions to this observation are Shaun Gregory, ‘The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons’ (Peace Research Report No. 13, School of Peace Research, University of Bradford, December 1986), Daniel Charles, *Nuclear Planning in NATO: Pitfalls of First Use* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), and Catherine McArdle Kelleher, ‘NATO Nuclear Operations’, in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket, eds, *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 445–69.

Further, theatre C³I systems are even more vulnerable than their strategic counterparts and, moreover, it is likely that theatre nuclear wars would be even more demanding on C³I systems than would strategic nuclear exchanges. Hence, as General Richard C. Ellis, former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) noted in 1982, 'if you think we're in trouble in strategic connectivity, we're in terrible trouble in the battlefield theater area'.⁸

The various factors impacting upon the design and operation of theatre and tactical C³ architectures were described by Dr Donald C. Latham, then the US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C³I) in testimony in March 1982 as follows:

The thing we are faced with [concerning theater and tactical C³ systems] is a very wide range of potential conflicts that really stress the system in terms of the geography you have to fight over, the types of forces you might meet, and so on.

So, the architecture, or how we would construct the system, is really driven by some quite unique theater aspects. For example, and these are just examples in Europe... high threat; NATO and interoperability; and nuclear weapons... In the Pacific of course it is somewhat different – there is very expanded geography, there are a lot of joint operations... The North Koreans have a very formidable capability. Going in there and reinforcing and coping with that threat drives a given kind of [unique] force structure and supporting C³.

In the Third World so far perhaps a different set of crises, but also demanding in the way you would be able to handle the forces.

If you look at the influences, then, on this, there are some very unique service interests. There are joint operations aspects, and of course the allied views – interoperability is key here. IFF [Interrogation Friend or Foe],... how do you tell a German aircraft from a British, from an American, and talk to each other?⁹

In summary, theatre C³I systems contain added complexities introduced by the necessity to co-ordinate operations with allies and other second parties, many of whom do not speak English and lack interoperable C³ systems. In some theatres, such as Southwest Asia, Africa and South America, the C³I architectures are comparatively rudimentary and unpractised. For example, an assessment by the Department of Defense of the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 found that the US Navy and Army used incompatible UHF communications systems, and that shipborne satellite communications equipment was not designed for manoeuvring operations:

Poor communications was the single most glaring deficiency of the entire operations.

Communications between JTF-120 and Army ground forces were practically non-existent. All ground operations were conducted using the same single net, since JTF-120 had no other communications capability which could link with Army ground forces, although both Army and Navy forces have UHF, the frequencies are incompatible and therefore, UHF could not be used.

⁸ General Richard C. Ellis, in 'Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence' (Program of Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, 1982), p. 2

⁹ US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5968* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), Part 3, p. 991.

Every time a ship would turn, communication was lost until the antenna could be manually readjusted. The net result was lack of communication during critical stages of the operations.¹⁰

As General John A. Wickham, Chief of Staff of the Army, explained in Congressional testimony on 25 February 1986,

There were problems of communications. There will be problems in the future .

The satellite antennas on the top of Navy ships had problems in lock-on. We hadn't thought about ships steaming around as opposed to steady on a certain course.¹¹

The geographical areas of some theatres are 'very expanded' compared to the continental United States (CONUS) or Europe, while the distances from Washington and the major CONUS C³I centres further increase the communications difficulties. In the case of the naval theatre, the C³I architecture is not only highly vulnerable; there are also grave deficiencies in the ability of National Command Authorities to exercise negative control, let alone precise and timely control, over significant aspects of naval operations involving nuclear forces.¹²

This article addresses certain aspects of command and control in the European theatre – which, notwithstanding the magnitude of the threat, has a more developed, extensive, comprehensive, sophisticated and practised C³I architecture than that of any other theatre. The primary concern is the implications of the complexity and vulnerabilities of the theatre C³I system for the control of escalation during a major conflict in Europe. It also explores some connections between the theatre and global/strategic C³I systems which suggest that a major war in Europe would greatly impede the transition to any limited or controlled strategic nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union.

THE COMPLEXITY OF THE EUROPEAN THEATRE C³I ARCHITECTURE

It is difficult to envisage a decision-making process or a C³I system as complex or as less capable of functioning in a timely and responsive manner than that of NATO. The Organization consists of sixteen sovereign nations, speaking a dozen different languages, and each with different military capabilities, national interests and threat perceptions. Three countries have independent national nuclear capabilities, while another six are involved in joint control of US nuclear weapon systems. There are far more nuclear weapons deployed in this theatre than in any other, and these weapons vary greatly in terms of their ranges, yields, purposes and effects – and hence in terms of their C³I requirements. The picture is further complicated by the existence of several dual-capable weapons systems.

Indeed, the decision-making process is so complex that the most likely outcomes are chaos and paralysis interspersed with precipitous activity. This is

¹⁰ US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), Part 1, p. 159.

¹¹ US Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987*, p. 140.

¹² See Desmond Ball, 'Nuclear War at Sea', *International Security*, 10 (1985/86), 3–31.

recognized within NATO itself. There is a popular joke at NATO headquarters, recently related by Daniel Charles as follows:

One of the most difficult decisions confronting Soviet military planners in the event that they attack Western Europe will be whether to bomb the Alliance's headquarters or not. They probably won't, so as to ensure a maximum degree of confusion within NATO.¹³

The Alliance is structured so that there are essentially separate channels of political decision-making and military command and control.¹⁴ The highest political authority is the North Atlantic Council, which consists of 'permanent representatives' from each of the sixteen NATO member countries, and which is located at NATO headquarters in Evere, northeast of the centre of Brussels. The Defence Planning Committee (DPC), which is composed of representatives of all the member countries except France, deals with matters specifically related to defence. The DPC provides the forum in which the member governments would express their views on the political and military objectives of any proposed use of nuclear weapons, as well as discuss such particular – and extremely critical – issues as alert measures (LERTCON levels) and dispersal of the NATO nuclear forces. The views of the six countries which host NATO nuclear forces (West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Turkey), in addition to those of the United States and the United Kingdom, would be particularly important in these deliberations. Although France withdrew its personnel from the NATO integrated Military Headquarters and terminated the assignment of its forces to the international commands in 1966, it is reasonable to assume that it would be consulted on these critical decisions in the event of war.

On the military side, there are innumerable headquarters and commands – including those of NATO itself, those of the US forces in Europe, and those of the European countries. Many of these commands are dual-hatted. Others are peacetime structures and would devolve into other arrangements in wartime situations.

The highest military authority in NATO is the Military Committee, which is responsible 'for making recommendations to the [North Atlantic] Council and the Defence Planning Committee on those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area, and for supplying guidance on military matters to the Major NATO Commanders'.¹⁵ In peacetime, the armed forces of the various member countries remain under national command structures, but in wartime they would transfer (or 'chop') to an integrated NATO command structure consisting of three Major Commands: Allied Command Europe (ACE), commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), whose headquarters are the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

¹³ Charles, *Nuclear Planning in NATO*, p. 19.

¹⁴ *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984), Chaps 4 and 5; and *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1986).

¹⁵ *NATO Handbook*, p. 35.

(SHAPE) at Casteau, on the outskirts of Mons, about 60 km. southwest of Brussels; Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia; and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN), headed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN), headquartered in Northwood, UK. These are each two-hatted commands; SACEUR is a four-star US General who in peacetime is the US Commander-in-Chief Europe (USCINCEUR); SACLANT is a US Admiral who in peacetime is Commander-in-Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT); and CINCHAN is a British Admiral who as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet is Britain's most senior naval commander and who in wartime would also serve as the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT) – which is, however, subordinate to SACLANT!¹⁶

The highest US command in Europe is the US European Command (USEUCOM), headquartered at Vaihingen, an outer suburb of Stuttgart in West Germany. USEUCOM has three components; US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), headquartered at Ramstein, about 60 km. south of Frankfurt; US Army Europe (USAEUR), headquartered in Heidelberg; and US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR), headquartered in Grosvenor Square, London. In wartime, USEUCOM staff at Vaihingen (Stuttgart) would split, with some personnel transferring to SACEUR's wartime headquarters at Casteau (Mons), forming the US element of the international staff of SACEUR, and the others moving to the new wartime headquarters of USEUCOM at High Wycombe, UK.¹⁷ Similarly, the USAEUR staff in Heidelberg would also split in wartime, with some transferring to the headquarters of the ACE Central Army Group at Seckenheim, FRG, and the others moving to the wartime USAEUR headquarters in Massweiler, FRG. It is doubtful whether such organizational rearrangements and command and staff movements would be conducive to orderly planning and timely operations – yet they would probably occur at precisely that point in a conflict when orderliness and timeliness would be at a premium.

The complexity of the multinational peacetime/wartime command arrangements involves numerous other officers – and especially British and West German officers – in two-hatted positions. In the case of the Royal Navy (RN), for example, not only does the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet hold the NATO posts of CINCHAN and CINCEASTLANT, but his two subordinate operational commanders each also holds two NATO posts: the Flag Officer at Plymouth is also both the Commander of Plymouth Channel (COMPLYMCHAN), subordinate to CINCHAN, and Commander of the Central Atlantic (COMCENTLANT), subordinate to CINCEASTLANT and SACLANT; and the Flag Officer at Pitreavie is both Commander of the North Channel (COMNORCHAN), subordinate to CINCHAN, and Commander of the North Atlan-

¹⁶ See Figures 1, 2 and 3 in Desmond Ball, 'Controlling Theater Nuclear War', in Schaerf, Holton and Carlton, eds, *New Technologies and the Arms Race*, derived from *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Facts and Figures*, pp. 102–12

¹⁷ Charles, *Nuclear Planning in Europe*, pp. 127–8.

tic (COMNORLANT), also subordinate to CINCEASTLANT and SACLANT.¹⁸

In the case of the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Strike Command also holds the NATO position of Commander-in-Chief UK Air (CINCUKAIR), subordinate to SACEUR. The Commander of 18 Group of Strike Command (which is equipped with nuclear-armed Nimrod and Buccaneer aircraft for ASW and maritime strike missions) is also the (NATO) Commander of the Air East Atlantic (COMMAIREASTLANT) and Commander of the Air Channel (COMMAIRCHAN), both of which are subordinate to SACLANT. Finally, the commander of RAF Germany, which is based at München-Gladbach and which is part of NATO's multinational Second Allied Tactical Air Force (2 ATAF), is also Commander of 2 ATAF and hence subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCAFCE) and thence to SACEUR.¹⁹

An obvious although quite impolitic question concerns the ultimate loyalties of these two-hatted commanders.²⁰ It is reasonable to assume that the senior NATO commanders would maintain some form of communication with their own national authorities.²¹ How would CINCHAN act if directed to one action by NATO and another by the British political authority? Although British forces assigned to SACEUR require a specific order from him to use British nuclear weapons, would the Commander 2 ATAF go against a negative SACEUR decision if he was instructed by the British Prime Minister to use a Jaguar or Tornado or Harrier with nuclear weapons to save an element of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR)? Alternatively, would the CINCEASTLANT refuse to pass on an order from SACLANT to use a British nuclear depth bomb to defend a US/NATO Poseidon SSBN if the British Government remained opposed to any use of nuclear weapons?

This picture is further complicated by the existence of national US, British and French nuclear forces and associated C³I systems which are independent of the NATO arrangements – such as Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) aboard US attack submarines (SSNs), and the British and French submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

This complexity extends from the command arrangements to the supporting communications and battlefield command and control information systems (CCIS). As a result of a NATO directive which permits each member nation to provide its own communications and CCIS systems up to Corps level, there is now a multiplicity of such systems with little interoperability. According to one review, there are at least six NATO battlefield communications systems: Ptarmigan (UK), RITA (Belgium and USA), Autokonetz (FRG), Zodiac (Netherlands), Tri-tak (USA), and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (USA). Only

¹⁸ Gregory, *The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 92–3.

¹⁹ Gregory, *The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 85–6.

²⁰ Gregory, *The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons*, p. 86.

²¹ Charles, *Nuclear Planning in Europe*, p. 128.

Ptarmigan and Zodiac are directly interoperable with one another, and none are directly interoperable with NATO's Integrated Communications System (NICS).²² In the case of battlefield CCIS, there are the US STOMA/SIGMA, the West German HEROS, and the British WAVELL systems. A similar situation obtains with regard to artillery fire control systems and many other important electronic systems.²³ In the case of IFF systems, US aircraft are equipped with systems which operate in the D-band (formerly known as the L-band) while West German systems operate in the E/F-band (formerly known as the S-band).²⁴ (In some exercises, as many as half of the participating NATO aircraft have been 'shot down' because of the lack of IFF commonality.)²⁵

One authoritative study of theatre communications and CCIS systems has concluded as follows:

For the typical senior commander, allied or US, whose forces must use these systems, they represent the largely unplanned splicing together of ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties far away who have co-ordinated adequately neither with him and his staff nor with each other. And they neither exploit the present capabilities of technology nor does the system for their development adequately provide that future systems will.²⁶

More succinctly, despite the enormous investments and the technical sophistication of the equipments involved, it remains the case that NATO 'cannot accomplish the major aims of a modern C³ system'.²⁷

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN THEATRE C³I ARCHITECTURE

C³I systems are invariably more vulnerable than the forces they control and support. Many of the measures which can be taken to enhance the survivability of the weapons systems are not applicable to C³I systems. Weapons systems can be hardened, but it is difficult to harden satellite ground stations, early warning radars, large HF or VLF communication systems, or signals intelligence (SIGINT) antennas. Some weapons systems can be camouflaged, but satellite control stations, radars and communications stations produce strong and readily identifiable electromagnetic emissions. Weapons systems can be dispersed or

²² Gregory, *The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons*, p. 99.

²³ Gregory, *The Command and Control of British Nuclear Weapons*, p. 100.

²⁴ Michael Feazel, 'NATO debates electronic warfare spending levels', *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 2 April 1984, pp. 62-5; 'Choice of common frequency emerges as major IFF issue', *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 21 May 1984, p. 98; and 'US, NATO agree in principle on IFF frequencies approach', *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 8 October 1984, p. 27.

²⁵ 'IFF frequency debate nearing resolution?', *Defense Electronics*, October 1984, p. 21.

²⁶ Lt Gen. John H. Cushman, 'Command and Control of Theater Forces' (Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, April 1983), p. ES-3.

²⁷ Franz-Joseph Schultz, 'C³ in NATO', in Werner Kaltefleiter and Ulricke Schumacher, eds, *Conflicts, Options, Strategies in a Threatened World* (Kiel: Institute of Political Science, Christian-Albrecht University, 1982), p. 223.

deployed in some mobile mode, but it has proved difficult to design C³I systems with any substantial degree of mobility, and the requirements of centralized command place practical constraints on the extent to which some critical elements can be dispersed. Moreover, C³I systems are generally more vulnerable not just to all the threats to which the forces are subject but also to others more peculiar to command structures and telecommunications systems.²⁸

The multiplicity of NATO and national command centres and communication networks provides more aim points for Soviet military planners, but it does little to enhance the redundancy and survivability of the theatre C³I architecture overall. Virtually all of the command centres and communications systems are soft, and there is very little interoperability.

The C³I facilities in the European theatre are vulnerable to a wide range of Soviet actions – including nuclear strikes, conventional and chemical weapons attacks, Spetsnaz operations and radio-electronic combat (REC) activities.

The author has listed elsewhere some sixty critical C³I points in the European theatre which, if destroyed or incapacitated, would completely nullify any capacity for controlled, informed, or responsive military operations within the theatre.²⁹ The list is not meant to be definitive or to imply anything about Soviet/Warsaw Pact targeting doctrine or plans. Apart from the NATO headquarters in Evere in Brussels, the USNAVEUR headquarters in London, the HQ Commander Iberian Atlantic Area in Lisbon, and the HQ Commander Allied Forces South Norway in Oslo, it does not include the national capitals. (There are good and obvious reasons why the Soviet Union might wish to exclude the national capitals from any initial counter-C³I strike.) In fact, it would clearly be unnecessary to destroy all of the sites listed. Many of them are subordinate headquarters which would be unable to operate following the destruction of their superior commands. The continued operation of many of the early warning, intelligence and communications stations would be futile in the absence of survivable centralized processing command and relay centres. Indeed, it is likely that the destruction or incapacitation of less than twenty of these sixty sites would totally immobilize command and control across the whole European theatre.

Very few of the European C³I facilities have any significant degree of protection against nuclear blast effects or even sustained assault by conventional ordnance. The only hardened underground command centres are the 'Pindar' bunker beneath the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, London;³⁰ the alternative British governmental headquarters at Hawthorn and the associated wartime headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee (CISC) at Corsham, in Wiltshire;³¹ the West German 'emergency government' complex in the Eifel

²⁸ See Ball, *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?*, pp 9–14.

²⁹ These are listed in Ball, 'Controlling Theater Nuclear War', Appendix, pp. 268–74.

³⁰ Duncan Campbell and Patrick Forbes, 'New Whitehall bunker', *New Statesman*, 26 July 1985, p. 6, and Paul Brown, 'MoD digs deep for bunker', *The Guardian*, 25 July 1985, p. 4.

³¹ Duncan Campbell, 'Maggie's bunker', *New Statesman*, 24 September 1982, pp. 6–8.

Mountains near Marienthal, about 20 km. south of Bonn;³² the new underground wartime SHAPE headquarters at Casteau;³³ the alternative wartime headquarters of NATO's Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF) at Kinsbach, FRG;³⁴ the RN/CINCHAN underground headquarters at Northwood, Middlesex;³⁵ the underground RAF/Strike Command/CINCUKAIR headquarters at High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, which has recently³⁶ been extended to include a new underground wartime headquarters for USEUCOM; the underground wartime headquarters of NATO's Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples;³⁷ the French National Military Command Centre at Taverny, Val-d'Oise; the alternate French underground national military command centre at Mount Verdun (Lyons), Rhône; and the underground command centre for the French SSBN force at Houilles, Yvelines.³⁸ None of these underground centres could withstand blast overpressures of more than 1,000 psi, and hence they would be unable to survive deliberate nuclear strikes.

The decision to construct the alternative underground USEUCOM headquarters at High Wycombe, which was taken by the US Department of Defense and approved by the US Congress and the British Government in 1982, was the subject of considerable controversy. On 29 March 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger issued the *Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense Guidance* which instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to establish a European Command war headquarters in the United Kingdom by 1986 as part of a survivable European command and control system.

The command and control system must ... survive enemy attack, including biological warfare and chemical warfare agents, nuclear effects, and acts of sabotage.³⁹

The requirement for the underground war headquarters at High Wycombe was justified to Congress as follows:

Until 1967, HQ USEUCOM was located near Paris. However, when France directed all foreign forces to leave her soil, USEUCOM moved to Patch Barracks at [Vaihingen] Stuttgart, Germany. The selection of Patch was an expedient. At the time, Patch was the only available location with facilities which could accommodate HQ USEUCOM. From a military standpoint, Patch has never been considered an acceptable wartime location. It

³² 'Preparing for a nuclear war: W. Germany tests an emergency government', *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 9 March 1981, p. 1.

³³ Duncan Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier. American Military Power in Britain* (London Michael Joseph, 1984), p. 187.

³⁴ Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier*, p. 74.

³⁵ Harold Jackson and David Fairhall, 'US to pull back war centre to Britain', *The Guardian*, 10 December 1982, pp. 1, 28.

³⁶ Jackson and Fairhall, 'US to pull back', p. 28.

³⁷ Jackson and Fairhall, 'US to pull back', p. 28; and Charles, *Nuclear Planning in NATO*, p. 128.

³⁸ William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race* (Cambridge, Mass. Ballinger, 1985), pp. 282-7.

³⁹ Richard Halloran, 'US plans war headquarters in Britain', *New York Times*, 11 December 1982, p. 3.

is too close to potential attacking forces, and its [deleted] provide nothing in the way of protection...

Current Situation – HQ USEUCOM currently occupies soft, above-ground facilities. They are malpositioned, extremely vulnerable and completely unsuitable for a wartime headquarters.

Impact If Not Provided – If this facility is not provided HQ USEUCOM will not have a survivable facility from which to conduct its wartime mission.⁴⁰

Although the threat of Soviet chemical weapons attacks against command centres has been recognised within NATO for more than a decade, it remains the case that only a handful have been protected against such a contingency. One is the new semi-hardened alternate war headquarters for the US Air Forces Europe (USAFE). According to testimony presented to Congress in 1984,

This facility is a chemically and biologically (CB) protected command post with reinforced concrete walls, roof and floor slab. It includes communication and computer centres, decontamination areas, stand-by power plant, vault and staff areas. Exterior walls and roof are constructed of 65 centimeters (25.5 inches) of reinforced concrete and armor plate doors.⁴¹

In fact, the Soviet Union could easily destroy all but about a dozen sites in the whole European C³I architecture with special forces using only conventional ordnance. The Soviet military literature frequently alludes to the value of sabotage or 'diversionary' operations against command, communications, early warning, navigation and electric power facilities, and some 380 Spetsnaz teams are reported to have been specifically organized for operations against NATO C³ facilities.⁴² This is sufficient to dedicate at least one team to every command centre, satellite ground station, ACE HIGH communications station and SIGINT collection facility in Western Europe.

Communications Systems

Numerous communications networks have been deployed in Europe over the past three decades to support both NATO and national defence forces. The most important of these are:⁴³ the ACE HIGH tropospheric scatter/microwave system, which consists of forty-nine tropospheric scatter links and forty line-of-sight microwave links, extending from northern Norway through western Europe to Turkey, which has 570 voice, 260 telegraph and sixty data circuits, and which provides the minimum essential transmission system for early

⁴⁰ US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1983* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), Part 1, p. 1406, and US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1983* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), Part 5, p. 206.

⁴¹ US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1985* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), Part 6, p. 187.

⁴² William Schneider, 'Trends in Soviet frontal aviation', *Air Force Magazine*, March 1979, p. 76.

⁴³ R. J. Raggett, ed., *Jane's Military Communications 1987*, 8th edn (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1987), pp 791–5.

warning, alert condition (LERTCON) and implementation signals; the NATO satellite communications (SATCOM) system, which has twenty-one fixed ground terminals, including one in almost all of the NATO countries; the British SKYNET SATCOM system; the US Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), which has some two dozen ground terminals in western Europe; the US Cemetery Net HF system for the transmission of Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) to '[nuclear] field storage sites, delivery units and mobile and fixed command headquarters';⁴⁴ the NATO Last Talk HF system;⁴⁵ the Cross Fox HF system for communications between shore-based and fleet-based NATO commands; the European Military Telephone Network for the US armed forces in Germany; the US Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) and Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) systems; the US Air Force's North Atlantic Relay System (NARS), which provides a tropospheric scatter radio relay link between the United States and Britain across Canada, Greenland and Iceland;⁴⁶ and the Initial Voice Switched Network (IVSN) and Telegraph Automatic Relay Equipment (TARE) voice and message switching facilities.

The total number of facilities in these systems amounts to about 200. However, they have poor survivability and endurance, and are generally vulnerable to Soviet radio-electronic combat (REC) activities. Most of the facilities are soft, and what little efforts at hardening have been made have been inconsistent. For example, some microwave relay towers have been hardened, but 'we ... have routed the waveguides into these towers out in the open, where they can easily be destroyed'.⁴⁷ Some sub-systems (such as NATO's new 'shelterized' transportable HF equipment) are hardened against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 'but we have not yet an EMP-protected network'.⁴⁸

The various systems also have relatively few nodal points. Although the ACE HIGH network has eighty-nine links, there are so few nodes that, according to a NATO official, 'about a dozen Russian satchel charges could take the whole thing out'.⁴⁹ The NATO SATCOM network has only two master control stations (Kester in Belgium and Naples in Italy), although it is likely that the British SKYNET master control station at Oakhanger, Hampshire, and the US DSCS Network Control Facility (NCF) at Landstuhl, FRG, could also control the NATO satellites. There are only three AUTODIN Switching Centres in Europe (Croughton in the UK, Pirmasens in the FRG, and Coltano in Italy), while all AUTOVON connections between the United States and Europe pass

⁴⁴ Defense Marketing Services (DMS), 'EUCOM C³', *DMS Market Intelligence Report* (Greenwich, Conn. DMS Inc., March 1982).

⁴⁵ Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier*, p. 184.

⁴⁶ Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier*, pp. 86-7, 226.

⁴⁷ Major-General Joachim M. Sochaczewski, 'The Role of Communications in NATO', *Military Technology*, No. 6 (1984), p. 154. See also 'NATO planning enhanced C³ over decade', *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 7 November 1983, p. 81.

⁴⁸ Sochaczewski, 'The Role of Communications in NATO', p. 154.

⁴⁹ Cited in Benjamin F. Schemmer, 'No NATO C³I "check-out counter"', *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 1982, p. 92.

through Hillingdon in Britain.⁵⁰ Pirmasens is also the headquarters of the Cemetery Net System.⁵¹

These communications systems are also vulnerable to Soviet jamming. For example, on one occasion in the late 1970s when extensive use of electronic counter-measures (ECM) was permitted during an exercise in Europe, the exercise ground to a halt after only some 30 minutes.

The PTT Network

The national PTT networks carry about 50 per cent of the NATO telecommunications circuitry.⁵² In some countries, the PTT system is more efficient, redundant, hardened and secure than the US and/or NATO systems. For example, the West German PTT system, which extends into several other NATO countries, has some 7,000 'entry points' and its buried Grundnet is relatively hardened and secure. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the German PTT system is better than the dedicated US telecommunications systems in Europe.⁵³

On the other hand, the national PTT systems contain some quite debilitating weaknesses. Even the West German PTT system has significant vulnerabilities. In Berlin, for example, there are several points where the underground cables cross into the Eastern sector and are known to be tapped by both Soviet and East German security/intelligence services. None of the national PTT systems are hardened against electromagnetic pulse (EMP). They are all vulnerable to Soviet signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations. And even though some national systems have relatively good redundancy and survivability, 'the cross-border connectivity is very often poor, relying heavily on a few very soft choke points'.⁵⁴

Further, while some national PTT systems are quite efficient, others – and particularly those on the southern flank – are rudimentary. According to General Richard Ellis, former Commander in Chief of SAC, for example:

You might be amused by some of the exposure I had to NATO command and control... In 1971 I was sitting happily in Wiesbaden, Germany, as vice commander in chief of US Forces Europe, and unexpectedly I was sent to Ismir, Turkey, as commander of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force. That is the easternmost projection of NATO's air power... My communications – when I walked into my office, I'll never forget the terrible shock. The phone looked like a World War I instrument. I picked it up, finally somebody answered, and he sounded like he was on the other side of the world. And I said, 'Who is this?' and his voice said, 'I'm your secretary.' He was right outside the door.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier*, pp. 190–1

⁵¹ Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier*, p. 184.

⁵² Sochaczewski, 'The Role of Communications in NATO', p. 154.

⁵³ Schemmer, 'No NATO C³I "Check-out counter"', p. 92.

⁵⁴ Sochaczewski, 'The Role of Communications in NATO', p. 154

⁵⁵ Ellis, in 'Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence', p. 2.

Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

With regard to the vulnerability of the NATO communications systems to Soviet signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities, Major General Joachim M. Sochaczewski, former Assistant Chief of Staff Communications and Electronics at SHAPE, has noted that 'all NATO communications are indeed on a daily basis easily interceptable'.⁵⁶

The Soviet Union maintains the most extensive and comprehensive SIGINT capability in the world. Some 350,000 Soviet personnel are engaged in SIGINT activities. There are more than 500 SIGINT ground stations located within the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere around the world. Other SIGINT systems have been deployed on an extraordinary range of platforms, including submarines, surface ships, aircraft, space satellites and various trucks and other vehicles. SIGINT systems have also been installed in Soviet diplomatic establishments in some sixty countries around the world.⁵⁷

Much of this SIGINT activity is directed against NATO communications and other signals. For example, a large station at Riga is primarily concerned with monitoring Scandinavian signals; a station at Kaliningrad provides coverage of Scandinavian and West German signals; and a station at Lvov is primarily concerned with monitoring military communications emanating from West Germany. The Soviet Union maintains more than 150 SIGINT stations in Eastern Europe, with major concentrations in East Germany (more than fifty stations), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. Some particularly important stations in East Germany are those at Zossen-Wuensdorf, Karlshorst (in East Berlin), Neuruppin, Eberswalde, Stahnsdorf, Prignitz and Brocken. The SIGINT stations in Poland are primarily directed toward West German signals; those in Czechoslovakia cover West German and Austrian signals; those in Hungary also cover Austria; while stations in Bulgaria cover signals emanating from Greece and Turkey.⁵⁸

The Soviet Union also operates an extensive variety of SIGINT aircraft designed to monitor NATO signals. Particular attention is accorded the Baltic Sea and the German border. In the case of the Baltic Sea, airborne SIGINT operations are conducted from bases at Riga, Palanga, Bryusterport, Kaliningrad and Baltiysk (Pillau) in the Soviet Union, and Slupsk and Kolobrzeg in Poland. MiG-25R/Foxbat D aircraft, used for high-altitude, high-speed ELINT operations, are based at Brzeg in Poland, Kolomniya in the Soviet Union, and Werneuchen, northeast of Berlin. Other bases for ELINT aircraft in East Germany include Schonerfeld, Stendal, Altenburg and Welzow. MiG25R/Foxbat D and Il-18 Coot A ELINT aircraft from Werneuchen and Schonerfeld make daily

⁵⁶ Sochaczewski, 'The Role of Communications in NATO', p. 154.

⁵⁷ See Desmond Ball, 'Soviet Signals Intelligence', in Bruce L. Gumble, executive ed., *The International Countermeasures Handbook*, 12th edn (Palo Alto, Calif. EW Communications, Inc., 1987), pp. 73-89.

⁵⁸ Ball, 'Soviet Signals Intelligence', pp. 73-8.

flights along the West German border.⁵⁹ (During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union greatly increased its airborne SIGINT operations in order to closely monitor the Western response.) Soviet SIGINT vessels, formally known as AGIs (Auxiliary General-Intelligence) are also routinely stationed in the immediate vicinity of the submarine bases at Holy Loch in Scotland and Brest in France, as well as in the North Cape area, the Skagarrak Strait linking the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Sicily.⁶⁰

SIGINT systems are maintained in Soviet diplomatic establishments in some eighteen countries in Western Europe. In many of these countries (such as Britain, France, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany) more than one such establishment is used.⁶¹ In Belgium, for example, both the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Trade Mission are used for SIGINT operations. According to a report by HQ USEUCOM in December 1973,

Human intelligence (HUMINT) sources have recently confirmed that . . . SIGINT intercept operations have been conducted [by both the GRU and KGB] from the SOVIET Embassy and SOVIET Trade Mission in BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, for a minimum of eleven years. These operations include, but [are] not necessarily limited to, direction-finding, plaintext analysis of voice, teletype, and Morse communications and analysis of the externals of encoded or enciphered messages. Among primary intercept targets are the strategic/tactical air and ground forces of the US, NATO and Western European countries. Some examples of exploited information are: combat readiness checks (e.g., Emergency Action Messages), planning/progress of major exercises/operations, real time status of deploying forces, flight activity by airborne command posts, travel of VIPs, etc.

These same HUMINT sources confirmed that the GRU participates in real situations by providing the following information. During the SOVIET Exercise OKEAN 1970, the task of the SOVIET Technical Service (SIGINT) Group in BRUSSELS was to intercept US military communications traffic pertaining to the exercise. This intercept activity enabled the SOVIETS to determine what the US and its Western Allies learned about OKEAN, how much they know, how much they were getting, etc.⁶²

The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact SIGINT agencies accord special attention to the circuits which would be used for the extensive international discussions that would precede any decisions to increase the NATO alert levels

⁵⁹ Dick van der Aart, *Aerial Espionage Secret Intelligence Flights by East and West* (New York: Arco/Prentice Hall, 1986), pp. 83–6, and 105–9; Bill Sweetman and Bill Gunston, *Soviet Air Power An Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Warsaw Pact Air Forces Today* (London: Salamander Books, 1978), p. 100, and information provided by William Arkin, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC, 16 April 1984.

⁶⁰ Charles C Petersen, 'Trends in Soviet Naval Operations', in Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, eds, *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 52–3.

⁶¹ See Desmond Ball, 'Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): The Use of Diplomatic Establishments', in Floyd C. Painter, ed., *The International Countermeasures Handbook*, 13th edn (Palo Alto, Calif.: EW Communications Inc., 1987), pp. 24–45.

⁶² Headquarters United States European Command, 'COMSEC Assessment during October 1973 Mid-East Conflict' (HQ USEUCOM, Vaihingen, Germany, ECJ-A-73-0045-S, December 1973), pp. A1–A2.

(LERTCONs) or disperse the nuclear forces; to the channels which would be used to communicate such decisions to the various commands and units; and to the systems which would transmit the nuclear release authorisations.

The communications security (COMSEC) assessment conducted by HQ USEUCOM following the Yom Kippur War in 1973 showed that the GRU and KGB SIGINT agencies were able to monitor combat readiness checks from the USCINCEUR Airborne Command Post; the real-time status of deploying forces, such as the departure of the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarines *Kamehameha* (SSBN-642) and *Simon Bolivar* (SSBN-641) from Rota following the declaration of DEFCON THREE on 25 October 1973; discussions relating to 'contingency planning operations and potential task force compositions'; traffic concerning airlift departures from the continental United States (CONUS); the movement of 'war material' from the ports of Nordham and Bremerhaven in West Germany; numerous communications concerning the movement of fuel and other logistic activity in the Mediterranean region; and other related air and naval activities.⁶³

According to a staff member of the House Armed Services Committee, the Soviet Union demonstrated its ability to intercept communications relating to the proposed 'use' of nuclear weapons during the NATO Reforger exercise in 1976:

In fact, to embarrass us, the Soviets, who listen in on all our communications over there, announced two hours before we had, that is, before our troops had gotten approval, that NATO was going nuclear during that exercise.⁶⁴

And according to another account,

The top level NATO C³ system is not just vulnerable; elements of it are so insecure that during the last major NATO exercise under Alexander Haig's tenure as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, even the highly encoded traffic sent over a special communications net to NATO's nuclear units was intercepted so quickly by Soviet communications intelligence [COMINT] posts that the Russians broadcast a message in the *clear* on an open broadcast channel to the effect that, 'NATO's going nuke'.⁶⁵

NATO ALERT LEVELS, NUCLEAR FORCE DISPERSAL, AND NUCLEAR RELEASE ORDERS

The NATO doctrine of 'flexible response' ideally requires a C³I system which provides the political and military authorities with continuous, real-time information from a variety of authoritative sources, and the ability to control the forces through a spectrum of contingencies ranging from conventional conflict through the limited use of battlefield nuclear weapons to a large-scale theatre

⁶³ 'COMSEC Assessment during October 1973'.

⁶⁴ US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 6495 Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980), Part 4, p. 1946.

⁶⁵ Schemmer, 'No NATO C³I "Check-out counter"', p. 92.

nuclear exchange, at all times responding to political and strategic demands in precise and timely fashion. It should be able to endure for at least as long as the forces themselves, and to communicate with the Warsaw Pact authorities, in order to support war termination. It should be able to move readily and smoothly from a negative control to a positive control mode, and vice versa. And it should not have vulnerabilities or procedural chokepoints which invite precipitous action by the adversary.

The present NATO C³I system is very far from this ideal. Its prevailing characteristics are more likely to be paralysis interjected with paroxysms. It is obviously impossible to predict how the system will in fact function – it will depend on the nature of the contingency, and there are no precedents for any of the situations of concern here. However, the system is so structured as to inhibit clear, coherent and timely decision-making at the outset of conflict, and then to rapidly generate escalation after a few days of intensive conventional conflict, followed very soon by a loss of any meaningful centralized control.

The most escalatory points in any theatre scenarios are when the decisions are implemented to raise the alert level from LERTCOM 5 (peacetime) or 4 ('military vigilance') to LERTCOM 3 or 2; to disperse the nuclear forces; and to issue the nuclear release authorizations. In practice, it is quite likely that these moves will be simultaneous – a major and ominous step.

In peacetime, the nuclear weapons in Europe are stored in a relatively few (about 110) well-known and fairly vulnerable storage sites.⁶⁶ In peacetime, all of the land-based weapons in Europe are locked with Permissive Action Links (PALs) which prevent accidental or unauthorized detonation. And in peacetime the NATO command system remains skeletal, with the forces remaining under national control while awaiting 'the chop' to transfer to NATO command.

The most compelling reason for unlocking the PALs and authorizing the release of the weapons at the same time as dispersing them is that subsequent communications between the command authorities and field units would be too problematical and the process of attempting to match particular PAL codes to their corresponding warheads impractical. There would also be the fear that a central headquarters holding the PAL codes would be attacked and the codes destroyed if the Soviets were to use the dispersal decision as a trigger to pre-empt.⁶⁷ Hence as Paul Bracken has observed, 'practically speaking, a strong pressure exists to release any needed codes at the same time that the weapons are dispersed from their storage sites'.⁶⁸ And Daniel Charles has noted that during the NATO WINTEX command post exercises, when the release procedures are practised, there is evidently no distinction made between the decision to distribute the warheads to their delivery systems and the nuclear release order.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Frank Greve, 'Security gaps raise fears about US warheads in Europe', *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 3 January 1983, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Charles, *Nuclear Planning in NATO*, p. 55.

⁶⁸ Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*, p. 168.

⁶⁹ Charles, *Nuclear Planning in NATO*, p. 50.

The NATO command structure is not conducive to timely or expedient decision-making. The complexities of the command arrangements and the profound and excruciating dilemmas which would face the political and military command authorities would probably mean that it would take two or three days to decide to disperse the nuclear forces and authorize nuclear release.

The central dilemma, which derives from the very nature of NATO's peacetime posture and C³I structure, is 'the conundrum between vulnerability and provocation' – i.e. the measures required to enhance survivability of the forces 'might be apprehended and trigger preemption'.⁷⁰ A second dilemma derives from the known fact that NATO procedures generally require many hours and perhaps days to work through, and therefore, for decisions to be relevant to emerging situations they would have to be taken considerably in advance – when the available intelligence is unlikely to sustain them and when NATO leaders would be very concerned not to feed the very developments they would be hoping to avoid.

These dilemmas would be compounded by the fact that the most critical actions would be unprecedented and NATO leaders would be fearful of unleashing unforeseen consequences. NATO has never moved beyond LERTCOM 4.⁷¹ (In 1968, when the NATO Council met to consider various alert measures in connection with the movement of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia, the 'deliberations gradually ground to a halt. Not a single one of the alert measures was implemented'.⁷²) Similarly, NATO has never dispersed the nuclear warheads. Indeed, dispersal has never even been realistically practised, even during the WINTEX CPXs, apparently because the subject is too sensitive for the participants to address.⁷³

It is likely that the process of authorizing nuclear release would take from 24 to 72 hours. The US Army's Field Manual FM 100-5, *Operations*, issued in 1976, contains a chart depicting the 'bottom up' release of nuclear 'packages', and moving through the subsequent request and release sequence to the receipt of release authorization by the fire-support element some 24 hours later.⁷⁴ (See Figure 1.) According to Catherine Kelleher, other estimates, supported by evidence from the WINTEX CPXs, suggest that 'perhaps as many as sixty hours would be required under the most favorable conditions'.⁷⁵ In the particular case of nuclear depth bombs, the exercise evidence is that the release sequence typically takes 48–72 hours – by which time, of course, the target submarine is likely to have long gone! Hence, as an account of US Army doctrinal developments

⁷⁰ *Crisis Stability and Nuclear War* (A report published under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Ithaca, New York, January 1987), p. 40.


⁷¹ *Crisis Stability and Nuclear War*, p. 36.

⁷² Richard Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 85.

⁷³ Charles, *Nuclear Planning in NATO*, pp. 49–50.

⁷⁴ US Department of the Army, *FM 100-5 Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 107.

⁷⁵ Kelleher, 'NATO Nuclear Operations', p. 457.



NCA	National Command Authorities†
MINISTERS, MC	NATO Foreign Ministers, Military Committee‡
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
AFCEM	Allied Forces Central Europe
CENTAG	Central Army Group
DIV ARTY	Division Artillery
FA GP	Field Artillery Group

† US and British NCA authorize release of nuclear weapons to using units after time shown.

‡ NATO Ministers, consulting Military Committee, approve their use. French release procedures are separate. Strictly US channels from corps to theatre to JCS to NCA and back, then same as above to delivery system in any theatre except Europe.

Source: Adapted from Army FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1 July 1976, pp 10-19.

Fig. 1. NATO theatre nuclear release channels

prepared by the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has noted, 'by the time a commander could clearly demonstrate the time to be right for nuclear weapons, it would already be too late'.⁷⁶

There are, therefore, alternatives to the 'bottom up' process. According to Catherine Kelleher, there is a 'top-down' process whereby SACEUR initiates the release sequence.⁷⁷ In principle, SACEUR would still have to secure prior release authority from the US and UK National Command Authorities, but thus could be expedited by 'early notification'. General Bernard Rogers, then SACEUR/US CINCEUR, testified in 1982,

⁷⁶ John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-82*, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, US Training and Doctrine Command (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), p 37.

⁷⁷ Kelleher, 'NATO Nuclear Operations', p. 457

The system that is used ... is that I go to the political authorities at NATO headquarters with the request I go also to the Ministers of Defense of all the nations and I go also to the two nuclear powers [the US and the UK] simultaneously with my request for release. But prior to that time there would have been a warning message that I was probably coming to ask for release. And even prior to that, in order to get the political authorities thinking in terms of giving this permission, I would have sent what I would call an 'early notification' message to them.⁷⁸

Having secured this release authority, SACEUR would then have to transmit the release order down through the successive levels of command, although some expedition could be achieved by leapfrogging direct to the field units.⁷⁹ However, the procedure remains somewhat cumbersome and dependent upon vulnerable communications systems, and unsuited to timely and responsive action. It is also possible that some pre-delegation has been given to SACEUR, as US CINCEUR, in some strictly-defined and contingent circumstances and with respect to US nuclear weapons in Europe. Such resort to national expedients, however, would likely be at the expense of further efforts at co-ordinated control across the theatre.

Whatever the mechanisms and time periods involved in taking and communicating the dispersal and release decisions, the consequences are likely to be two-fold: firstly, the distribution of unlocked nuclear weapons to numerous and widely dispersed field units involved in many different tactical situations is likely to render futile the subsequent efforts to control and co-ordinate their deployment and employment. Further, the transition from negative to so-called positive control is unlikely to be reversible in any well-managed fashion.

Secondly, it is likely that, through SIGINT activities and other means, the Soviet authorities would be able to keep abreast of NATO alert, dispersal and release developments. The difficulty for Soviet intelligence would be determining whether these developments were merely precautionary, or whether they were preparatory to launching a nuclear attack. There would certainly be great pressure to strike the storage sites and the supporting C³ systems before the decision to disperse and unlock the weapons could be implemented.

War Termination

One of the functions of an ideal C³I system is to support war termination. Indeed, this is an essential requirement for doctrines of flexible response and escalation control. It means that some form of direct communication link should be maintained between the NATO and Warsaw Pact authorities, and that the NATO political and military authorities are able to exercise the strictest control over the forces at all levels at all times. The NATO C³I system would

⁷⁸ US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), Part 7, p. 4334.

⁷⁹ Kelleher, 'NATO Nuclear Operations', p. 457.

seem to be unable to satisfy this latter condition. Given the vulnerability of NATO communication systems, once some significant number of nuclear weapons had been used, it would be largely fortuitous if all the remaining weapons could be recalled from the hundreds of disparate field units and secured harmoniously. At best, there would likely be a few isolated detonations. At worst, operations would continue that would nullify an intra-war pause or armistice.

STRATEGIC C³I AND THEATRE WAR

Despite what might reasonably be inferred from some aspects of US strategic nuclear planning with respect to limited or controlled nuclear strikes against targets in the Soviet Union, it is most unlikely that any use of strategic nuclear weapons by either the United States or the Soviet Union against targets in the other's heartland would be the first move in any conflict between them. Rather, such use is likely to follow a period of large-scale military action, probably involving substantial use of battlefield and theatre nuclear weapons, in an area of vital interest to both adversaries and during which the dynamics of the escalation process would have already been set in motion. Military casualties on both sides, as well as collateral casualties among allied civilians, are already likely to be very high *before* any strategic nuclear exchange. In the European theatre, possible fatalities range from 2 to 20 million, assuming extensive use of nuclear weapons with some restraints, up to 100 million if there are no restraints at all.⁸⁰

Moreover, it is almost certain that some of the command and control facilities, communications systems, early warning stations and intelligence posts that would be required to control a strategic nuclear exchange would have been destroyed or damaged in the conventional or theatre nuclear phases of a conflict.

Extensive segments of the US strategic C³I systems are based in the European theatre. The US Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) satellites are used for communications with both the strategic and theatre forces, and the DSCS network control facility (NCF) at Landstuhl, as well as the stations with alternative control capability at Croughton and Oakhanger, together with many of the two dozen other DSCS terminals in Europe, would be likely targets for Soviet attention in a theatre conflict. The Classic Wizard/White Cloud ELINT ocean surveillance satellite ground station at Edzell in Scotland is one of only five ground stations in the system, and would again be likely to attract Soviet attention in a theatre conflict. The US Air Force's Satellite Control Facility (SCF) at Oakhanger is one of only eight such facilities. The SCF network controls the great majority of US Air Force satellites, as well as CIA photographic surveillance and CIA and NSA electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites. The ELINT satellites, together with the new CIA KH-12 photographic surveillance satellites, are becoming increasingly important sources of real-time theatre intelligence.

⁸⁰ Ball, *Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?*, p. 36

Early warning systems, such as the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) station at Fylingdales and the US Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite early warning system, with one of its three ground stations at Kapaun, FRG, are used to detect both ICBMs and shorter-range ballistic missiles. SOSUS and other ASW systems would also be important in both theatre and strategic conflicts.

The likely destruction of some of these systems in a theatre conflict would generate considerable escalatory pressures. For example, any attempt by the Soviet Navy to move its SSBNs and/or surface fleet through the Greenland/Iceland/United Kingdom (GIUK) gap would doubtless be accompanied by attacks on the SOSUS, SIGINT and related facilities in Iceland, Norway and Britain. The expectation that these systems would soon be unavailable would cause many US Navy commanders to strike against any ships that were in their 'sights', be they Soviet SSBNs or whatever, while they still had the opportunity.⁸¹

It also follows that the United States would find, at the outset of any strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, that its strategic C³I system was already impaired, with important geographical segments missing. The prospects for controlling the strategic exchange would be correspondingly weakened.

CONCLUSIONS

War is by its very nature not subject to precise control. There are inherent tendencies toward escalation. Information is obfuscated and distorted by Clausewitz's 'fog of war'. The horror, confusion and hatred produced by extreme violence generates irrationality. Outcomes are determined less by careful planning and management than by Machiavelli's *fortuna*. The use of nuclear weapons greatly exacerbates both the human and physical problems of command and control.

Strategic policies and doctrines based on notions of escalation control therefore warrant the most careful scrutiny. This is particularly the case where their application is sought in theatres at some remove from Washington and Moscow. In the European theatre, assessments of the implications of C³I systems and arrangements for crisis stability, flexible response and escalation control must focus on the complexity and vulnerability of the C³I architecture.

There is probably, in practice, little scope for reducing this complexity and vulnerability. The complexity is, to some extent at least, inevitable in an alliance of sixteen sovereign states, each with different capabilities, interests and threat perceptions. Although understandable, the decision-making structure and command and control arrangements spawned by this alliance are quite unsuited to the demands of rapid and timely decision and implementation that would pertain on the European battlefield. And the development of procedures to circumvent the present system do not resolve the fundamental problems. To resort to

⁸¹ Ball, 'Nuclear War at Sea', p. 22.

national machinery, to give commanders greater autonomy, to institute command and control structures in peacetime that would more closely reflect those needed for war-fighting, to clarify the pre-delegation arrangements for SACEUR/CINCEUR – these measures would serve only to undermine other aspects of stability and escalation control.

Many of the vulnerabilities are inherent in the nature of C³I systems, and would not be significantly alleviated by the expenditure of additional resources. Over the next ten years, it is likely that more than \$50 billion will be spent on C³I systems in the NATO theatre, including more than \$15 billion on the acquisition of new communications systems. As General Cushman has noted, 'the obstacles are not financial ... but are primarily organizational and institutional'.⁸² There is no centralized process for designing and acquiring a coherent and efficient theatre architecture, and it is reasonable to assume, given the minimal extent to which high-level interest and attention is devoted to the issue, that most of the present deficiencies will remain.

This is not to say that no improvements can be made. Concentration of effort on a few particular problems could achieve some progress. Three areas would be worthy of special attention. Firstly, with respect to command and control facilities, consideration should be given to the design and development of a network of alternative ground-mobile command posts, which have increasingly been deployed in the United States itself – the mobile command posts (MCPs) for the National Command Authority (NCA) in the Washington area; the SAC HERTS system; the NORAD RAPIER system; and the Mobile Ground Terminals (MGTs) for the DSP satellite early warning system.

Secondly, much greater attention should be accorded to communications security (COMSEC) and communications deception, in order to reduce the ability of Soviet SIGINT agencies to monitor particularly sensitive European communications and the confidence that the Soviet leadership might place in signals interception as a trigger for pre-emption.

And, thirdly, consideration should be given to the strictest possible separation of strategic and theatre C³I assets. Despite the additional financial costs which would be involved, there would be great merit in withdrawing critical strategic C³I systems, wherever technically feasible, to the Soviet Union and the continental United States (CONUS); to physically separating those strategic C³I facilities which it is determined are necessarily required abroad from areas of potential theatre operations; and for dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union to identify agreed remaining C³I systems that would be exempted from such theatre operations.

In general, however, the problems which derive from the complexity and vulnerability of theatre C³I systems can best be addressed by changes to the strategic policies and postures which the C³I systems are intended to support. At the most fundamental strategic level the inherent complexity and vulnerability of the NATO C³I systems comprises a basic flaw in the NATO doctrine of Flexible

⁸² Cushman, 'Command and Control of Theater Forces', p. 96.

Response. Although Flexible Response has been accepted as NATO doctrine for more than two decades, the development of a commensurate C³I system has proved unachievable. Any objective analysis of the C³I system by the Warsaw Pact would have proved the doctrine incredible. Flexible Response requires an ability to respond to warning and attack assessment intelligence in timely and flexible fashion; to progressively increase (or lower) the alert levels of the forces and to disperse (or recall) them unambiguously, smoothly, and in close conjunction with the development of crisis situations; to control the forces through a spectrum of contingencies, ranging from conventional conflict through the limited use of battlefield nuclear weapons to a large-scale nuclear exchange, at all times responding precisely and opportunely to political and strategic demands; and to maintain communications between the various NATO and Warsaw Pact political and military authorities in order to support war termination. The NATO C³I system is patently unable to satisfy these requirements. Indeed, the dynamics of the decision-making, alert and force-dispersal processes are more likely to result in a confused mixture of paralysis and fits of sudden escalation. Both the lack of credibility and the likelihood of uncontrolled escalation which the deficiencies in the NATO C³I system impose on Flexible Response are sufficient to require a fundamental reconsideration of NATO doctrine.

Much of the problem inheres in the widespread deployment of the short-range battlefield nuclear weapons and their role in Flexible Response – including the requirement that they be available and prepared for employment in NATO's 'First Use' option. Again, the complexities of the NATO decision-making process and the vulnerabilities of the C³I system make the ability to alert, disperse, authorize and use these battlefield weapons in timely and flexible fashion extremely problematical. There is very little that can be said in favour of these weapons. They contribute little to deterrence. Their military efficacy lies in either early employment or particular tactical engagements – situations which would involve their detonation on West European territory, and which would require a more responsive decision-making process than NATO could possibly pretend. Insofar as some of them depend on dual-capable delivery systems, they tend to constrain the conventional commitment and hence contribute to the pressures for escalation.

NATO should accord high priority to the removal of these short-range battlefield nuclear weapons from the European theatre. Some could be withdrawn unilaterally without detriment to the overall effectiveness of the NATO force posture. In other cases, it would be more reasonable to pursue withdrawal more actively and purposefully through bilateral arms control arrangements.

At the same time as any disavowal of Flexible Response and the removal of the short-range battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe – and a general reduction in NATO's dependence on nuclear forces – there must also be enhancement of NATO's conventional capabilities. This does not necessarily involve either increased conventional forces or improved offensive capabilities. But there is no way that the battlefield nuclear weapons can be removed and the deficiencies in

the theatre C³I architecture addressed without much greater attention being accorded to the conditions of viable conventional deterrence. Again, while there are some measures here which could be pursued unilaterally, long-term security in Europe requires mutual and balanced reductions in conventional forces and changes towards more defensive doctrines and postures on both sides.

Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica

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MITCHELL A. SELIGSON

While much is known about the effects of the economy on the popularity and electoral fortunes of political leaders, political scientists know very little about how economic decline and political performance influence support for the political regime and the stability of democratic systems. We use three cross-national longitudinal surveys to address this issue: two collected in Costa Rica in the midst of a severe economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and one in West Germany during the recession of the mid-1970s. We show that in both countries, overall support for the political regime remained extremely high during the economic decline, while satisfaction with incumbent performance fluctuated much more sharply. Moreover, at the individual level, changes in satisfaction with incumbent performance were only weakly related to changes in regime support. These results provide strong evidence suggesting that if democracies enter economic downturns with initially high levels of regime support, they will be able to withstand even severe, prolonged crises of economic performance.

INTRODUCTION

The disastrous chain of events culminating in Adolf Hitler's *Machtergreifung* of March 1933 raises important questions about the relationship between political support, economic crisis and the stability of democracy. The global economic crisis that came as an aftershock of the crash of the New York stock market in October 1929 hit Germany harder than any other advanced industrialized country.¹ Did this severe crisis of macroeconomic performance cause sentiments of legitimacy to decline from a level sufficient to maintain regime stability to a level so low that the breakdown of the Weimar Republic became inevitable? Or was the economic crisis merely an accelerator that hastened the demise of a

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¹ M. Raine Lepsius, 'From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist Takeover: Germany', in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 34-79.

regime that already was vulnerable to breakdown because of insufficient legitimacy even during the 1920s?

The answer to this question is not obvious. On the eve of the Great Depression, Germany was one of the leading industrial powers in the world, the labour force was well educated, and communications and mass media were extensive. Thus, Germany had very high levels on all of the socio-economic indicators presumed to be conducive to the development of stable democratic systems. Moreover, the fact that democracy had been externally imposed on Germany, and that the German party system exhibited what Sartori² calls 'polarized pluralism', does not necessarily indicate that the level of legitimacy was insufficient for stable democracy. Democracy was imposed on Italy by foreign powers in 1945, just as it was imposed in Germany by the Versailles Treaty of 1919; and the disloyal opposition initially in Italy during the 1950s was about as large as in Germany during the 1920s; yet there seems to have been sufficient legitimacy sentiment among the approximately three-fifths of party elites occupying the centre of the left-right continuum in Italy to stabilize democracy during its formative years. Thus, if German democracy in the 1920s was as legitimate as Italian democracy in the 1950s, it is quite possible that the Weimar regime could have evolved into a stable democracy were it not for the unusual severity of the economic crisis of the early 1930s. If so, perhaps it was the *erosion* of legitimacy sentiment due to failure of economic performance, rather than an insufficient initial level of legitimacy, that caused the breakdown of democracy in Germany.

The question of the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic leads to a more general question of importance for empirical democratic theory: how close is the relationship between satisfaction with the performance of the incumbents and support for the political system or regime? Two fundamentally different interpretations of the breakdown of democratic regimes emerge from the answer to this question.

If regime support is assumed to be a relatively volatile response to change in performance satisfaction, then the explanation for why democracy failed in Germany but not in other advanced industrialized societies at that time assigns predominant causal importance to the factor of performance failure or lack of effectiveness. If regime support is easily eroded by perceived ineffectiveness, then by implication the Great Depression could have caused a breakdown of democracy in any of the industrialized countries. Given an assumption of volatile legitimacy sentiment, the reason why regime breakdown occurred in Germany is that the greater magnitude of the performance failure there eroded support for the regime more deeply than in other countries.

Alternatively, it is possible that regime support is quite resistant to erosion even in the face of severe performance failure. An explanation of why a breakdown in democracy occurred in Germany but not in other industrialized coun-

² Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

tries, based on the assumption of robust legitimacy sentiment, would assign predominant causal importance to the factor of regime support instead of performance satisfaction. The argument would be that, in contrast to older democracies such as France, Britain and the United States, the Weimar Republic was not accorded much support by many Germans even as late as 1928; Germany was therefore far more susceptible to regime breakdown than the other countries, which, because of their much higher levels of regime support, withstood the crisis that Germany could not.

In this article we report an analysis of contemporary data from long-interval and short-interval panel surveys that focuses on the issue of the role of effectiveness and legitimacy as determinants of democratic regime stability. Our cases include an economically advanced country (West Germany) and a less developed country (Costa Rica). The results address the question of the sensitivity of regime support to economic crisis and performance failure in general, and they are relevant inferentially to a retrospective understanding of the particular instance of the breakdown of German democracy.

The Relationship Between Effectiveness and Legitimacy

In the seminal theoretical work on the link between performance crises such as the Great Depression and democratic political instability, Lipset hypothesized that the stability of a given democracy depends upon an interaction between effectiveness and legitimacy.³ If effectiveness is high, a regime can maintain stability regardless of the level of legitimacy; if legitimacy is high, stability can be maintained regardless of the level of effectiveness; the stability of the regime is threatened only if both effectiveness and legitimacy are low. The predictions of Lipset's theory can be summarized in the four-fold Figure 1:

		<i>Effectiveness</i>	
		Low	High
<i>Legitimacy</i>	High	Stability (a)	Stability (b)
	Low	Instability (c)	Stability (d)

Fig. 1. Summary of predictions about stability of democracies

The most interesting predictions here are (1) that high legitimacy provides a 'reservoir' of diffuse support⁴ upon which the system can draw when its stability

³ Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *American Political Science Review*, 53 (1959), 69-105.

⁴ David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 273-4.

would otherwise be threatened by dissatisfaction with ineffective performance (cell 'a'); and (2) that effective performance can 'buy' stability in the absence of legitimacy (cell 'd'). These predictions both assume, however, that legitimacy and performance are relatively independent, i.e., that evaluations of performance effectiveness have little consequence for the legitimacy of the regime.

But what if the impact of effectiveness on legitimacy is relatively strong? Then the two inconsistent cells, low effectiveness with high legitimacy (cell 'a') and high effectiveness with low legitimacy (cell 'd'), will be empirically trivial. Any country in cell 'a' would be expected to shift into cell 'c', where effectiveness and legitimacy are both low. In this case, a low level of performance effectiveness would erode legitimacy, causing a shift from regime stability to instability. Conversely, any country in cell 'd' would be expected to shift into cell 'b', where both effectiveness and legitimacy are high. Here, performance effectiveness would operate positively on legitimacy, facilitating a strengthening of attitudes about the regime and thereby reinforcing regime stability.

The question of the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy has important implications for theories of democratic regime stability. Is legitimacy eroded by negative change in performance evaluations, if not during 'normal' times, then during severe economic crises? Conversely, can positive change in performance evaluations help build legitimacy? Finally, how long do these processes take? Do they happen more or less instantaneously, or is there some delay in the effects on change in legitimacy that are produced by change in effectiveness?

RESEARCH DESIGN

The empirical study of attitudes of individuals relevant to democratic regime stability, initiated a quarter of a century ago by Almond and Verba,⁵ still has little to say about the critical relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, measurement of the concept of regime legitimacy has been deficient. The most frequently used measure of political system support, the 'Trust in Government' scale, suffers from problems of questionable face validity as well as weak construct validity and relatively low reliability.⁶ Secondly, the survey designs have been static instead of dynamic. The most interesting questions raised by the effectiveness-legitimacy theory can be

⁵ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁶ On the measurement of Trust in Government, see Arthur H. Miller, 'Political Issues and Trust in Government', *American Political Science Review*, 68 (1974), 951-72. On the controversy surrounding the validity and reliability of the measure, see Jack Citrin, 'Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government', *American Political Science Review*, 68 (1974), 973-88; Arthur H. Miller, 'Rejoinder to "Comment" by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism?', *American Political Science Review*, 68 (1974), 989-1001; Samuel H. Barnes *et al.*, *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979); Paul Abramson and Ada Finifter, 'On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978', *American Journal of Political Science*, 25 (1981), 297-307; Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam and Mitchell A. Selig-

addressed decisively only by panel surveys.⁷ Thirdly, the cases selected for investigation have been confined to the advanced industrialized democracies of the North Atlantic region. Although these countries have experienced economic crises during the 1970s due to increases in the cost of petroleum, in the era since the Second World War none has experienced a crisis of the magnitude of the Great Depression. A strong test of the predictions made by the effectiveness–legitimacy theory requires at least one instance of a political system subject to the stress of an extreme performance failure.

In this study we will conduct a comparative causal analysis of effectiveness and legitimacy in Costa Rica, a middle-income developing democracy, and West Germany, a very rich, highly developed democracy. Our measure of regime legitimacy is one that has been repeatedly validated cross-culturally in a series of previous studies.⁸ The survey designs are two-wave panels. One of the cases, Costa Rica, experienced a severe economic crisis during the period spanned by the panel surveys.

Costa Rica: A Critical Test Case

In 1979 the economy of Costa Rica entered what was to become not only its most serious depression in the twentieth century but a depression rivalling on a world scale that of the early 1930s.⁹ As a result of a combination of external factors (oil shocks and the decline in coffee prices) and inept domestic public policy (unprecedented foreign borrowing, overspending and exchange rate mismanagement), thirty years of steady economic growth was halted abruptly. The impact could be seen everywhere: the dollar exchange rate dropped from 8.6 to over 60, inflation rose from 5 per cent to over 100 per cent, unemployment tripled and the per capita foreign debt rose to the second highest in the world.

During the 1980s the economic crisis has continued.¹⁰ The incumbent

son, 'Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis', *American Journal of Political Science*, 26 (1982), 240–64; and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'On the Measurement of Diffuse Support. Some Evidence from Mexico', *Social Indicators Research*, 12 (1983), 1–24.

⁷ See, for example, Edward N. Muller and Carol Williams, 'Dynamics of Political Support–Alienation', *Comparative Political Studies*, 13 (1980), 33–59.

⁸ See Edward N. Muller, *Aggressive Political Participation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, 'On the Meaning of Political Support', *American Political Science Review*, 71 (1977), 1561–95; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 'Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior'; and Seligson, 'On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico'.

⁹ See Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Costa Rica', in Jack W. Hopkins, ed., *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record, Volume I: 1981–82* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983); and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Costa Rica', in Jack W. Hopkins, ed., *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record, Volume II 1982–83* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984).

¹⁰ For details, see Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller, 'Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica, 1978–1983', *International Studies Quarterly*, 31 (1987), 301–26; and Mitchell A. Seligson and Miguel Gómez B., 'Elecciones ordinarias en tiempos extraordinarios. La economía política del voto en Costa Rica', *Anuario de estudios centroamericanos*, 13 (1987), 5–24.

administration of Rodrigo Carazo Odio (leader of the Unidad coalition) was replaced in the 1982 elections by the PLN (Partido Liberación Nacional) led by Luis Alberto Monge, a seasoned politician who had been defeated by Carazo in 1978. Monge was somewhat successful in regaining governmental control over the economy. The rapid decline in the value of the *colón* was halted, and the exchange rate actually improved. Inflation dropped to about 11 per cent annually, and unemployment declined somewhat to 19.9 per cent. But Monge's efforts could not reverse the scale of the crisis, nor could they reduce the pain that Costa Ricans would have to feel as the country began paying for its economic errors of the past. Taxes were raised dramatically, with the levy on income, consumption and sales increasing in the range of 60 to 170 per cent. Compared to 1978, Costa Ricans faced a drop of 29 per cent in their disposable income, depressing private consumption to the level of fifteen years before. Industrial wages dropped to levels similar to those paid in Haiti, the poorest country in all of Latin America, and, according to one report, 71 per cent of all Costa Rican families had incomes below the poverty line of basic food costs.¹¹

Two panel studies were conducted during this time frame. One spanned the period 1978–85, and will be analysed to model the long-term effects of economic crisis, while the other ran from 1983 to 1985, providing information on short-term changes during the latter part of the time period. Both samples were drawn from the metropolitan region of greater San José, the capital of Costa Rica, and its surrounding suburbs and towns. Approximately 80 per cent of the urban population and 40 per cent of the entire population of the nation was covered by this sample. The 1985 sample was designed not only to complete the panel re-interviews, but also to produce its own representative cross-section of metropolitan San José. As funding limited the entire 1985 survey to approximately 500 interviews, it was decided to allocate about one half to a 'fresh' sample of respondents, and the remaining half to re-interviews distributed among the 1978 and 1983 respondents. Approximately one in three of the 201 respondents in 1978 was re-interviewed ($N = 75$), and re-interviews were conducted with approximately one in four of the 501 respondents from 1983 respondents ($N = 119$).¹² These panel respondents, interviewed before and at several points

¹¹ V. H. Céspedes, C. G. Vega, R. Jiménez and E. Lizano, *Costa Rica Estabilida sin Crecimiento* (San José, Costa Rica: Academia de Centroamérica, 1984). See also Gudmundson, 'Costa Rica', in Jack W. Hopkins, ed., *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record, Volume III 1983–84* (New York: Homes and Meier, 1985).

¹² The response rates for the panels were affected not only by limited funds but also by the difficulties in locating respondents from the 1978 and 1983 surveys, neither of which were conducted with a panel design in mind. In regard to basic SES and attitudinal characteristics, however, the panel respondents differ little from the cross-section respondents, as the figures in the Appendix Table make clear. The only significant differences are in age, where the 1978–85 panel contains older respondents on average (since younger individuals could not, obviously, have been included in the original interview), and a greater proportion of primary education respondents in the cross-section than in either panel survey. But the equal proportion of university respondents is reassuring, because the generally lower degree of regime and performance support found in the university setting could have distorted the generalizability of the findings reported here. On all other variables, the distribution in the three samples are very similar.

after the onset of the economic crisis, thus constitute a unique real-world data base for investigating the extent to which legitimacy sentiment is subject to long-term and short-term erosion due to dissatisfaction with incumbent performance. These features, we believe, justify the analysis of samples which are small by conventional standards.

West Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany has achieved a superior record of economic performance since its inception in 1949. Nevertheless, in West Germany, as in all of the other advanced democracies, the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s came to an end with the oil shock of 1973–74, which resulted in a recession lasting from 1974 to 1976 that was more severe than anything experienced since the early 1930s. This time, however, as a result of effective management of macro-economic policy levers by the Schmidt administration, West Germany was among the countries least hard-hit by the recession.¹³

During 1974–76 a two-wave panel survey of selected rural, urban and university communities was conducted in the Federal Republic.¹⁴ Panel respondents ($N = 1,310$), who were interviewed in the autumn of 1974 and re-interviewed two years later, are a 49 per cent subset of the total number of respondents (2,662). The sampling sites from which they were drawn had manifested higher than average levels of anti-system political behaviour during the preceding five years.¹⁵ They were chosen in order to enhance the observation of anti-system political behaviour, thereby facilitating statistical testing of hypotheses about determinants of such behaviour. Because levels of regime support are related to anti-system behaviour, the distribution of regime support in the West German panel study is not representative of West Germany as a whole. However, the greater variation of regime support in the panel study is useful for the analysis of the relationship between effectiveness of incumbent performance and the legitimacy of the regime.

The decline of economic performance that occurred in West Germany during the time of the 1974–76 panel survey was much less extreme than that which began in Costa Rica in 1979. This contrast will enable us to investigate the question of whether relationships between performance satisfaction and regime support differ under the conditions of a mild, short-term recession as compared with a severe, long-term depression. In addition, we may compare the results of the West German to the Costa Rican two-year panels to determine whether short-term influences on legitimacy are similar in the two contexts.

¹³ Arnold Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo and Carolyn Adams, *Comparative Public Policy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 126–33.

¹⁴ For full details on the West German sample, see Muller, *Aggressive Political Participation*, pp. 8–9.

¹⁵ Anti-system behaviour in the rural and urban sites entailed voting for political parties of the extreme left or right; in the university sites it entailed civil disobedience and political violence. See Muller, *Aggressive Political Participation*, p. 9.

COSTA RICA: RESULTS

Our analytic strategy will proceed as follows. After outlining the measurement of regime support and incumbent performance satisfaction, we discuss the stability and change in those variables that occurred during the period spanned by each of the panel studies. We shall then attempt to model more precisely the influence on change in regime support, and isolate whether and to what extent short-term or long-term changes in performance satisfaction may have had an impact on regime attitudes.

Measurement of the Variables

We measured Regime Support through responses to six questions, which, as noted above, have been used extensively in cross-national research. The items are:

To what extent . . .

- (a) do you believe that the courts in Costa Rica guarantee a fair trial?
- (b) do you have respect for the political institutions of Costa Rica?
- (c) do you believe that the basic rights of citizens are well protected under the Costa Rican political system?
- (d) are you proud to live under the Costa Rican political system?
- (e) do you believe that the Costa Rican political system is the best possible system?
- (f) do you believe that one ought to support the Costa Rican political system?

Each question was coded on a seven-point scale, with 0 representing the least favourable response and 6 the most favourable. An overall scale from 0 to 36 was created for each respondent who answered at least three of the six questions ($N = 70$), by multiplying their average response by the total number of items (6). For the 1978–85 panel, the scales show reliabilities (alpha) of 0.83 in 1978 and 0.69 in 1985, while for the 1983–85 panel, reliabilities of 0.76 and 0.80 were obtained.

Specific support for the performance of the incumbent authorities (Performance Satisfaction) was also measured from a summation of six questions, three of which directly relate to economics and three of which concern other aspects of governmental effectiveness. The questions are:

To what extent would you say that the government of President ('Oduber' in 1978, 'Monge' in 1983 and 1985) . . .

- (a) guarantees the security and protection of individuals?
- (b) has a strong and able political leadership?
- (c) controls the problem of the cost of living?
- (d) combats crime?
- (e) helps the needy classes?
- (f) successfully stimulates productive activities?

These scales also range from 0 to 36, and show reliabilities (α) of 0.90 in 1978 and 0.88 in the 1978–85 panel, and 0.89 and 0.83 in the 1983–85 study. It should be noted that although the specific President referred to in the 1978–85 panel questions are not the same over time, in both surveys the same political party, the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN), held power. Thus, the changes in perceptions of incumbent performance which we discuss below are not merely artefacts of the respondent's partisan preference. The same President, Luis Alberto Monge, was in power for both years of the 1983–85 panel.

Stability of Regime Support and Performance Satisfaction

In 1978, both absolutely and in relation to other democracies for which we have data, support for the regime in Costa Rica was quite high. Thus, 91.5 per cent of Costa Ricans from metropolitan San José gave positive responses to the question about the extent to which they were proud to live under their political system, as compared to positive response rates of 88.3 and 70.0 per cent among representative samples of an urban population in the United States (New York City) and the urban Jewish population in Israel, respectively; also, in regard to the question about the extent to which the basic rights of citizens are protected under the political system, 70.2 per cent of the Costa Rican sample gave a positive response, as compared to positive response rates of 68.1 and 67.2 per cent registered by the American and Israeli samples, respectively.¹⁶ The comparatively high regime-support scores in Costa Rica result from a tradition of successful domestic conflict resolution that emerged in the nineteenth century, reinforced by the racial and ethnic homogeneity of Costa Rica's small population. The mean score on the total regime support scale in 1978 was 28.4 out of a possible 36.

Costa Ricans in 1978 were not only very supportive of the regime; they were also fairly satisfied with the performance of the PLN administration of Daniel Oduber. The mean score on Performance Satisfaction was 25.9 out of the maximum 36, with the large majority of respondents registering in the upper third of the performance satisfaction scale. Before the economic crisis, then, the Costa Rican political system was high on both effectiveness and legitimacy.

The panel respondents were also very favourable toward the political system in 1978, registering a mean Regime Support score of 29.4; and they were quite satisfied with the performance of the Oduber government as well, registering a mean Performance Satisfaction score of 27.8. In terms of the percentage distribution of scores, grouped according to levels of support and satisfaction, high scores on Regime Support (in the upper third of the scale, or the range of 25–36) were manifested by 81.4 per cent of panel respondents, and a miniscule 1.4 per cent of them were low (in the lowest third of the scale, 0–12); also, 71.8 per cent of panel respondents were high on Performance Satisfaction, while only 4.2 per cent were low.

¹⁶ See Seligson and Muller, 'Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica, 1978–1983', pp 311–13




Fig. 3. Plot of Performance Satisfaction, 1985, with Performance Satisfaction, 1983; Costa Rican Panel Study

tered declines by 1985, and 38 per cent declined more than 10 points on the 36-point scale. In the 1983–85 plot, there is more stability, but still a large number of initially high-score respondents who decline over time, and a substantial number of initially medium-score respondents who decline as well. In this sample, 59 per cent showed some decline over time, while 25 per cent declined more than 10 points. It should be noted as well, however, that decline in Performance Satisfaction was not unanimous. Substantial numbers of individuals increased on this measure in both samples, and the pattern of increases and decreases also contributed to the low stabilities of Performance Satisfaction over time.

The important question is: what happened to support for the regime over the periods examined above? If there is a strong relationship between regime support and performance, one would expect the patterns seen in Figures 2 and 3 to be similar for regime support. This did not occur, however.

Figure 4 shows the change in Regime Support between 1978 and 1985 and Figure 5 the change in Regime Support between 1983 and 1985. In both plots, one can immediately see the large cluster of cases in the upper right-hand corner, indicating a substantial number of respondents who remained in the upper third




Fig. 4 Plot of Regime Support, 1985, with Regime Support, 1978, Costa Rican Panel Study

of the scale – the ‘high’ region of regime support. Almost three quarters (74 per cent) of the 1978–85 panel respondents maintained a high level of support for the regime, while almost 80 per cent remained at this level in the shorter 1983–85 interval. Another 4 per cent remained at the ‘medium’ level of support over the long-term, and 3 per cent over the 1983–85 period. Not a single panel respondent in either sample was consistently low on support for the regime. Indeed, the one respondent in each of the panel surveys who manifested a low level of support had shifted to the high range by 1985, while no respondents declined from high to low during either interval.

The pattern that we see in the figures is one of much stability in support of the regime. While there was some fluctuation in support scores over time in both samples, it generally took place within the restricted range of the upper third of the scale. Consequently, although there was decline in regime support, it was certainly not of a regime-threatening magnitude. In addition, many respondents increased their support for the regime during these periods, not only among those already high on support, but those in the intermediate range as well. Interestingly, of the fourteen respondents who were in the 13–24 range on regime support in 1983, only three remained at the medium level, while the rest registered high scores in 1985.




Fig. 5. Plot of Regime Support, 1985, with Regime Support, 1983; Costa Rican Panel Study

Taken together, these two figures indicate that while performance satisfaction at the individual level declined for most individuals during the economic crisis, regime support remained at high levels, and even increased for many who were not already highly supportive. The appropriate conclusion from analysis of the change which occurred in Performance Satisfaction and Regime Support is that the former was volatile while the latter was much less so. The economic crisis and performance dissatisfaction that resulted thus represented little danger for the stability of the regime.

The Effect of Change in Satisfaction on Change in Regime Support

Up to this point our analysis has focused on stability and change in support for the regime and satisfaction with incumbent performance separately. Because the plots of the changes in Regime Support were so dissimilar to the changes in Performance Satisfaction, we conclude that the overall sharp decline in performance during the late 1970s and early 1980s did not result in a legitimacy crisis, which helps account for the macro-level stability of Costa Rica during the economic downturn. However, little has been said about the precise effects of performance satisfaction on regime support; i.e. how changes in performance

may have affected changes in regime support over either the seven-year or two-year panels. It cannot be concluded from the above results that *no* relationship exists between these variables – only that the large drop in satisfaction with incumbent performance did not correspond with an equally large, system-threatening drop in support for the regime. It may be, however, that those respondents who did decline in regime support also registered the sharpest drops in performance satisfaction. It may also be true that the somewhat anomalous *increase* registered in regime support may have been concentrated among those whose performance ratings also increased. In short, we have not yet taken full advantage of the panel data to delineate the precise effects that performance satisfaction or dissatisfaction may have on regime support.

What we wish to determine is the effect of the *change* in performance satisfaction on *change* in regime support in both the long and short terms, and panel data is ideally suited to this task. We may begin simply by correlating the two change scores in both panels and noting their statistically indistinguishable 0.36 and 0.33 values in the 1978–85 and 1983–85 studies.¹⁷ Thus there is some covariation between the two measures. However, a more precise specification of the relationship between the change scores includes other influences on changes in regime support, and takes the following form:¹⁸

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CHANGE IN REGIME} = & a + b_1 * T_1 \text{ REGIME} + b_2 * T_1 \text{ PERFORMANCE} \\ & + b_3 * \text{CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE} + b_4 \text{ EDUCATION} \\ & + b_5 \text{ AGE} + b_6 \text{ IDEOLOGY} + b_7 \text{ CLASS} + U \end{aligned}$$

where CHANGE IN REGIME is an individual's change in regime support in the given survey, T_1 REGIME is the initial score on Regime Support, T_1 PERFORMANCE is the initial score on Performance Satisfaction, CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE is the change in Performance Satisfaction, U is an error term and education, ideology, age and class are control variables. This model takes into account several different sources of change in Regime Support, in addition to changes in Performance Satisfaction. It includes initial scores on Regime Support to control for the 'regression to the mean' effect commonly seen in longitudinal data, and because

¹⁷ Seligson and Gomez, 'Elecciones ordinarias en tiempos extraordinarios: la economia politica del voto en Costa Rica'.

¹⁸ It can be shown, with some very simple algebraic manipulations, that the following model reduces to the static score model where Regime Support in 1985 is a function of Regime Support in the previous survey, Performance Satisfaction in 1985 and Performance Satisfaction in the previous survey, and the control variables. See Ronald Kessler and David Greenberg, *Linear Panel Analysis* (New York: Academic Press, 1981), pp. 7–12. Kessler and Greenberg note (p. 11) that 'linear difference equations (those involving change in X as dependent variable) and equations involving only static scores (X_1 and X_2) are mathematically equivalent and can readily be transformed into one another'. Analysis of static scores is quite common with panel data (cf., e.g., Gregory Markus, *Analyzing Panel Data* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980); and Steven E. Finkel, 'The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support: Evidence From a West German Panel', *Journal of Politics*, 49 (1987), 441–64), but in this case, we use the change score transformations because our theoretical interest is in describing *change* in regime support as a function of *change* in performance satisfaction during the economic crisis.

the Regime Support scale is 'bounded': change among those who are initially very low can only be positive, and change among those who are initially very high can only be negative. We thus expect a negative coefficient for this variable. Change in Regime Support may also be caused by initial values of Performance Satisfaction, indicating that evaluations of incumbent performance at one point in time influence subsequent changes in regime orientations. Age and education (measured in years), ideology (1 to 8 indicating 'left' or 'right' self-identification), and class (1 = upper, 2 = middle, 3 = working) are also included as controls, and to determine whether change in regime support was concentrated among certain sub-groups in the Costa Rican population.

Table 1 shows the results of this model as equation 1.1 for the 1978–85 panel and equation 1.2 for the 1983–85 sample.¹⁹ As can be seen, both equations show a large portion of explained variation in the Regime Support Change score, yet the lion's share of the explanation is due to initial levels of regime support. The very strong negative effect of initial levels of support on change means that initial differences between individuals in 1978 and 1983 declined by 1985; this is due to natural regression effects as well as to the larger increases registered in Regime Support among those who were initially in the 'medium' range, as seen in Figures 4 and 5.²⁰ These changes, it must be noted, occurred *independently* of changes in, or initial levels of, Performance Satisfaction.

Changes in Performance Satisfaction, however, did exert a significant impact on Changes in Regime Support in both samples. While most effects in panel models tend to diminish over time, the severity of the economic crisis in the late 1970s caused the effect of Performance Satisfaction on Regime Support to be even greater over the seven-year panel ($b = 0.20$) than over the two-year period ($b = 0.10$). This indicates that short-term fluctuations in performance are less likely than long-term changes to spill over on to regime support. Evidently, the changes must be large enough, and persist for a long period of time before they can have an impact on fundamental regime attitudes. It must be noted, however, that the magnitude of the effect in both surveys was relatively small; an individual must have changed 5 points on the performance scale in 1978–85 to have changed 1 point on the Regime Support scale, and must have changed 10 points (almost one-quarter of the entire scale) on performance from 1983 to 1985 to have changed 1 point on Regime Support during that period. Clearly, regime support is influenced to some degree by performance satisfaction, but, in accord with the findings from Figures 4 and 5, not to such an extent as to result in massive increases or decreases in legitimacy.

¹⁹ Because of the relatively small number of cases in the panel surveys, we used mean substitution for missing values, which saved seven cases for the 1978–85 analysis and five for the 1983–85 sample.

²⁰ By 'natural' regression effects, we mean the tendency of initially high scores on a variable to decline over time, and the tendency of initially low scores on a variable to increase. One reason this pattern occurs is that initially extreme scores are caused in part by a very large positive or negative error term. When the variable is measured at another point in time, there is a high likelihood that the error term will be smaller; hence extreme scores tend to become less extreme over time. Regression to the mean can also result from measurement error and the effects of omitted variables which are captured in the error term. See Markus, *Analyzing Panel Data*, pp. 45–8.

The effects of the other control variables are also weak in comparison to the effect of initial levels of Regime Support, yet they do reveal some interesting patterns of change over time. For the long-term panel, Ideology appears to be a marginal predictor of change, in that right-wing respondents show the largest increases, while left-wing respondents the sharpest declines. In addition, initial levels of satisfaction significantly affected changes in Regime Support in this study. This indicates that, controlling for initial levels of Regime Support, the higher the individual was on Performance Satisfaction, the greater the change in Regime Support over time. For the short-term panel, Class shows a marginally significant effect, indicating that working-class respondents registered somewhat larger increases in support than respondents from middle-class or upper-class backgrounds. The significant negative effect for Education also means that the most highly educated registered the largest *decreases* in support, which, given the radicalizing impact that university education has on many Latin Americans, is a not unexpected finding.

The Asymmetric Effects of Change

The data in Table 1 indicate that changes in performance satisfaction do have some impact on changes in regime support. Our theoretical concerns, however, necessitate further investigation into what types of change matter; that is, did increases and decreases in performance satisfaction have similar effects on regime support? One would have expected negative changes to have the more important effects on Regime Support during the economic crisis, yet from the data in Figures 4 and 5, it appears that the larger changes in Regime Support were in the positive direction, and this may have been caused by increases in satisfaction with incumbent performance.

We created two separate variables, one representing the extent of positive change in performance evaluations and one representing the extent of negative change across each of the two time periods.²¹ We re-estimated the models, substituting Positive Change in Performance Satisfaction and Negative Change in Performance Satisfaction for the overall change measure, and obtained the results in equation 1.3 for the 1978–85 sample and 1.4 for the 1983–85 sample.

In both periods, the somewhat unexpected finding is that greater effects are seen for *positive* rather than negative changes in performance evaluations. The difference is much greater in the short-term panel, where negative changes in evaluations have no impact on regime support whatsoever. In the long-term

²¹ If an individual increased in Performance Satisfaction, then the positive change variable equalled the amount of change; otherwise, the positive change variable was 0. If an individual decreased in Performance Satisfaction, then the negative change variable equalled the amount of change; otherwise, the negative change variable was 0. Thus, the positive signs for the coefficients for the Positive Change variables in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that as individuals become more positive in performance satisfaction, they become *more* favourable towards the regime. The positive signs for the coefficients for the Negative Change variables indicate that as individuals evaluate incumbents more negatively, they become *less* favourable towards the regime.

panel, positive change has a greater impact than negative change, although both effects are statistically significant. These findings confirm first that regime support is very resistant to weakening, as it declines only in response to long-term drops in performance satisfaction. They also suggest that regime support may increase through positive changes in incumbent performance in both the long and short term. Although most respondents in both samples declined in their perception of incumbent performance satisfaction, some individuals did show increases, and these models indicate that regime support among those respondents was strengthened as a result. While previous research suggests that individuals are more likely to attend to negative than positive information about incumbent performance, the results here indicate that the opposite may be true about regime support: positive changes in performance satisfaction in Costa Rica are more likely than negative changes to influence regime attitudes.²²

WEST GERMANY: RESULTS

The West German context, as noted above, provides interesting comparisons to Costa Rica. West Germany experienced only a mild shock as a result of the oil crisis of the 1973–74 period, not the full-blown crisis seen in Costa Rica during the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s. In this sense, we can compare the changes in regime support which may result from a milder economic setback with those from a more severe depression. The survey design in West Germany is a two-year panel, enabling us to compare the short-term influences on regime support in West Germany with the 1983–85 results in Costa Rica. There are, then, ample opportunities to test whether the results found in both panels in Costa Rica are generalizable, or whether they are limited because of the severity of the economic crisis or for other, country-specific or idiosyncratic, reasons.

Measurement of the Variables

The variables in West Germany were measured with similar regime support and performance items as in Costa Rica. Indeed, the design of the Costa Rican surveys was closely modelled on the West German study. However, only three of the regime support items which constitute the scale in Costa Rica were included in the earlier West German study. We constructed the regime support measure, then, from those three items:

- (a) I have great respect and affection for the political institutions in the Federal Republic.
- (b) I find it very alarming that the basic rights of citizens are so little respected in our political system.

²² On negativity in political evaluations, see Richard Lau, 'Negativity Effects in Political Behavior', *American Journal of Political Science*, 29 (1985), 119–38; and Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', *American Political Science Review*, 71 (1977), 44–66.

- (c) The courts in the Federal Republic guarantee everyone a fair trial regardless of whether they are rich or poor, educated or uneducated.

The scales are somewhat less reliable than the six-item regime support scales in Costa Rica, but are in the acceptable range of 0.70 in 1974 and 0.63 in 1976. We multiplied the resultant index by two to ensure comparability of the scales in the two countries.

Incumbent performance was also measured by six items, again with as many questions as possible similar to the Costa Rican study. The questions ask the respondent to 'give a grade between 1 and 5' to the present government according to how well it has:

- (a) provided care for the old, weak and needy;
- (b) worked for economic stability;
- (c) guaranteed the national defence;
- (d) provided strong and active political leadership;
- (e) protected the free market economy;
- (f) worked for law and order in the country.

The reliabilities of this 25-point scale are extremely high, with an alpha of 0.81 in 1974 and 0.85 in 1976.

Stability and Causal Effects

Of initial interest are the changes in means for each of these variables over time. As in Costa Rica, Regime Support in West Germany increased very slightly among panel respondents, from 19.4 in 1974 to 20.7 in 1976. This is somewhat surprising, given the attempt of the survey's sampling procedures to locate anti-regime sentiment, yet even among this rather unrepresentative group, the economic downturn did not serve to increase alienation from the system as a whole. The absence of aggregate change in incumbent evaluations observed in the panel is even more striking. The panel rated the performance of the Social Democratic government under Helmut Schmidt slightly higher in 1976 (20.39 out of a possible 25) than the Wili Brandt SPD government in 1974 (18.45), suggesting that although there was an economic decline, aggregate perceptions of government competence remained very high. These ratings show that, at least for this sample, the economic downturn did not result in more negative performance ratings for the West German incumbents. This confirms the widely-held view that objective economic conditions do not automatically translate into a loss of incumbent support.²³ But did either the increases or decreases in incumbent performance produce change in regime support?

Identical models to those in Costa Rica were estimated with the West German

²³ See Michael Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy', *American Journal of Political Science*, 30 (1986), 315-46; and Manfred Kuechler, 'A Trend Analysis of System Support in West Germany', paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 1986.




TABLE 2 *Regime Support Regressions in West Germany†*

	Change in Regime Support, 1974-76	
	(2.1)	(2.2)
Initial Regime Support	-0.72** (0.39) <i>-0.62</i>	-0.72** (0.39) <i>-0.62</i>
Initial Performance Satisfaction	0.17* (0.09) <i>0.08</i>	0.17* (0.09) <i>0.08</i>
Change in Performance Satisfaction	0.31** (0.07) <i>0.19</i>	—
Positive Change in Performance Satisfaction	—	0.28** (0.10) <i>0.12</i>
Negative Change in Performance Satisfaction	—	0.35** (0.12) <i>0.10</i>
Education	0.008 (0.10) <i>0.01</i>	0.003 (0.10) <i>0.01</i>
Age	0.05** (0.02) <i>0.10</i>	0.05** (0.02) <i>0.10</i>
Ideology	0.27* (0.15) <i>0.06</i>	0.27* (0.15) <i>0.06</i>
Class	0.04 (0.62) <i>0.00</i>	0.05 (0.62) <i>0.00</i>
Intercept	9.0	9.2
Adj. R-squared	0.40	0.39
N	(632)	(632)

† Standard error in parentheses; standardized betas italicized.

* $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$

data to determine more precisely the impact of performance evaluation on regime attitudes. The form of the equation is identical to the Costa Rican analysis except that the relevant variables are measured in 1974 and 1976, instead of the years spanned in the Costa Rican surveys. Equation 2.1 in Table 2 shows the results of the general model predicting change in regime support.

The results, except for the demographic and ideology variables, are very similar to the short-term Costa Rican panel. The largest effect on Change in Regime Support is, again, initial levels of that variable, followed by Change in Performance Satisfaction. Although the scales are not directly comparable, both the unstandardized and standardized effect ($\beta = 0.19$) of Change in Performance Satisfaction are congruent with the results from Costa Rica. This suggests that there may be a very general impact of change in evaluations of incumbent performance on regime support, differing slightly according to the time lag involved and the economic and political context. However, although the effects are all statistically significant, they are not large enough in magnitude in either country to have had a profound substantive impact on the legitimacy of the regime.

We next investigated the possibility of differential effects of positive and negative change. The results, from equation 2.2, show that in West Germany, both positive change ($b = 0.28$) and negative change ($b = 0.35$) in performance evaluations had a statistically significant impact on changes in regime support, and both were of approximately equal magnitude. This pattern differs slightly from the patterns seen in Costa Rica. While in both countries positive changes in performance satisfaction spilled on to regime orientations, only in West Germany did negative short-term performance evaluations cause a decline in regime support. The differences between the countries probably reflects the different sampling strategies in the two countries which resulted in many more individuals with negative regime attitudes being included in the West German study. Moreover, in West Germany, as in Costa Rica, the effects of changes in performance satisfaction on regime support were small in substantive magnitude. There were perceptible adjustments of regime attitudes as a response to both positive and negative changes in performance satisfaction in both countries, but the effects were certainly not of sufficient magnitude to have significant macro-level implications for overall regime stability.

CONCLUSION

We find no evidence that changes in the evaluation of incumbent performance caused major changes in regime support in either Costa Rica or West Germany over either the short or the longer time periods investigated here. However, the two variables were not completely independent. Change in performance evaluation did exert some impact on change in attitude towards the regime in both countries, controlling for a wide range of other variables; yet the macro-level implications for the stability of the regime were minimal, as most of the changes were slight in magnitude and most change took place only at the upper portions of the regime-support scale.

These results have important implications for theories of the determinants of democratic regime stability. Although Costa Rica in the late 1970s experienced an extremely severe economic crisis, and although West Germany slid into economic recession in 1973–74, there was no aggregate erosion of the very high levels of legitimacy in either country. In Costa Rica, the economic crisis had a substantial negative impact on evaluations of the effectiveness of incumbent performance, but in West Germany no such general decline occurred. In neither case, however, did evaluations of incumbent performance influence overall system attitudes to such an extent as to call the legitimacy of the regime into question for large numbers of citizens. This strongly suggests that if democracies enter economic downturns with initially high levels of regime support, as both Costa Rica and West Germany did in the 1970s, they will be able to withstand even severe, prolonged economic performance crises.

Our findings suggest, therefore, that in democracies that have achieved a high level of legitimacy there are limits to the potential effects of economic outcomes on political support. While a substantial body of recent literature has documented the importance of economic conditions on elections and incumbent popularity,²⁴ our results show that evaluations of incumbent performance during economic downturns or crises by no means automatically translates into general regime orientations. To the extent that there is a 'spill-over' effect, it is imperfect, generally weak, and, at least in Costa Rica, asymmetric, with regime support being more receptive to positive than to negative change in performance satisfaction.²⁵

Thus, the existence of high levels of legitimacy acts as a barrier protecting the political system against the potentially deleterious effects of failures in economic performance. We may speculate that in the absence of legitimacy, performance failures may lead to regime instability under conditions of protracted crises. But we infer from the results of this study that lack of legitimacy, rather than performance dissatisfaction, is the key determinant of the breakdown of democratic political systems.

²⁴ See Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative Economic Voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy'; Kristen Monroe, ed., *The Political Process and Economic Change* (New York: Agathon Press, 1983); and the many references cited in those works.

²⁵ The slight positive effect of change in performance evaluation on change in regime support in both West Germany and Costa Rica supports theoretical speculation about the role of effectiveness as a source of legitimacy sentiment. See David Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1980); and James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

APPENDIX TABLE *Characteristics of Cross-Section and Panel Respondents in Costa Rica*

	1985 Cross-section	1983-85 panel	1978-85 panel
<i>Sex</i>			
Male	44%	43%	43%
Female	56	57	56
<i>Class</i>			
Middle	45	46	—
Working	55	54	
<i>Education</i>			
Primary	40	49	47
Secondary	41	33	32
University	19	17	21
<i>Age</i>			
Under 30	44	44	23
30-50	38	37	47
50+	18	19	30
<i>Ideology</i>			
Mean on 1-8 scale	5.97	6.22	5.95
<i>Regime Support</i>			
1985	30.1	30.5	29.9
<i>Performance Satisfaction</i>			
1985	20.1	20.3	20.5

The Politics of Corn Law Repeal and Theories of Commercial Policy

T. J. McKEOWN

The large shift in voting in the House of Commons on repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1842-46 period has led many analysts to focus on the political calculus of Peel's government and on the role of ideology in shaping this policy change. While the claim that ideology was an independent source of change lacks substantiation, the claims about Peel's changing political calculus are an important part of a larger explanation for the change in voting. However, showing that Peel had his own reasons for preferring repeal is not the same as showing why Peel was successful. An analysis of the political and economic interests of constituents and Members of Parliament reveals that these interests were systematically related to Members' votes on repeal. Repeal is thus more appropriately understood as the result of the interaction of Peel's immediate objectives with a more congenial political environment that had arisen due to the changes induced by British economic development.

The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 is probably the most studied question of nineteenth-century tariff politics. Long an object of attention because of its alleged significance as an indication of the waning of aristocratic domination of British politics, repeal is theoretically significant as well. It seems at first glance to conform to the key tenet of the so-called theory of 'hegemonic stability' – that the leading industrial state of an era will adopt free-trade policies.¹ It also seems to be an instance where the combination of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs is not enough to preserve a policy favoured by a powerful and well-placed special interest.² The pivotal role of Robert Peel and allied Tory leaders in this episode seemingly accords well with recent scholarship that emphasizes the importance of state actors and state institutions in the formation of policy,³ but is less easily accommodated within economists' theories of 'endogenous' tariffs which treat government officials as responding mechanically to signals in their

Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Credit for the accomplishments but not blame for the drawbacks of this analysis is due to William Aydelotte, Robert Bates, John Conybeare, Gary Cox, William Keech, Peter Lange, Neil deMarchi, the Editor and two anonymous reviewers.

¹ Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic, 1975); Steven D. Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', *World Politics*, 28 (1976), 317-47; Harry Johnson, 'An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions', *Journal of Political Economy*, 73 (1965), 256-83.

² Michael Hayes, *Lobbyists and Legislators. A Theory of Political Markets* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1981)

³ Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

political environment.⁴ The significance of Corn Law repeal is further enhanced by the fact that the econometric base for most theorizing about the politics of protection is dominated by studies of post-Second World War Western Europe and North America.⁵ As a result, it is difficult to assess the accuracy of many current theories across a wider range of political circumstances.

THE THEORETICAL PUZZLES

Advocates of a theory of hegemonic stability as applied to international trade argue that British economic pre-eminence made it rational for Britain to prefer free trade, while giving her the economic and military capability to ensure that other states would reduce their own trade barriers. The repeal of the Corn Laws conforms neatly to such a theory, because it was a movement towards free trade by the leading industrial state, whose reduction in agricultural protection increased returns to foreign agriculture. This change arguably retarded foreign industrialization slightly, thus preserving Britain's advantage in manufacturing.

There are two obvious problems with this account of British commercial policy. The first is that it fails to offer any explanation of why Britain would not behave according to orthodox economic theories of international trade and take advantage of its ability to maximize its gains from trade by imposing the 'optimal' tariff.⁶ The problem is highlighted by work showing that Britain's nineteenth-century adoption of free trade probably led to a *reduction* in British national income.⁷ Just as important, this account cannot explain why this process did not take place much sooner. Neither hegemonic stability theorists such as Krasner and Gilpin nor anyone else argues that British pre-eminence in manufacturing emerged only in the 1840s; depending exactly on how one defines and measures this pre-eminence, one could easily date its appearance as early as the latter part of the eighteenth century. Since theories of hegemonic stability treat the state as a unitary actor and do not specify the internal political processes by which manufacturing advantage translates into a free-trade policy, one can still treat the repeal of the Corn Laws as a confirming instance of the theory by the simple expedient of introducing an *ad hoc* lag between the onset of manufacturing supremacy and the resultant change in commercial policy. The theory is thus saved from falsification but at the price of considerable vagueness about

⁴ Stephen P. Magee, 'Endogenous Tariff Theory. A Survey', in David Colander, ed., *Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984); Stephen P. Magee and Leslie Young, 'Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984', in Robert M. Stern, ed., *US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987)

⁵ Jonathan Pincus, *Pressure Groups and Politics in Ante-Bellum Tariffs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) constitutes an important exception to this generalization

⁶ John A. C. Conybeare, 'Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International Political Economy', *International Studies Quarterly*, 28 (1984), 5-22

⁷ Donald McCloskey, 'Magnanimous Albion: Free Trade and British National Income, 1841-1881', *Explorations in Economic History*, 17 (1980), 303-20. A more refined analysis is provided in Douglas Irwin, 'Political Economy and Peel's Repeal of the Corn Laws', Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC, August 1988.

what would constitute a falsifying observation. An alternative approach is to make the argument about domestic political processes within the hegemonic state that is implied by the theory: as the hegemonic state acquires a large comparative advantage in manufacturing, protection for manufactured goods become a useless prize for the exporting manufacturers, while the increasing economic importance of the manufacturing sector gives it increasing political influence as well. Under these circumstances the manufacturing sector can wrest protection away from the agricultural and extractive sectors, improve its own pecuniary returns, and as a by-product of its self-interested activity create a national policy of free trade. Such an account is plausible, but it stands in contradiction to the commitment of hegemonic stability theory to model commercial policy as rational from the standpoint of the nation as a whole. In this scenario the hegemonic state fails to apply the optimal tariff, and it is not clear what national policy objectives are (inadvertently) served by the manufacturers' political success.

The translation of a theory of hegemonic stability into an argument about domestic political processes within the hegemonic state leads to consideration of the second theoretical puzzle. A well-defined and politically quite influential interest group benefited from duties on corn, while the costs of the duties were widely dispersed. A common expectation in situations of this sort is that the policy of benefit to the special interest will endure. The economics of information means that it is not rational for consumers to invest effort to identify small losses concealed by the 'noise' inherent in the information they receive about economic conditions. In addition, small-scale consumers have difficulties in organizing for effective political action due to the well-known free-rider problem. From this perspective, the only way that a tariff could be changed would be if there were changes in the price or quantity of output, degree of producer, consumer or geographic concentration, or in a shift in comparative advantage in the protected sector or in sectors that are strongly affected by the imposition of protection.⁸ In the specific case of the Corn Laws, the explanation for repeal would focus on the above-mentioned variables, and, unless supplemented by an explicit theory of the workings of the political system, would postulate that the tariff schedule ought to have evolved in step with the evolution of the economic structure of Britain.

The problem with such an argument when applied in straightforward fashion to Corn Law repeal is that the large shift in political support in the House of Commons for repeal between 1842 and 1846 can hardly be reconciled with the degree of economic change in that four-year period – especially since there was no general election in that period. The most convincing evidence for this point is

⁸ The theoretical argument is given by Sam Peltzman, 'Towards a More General Theory of Regulation', *Journal of Law and Economics*, 19 (1976), 211–40, and further developed by Arye L. Hillman, 'Declining Industries and Political-Support Motives', *American Economic Review*, 72 (1982), 1180–7. Empirical work which attempts to explain differences in the level of protection across sectors is surveyed by Real Lavergne, *The Political Economy of US Tariffs* (Toronto: Academic Press, 1983).

TABLE 1 *Parliamentary Divisions on Corn Law Repeal, 1842-1846**

Date	Measure	Division	Tory votes	Whig-Liberal votes	Reformer votes	Repealer votes
4 July 1842	Corn Law	93 Y	9 + 0	48	31	5
	Importation Bill,	230 N	155 + 64	7	3	1
	3rd reading	491 AB	191 + 50	157	70	23
15 July 1843	Villiers'	127 Y	0 + 0	70	55	2
	motion for	382 N	243 + 88	40	10	1
	abolition	305 AB	112 + 26	102	39	26
26 June 1844	Villiers'	126 Y	0 + 1	70	51	4
	motion to	330 N	222 + 79	21	6	2
	consider repeal	358 AB	133 + 34	121	47	23
15 May 1846	Peel's bill,	348 Y	0 + 114	146	73	15
	3rd reading	251 N	241 + 0	6	4	0
		215 AB	114 + 0	60	27	14

* Data is taken from Aydelotte's dataset. Due to missing data for one MP, there is a slight discrepancy between these totals and those reported by Aydelotte. Party identifications use Aydelotte's Variable #174, a five-fold classification. Tory votes are shown as the sum of protectionist and Peelite factions. A 'Y' is a vote for the repeal position, an 'N' a vote against, and 'AB' denotes not voting. Since the dataset does not record the reasons for not voting, the 'AB' totals are inflated by inclusion of members who were in the dataset but who were not in Parliament at the time of the vote. There are 814 MPs in the dataset, but only 658 seats in Commons at this time. Thus, the 'AB' count should be reduced by 156 to arrive at an accurate division for most votes in this period.

provided simply by the tally of the votes in Table 1 detailing various attempts to abolish the Corn Laws in the 1840s. Whereas attempts to repeal the Corn Laws up to 1845 were easily defeated, Peel was able to count on more than 300 votes for passage of repeal in 1846, with a winning margin of about ninety votes. No one has argued that the economic structure of Britain was changing so rapidly at this time as to lead directly to this dramatic change in voting. Even the Irish potato famine, which began near the end of this period, and which certainly was on the mind of Peel and his ministers when they proposed repeal (see below) does not suffice to rescue an explanation founded solely on changes in economic structure: grain prices were higher in the early part of the decade and in the period immediately after 1846 than they were when the Corn Laws were repealed.⁹

The final puzzle we consider is related to the previous one. A large swing in political outcomes in a short period of time, unaccompanied by a corresponding shift in economic conditions, suggests serious limitations in economists' attempts to 'endogenize' tariff levels, even when such efforts incorporate functions which model strategic interaction among interest groups and which relate shifts in policies to shifts in the resource levels that interest groups devote to

⁹ B. R. Mitchell, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 488.

influencing political outcomes. The uncompromisingly instrumentalist conception of the state embodied in endogenous tariff theory seems to leave little scope for political leaders to shape outcomes by acting in creative or entrepreneurial fashion. The common historical assessment that Peel's leadership was central to the passage of the Corn Laws suddenly becomes quite problematic from the standpoint of endogenous tariff theory. Both accounts cannot be literally correct: if endogenous tariff theory arguments are accurate, then either Peel had no independent effect on the outcome, or, if he did have an independent effect, he did so by behaving in a politically non-rational fashion.¹⁰

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF CORN LAW REPEAL

The variety of explanations for the repeal of Corn Laws can be conveniently grouped into three categories. First is an explanation which focuses on the changing economic structure of Britain and the concomitant changes in the distribution of political influence. Because this type of explanation cannot explain the relatively large changes in voting on the Corn Laws in the House of Commons within the relatively brief period of 1842–46, a second type of explanation, which focuses on the changing objectives of Peel's government and its changing position on repeal, has been elaborated. Because this second explanation in turn neglects the question of how Peel's government could succeed in overcoming existing political constraints, a third type of explanation has argued that the shift in British policy was the result of the diffusion of liberal ideology throughout British society and government. This third explanation, however, is unsatisfactory. The question raised by the historical studies – how the changing short-term objectives of Peel's government interacted with structural constraints that were changing much more slowly – has not been satisfactorily answered.

Theory One: The Rise of Industrial Capital and its Interest Group (The Anti-Corn Law League)

Probably the most venerable assessment of repeal was that it was a straightforward triumph of bourgeois interests, particularly manufacturing interests, assisted in part by portfolio diversification by the aristocracy so that they held relatively more of their assets in non-agricultural activities that would benefit from repeal.¹¹ The problem with this argument (the 'Thomas–Brock thesis') has

¹⁰ That the latter possibility is close to historical accounts which emphasize the 'statesmanlike' side of policies which broke apart the Tory party can be readily admitted, but there remains an analytical tension between these two accounts. Whether Peel's behaviour is seen as politically non-rational depends on whether he is judged to have attached much intrinsic weight to office-holding *per se* as opposed to getting the policy results he desired.

¹¹ J. A. Thomas, *The House of Commons 1832–1901: A Study of its Economic and Functional Character* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1939); W. R. Brock, *Lord Liverpool and Liberal Toryism* (London: Frank Cass, 1941).

already been noted: the large shift in House of Commons voting on the Corn Laws between 1842 and 1846 occurred in the absence of a general election, in a period of moderate economic growth, and with no obvious discontinuities in economic development. This hardly means that changes in the economic structure of Britain were unrelated to changes in its commercial policy, but it certainly suggests that the proximate sources of the changes in political outcomes in this period lie elsewhere.

One way to meet this objection is to argue that industry was spatially distributed in such a way that small but widespread growth in the industry would have a 'tipping' effect on many parliamentary constituencies, changing the local balance between protectionists and free traders in a dramatic fashion. Were this to occur, parliamentary voting patterns might change dramatically, even though the change in economic structure is relatively slight.¹² However, as Table 2 shows, even the most economically and politically important industry, cotton textiles, was not geographically distributed in a way that would give it much political weight in more than about 20 per cent of all parliamentary constituencies. Incremental growth in the industry would therefore not have had great system-wide repercussions in just four years.

A second answer is to modify the purely economic argument by emphasizing the importance of the Anti-Corn Law League in the repeal effort. If the liberalizing forces possessed an organizational weapon not in the arsenal of the protectionists, it is plausible to argue that many of the Tories may have preferred to abolish the Corn Laws because of a rational anticipation that failure to do so would soon result in an eventual confrontation with industrial capital and the League which they could ill afford.¹³ Thus, if one could show that the League was beginning to pose a real threat to Tory interests which could not easily be met except by conceding on the Corn Laws, one would demonstrate that the Thomas-Brock thesis contains an important element of truth.

The League first fielded candidates in the 1841 elections. In February 1842 Cobden proposed the strategy of targeting 'swing' boroughs, which was implemented in a series of by-election contests beginning in 1843. One contemporary calculated that a vacancy occurred in the House of Commons on the average of once per fortnight, which would imply that the League at best would gain twenty-six seats per year via this strategy until such time as a general election occurred.¹⁴ The League's record in these by-elections was not especially encouraging; particularly in small and often corrupt pocket boroughs, the League forces were often defeated.¹⁵ Popular agitation is held to have peaked in 1842, with the revival of trade in 1843 diminishing public attention to the Corn Law issue; some have therefore argued that passage of repeal occurred at a point

¹² Morris Fiorina, 'Constituency Influence', *Political Methodology*, 2 (1975), 249-66.

¹³ John Morley, *The Life of Richard Cobden* (Boston, Mass.: Roberts Brothers, 1881).

¹⁴ David A. Hamer, *The Politics of Electoral Pressure: A Study in the History of Victorian Reform* (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1977), p. 66.

¹⁵ Hamer, *The Politics of Electoral Pressure*, pp. 73-4; Eric J. Evans, *The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain 1783-1970* (London: Longman, 1983), p. 265.

TABLE 2 *Cotton Textile Employees per Registered Voter in Parliamentary Districts in England, Wales and Scotland, 1840s*

Employees per voter	Percentage*
0	81
0.001-0.01	2
0.02-0.10	5
0.11-1.00	6
1.01-12.24	5

* Due to rounding, the percentage total is only 99 per cent. As a rule of thumb, we may assume that 30 per cent of the employees were eligible to vote. See George M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison, 'A Rent-Seeking Explanation of the British Factory Acts', in Colander, ed., *Neoclassical Political Economy*, p. 196.

when the League's influence was at low ebb.¹⁶ It is true that by February 1844 Cobden was coming round to the view that the by-election strategy was not working out, and that a numerical majority in the Commons was beyond the League's reach. However, the subsequent League strategy of aiming at large urban districts and at county seats where the nature of the population created the possibility of League victories simply by large-scale voter registration did deliver prompt successes in the West Riding, South Lancashire, Middlesex, South Staffordshire and possibly North Lancashire.¹⁷ The League then drew up a list of twenty more counties in which to apply the strategy. Although this latter strategy obviously was not designed to secure a simple numerical majority either, it did have the virtue of cutting into the core of Tory legislative strength – their dominance of county seats in England. Thus, although the League did not have the capacity to wrest control of the Commons away from the Tories in a direct contest, it was probably clear to the Tories that the League was becoming an increasingly sophisticated and well-financed opponent, and that an energetic League registration campaign might cost it many formerly safe seats in the counties. Given the Tory reluctance to mobilize their own rural following due to fears of politics assuming a 'popular' character, it is certainly plausible to argue that the Tories saw continued intransigence on the Corn Laws as politically too risky.¹⁸ However, these risks were expected ones, rather than ones already experienced. Even with the success of the county strategy, Tory antipathy towards popular movements of any kind suggests that the only way the League could reduce Tory opposition to repeal was to reduce the number of Tory MPs.

¹⁶ It should also be noted, however, that the League's fund-raising continued to prosper in 1843–44. It had raised only £7–8,000 in 1840, but in 1843 raised £50,000 and in 1844 £90,000. See Robert Stewart, *The Politics of Protection. Lord Derby and the Protectionist Party 1841–1852* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 15.

¹⁷ Hamer, *The Politics of Electoral Pressure*, p. 84.

¹⁸ Travis L. Crosby, *English Farmers and the Politics of Protection* (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1977).

Unfortunately for the League, the large number of Tory seats in rural areas and pocket boroughs where the League could not hope to mount a serious electoral challenge meant that the direct and immediate impact of League agitation was inherently limited.

A third possible modification to the analysis of the role of economic change in the abolition of the Corn Laws is a more general argument that relatively decentralized or even unorganized efforts by industrial interests exerted a diffuse but pervasive pressure for liberalization. However, this argument about 'business influence' is even more difficult to sustain than an argument that relies on the specific organizational capacities of the League. Although League efforts seemed quite impressive at the time – perhaps because of their novelty – they occurred against a backdrop of very weak business organizations: in several important manufacturing towns chambers of commerce were dormant or non-existent for lengthy periods (Birmingham (1832–42), Leeds (1800–51), and even Manchester (1801–20)).¹⁹ Cobden in a letter to one of his colleagues complained bitterly about the lack of support from local businessmen: 'Leeds ran away after a political *ignus fatuus*. Glasgow deserted us for tariff reform. Birmingham has never had a lucid interval yet.'²⁰ In the period prior to 1846 there were many petitions to the Board of Trade that complained of the duties on individual commodities, but almost no petitions favouring a general movement to free trade as such;²¹ there is therefore very little evidence for any significant political mobilization on the part of business in general for free trade in general. To the extent that business had an important political impact, it was by its actions against protection on a specific set of agricultural commodities, rather than against protection as a general policy.

Although there is support for the idea that the activities of the League had an impact, treating the repeal of the Corn Laws simply as a triumph of industrial capital is far more problematic. There would be some obvious difficulties with Theory One, even if the voting pattern on the Corn Laws in the House of Commons had not changed much more rapidly in the 1840s than the underlying economic interests did. Bourgeois representation in the Commons in the 1840s was still quite modest. Repeal could not pass without the votes of many nobles, most of whom would not have business interests.²² Moreover, since the Tories held a sizeable majority, no repeal bill could pass without at least some Tory support. William Aydelotte investigated Tory voting on the repeal bill by examining several bivariate relationships pertaining to MPs' economic interests and failed to find any significant difference between the economic interests of the

¹⁹ Lucy Brown, *The Board of Trade and the Free Trade Movement, 1830–1842* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 182.

²⁰ Hamer, *The Politics of Electoral Pressure*, p. 65fn.

²¹ Brown, *The Board of Trade*, pp. 180–2.

²² Even if there were many MPs with business interests that have not been identified, the argument still is strained, since the extent of unidentified holdings would have to be quite large in order for portfolio diversification by itself to be decisive.

Peelite faction and those of the Protectionists.²³ Aydelotte's study suggests that the most sizeable bloc of Tory votes for repeal came from those who held government office under Peel, and who probably would have lost office if his government had fallen on account of losing the repeal vote. Similarly, Boyd Hilton has questioned the claim that shifting economic interests in the Tory party led to the policy change, contending instead that 'the ministers were after stable employment, and they saw [it] as more likely to be provided by the towns.'²⁴ How then to account for Tory votes, and more generally, the votes of the other MPs?

Theory Two: The Changing Objectives of Peel's Government

Partly due to the above-noted weaknesses in Theory One, some historians have focused on the changing perceptions and objectives of Sir Robert Peel and his government in attempting to explain the change in policy on the protection of corn. There is a fair amount of agreement about the reasons why Peel's government wanted repeal. Peel sought to improve living conditions for the labouring classes, partly as an end in itself, partly to blunt class antagonisms.²⁵ He showed a keen appreciation of the political difficulties facing the landed interest in attempting to preserve the Corn Laws in the face of an attack on aristocratic privilege that was beginning to link the Corn Law issue to larger constitutional questions.²⁶ As a corollary to this, he was concerned with outmanoeuvring Whigs and Liberals in the electoral arena by depriving them of one of their more potent issues.²⁷ He wished to establish the wheat supply on as secure a basis as possible, and changing conditions in the world grain market probably led him to believe that repeal would facilitate rather than endanger the acquisition of necessary supplies.²⁸ As Imlah notes, 'Against the rising needs of the population and the persistent hazard of crop failures, the only genuine security was to develop production and supply from abroad, and this could not be called suddenly into being in the quantities coming to be required in poor harvest years.'²⁹ Peel also envisioned 'high farming' (capital intensive production using advanced techniques) as a strategy which would minimize the adverse impact on British

²³ William Aydelotte, 'The Country Gentlemen and the Repeal of the Corn Laws', *English Historical Review*, 82 (1967), 47–60.

²⁴ Boyd Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815–1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 305.

²⁵ Norman Gash, *Sir Robert Peel. The Life of Sir Robert Peel after 1830*, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1986), pp. 215, 361, 546; W. H. Chaloner, 'The Agitation against the Corn Laws', in J. T. Ward, ed., *Popular Movements c. 1830–1850* (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 140–6; Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, p. 303.

²⁶ Gash, *Sir Robert Peel*, p. 557.

²⁷ Brown, *The Board of Trade*, p. 220; Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, pp. 130, 306–7.

²⁸ Susan Fairlie, 'The Corn Laws and British Wheat Production, 1829–76', *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, 22 (1969), 88–116; Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, p. 107.

²⁹ Albert H. Imlah, *Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica. Studies in British Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 186.

agriculture of competition on an open world market, and he introduced measures to provide government loans to promote high farming and to reduce the obligations of rural notables for the economic welfare of unemployed agricultural labourers at the same time that he introduced the repeal measure.³⁰ While not primarily concerned with benefits to manufacturing, he was aware of the possibility that improving foreigners' opportunities to sell grain to Britain would in turn give foreigners more foreign exchange with which to purchase British manufactures, and he was also mindful of the possibility that this might encourage the development of foreign agriculture while having some braking effect on foreign manufacturing development. Inasmuch as the tariff in the 1840s was an important source of revenue for governments that generally adhered to a balanced budget fiscal policy in peacetime, any tariff policy changes were possible only if they actually increased customs revenues by stimulating growth in the volume of imports to compensate for the decline in the tariff rates, if lost revenue could be replaced by other sources of revenue, such as an income tax, or if the government's overall finances were sufficiently favourable to bear some loss in revenue without difficulty. Fortunately for Peel these conditions seemed to be met in 1846. Finally, the onset of the potato famine in Ireland in 1845 was met by Peel's government by a relief scheme intended to provide employment for Irish peasants and paupers to give them an income with which they could purchase food. The minimization of grain prices complemented this relief strategy.³¹

The primary difficulty with Theory Two is that it is much easier to explain why Peel led the repeal effort than to explain why a majority of the House of Commons – and anybody at all in the Tory party – chose to follow him. The decision calculus that motivated Peel and his followers led them to a position that was contrary to the economic interests of many in their own party. Even with the help of the votes of the Whigs, Liberals and Irish Repealers, Peel could not hope to win without attracting at least some support from within Tory ranks. The explanations that focus on how Peel saw the situation neglect the characteristics of the coalition of supporters for the legislation. Thus, the question of how a winning coalition became feasible remains to be addressed.

Theory Three: The Triumph of Liberal Ideology

Standing apart from explanations couched in terms of specific economic or political stakes is an argument that characterizes Corn Law repeal as an incident in a larger drama of the unfolding of the intellectual hegemony of classical liberalism. Changing conceptions of self-interest, rather than changes in the social situation confronting actors, are held to be central to the explanation for the policy change. Kindleberger and Rohrich have both argued in this fashion

³⁰ D. C. Moore, 'The Corn Laws and High Farming', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 18 (1965), 544–61; Gash, *Sir Robert Peel*, p. 570

³¹ R. D. Collison Black, *Economic Thought and the Irish Question 1817–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 112–13

that the ideology of free trade played an important role in the repeal of the Corn Laws.³² While there is no denying that the precepts of classical liberalism were the dominant ideology of mid-nineteenth century Britain, to ascribe a significant independent role to these ideas in the repeal of the Corn Laws is a far more controversial judgement.

Was free trade in corn really a part of this ideology? If we take Adam Smith's position on matters of economic policy as the measuring rod of classical liberalism, the answer clearly is 'no'. Smith, as is well known, made exceptions to his general doctrine of free trade whenever considerations of national security were particularly pressing. One such exception was the Navigation Acts; the other was the regulation of international trade in corn. One might object that a larger set of ideas and writers ought also to be considered as defining this ideology; if so, it is clear that some elements of the liberal case for free trade had been in circulation since the latter part of the 1600s; the Tories of that day put forward remarkably 'liberal' arguments on trade policy because that position suited both their interests in improved commercial and diplomatic relations with France and the desires of the Tory directors of the East India Company for expanded foreign trade.³³

The argument about the importance of ideology has very little to say about the fact that the renewal of the Corn Laws in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars took place well *after* the ideas of Smith and others had entered into general circulation. Having an adequate ideological justification for policy was not a necessary condition for getting the policy adopted, since, as Hilton notes, protectionist policies were enacted even though there was no coherent theory of protection and its supporters were generally 'brazenly empirical'.³⁴ In discussing the development of a liberal theory of public policy Trevelyan notes that, 'When the Reformers... took in hand the problem of the relation of this old governmental system to the new facts of the Industrial Revolution, their first belief was that the remedy lay in reduced taxation and less State interference.'³⁵ This sounds like a good argument for the importance of ideological factors, until one notes that Trevelyan is describing England in the eighteenth century, not the nineteenth, and that his argument proceeds to explain this policy preference in terms of the administrative weakness of the British government prior to 1832, not in terms of the ideological hegemony of liberalism. Since the appearance of classical liberal ideas considerably antedates both the renewal of the Corn Laws and their repeal, one can reconcile a claim about the independent significance of

³² Charles P. Kindleberger, 'The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820 to 1875', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 35 (1975), 20-55; Paul E. Rohrich, 'Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy-Making', *International Organization*, 41 (1987), 61-92.

³³ W. J. Ashley, 'The Tory Origins of Free Trade Policy', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 12 (1987), 335-71. One can, if one wishes, pursue the origins of free-trade policies to the dawn of the seventeenth century. See, for example, Pauline Croft, 'Free Trade and the House of Commons, 1605-1606', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 28 (1975), 17-27.

³⁴ Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, p. 9.

³⁵ G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England* (London: Longmans, 1960), p. 614.

ideology with the observed historical events only by adopting a transparently *ad hoc* assumption that somehow the ideology diffused quite slowly until sometime after the Corn Laws were renewed in 1819, but thereafter diffused remarkably more quickly, and diffused with particular rapidity in the early 1840s. This is not an impossible condition, but to date no one who takes the ideology argument seriously has developed the evidence for it.

The argument about ideology also seems to assume too much about the prevailing attitudes in the English business community of the nineteenth century. It passes in silence over the lack of petitions to the Board of Trade in favour of a general movement to free trade as such, and fails to take note of Brown's observation that 'in formulating a general criticism of the tariff it would seem that the Board of Trade was leading a new movement of opinion, rather than expressing one which was already there.'³⁶ Regardless of whether English businessmen were aware of the ideas of Adam Smith and thought of themselves as his disciples, they clearly were not prepared to follow a political strategy aimed simply at implementing Smithian ideas. It is easily forgotten that British manufacturing industries received protection in the 1840s. Indeed, because the price level had fallen since the 1820s, while the tariffs were at a fixed rate rather than *ad valorem*, the rate of effective protection for many commodities *increased* in the period between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the advent of Peel's administration. British tariffs in 1840 were a higher percentage of the value of imports or of total government revenues than they were prior to the Napoleonic Wars.³⁷ Peel's 1842 budget provided for duties of 12 per cent on most semi-manufactures and 20 per cent on most finished goods; these are hardly negligible duties, at least when compared to those of the present day.³⁸ The fact that much of this protection is now seen as superfluous does not mean that contemporaries were able to make such a judgement, and it certainly does not alter the fact that not all of it was. The lack of enthusiasm among manufacturers for a campaign against protectionism in general thus had some basis in their pecuniary self-interest, and it is clear that this self-interest was not counterbalanced by the increasing popularity of a free-trade ideology, at least in this particular historical period. If manufacturers were concerned that an assault on the Corn Laws, even an unsuccessful one, would serve as a prelude to an attack on their own protection, then their enthusiasm for Cobden's more sweeping attacks on protectionism would understandably be quite restrained.

Although the more general arguments about the role of ideology are clearly suspect, the historical record offers better support for three more limited amendments to an explanation of repeal couched in terms of micro-economic rationality. The first amendment concerns the role of superstitious learning in the policy process. Prior to the successful effort to repeal the Corn Laws, Peel's government had adopted a number of other changes in tariffs which generally moved

³⁶ Brown, *The Board of Trade*, p. 182.

³⁷ Imlah, *Economic Elements of the Pax Britannica*, p. 117; 120.

³⁸ Imlah, *Economic Elements of the Pax Britannica*, p. 151.

the system in a more 'liberal' direction. These changes were begun in 1842, a year of economic distress and civil strife. The period 1842–45 saw a steady improvement in economic conditions, and thus the policy changes appeared to Peel (and probably others as well) to 'work' in the sense that the dire consequences predicted by opponents did not come to pass.³⁹ Thus, the earlier policy changes were positively reinforced and the probability of more policy changes of the same sort increased.

A second amendment is suggested by Peel's views on the impracticality of merely suspending the Corn Laws for the duration of the Irish famine (an expedient for which there was ample precedent). Peel viewed even an avowedly temporary reduction in duties as irreversible.

To suspend temporarily the duties on all foreign cereals would be to confirm the argument of the League that the Corn Laws aggravated scarcity and their abolition would secure plenty. A suspension of the Corn Laws would be unpredictable in its duration, their ultimate reimposition only conceivable at the cost of violent public controversy. Already in their minds the 1842 Corn Law had been undermined to the point of being simply a political and economic expedient. If that expediency was now swallowed up by the Irish famine, the last argument for protection had been destroyed.⁴⁰

What made the policy change irreversible was that the new policy would give actors information that they did not previously possess about the actual effects of removal of duties as well as the willingness of even a Tory government to remove them; there was no way that any government could 'divest' political actors of this information in a short period of time. Current models which attempt to account for changes in the level of protection accorded a good in terms of changes in its price generally neglect information costs, and provide no reason to believe that changes in tariff levels are not completely reversible when the price of the good in question returns to its original level.⁴¹

Finally, political actors often have concerns other than their narrowly pecuniary interest in the price of a good, and they may be willing to sacrifice some modest amount of pecuniary gain provided they believe that by doing so they will promote a policy that gratifies their other concerns. Thus, information about the social impact of policy changes – as distinct from information about its impact on their own economic welfare – can have an effect on how they decide the question. The ability to justify a policy change by appealing to a widely held set of shared values that allegedly will be served by the change is certainly a political asset.⁴² In the context of British tariff politics in the 1840s there was widespread concern about making sure that the lower classes had enough to eat, and any policy which seemed to promise sufficient food for these classes was

³⁹ Arthur D. Gayer, W. W. Rostow and Anna J. Schwartz, *The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790–1850*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); Gash, *Sir Robert Peel*, p. 552.

⁴⁰ Gash, *Sir Robert Peel*, p. 538.

⁴¹ See, for example, Hillman, 'Declining Industries and Political Support Motives'.

⁴² Paul A. Anderson, 'Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision-Making', *American Journal of Political Science*, 25 (1981), 738–61.

bound to attract political support. High grain prices early in the decade and the looming famine in Ireland would have made these values salient at the time.

THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CORN LAW VOTING

The above-mentioned theories, in spite of their difficulties, do provide guidance for an empirical analysis of Corn law voting, and the empirical analysis in turn provides a better basis for evaluating the accuracy and empirical importance of the theoretical arguments. There has been surprisingly little systematic analysis of the parliamentary voting on the Corn Laws, and none of it has used a method of analysis that is equal to the task of assessing the relative importance of a multiplicity of potential influencing factors and gauging the strength of contending theories.

The analysis that is presented here is motivated by an extremely simple point of view: whatever the motives of Peel and his government, whatever the strength of the Anti-Corn Law League, and whatever the potency of arguments couched in terms of liberal ideology, any effort to repeal the Corn Laws had to contend with the political and economic self-interest of individual Members of Parliament. Thus, this analysis of repeal begins by depicting the precise nature of these interests. For the purposes of this study, there are four: firstly, the personal pecuniary interests of MPs; secondly, the effects of constituency characteristics, in particular constituency economic activity, on the political survival of MPs; thirdly, MPs' assessment of the threat of rebellion and the efficacy of repeal as a means of coping with that threat, and fourthly, the importance of maintaining legislative coalitions. The effects of these four facets of self-interest on voting in the House of Commons are the primary focus of this study. In the course of analysing these effects, we will be able to sharpen considerably our understanding of the composition of the winning coalition and the interests it represented, and to come to a clearer verdict on the value of existing theories.

Personal Pecuniary Interests

The notion that the distribution of private economic gains underlies the pattern of support for repeal is embodied in the Thomas-Brock thesis, but came under attack in later decades as an insufficient explanation. It is undoubtedly true that personal pecuniary interests were not the only important consideration in MPs' voting, but the empirical work to date is not very helpful in assessing just how important these interests were. Simple bivariate cross-tabulations which do not control for the effects of additional variables are not useful for resolving this issue; hence, in this article we turn to multiple regression in hopes of rendering a more definitive assessment.

Aydelotte's dataset on MPs from 1841 to 1847 provides information on these pecuniary interests.⁴³ He not only coded every business interest of the MP, but

⁴³ William O Aydelotte, *British House of Commons, 1841-1847* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, n.d.).

also those of the MP's father. (These non-agricultural business interests could be inherited by the sons, and in contrast to the contemporary situation regarding land transfers, one did not need to be the first-born to inherit.) However, he did not code the size of estates or the economic activity which took place on those estates, thus the analysis of the agricultural interest must be more indirect. His data on social class includes a variable which categorizes MPs by whether they were related or unrelated to the landed class. This simple dichotomous measure is used to indicate a pecuniary interest derived from holding land (see Table 3). (Specific agricultural activity is also treated in 'constituency interests', below.)⁴⁴ Since it is likely that more than one-third of the total acreage of England, Wales and Scotland was planted in corn in the 1840s,⁴⁵ the removal of protection for corn obviously could reduce many landlords' ability to extract rents.

TABLE 3 *Variables Relating to MPs' Pecuniary Interest and Hypothesized Relationship to Support for Repeal of Corn Laws*

Variable	Description	Hypothesized sign
LAND	Whether MP belonged or was related to landed class	(-)
BSNS	Whether MP had identifiable non-agricultural business interests	(+)
FBSNS	Whether MP's father had identifiable business interests	(+)

The argument about personal pecuniary interests is straightforward. We expect MPs from families that are members of the landed classes to prefer policies that sustain high levels of rent. This should be true even when the landowner in question has land that is not being used for the cultivation of corn, since reductions in the acreage demanded for planting corn would increase the supply of land available for other uses, thus generally depressing rents. Those

⁴⁴ An additional pecuniary interest relevant only to Tory MPs was their access, and that of their family and supporters, to government patronage. According to information provided by Pinto-Duschinsky, the amount of patronage controlled by the government in the mid-nineteenth century was still quite substantial, thus, the heavy support by office-holders for Peel's Corn Law legislation noted by Aydelotte could have had a pecuniary basis. A logit regression performed solely on Tory MPs with office-holding as a dichotomous dependent variable reveals that office-holders differed from their non-office-holding counterparts in their greater business holdings and in the tendency for their constituents to grow less corn and to riot less. See Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, *British Political Finance, 1830-1980* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 18.

⁴⁵ This figure is based on 1866 data, which revealed that a little over 30 per cent of total acreage was planted in corn. Since productivity had improved, while output had declined, the obvious implication is that corn acreage was greater twenty years before. See *Parliamentary Papers*, 60 (1866), 6-9.

MPs from families that owned non-agricultural businesses are expected to favour repeal for a variety of inter-related reasons: if removing protection reduces returns to domestic corn-growers, they will grow less corn, which frees labour for other activities. Decreasing the cost of food increases real wages, increasing the supply of labour, without employers' paying higher money wages. It also means that workers will have more disposable income to use for purchases of manufactured goods. Employers also have a modest personal interest, as consumers of corn, in a lower price for corn.

Constituency Interests

The consideration of constituency effects is based on a general argument that MPs' voting decisions are the product of the various economic interests within the constituency. Certain interests would lose economically from repeal of the Corn Laws, while others would gain; the MP's vote then is treated as a function of the relative strength of these two opposing interests.⁴⁶ Even in districts where there was little electoral competition in 1841, one might expect such a relationship. This is partly because the nomination process was probably controlled by local notables possessing political bargaining strength roughly proportional to their economic importance.⁴⁷ In addition, a political natural selection process in the MP's district could have produced an equilibrium outcome by 1841 in which the incumbent MP took positions on legislation that generally conformed to the dominant pecuniary interests of his constituents.⁴⁸ Thus, as Cox notes, it is incorrect to infer that the absence of competition in the 1841 general election means that an MP necessarily held a safe seat and was relatively unconstrained in his voting decisions.⁴⁹ The absence of competition in a given district might simply have reflected the MP's skill in identifying the political constraints and living within them.

Aydelotte's treatment of economic interests in Corn Law voting did not distinguish constituency characteristics from personal pecuniary interests, and focused simply on the latter. To learn something of the effects of constituency economic interests it is obviously necessary to obtain data on the economic activities within constituencies, rather than those represented in MPs' portfolios.

⁴⁶ For a recent, sophisticated example, see Thomas W. Gilligan, William J. Marshall and Barry R. Weingast, 'A Reconsideration of the Railroad Problem: The Economics and Politics of the Interstate Commerce Act' (working paper, Domestic Studies Program, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1987).

⁴⁷ R. J. Olney, *Lincolnshire Politics 1832-1885* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) describes a situation which is generally consistent with this.

⁴⁸ A third potential source of a relation between constituency characteristics and MPs' voting patterns is that an MP's portfolio of economic assets may have been geographically concentrated in the district which he represented, unfortunately, since the data on their economic assets merely tell us what type of assets they held without describing where the asset was located, we cannot evaluate the importance of this factor.

⁴⁹ Gary W. Cox, *The Efficient Secret. The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

TABLE 4 *Independent Variables Included in Regressions*

LAND	Scored 0-1; denotes whether MP was related to the landed classes (Aydelotte's Variable # 69).
BSNS	Scored 0-1; whether MP had any non-agricultural business interest (Aydelotte's Variable # 119, with 'minor' business interests lumped together with 'business interests').
FBSNS	Scored 0-1; whether father of MP had non-agricultural business interest (Aydelotte's Variable # 120, treated as # 119 above).
RIOT	Whether civil disturbances had occurred in MP's county in 1842. Taken from F. C. Mather, 'The General Strike of 1842: A Study in Leadership, Organisation and the Threat of Revolution during the Plug Plot Disturbances', in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson, eds, <i>Popular Protest and Public Order</i> (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), p. 116fn.
COT	Ratio of cotton employment, 1839, to registered voters in constituency, 1846. From <i>Parliamentary Papers</i> , 42 (1839) 1-351, and Charles R. P. Dod, <i>Electoral Facts from 1832 to 1853: Impartially Stated, Constituting a Complete Political Gazetteer</i> , H. J. Hanham, ed. (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1972).
IRON	Ratio of iron production in MP's county, 1843, to registered voters in constituency, 1846. Iron statistics taken from Richard Meade, <i>The Coal and Iron Industries of the United Kingdom</i> (London: C. Lockwood, 1882), pp. 829 <i>et seq.</i>
SHEEP	Sheep per acre in MP's county, 1866.
CORN	Percentage of acreage of MP's county planted in corn, 1866.
CTL	Head of cattle per 100 acres in MP's county, 1866. Data for CTL, CORN, and SHEEP from <i>Parliamentary Papers</i> , 60 (1866), 6-9.

The particular economic interests that we are able to represent within the model are few, but they are important: corn growing, sheep and cattle raising, and cotton textile and iron production (see Table 4 for detailed information on data and sources). These data are often at the county rather than the constituency level for this period, and the measurement errors created by applying them to individual constituencies will reduce the efficiency (i.e. increase the standard error) of the parameter estimates for the constituency variables. However, there is no obvious reason for believing that systematic error has biased the parameter estimates. Indeed, the measurement error contained in the constituency data implies that for the parameter estimates on these variables there is less chance of incorrectly rejecting a null hypothesis and more chance of incorrectly accepting it. This imparts a conservative bias to the empirical assessment of these variables.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ It should also be noted that *t*-statistics are only reported here for single divisions. Had the data for all divisions been pooled, or had we computed the *joint* significance of results for several equations, the strength of the reported statistical relationships between variables would appear to be stronger than it is in the single equation case. This is because the regression results across all divisions were broadly similar

We expect that the higher the proportion of acreage devoted to corn in a constituency, the more likely the MP is to vote against repeal; for the other activities, which by and large have only a consumer's interest in the price of corn,⁵¹ the situation is more ambiguous.

Prior expectations about the interest of other constituency economic interest groups on the Corn Law divisions depend on one's conception of the nature of economic assets and parliamentary coalition dynamics. If one adopts a neo-classical view of assets as suitable for use in the production of a very wide range of commodities without substantial transition costs or substantial degradation in productivity when production is shifted from one commodity to another, one can take a very small number of factors of production as the primary economic and political groupings. On the other hand, if one views these transition costs or degradations in productivity as quite significant, then there ought to be as many economic and political groupings as there are industries.⁵² The former viewpoint, when applied to the Corn Laws, suggests a cleavage between Land and Capital, with Labour as a factor lacking political representation at this time. (This is also the viewpoint implied by the notion that conflict over the Corn Laws was part of a much larger, more deeply rooted, and partly non-economic conflict between the 'landed interest' and the rest of British society.) The latter viewpoint on assets is consistent with a variety of cleavages, depending on parliamentary coalition dynamics. The simplest initial expectation is that all interests other than corn take a consumer's view of protection for corn, and that their presence reduced the chances of an MP voting against repeal. However, this simple situation is complicated – at least in principle – by the possibility that coalitions across producer groups, each seeking protection for its own output, could considerably expand support for protection of any given commodity. (In the most extreme case, this could create a grand coalition of all producing interests.)⁵³ Although both Peel and Cobden pursued strategies designed to minimize this possibility – Peel by reducing other tariffs before attacking corn, Cobden by resolutely refusing to broaden the agenda of the Anti-Corn Law League so as to turn it into a general free-trade lobbying group – they may not have been completely successful. The regression results for these variables will thus be helpful in assessing the existence of such cross-commodity coalitions. The particular

⁵¹ It is always possible that corn growers are the primary customers of some other producers, and so these producers' interest in repeal may be diluted or even reversed by their rational desire not to reduce the incomes of their customers. However, we have no data which would permit us to estimate the importance of such a relationship.

⁵² An analysis which adopts the former view is Ronald Rogowski, 'Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade', *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1987), 1121–38; the latter view is taken in Stephen P. Magee, 'Three Simple Tests of the Stolper–Samuelson Theorem', in Peter Oppenheimer, ed., *Issues in International Economics* (Stocksfield: Oriel Press, 1978) and James Cassing, Timothy J. McKeown and Jack Ochs, 'The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), 843–62.

⁵³ Kenneth Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, 'Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel. A Generalization', *American Journal of Political Science*, 25 (1981), 96–111.

TABLE 5 *Possible Patterns of Non-Corn Producers' Behaviour with Regard to Repeal of the Corn Laws*

Coalition dynamics	Implications for regression results
No protectionist producer groups coalesce with corn; repeal treated in isolation from other issues	Variables for non-corn production will be negatively related to votes against repeal.
Coalition among landed interests due to linkages to other issues	Variables for cotton textile and iron production negatively related to votes against repeal; variables for sheep and cattle production positively related.
'Pork barrel' producers' coalition	Variables for all production of protected goods positively related to votes against repeal.

regression results that would be consistent with the given alternatives are specified in Table 5.

Linkage to Other Issues

The very idea of an 'issue' as a set of political interactions that can be analysed without reference to other political interactions is obviously an abstraction that cannot always be relied upon to give an accurate analysis of political events. In the particular case of Corn Law repeal we have historical evidence that a variety of other considerations affected the way in which many MPs voted on repeal. Lord John Russell's very inability to form a Whig government after Peel resigned in December 1845 has been attributed to his reluctance to attempt to govern in a situation where he could obtain a majority on few issues other than that of repeal of the Corn Laws. The Irish Repealers voted as a bloc for removal of protection from corn, but this was more a result of internal Whig-Liberal-Repeal coalition politics than of the inherent attractions of Corn Law repeal to the Irish MPs; 'Young Ireland' was on record as supporting the Corn Laws because they provided protection to Irish corn producers who exported duty-free into England.⁵⁴ As has been noted, the government was concerned with neutralizing radicalism and rebellion among the lower classes and preventing any larger attack on the prerogatives of the landed interests. Those MPs most likely to be sensitive to Peel's advocacy of heading off seditious developments would probably have been those who had the most direct contact with unrest. Thus, if riots had occurred in the MP's county in 1842, he is hypothesized to be more likely to vote for Peel's proposal than if they had not. This gives a second method – in addition to the pattern of producer opposition to repeal noted above – of identifying these broader cross-issue linkages. (Note that since most

⁵⁴ Gash, *Sir Robert Peel*, pp. 593–4, Collison Black, *Economic Thought and the Irish Question*, p. 143

rioters did not possess the right to vote, there was no *direct* electoral cost to MPs to taking positions which displeased the rioters.)

The Role of Party

Aydelotte has suggested that party allegiance played an important independent role in the Corn Law votes, but there are two reasons to doubt his claim.⁵⁵ Firstly, repeal was not a party issue until 1845, and in the 1840s considerations of party unity and preservation of party cohesion were not widely accepted.⁵⁶ Secondly, Aydelotte's empirical findings which he invokes to establish the importance of party rely on a bivariate analysis; the problems with this have already been noted.

The importance of party in the Corn Law votes can be assessed by constructing a model of legislative voting in which only party identification is used to account for voting. These results are then compared to the analysis using the personal pecuniary, constituency and riot variables noted above. The personal pecuniary, constituency and riot variables are then used to model the party affiliation of MPs. By doing this we can observe whether the variables alleged to constrain Corn Law voting also shape more general political allegiances, and thus whether a party-based model of voting in fact reflects the indirect effects of the underlying constituency, personal pecuniary and linkage variables.⁵⁷

DATA ANALYSIS

Although analyses were performed for every one of the divisions on the Corn Laws recorded by Aydelotte for the period 1842–47, the empirical analysis presented here focuses on how members of the House of Commons voted on the third reading of Peel's Corn Law bill on 15 May 1846.⁵⁸ For the vote on the third reading, each member is scored as for, against or absent, with the absent members modelled as indifferent between passage and defeat. Interpreting the non-votes in terms of the logic of a spatial model⁵⁹ presumes that 'accidental'

⁵⁵ Aydelotte, 'The Country Gentlemen'

⁵⁶ Evans, *The Forging of the Modern State*, p. 262.

⁵⁷ In addition, in an analysis not reproduced here, party variables are added to the right-hand side of the basic model of Corn Law voting to determine which variables remain significant when they are jointly used to account for floor votes. Although collinearity of course weakens the overall goodness-of-fit, in this context it is not overall goodness-of-fit that is of interest. Instead, the main objective is to identify which variables exhibit some independent effects when they are combined into a single regression.

⁵⁸ The regression results are also supplemented by an analysis of members' positions on a three-point Guttman scale derived from Aydelotte's Guttman scale of Corn Law voting. In general, the parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit measures did not vary dramatically across regressions.

⁵⁹ In a 'spatial' model voters choose a party or candidate in order to secure the adoption of policies which are the shortest 'distance' from their own ideal policies when these policies are mapped on to a space. The simplest useful spatial model is one in which the voter's location on a left–right continuum is compared with the location of various policy packages on the same continuum. An early but still useful example of this genre is found in Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957)

factors leading to absence, such as transport difficulties, illness, etc. are not the sole reasons for non-voting and that at least some of the MPs did not vote for political reasons. There are two reasons why this strategy seems preferable to simply discarding all the absent members from the dataset. Firstly, as a general rule, it is preferable to expand rather than restrict the universe of cases being modelled; discarding the absent members seems to be a step backwards rather than forwards. Secondly, in the particular case of attempts to model voting decisions, one has to account theoretically and empirically for the possibility that voters are subject to cross-pressures that prevent them from coming to a clear judgement for or against a particular piece of legislation.

Given the nature of the dependent variables, an appropriate regression technique is multinomial logit.⁶⁰ In addition, collinearity diagnostics developed by Belsey, Kuh and Welsch were used on the data matrix.⁶¹ As already noted, the Irish MPs have been excluded from analysis due to the lack of economic data for Ireland. Because of the difficulty of identifying the reasons for non-votes, the results were checked by analysing the votes of two different sub-samples: firstly, only those members who were in Parliament for the entire 1841–47 period; secondly, only the members voting on a given vote. These additional results were generally consistent with those attained by the more inclusive results reported here.

RESULTS

Table 6 shows the results of logit regressions on two Corn Law divisions in Aydelotte's dataset: Villiers' motion of 10 June 1845 to have a committee of the whole House consider abolition of duties on corn, and the vote on the third reading of Peel's bill on 15 May 1846. The numbers in parentheses are *t*-values. Results are given for two equations on each vote because there are three sub-groups; the first equation compares the protectionists to free traders, the second equation compares non-voters to free traders. The overall goodness of fit is indicated by the log-likelihood ratio statistic.⁶²

⁶⁰ This technique is designed for situations where the left-hand side variable is restricted in the values it can make. In such a situation ordinary least squares estimation is inappropriate. For a helpful introductory discussion, see John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, *Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models*, Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-045 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1984).

⁶¹ David A. Belsey, Edwin Kuh and Robert E. Welsch, *Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity* (New York: John Wiley, 1980). Although some collinearity is present in the data, it is important to note that its effect is to decrease the efficiency of the parameter estimates, but not to bias them. Thus, when statistically significant relations are found in spite of collinearity, one can be reasonably certain that if one adopted some technique for removing the collinearity, the relationships would be even stronger, rather than disappearing.

⁶² This statistic is useful for measuring goodness-of-fit in situations where the model is non-linear. Large negative values indicate a large reduction in unexplained variance compared to a null model. For more information, consult A. C. Harvey, *The Econometric Analysis of Time Series* (Oxford: Philip Allen, 1981), pp. 159–65.

TABLE 6 *Regression Results for Basic Model on Two Divisions**

Variable	Villiers' bill, protectionist	Villiers' bill, absent	Peel's bill, protectionist	Peel's bill, absent
LAND	0.883 (3.25)	0.403 (1.69)	0.595 (2.64)	0.140 (0.616)
BSNS	-0.621 (-2.43)	-0.340 (-1.45)	-0.427 (-2.13)	-0.239 (-1.12)
FBSNS	-0.386 (-1.37)	-0.246 (-0.98)	-0.433 (-1.86)	-0.153 (-0.643)
RIOT	-0.334 (-1.19)	-0.041 (-0.16)	-0.011 (-0.047)	-0.272 (-1.15)
COTTON	-0.131 (-1.30)	-0.112 (-1.62)	-0.475 (-1.63)	-0.511×10^{-3} (-0.007)
IRON	-0.359×10^{-3} (-0.251)	-0.473×10^{-3} (-0.378)	-0.278×10^{-2} (-1.48)	0.130×10^{-4} (0.111)
CORN	0.030 (3.43)	0.035 (4.43)	0.018 (2.72)	0.316×10^{-3} (0.452)
SHEEP	-0.195×10^{-3} (-0.076)	-0.092×10^{-3} (-0.039)	-0.869×10^{-3} (-0.394)	0.191×10^{-3} (0.090)
CATTLE	-0.017 (-1.07)	0.002 (0.142)	-0.049 (-3.71)	-0.028 (-2.14)
log-likelihood:	-631.6		-654.6	

* $n = 650$

In a number of respects the results for the two votes are quite similar. Personal pecuniary characteristics did indeed affect the voting, and in roughly the way predicted. The results for the variables representing constituency economic characteristics show that some of these variables did have a systematic impact on voting, although the relations in the case of Villiers' bill are, with the exception of CORN and to a lesser extent COTTON, statistically weak. The voting on Peel's bill generally displays stronger relationships between constituency economic activity and positions taken, suggesting that MPs were generally responsive to constituency economic interests.⁶³

Both regressions given evidence of a split in agriculture between the cattle producers and the growers of corn, a pattern that is particularly pronounced in the vote on Peel's bill. Agricultural solidarity was probably undercut by the interests of cattle producers in cheap cattle feed. (Since Peel's government in the budget of 1842 had already converted a prohibition on cattle imports into a fixed duty, cattle interests may have viewed the corn interests as being the first to

⁶³ This analysis was corroborated by regressions performed on two sub-populations: those MPs who did not return to Parliament in 1847, and those who did. The results showed that protectionists who dropped out or who were defeated for re-election tended to be more responsive to corn and sheep and less responsive to cotton and cattle than the ones who returned in 1847. This is exactly the pattern of results one would expect if constituency economic interests shaped the voting behaviour of Parliament by natural selection. It is interesting that the personal pecuniary variables also do not predict voting as well for the drop-outs as for those who returned.

defect and therefore would have had little incentive to respond to appeals to close ranks against the industrialists.) Although IRON takes the expected sign, it is a good deal weaker than COTTON. This may simply reflect the crudity with which this production was allotted across parliamentary districts; unlike the situation for cotton, it was impossible to allocate production at the constituency level. The statistical weakness of SHEEP is at least partly attributable to collinearity between SHEEP and LAND, and to a lesser extent between SHEEP, CATTLE, CORN and RIOT. The conflict between cattle-producing areas and corn-producing areas suggests that there was no 'agricultural bloc' as such. Of course, the opposition of cotton-, iron- and cattle-producing areas fatally undermines the 'pork barrel' model.⁶⁴

The results for the RIOT variable only weakly accord with expectations. Representation from a county in which rioting had occurred depresses the probability of a member being a protectionist, but the relationship is not statistically strong. It would be unwise to attach much substantive significance, as the measure of RIOT is extremely crude: any incident whatsoever within a given county results in that county being given a score of '1' on this variable; without better data on the location and severity of riots, we cannot come to a sharper substantive conclusion. In addition, there is some collinearity between RIOT, COTTON and IRON as well as between RIOT, CORN and SHEEP.

For both models the results for the non-voters are a good deal weaker than the results for the protectionists. Given the abundant non-systematic reasons for absence, in addition to the limitations of the dataset's coding scheme, these results are hardly surprising.⁶⁵ The fact that the overall goodness-of-fit for the model of the vote on Villiers' motion is weaker than that for Peel's is representative of a more general pattern: the goodness-of-fit of the model steadily improved as the number of non-voters on the divisions declined. This statistical result is in accord with the observation that for many of the earlier divisions there was little doubt about the outcome; hence, many MPs on both sides of the issue had little rational incentive to vote since there was almost no chance that their vote would affect the result. In such a situation abstaining would be related even more weakly to constituency and other characteristics than it would be on close votes.

The differences between the results on the two votes suggest the need for a closer analysis of those whose votes switched. This was accomplished by two regressions, one analysing the behaviour of those who were absent on the first vote, the other analysing the behaviour of those who voted with the protectionists the first time. (The equations differ slightly in that a variable representing office-holding during Peel's tenure was added to the second regression to

⁶⁴ Re-analysis of the voting after excluding constituencies with less than 1,000 registered voters revealed no dramatic differences in the results.

⁶⁵ Aydelotte's dataset is so arranged that it is not possible to determine why a member was absent for a vote. If the reason were death, resignation or some other factor not plausibly connected to Corn Law voting in any systematic manner, such instances would of course reduce the efficiency of the estimates.

capture the switch in position of Peel's ministry between the two votes.) The most clear-cut result of those regressions, which are not reproduced here, is that those who switched, in addition to holding office under Peel, tended to be from constituencies with abundant cattle production.⁶⁶

The results from a model relying solely on party identification are presented in Table 7.⁶⁷ Essentially, they ratify the conventional wisdom about which parties most heavily supported removing the Corn Laws, and the strong relationship between party identification and voting on this issue. However, it is worth noting that the overall goodness-of-fit for the model is significantly inferior ($p < 0.01$) to that provided by our basic model. Thus, Aydelotte's conclusion about the relative weakness of an 'economic' versus a 'political' explanation for voting does not survive re-analysis.⁶⁸

Our basic model also performs reasonably well as a predictor of party identification. (In all three equations in Table 8 the comparison is between membership of the party in parentheses and the Liberal/Radical members.) From a purely statistical standpoint this cannot be viewed as much of a revelation, since previous regressions have already shown that there is a good deal of covariation between party identifications and Corn Law votes. More substantively, the analysis supports the claim that members' asset portfolios and those of their constituents affected not merely the Corn Law vote but also their basic grouping into different political parties. Members of all three of the non-Liberal parties are more likely to be from the landed class, and much less likely to represent constituencies where cattle-raising is an important economic activity. The sharpest differences in background among the three non-Liberal groups arise from involvement in non-agricultural business and from representation of corn-growing areas. Tories were the party of corn and particularly strongly tied to the landed class, and are less likely to be connected to a non-agricultural business; Whigs had a (weak) tendency to represent iron- and cotton-producing constituencies, were less likely to represent corn-growing constituencies, and were even more likely to be involved in business than the Liberals. (This point is less

⁶⁶ Involvement in a business or the involvement of one's father in a business, representation of a county with rioting in 1842, less corn production than average, and not being a member of the landed class were more weakly associated with switching to a liberalizing position

⁶⁷ The analysis of voting on the Corn Laws uses only a three-fold division of members into parties rather than the four-fold division adopted here. Dividing the Tories into Peelites and protectionists creates a situation where two of the twelve cells in a 4×3 matrix are empty: there are no Peelites in the hard-core protectionist camp and there are no protectionist Tories in the free-trade camp.

⁶⁸ A regression combining the party variables and the basic model was also run for both the vote on Villiers' motion and on Peel's bill. In the equations for protectionist voting the inclusion of party variables moved the coefficient on LAND to near zero and actually caused the coefficient on CORN to change sign. Other coefficients were not as dramatically affected. Since the coefficient on TORY was large and highly significant it is apparent that the strong relationship between membership in the Tory party and association with the landed class and corn-growing areas accounts for these results. The only important difference between the results for the two regressions is that protectionist voting on Villiers' motion displayed a strong negative relationship to representation of areas where rioting had occurred (coef = 0.880, $t = 2.47$)

TABLE 7 *Voting as Predicted Solely from Party**

V223 (protect)	= -3.243 + 3.991 TORY + 0.502 WHIG
	(-7.113) (8.451) (0.729)
V223 (absent)	= -1.269 + 1.148 TORY + 0.437 WHIG
	(-6.724) (4.787) (1.468)
log-likelihood	= -574.8

* n = 650

TABLE 8 *Using the Basic Model to Predict Party Affiliation**

PARTY (Tory)	= 1.07 LAND - 0.338 BSNS - 0.567 FBSNS - 0.093 RIOT - 0.033 COT
	(4.66) (-1.55) (-2.35) (-0.39) (-0.39)
	-0.867 × 10 ⁻³ IRON + 0.029 CORN + 0.002 SHEEP - 0.050 CATTLE
	(-0.50) (4.07) (0.97) (-3.68)
PARTY (Peel)	= 0.876 LAND - 0.218 BSNS - 0.918 FBSNS - 0.081 RIOT - 0.060 COT
	(3.02) (-0.81) (-0.68) (-0.28) (0.59)
	+0.914 × 10 ⁻³ IRON - 0.010 CORN + 0.003 SHEEP - 0.042 CATTLE
	(0.57) (-1.13) (1.09) (-2.51)
PARTY (Whig)	= 0.919 LAND + 0.343 BSNS - 0.254 FBSNS - 0.398 RIOT + 0.011 COT
	(3.08) (1.23) (-0.84) (1.30) (0.12)
	+0.003 IRON - 0.007 CORN + 0.381 × 10 ⁻³ SHEEP - 0.058 CATTLE
	(1.92) (-0.78) (0.27) (-3.23)
log-likelihood	= -775.7

* n = 651

than earthshaking, however, since political differences between Whigs and right-wing Liberals were fairly slender.) Peelites, while not as involved in business as the Whigs, were less tied to the landed class, less likely to represent a heavy corn-growing area, and slightly more likely than the protectionist Tories to represent cotton or iron industries or cattle-raising areas. The overall pattern is remarkably coherent: many of the variables have parameter values for the different parties that are transitive, or nearly so. Overall, the findings are highly consistent with Aydelotte's argument that the political cleavage on the Corn Laws was congruent to a single political cleavage which divided members on most of the important issues facing the House of Commons in the 1840s.⁶⁹ The image of political parties as rival blocs of investors certainly does not exhaust the universe of differences between Tories, Whigs and Liberals in mid-nineteenth century Britain, but it does suggest that Aydelotte was correct when he argued

⁶⁹ William O. Aydelotte, 'Voting Patterns in the British House of Commons in the 1840s', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5 (1963), 134-63.

that for Members of Parliament in the 1840s, 'the central issue of politics was not the welfare of the poor but the divergent interests of the rich'.⁷⁰

CONCLUSIONS

One general conclusion from these findings is that the Thomas-Brock thesis was not so much incorrect as incomplete. Aydelotte and other critics are correct in noting that the changing economic structure of Britain can hardly account for the dramatic change in legislative voting patterns on this measure in the relatively brief period 1842-46.⁷¹ The historians are also right to note the influence of a variety of other factors on the decision calculus of Peel's government. However, there are systematic relationships between voting and the personal pecuniary interests and constituency economic interests of MPs; in this sense the basic insight of Thomas and Brock was right. If industrialization was associated not just with the proliferation of cotton mills, but also with higher incomes and an increasing demand for meat and dairy products from cattle, as well as changing asset portfolios for the wealthy families of Britain, the model we have presented suggests that the changes in the economic structure of Britain did indeed create a situation where a winning coalition for Corn Law abolition could be assembled. However, the changes in economic structure did not 'cause' the abolition in the Corn Laws in any direct sense. Abolitionist forces were still too weak in 1846 to win a simple trial of strength in the House of Commons; this was still true even after the anti-protectionists succeeded in mobilizing the MPs from cattle-raising areas. It is obvious from Table 1 that the arithmetic of the Corn Laws vote is dominated by the accession to the anti-protectionist coalition of the Irish Repealers and the Peelites, both of whom had their own reasons for favouring abolition and neither of whom had undergone any drastic change in economic circumstances in the few short years since the beginning of Peel's ministry.⁷² The economic structure made a winning coalition feasible in 1846, but that is not the same as arguing that changes in economic structure led directly to changes in public policy. Acceptance of the latter contention would require a demonstration that in a given set of economic circumstances, one and only one winning political coalition could emerge. This is logically conceivable, but in the historical circumstances extremely unlikely.

⁷⁰ Thomas Ferguson, 'Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure: The Investment Theory of Political Parties in Historical Perspective', in Paul Zarembka, ed., *Research in Political Economy*, Volume 6 (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1983), 1-82; Aydelotte, 'Voting Patterns in the British House of Commons', p. 157.

⁷¹ Indeed, Richard Cobden himself seems to have regarded the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846 as an event that happened too soon, because another three or four years would have given his forces not only more strength to challenge the Corn Laws, but also the capacity to secure a host of other reforms. One suspects Peel agreed with Cobden's assessment, which explains his willingness to act when he did. See Hamer, *The Politics of Electoral Pressure*, p. 96.

⁷² This is true even with regard to the Irish Repealers and the emerging potato famine, which seems to have had remarkably little effect on the content of the Repealers' political demands. See Cecil B. Woodham-Smith, *The Great Hunger: Ireland 1845-1849* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

Historians dissatisfied with an explanation in terms of pecuniary interests have long argued that broader political concerns motivated the Corn Law votes. The results provide some support for this line of argument. When party variables are added to the basic model, party identification, at least in the case of the Tories, seems to play an independent role in the voting; for Tories, involvement in Peel's ministry is strongly associated with switching to repeal, even when controlling for other effects. There is also some weak evidence that concerns with rebelliousness among the lower classes was a consideration among MPs. However, it must be emphasized that the regression analysis suggests that these factors are operating *in addition to* rather than *in place of* the economic factors noted above.

The results also have implications for a broader set of concerns about legislative systems and commercial policy. They suggest that constituency or party discipline did not completely constrain members' votes, and so left them with some latitude for satisfying private pecuniary interests. On the other hand, the performance of the constituency economic variables suggests that they did generally constrain voting. No matter how strong the aristocratic ethos of representation may have been at the time, comparison of those who were re-elected versus those who were not shows that the former were less responsive to constituency interests than the latter, suggesting that the system was sufficiently competitive for a process of political natural selection to weed out at least some of those who were insufficiently attentive to the economic concerns of influential constituents. It is also notable that the pattern of results on the constituency variables is consistent with a sector-specific view of capital, and inconsistent with neo-classical or modified neo-classical interpretations of tariff politics which treat the primary actors in tariff politics as factors of production such as Land, Labour, or Capital. (While this study is not primarily intended to test rival theories of the behaviour of capital, these results do have implications for economic models concerned with the degree of functional mobility of economic assets.)

Once the corn growers had been deprived of protection, the possibility of a grand producers' coalition delivering 'tariffs for all' (or, less universally, tariffs for all of agriculture) was effectively undercut. The still large and potent agricultural interests in the House of Commons had no incentives whatsoever to oppose efforts to reduce protection on manufactured goods. One suspects that Cobden understood well that getting rid of protection for corn would remove the key political prop for protection in general; thus, there was nothing to be gained and everything to be lost by a *general* assault on tariffs. But even with this astute strategy, the limits on the effectiveness of the Anti-Corn Law League meant that the success of repeal rested heavily on a government initiative. It is here that a weakness of instrumentalist or interest-group liberal models of the state, which treat politicians as passive 'auctioneers' of policies to interest groups, becomes most apparent; moreover, there are good reasons for believing that it is not merely in the short run or under conditions of less than perfect competition that a purely passive conception of politicians breaks

down.⁷³ If the government is organized in such a way that agenda-setting is centralized in the hands of the leadership of a majority party or some other central authority, and if that leadership has the financial resources and effective legal authority to make credible promises or threats of side-payments to those whose support is needed to maintain a winning coalition, and if private interests are fragmented, then it is not at all obvious that even in the long run the policy results converge to those generated by some hypothetical, purely passive, government. Although the regression equations used here do embody a mechanical conception of parliamentary voting, and although the results show the influence of producer interests in exactly the way that the Thomas–Brock thesis or an instrumental theory of the state would lead us to expect, the results also show there is scope for discretionary behaviour – in MPs' gratification of personal pecuniary preferences, and in Peel's use of his control of government to shift a bloc of votes to the cause of repeal. Parliamentarians thus make their own voting records, even though they do not make them just as they please. Capturing this interplay of choice and constraint is a difficult task, but an essential one.

⁷³ 'Auctioneers' is Magee and Young's term. They argue that the long-run effect of politicians on policy is 'small relative to the underlying power variables'. See Magee and Young, 'Endogenous Protection in the United States', p. 145.

Level-of-Analysis Effects on Explanations of Voting: The Case of the 1982 US Senate Elections

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The availability of rich survey data, and concerns over the ecological fallacy, have led voting researchers to focus on the explanation of individual voting decisions at the expense of accounting for patterns of aggregate election outcomes. This has skewed our understanding of the relative importance of various factors in the electoral process. A framework for analysis of elections at multiple levels is developed and applied using data from twenty-three exit polls from the US Senate elections. Comparable parameters for a simple voting model are estimated for individual voting and for election outcomes. Election-level factors, especially candidates' issue strategies and incumbency, are substantially more important in accounting for election outcomes than in explaining individual voting decisions. Finally, working with election outcomes permits an estimate of a path model of Senate election outcomes that shows key relationships that are not accessible from individual level data.

Concerns over the ecological fallacy have led many electoral researchers to reject aggregate data studies in favour of analyses of individual voters' decision making. The argument offered here is that this focus on individual voters misses important elements of the electoral process; it tends to underestimate the theoretical and practical significance of important election-level factors. This leads to the conclusion that explanation and analysis of electoral behaviour should proceed simultaneously at the individual and macro levels, and to the recognition that this multi-level strategy will frequently lead to different explanations for voting at different levels. While the ecological and related fallacies are methodological challenges that must be met, theories of voting will be improved by focusing on and explaining election *outcomes*, which are the connecting link between individual voter decisions and the actions of democratically elected governments.

The first section discusses the background to the problem and argues that electoral studies should be concerned with election outcomes as well as individual voters. The following two sections develop an analytic framework for looking at elections at multiple levels, and a model of voting suitable for the analysis of US Senate elections. The fourth section presents the analysis, which is a

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comparison of the model parameters estimated at the individual and state levels for the 1982 Senate elections, and a more complete aggregate-level path model of election outcomes.

MICRO AND MACRO ELECTORAL ANALYSES

Discussions of micro and macro analyses of electoral behaviour generally have as their purpose some method of grappling with the problem of the ecological fallacy. Robinson's presentation of the problem was simple in its message and profound in its effect on the shape of electoral research. The message is that one cannot rely on aggregated data in correlational analyses to draw inferences about the behaviour of individuals. His interest in influencing social analysis was clear: 'The purpose of this paper will have been accomplished, however, if it prevents the future computation of meaningless correlations and stimulates the study of similar problems with the use of meaningful correlations between the properties of individuals.'¹

The effect of this widely appreciated dictum was to render suspect most analyses based on aggregated data. Electoral analysts have learned to qualify their findings if based on aggregated data, usually quite apologetically. The general belief is that it is best to avoid such ecological correlations and regressions altogether, even though quite a few scholars have addressed the problem of inferring individual-level relationships from aggregated data.²

The purpose here is not to quarrel with the ecological fallacy, nor are any means offered of getting around it. Robinson, and subsequent scholars motivated by his insight, are correct in arguing that it is best to have individuals as the units of analysis when one wishes to explain individual behaviour. Where such individual-level data are not available, and the purpose is still to account for individual decisions, then the various approximations for getting around the ecological fallacy are relevant. However, recent efforts to test the efficacy of various ecological correlation models in cases where the individual-level parameters are known have not been at all encouraging about our ability to uncover micro processes from macro correlations.³

¹ W. S. Robinson, 'Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals', *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), 351-7.

² See, for example, Ivor Crewe and Clive Payne, 'Another Game with Nature. An Ecological Regression Model of the British Two-party Vote Ratio in 1970', *British Journal of Political Science*, 6 (1976), 43-81; Leo A. Goodman, 'Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation', *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (1959), 610-25; Eric A. Hanushek, John E. Jackson and John F. Kain, 'Model Specification, Use of Aggregate Data, and the Ecological Correlation Fallacy', *Political Methodology*, 1 (1974), 89-107; Laura I. Langbein and Allan J. Lichtman, *Ecological Inference* (Beverly Hills, Calif. Sage Publications, 1976); W. Phillips Shively, 'Ecological Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals', *American Political Science Review*, 63 (1969), 1183-96 among many others.

³ Otto Schmidt and Tibert van Dijk, 'Ecological Inference. An Empirical Analysis of Dutch Electoral Data', and Verna Tomaselli, 'The Comparison of Conventionalist Goodman's Fluxes and True Fluxes of Voting and Non-voting' Both papers were presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Rimini, April 1988

This concern with the ecological fallacy is certainly one of the reasons that electoral analysis, at least in the United States, has become almost synonymous with studies based on surveys in which individuals are the units of analysis. The move towards individual-level analysis has been greatly reinforced by the successes and availability of high quality survey data. The Columbia studies,⁴ and especially the Michigan studies beginning with *The American Voter* and continuing with the biennial National Election Studies,⁵ have provided scholars with the theoretical focus and raw materials for testing a wonderful array of sociological, psychological and, later, rational choice theories of voters' decision making. Surveys are specifically designed to gather data that are theoretically interesting. Most aggregate data collections have no counterpart to the attitudinal and perceptual variables that are the mainstay of survey research on voters. Thus, it is not hard to appreciate the widespread presumption that the best electoral analysis uses survey data to study the decisions of individuals.

Some analysts have gone beyond explaining voters' decisions. For example, there are statistical models for assessing the contributions of attitudinal factors to the net vote split as well as the more common ranking of factors as they contribute to voter decisions.⁶ More broadly, the several essays of *Elections and the Political Order* use survey data to address topics that extend beyond citizens' voting decisions.⁷

The politico-business cycle literature is an example of another body of work that takes electoral analysis beyond individual choice. However, the two major types of research designs used to study the effects of economics on voting have yielded different messages about the importance of personal economic circumstances.⁸ Kramer makes the novel suggestion that, with this version of the ecological fallacy problem, scholars are probably better off with aggregated data.⁹

In general, the most useful perspective on the appropriate uses of aggregate data for electoral analysis was provided by Austin Ranney. Writing over twenty-five years ago, he said that aggregate data 'are most likely to make valuable

⁴ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Helen Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) and Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954)

⁵ Angus E. Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960)

⁶ Donald E. Stokes, 'Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency', *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966), 19-28; Warren E. Miller and Merrill Shanks, 'Policy Directions and Presidential Leadership: Alternative Interpretations of the 1980 Presidential Election', *British Journal of Political Science*, 12 (1982), 299-356

⁷ Angus E. Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966)

⁸ Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, 'Sociotropic Politics: The American Case', *British Journal of Political Science*, 9 (1979), 129-61 and Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, 'Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting', *American Journal of Political Science*, 23 (1979), 495-527.

⁹ Gerald Kramer, 'The Ecological Fallacy Revisited', *American Political Science Review*, 77 (1983), 92-101.

contributions if they bypass questions about particular individuals and types of individuals and adopt as their sole object of inquiry the behaviour of *electorates*.¹⁰ If elections were just reflections of individual decisions, then understanding individual voters would constitute most of what we would need to know about the electoral process. But elections are not mirror reflections of individual decisions, and explaining individual decisions in the electoral process is only one important part of understanding and accounting for the important aspects of what happens in the electoral process. V. O. Key, Jr., emphasizes this point: 'If the specialist in electoral behavior is to be a student of politics, his major concern must be the population of elections, not the population of individual voters. One does not gain an understanding of elections by the simple cumulation of type-findings from the microscopic analysis of the individuals in the system'.¹¹

One need not eschew individual-level studies to appreciate that the explanation of election outcomes should be a central feature of electoral studies. To be sure, election outcomes are aggregations of individual decisions, but these are not 'mere' aggregations. Rather, the process of aggregating votes into election outcomes is profoundly political, and the political significance of aggregation into electoral constituencies is no less when the electoral lines are largely historical and permanent, as in the state boundaries for statewide elections, than when district lines are drawn for obvious partisan advantage, as is frequently the case in schemes for the decennial reapportioning of seats to the House of Representatives.

Understanding individual voters' decisions entails bringing to bear a mix of private and public values, perceptions and attitudes as part of one's explanation. Voters are responsive to their family loyalties, peer-group pressures, and their own attitudes, as well as to the actions of political parties, politicians and government. Although voting choice results from a mix of private and public attitudes and values, the ballot decision for the citizen is essentially an individualistic, private decision. It is made in secrecy and revealed only *post hoc* in reconstructed form to an interviewer.

Elections may be seen as the public and political side of voting. The aggregate study of elections as collective decisions in cross-sectional designs concerns the geopolitical interaction between the citizenry and the parties and candidates. Election outcomes are the product of individual choices, but it is the collective outcome that parties and politicians try to influence, and it is the outcome that determines the allocation of power in democratic systems. Electorates are imbued with a legal status by constitutional design, and they are discussed as collective decision makers by politicians, commentators and journalists. As academic researchers, however, many of us are reluctant to attempt an explanation

¹⁰ Austin Ranney, 'The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior', in A. Ranney, ed., *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 91-102, at p. 99.

¹¹ V. O. Key, Jr., 'The Politically Relevant in Surveys', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), p. 55

of the behaviour of electorates unless this is tightly tied to, or a simple reflection of, the decision processes of individuals.

Heinz Eulau discusses the 'simultaneity' of individual and collective action. His remarks about committees apply equally well to elections.

As each member votes, the group's decision emerges simultaneously as a collective product. It is not that the individuals decide and vote first, and then the group decides. The group's decision is simultaneous with each individual member's decision as the votes are combined into the collective decision. Institutional analysis would be satisfied with knowing the outcome of the decision process, with the decision as an emergent property of the group.¹²

This distinction between individual voters' decisions and the outcomes of elections is important theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, it entails explaining two different things, the individual decision and the group outcome. These are different, although one is 'only' an aggregation of the other. However, the process of aggregation may also alter the nature of explanations we offer for what is important in the electoral process. The next section develops a simple framework for examining the effects of levels-of-analysis on statistical explanations of voting.

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK: LEVEL AND 'IMPORTANCE'

Social science explanations usually entail statements about the effect of an independent variable, or group of variables, on some dependent variable of interest. Although our theories seldom make exact predictions, we do often glean from our verbal formulations expectations about whether a particular variable should be 'important' in explaining votes or elections. Here a distinction is made between two meanings of 'importance' that are commonly used in quantitative social science. One meaning is the ability of a change in one variable to produce a response. A variable that produces a large response can be said to be 'theoretically important'. This notion of responsiveness is usually measured by the unstandardized partial regression coefficient, or the slope of the dependent variable Y regressed on the independent variable of interest, X , while controlling for the appropriate other potential causes of Y . Whatever the slope of Y on X , one does not necessarily know for the sample at hand, or for the set of elections in which one is interested, how much X actually varies. Even if the slope is judged to be substantial, X may have relatively little effect on Y in practice unless there are significant differences on X among the units being observed. That is, X may be theoretically important but practically irrelevant because of attenuated variation.

The practical 'importance' of an X is sometimes conceptualized to be its ability to explain variance in Y . This idea of 'explanatory importance' of an independent variable (X_i) is a function of its causal relationship to the dependent variable (its slope, b_i) and its variance, or standard deviation (S_{X_i}). This is most

¹² Heinz Eulau, *Micro-Macro Political Analysis* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 3.

TABLE 1 *Levels of Analysis and Measures of 'Importance' in Electoral Research*

Level of analysis	Measure of importance	
	Responsiveness	Explanatory power
Individual voters	$b_{i(k)}X_{ik}$	$\text{Beta}_{i(k)}X_{ik}$
Elections and electorates	$b_{i(j)}X_{ij}$	$\text{Beta}_{i(j)}X_{ij}$

Note $b_{i(k,j)}$ and $\text{beta}_{i(k,j)}$ refer the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients for vote on i^{th} independent variable measured across either k voters or j states.

frequently measured by the standardized regression coefficient, or beta weight, and has a straightforward relationship to the slope.

$$\text{Beta}_i = b_i (S_X/S_Y)$$

Both measures of the impact of an independent variable, the slope and the beta weight, are valid and each provides useful information. One best captures the underlying relationship between cause and effect, the other is most useful in attributing relative explanatory power for a specific set of voters or elections.¹³ Thus, a comparison of the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients provides the first dimension for comparison. These are the columns of Table 1.

The second dimension for comparison pertains to the thing that we wish to explain. These are the two levels we have been discussing, the individual vote decision and election outcomes. These make up the rows of Table 1 giving us a fourfold perspective for discussing the role of various causal factors in electoral analysis.

The basic relationship between the independent variables of interest and voting will be shown by the slopes. The slopes at the individual and election levels should be about the same for a properly specified model,¹⁴ although certain correlations between the variable that constitutes the units of aggregation and the independent variables can cause the slopes to change at different levels.¹⁵

¹³ Elsewhere I have argued that we should use slopes to compare between populations and betas to compare variables within a single population. This perspective fails to consider that changes in beta weights across populations, or here across levels of analysis, can be of theoretical interest. See Gerald C. Wright, 'Linear Models for Evaluating Conditional Relationships', *American Journal of Political Science*, 61 (1976), 130-6, see also Hubert M. Blalock, 'Causal Inference, Closed Populations and Measures of Association', *American Political Science Review*, 61 (1967), 130-6.

¹⁴ Hanushek, *et al*, 'Model Specification, Use of Aggregate Data, and the Ecological Correlation Fallacy', pp. 90-5

¹⁵ Desmond Cartwright, 'Ecological Variables' in Edgar F. Borgatta, ed., *Sociological Methodology 1969* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), pp. 205-12

For our purposes here, the most interesting level-of-analysis differences should occur with the betas.¹⁶ Aggregation does not have similar effects on the variances of each of the independent variables. Some variables will be relatively more correlated with the aggregation units (states) than others. To the extent that an individual-level variable is correlated with the aggregation variable, it retains its initial variance at the macro level. However, if a variable, at the extreme, is orthogonal to the grouping variable, then it would have no variance when aggregated.

A simple example may illustrate. Recent presidential elections have seen the emergence of the 'gender' gap, with women less willing to support Reagan and his policies than men. Thus gender has some explanatory role at the individual level. However, if aggregated to the state level, gender would undoubtedly lose virtually all of its explanatory power. Percentage female would have almost no correlation with percentage voting for Reagan, and the primary reason would be that there is almost no variance in percentage female across the states; the states are alike in this respect. Hence, gender, while useful for distinguishing among individuals, would not be of any assistance in explaining inter-state differences in support for Reagan.

This can be seen in the formula above for the beta weight. If applied first to the individual and then to the state level, the standard deviation for gender would collapse dramatically, with the result that the beta for the state level would be much smaller than for the individual level – even though the underlying relationship (slope) might be identical at both levels. Below we shall see some examples of such changes in explanatory power that have significance for our interpretations of Senate elections.

A MODEL OF THE VOTE

The Data

A multiple-level strategy places unusual requirements on the structure of the data set. To examine relationships at both the mass and state levels necessitates valid samples of voters in the states. The primary source of survey data for analysts of American elections has been the National Election Studies; however, these data are not amenable to aggregation to the state level, and are therefore not useful for this analysis. Fortunately, media-commissioned exit poll data

¹⁶ Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 130–4, use analysis of variance terminology to make this and several of the points made here in their discussion of problems of relating congressmen's service and advertising behaviour to citizen evaluations of incumbents. By implication, the conclusions offered below can be extended to many instances in which the analyst wishes to assess elite behaviour or system characteristics (such as economic performance) using mass survey data. Two promising instances are the study of representation and voter perceptions of party positions. These are explicated very nicely in chapters that came to the author's attention after this article was written. See Philip E. Converse, 'Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information', and James A. Stimson, 'A Macro Theory of Information Flow', both in John A. Ferejohn and James Kuklinski, eds, *Information and Democratic Processes* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, forthcoming).

have been collected in recent years, and are now being made available to the academic community.

The data on voters for this study were collected by CBS News/*New York Times* in their 1982 election-day exit polls. Using short questionnaires filled out by voters immediately after voting, these exit polls comprised large numbers of respondents in each state using randomly selected precincts. The data set includes state-wide samples for twenty-three of the thirty-three Senate races in 1982, with state sampling ranging from 652 in West Virginia to over 3,000 in California. The sample design and the large state-wide samples provide the opportunity to use reasonably sophisticated voter attitude measures in parallel analyses at the individual ($N = 33,200$) and state ($N = 23$) levels. Of course, such an analytic strategy would be impossible with most national samples, since the designs are not appropriate for generalizing to state populations, and the numbers of respondents per state are too small to provide a basis for much faith in such estimates. Moreover, aggregate data collections are almost always restricted to a combination of census statistics and election returns. Being able to characterize the state electorates with theoretically meaningful attitudinal measures is a rare opportunity.

The Variables

The model has some variables that may be conceptualized as attributes of voters and some that are attributes of elections. Attributes of voters that are important for explaining the vote include party identification, ideology, presidential popularity, and a measure of changes in the voter's family financial circumstances.¹⁷

Election-level variables expected to influence the vote in this model include incumbency as a pair of dummy variables for elections with a Democratic or Republican incumbent seeking re-election, and a measure of the candidates' issue positions in each Senate election. The candidate issue variable is constructed from a scale of ten issue items administered by CBS News and the *New York Times* to all congressional candidates just before the 1982 election. The ten items scale to form a single dimension of liberalism-conservatism, running for each candidate from -5 to $+5$.¹⁸ Here a single measure of issue conservatism is con-

¹⁷ The exact wording and scoring (in parentheses) used throughout are as follows: Party Identification: 'Do you usually think of yourself as a: Democrat (-1), Independent (0), Republican (1)?' Voter Ideology: 'On most political matters do you consider yourself Liberal (-1), Moderate (0), Conservative (1)?' Presidential Popularity: 'Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?' Approve (1), Disapprove (-1) (undecided was volunteered by some respondents, 0); Family Finances: 'Compared to a year ago, is your family's financial situation better today (1), worse today (-1), about the same (0)?'

¹⁸ Candidates and incumbents were asked if they favour or oppose constitutional amendments to: (1) allow individual states to prohibit abortions, (2) permit organized prayer in the public schools; and (3) require a balanced budget. In addition, they were asked about positions on (4) the Equal Rights Amendment; (5) a mutual nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union; (6) domestic content legislation for foreign cars sold in the United States; (7) cancelling the July 1983 tax cut; (8) cutting back increases in military spending; (9) additional reductions in domestic social programs; and (10) regulation of air pollution.




Fig. 1. Candidate issue midpoints for alternative democratic strategies

structed; it is the midpoint between the Democratic and Republican candidates. The hypothesis is that where the midpoint score is higher (more conservative) the Democratic candidate will be relatively advantaged, and conversely, where the midpoint score is lower (more liberal) the Republican should do better.¹⁹

The logic of this hypothesis is based on a spatial model of voter decision making that includes the assumptions that the Democratic candidate is perceived to be to the left of the Republican candidate, and that the two candidates usually span the median voter. Thus, as the Democrat moves to the right, or the Republican moves to the right, more voters will be relatively closer to the Democratic candidate. Similarly, as the Democratic candidate moves to the left, or the Republican candidate moves to the left, more voters will be relatively closer to the Republican.

Figure 1 provides a demonstration of the logic of the midpoint measure of candidate issue positions. A hypothetical electorate is arrayed on the horizontal dimension from liberal (left) to conservative (right). Now assume that the Republican candidate's position is fixed at point R_1 . If the Democrat moves to the left, at position D_1 , then the midpoint between the candidates is M_1 . In such an election we would expect the Democrat to receive the votes to the left of M_1 , or the area A. In this example, this would yield a bare majority, with all voters to the right of M_1 voting for the Republican. Now let the Democrat take a more moderate position, moving to the right to position D_2 . This shifts the midpoint

¹⁹ The use of the midpoint as a summary of candidates' issue positions is adapted from Robert Erikson's ideas on measuring party elite preferences in comparative state politics. See Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright and John P. McIver, 'Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy', *American Political Science Review* (forthcoming).



to point M_2 , and the votes expected for the Democrat are now the areas A plus B. Thus, the midpoint can represent the positions of both candidates in a reasonable way, and this logic yields the clear expectation that the midpoint should be negatively correlated with support for Republican candidates.

ANALYSIS

Voter and State Samples Compared

We begin with a look at the mean and standard deviations of the variables in the analysis. Table 2 presents these for the individual and state levels. The means and standard deviations for individuals are straightforward. These are not weighted to represent any sort of a national sample. The means and standard deviations for the states are derived from, firstly, obtaining the mean of each variable at the state level, and then taking the average and standard deviation of these state means. The state and individual means do not match exactly because the N s for the state samples are not the same. For example, the proportion of voters casting ballots for the Republican candidate was 0.439 while the mean of the state proportions for the Republican candidate was 0.434. The individual and state means correspond quite nicely overall. This is not the case with the standard deviations. Here there is a very clear pattern. The standard deviations of the voter-level variables are smaller after aggregation. This is because a great deal of the variance in voter-level factors is within-state variance and all of this is lost at the state-level.

It is worth noting that the election-level variables retain all of their initial standard deviations upon aggregation. This must be so because by definition, all

TABLE 2 *Means and Standard Deviations for Voter and State Samples*

Variable	Voters		States	
	Mean	Standard deviation	Mean	Standard deviation
Proportion Republican of the vote	0.439	0.496	0.434	0.096
Party identification	-0.117	0.818	-0.115	0.137
Voter ideology	0.092	0.674	0.107	0.094
Presidential popularity	0.010	0.963	0.011	0.148
Family finances	-0.098	0.723	-0.112	0.075
Incumbency: Democratic	0.494	0.500	0.522	0.511
Republican	0.331	0.471	0.348	0.487
Candidate issues	-0.394	2.156	-0.207	2.324
<i>N</i> of respondents/states	33,200		23	

Source: The CBS News/New York Times 1982 Election Day Exit Polls, and the CBS/New York Times 1982 Congressional Poll

TABLE 3 *Simple Slopes and Correlations of Vote with Independent Variables, at Voter and State Levels of Analysis*

	Voters		States	
	<i>b</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>r</i>
Party identification	0.303	0.50	0.312	0.45
Voter ideology	0.200	0.27	0.059	0.06
Presidential popularity	0.277	0.54	0.348	0.54
Family finances	0.198	0.29	0.538	0.53
Incumbency: Democratic	-0.149	-0.15	-0.147	-0.79
Republican	0.117	0.11	0.125	0.64
Candidate issues	-0.019	-0.08	-0.019	-0.46

of the variance in these measures is between-states. Turning to Table 3, we can see the significance of this. Table 3 shows the simple bivariate slopes and correlations of each of the independent variables with vote, again at the individual and state levels. Overall, the slopes at the two levels are similar. The only two shifts that might be substantively important are that the slope for ideology seems to flatten out and the slope for family finances gets steeper upon aggregation. Unlike Robinson's example, all the signs agree.

The correlations, however, are not the same. For the individual-level variables there is no clear pattern. Party identification and presidential approval remain about the same at both levels in their simple correlation with the vote. The correlation for ideology drops while that for family finances shows a healthy jump from the individual to the state levels. The election-level variables show clear level-of-analysis differences. In each case they correlate much more strongly at the state than at the individual level. The reason is that at the individual level all within-state variance in the vote is error variance for these state-level variables, and that error variance disappears when explaining inter-state rather than inter-voter differences. The shifts in the correlations between the two levels-of-analysis are rather dramatic. At the individual level all of the election variables are clearly of secondary importance. Each is surpassed by all of the individual-level correlations. In sharp contrast, at the state level the election variables generally equal or exceed the voter characteristics in correlating with the vote. Thus, aggregation can differentially affect the correlation of variables with the vote, even while leaving largely intact the basic responsiveness of the vote to differences in the variables.

A Multivariate Model

Explanations of voting and election outcomes usually consider the joint contributions of a set of variables, as well as their unique contributions or effects on the dependent variable. Table 4, therefore, presents the results of multiple regression runs of the vote on our set of independent variables. As before, this is done

TABLE 4 *Models of Voting in US Senate Elections: Voter and State Level Regressions*

Independent variable	Regression coefficients Slopes		Betas	
	Voters	States	Voters	States
Party identification	0.168 (54)*	-0.327 (-2.4)	0.278	-0.469
Voter ideology	0.056 (17)	0.078 (0.3)	0.077	0.077
Presidential popularity	0.176 (62)	0.519 (2.8)	0.341	0.792
Family finances	0.041 (13)	0.099 (0.4)	0.060	0.078
Incumbency:				
Democratic	0.099 (-15)	-0.092 (-2.5)	-0.100	-0.491
Republican	0.001 (0.2)	-0.013 (-0.4)	0.002	-0.066
Candidate issues	-0.008 (-5.9)	-0.021 (-2.5)	-0.033	-0.505
Intercept	0.501 (93)	0.443 (45)		
R^2	0.379	0.797		
N	33,200	23		

* *t*-values are in parentheses.

at the individual level and at the state level, showing both the partial slopes and the partial beta weights.²⁰

Several important features stand out from the comparison of the multivariate model at the voter and at the election levels. Firstly, unlike the bivariate regressions, the partial slopes for several of the variables changes quite radically. Party identification changes to a surprisingly large negative direct effect on the state vote for senator. The partial slope for presidential popularity, in contrast, increases from the voter level (0.176) to the election level (0.519). The election variables are somewhat more stable in their partial slopes across levels of aggregation. In both the voter and the state analyses Democratic incumbents had a substantial advantage, while in the recession year of 1982, incumbency was of virtually no use at all to Republican senatorial candidates. Also, in both analyses, candidate ideology has the expected negative sign, although its partial slope is larger in the state analysis. The only really troublesome change among the partial slopes is the sign change for party identification, which is examined below.

Consider next the explanatory importance of the model variables at the two levels. This is seen in comparing the partial beta coefficients for the voter and state samples. The explanatory effects of the voter characteristics of family finances and ideology are about the same at both levels. Aggregation causes the

²⁰ One generally needs to be concerned with heteroscedasticity when using OLS regression with a dichotomous dependent variable. Regression creates no distortions in these data, however. All the individual-level equations were run with probit and the same conclusions resulted. Regression is used at both levels here to achieve comparability of the estimated coefficients.

beta for presidential popularity to shoot upward while yielding the strange negative effect for party identification.

There are dramatic increases in the explanatory importance of incumbency and candidate strategy. While Republican incumbency remains essentially zero at both levels, the explanatory contributions of Democratic incumbency and of candidate strategy are larger for election outcomes than for individual choice. Here is the clearest demonstration that explaining voter decisions and explaining election outcomes are not the same thing.

The estimates of the state model are in several respects quite encouraging. The election-level variables, which are most important to politicians and parties, loom larger at the state than at the individual level. However, this picture is complicated by the negative sign for state partisanship. It is not at all plausible that more Republican states would vote Democrat, even with all of the other variables controlled. Such a perverse outcome makes one suspect the integrity of the entire state-level model.

At the state level the number of cases is just twenty-three which means that the regression coefficients could be influenced by a single outlying case or two. Two races in 1982 are suspect. In New York, Senator Daniel Moynihan won by an unusually large margin in a state that is generally quite competitive. Moreover, the exit poll data produced a win for Moynihan that was even more lopsided (74 per cent) than the actual result (65 per cent); all other states' exit poll claims and reported vote agreed quite closely. Moynihan's tremendous victory was due in part to his unusual stature in New York, based on his unusually wide experience (having held high posts in both Republican and Democratic administrations) and to his uncanny sense for playing the issues. Moreover, he drew particularly weak opposition in 1982, outspending his underfunded challenger by a ratio of twenty to one. As a result his margin of victory was the largest of any senator in New York history.²¹ Nebraska witnessed the odd candidacy of Senator Edward Zorinski. He had been a Republican before running in 1976 as a Democrat due to a dispute with the state party. However, he voted quite conservatively, representing a rather conservative state. He was a Democrat in name only and won by huge margins in that heavily Republican state. Nebraska and New York are the big outliers in the simple bivariate relationship between vote and state partisanship, as can be seen in Figure 2.

When these two states are dropped from the analysis the state partisanship variable is much better behaved. Table 5 presents the coefficients for an abbreviated model, re-estimated after dropping the insignificant variables. (Estimating the full model does not change the essential results.) The sign for state partisanship remains negative, but it drops to insignificance, thus allowing for the more acceptable conclusion that partisanship has no direct effect on state senatorial voting, once other factors are controlled. Statistically, each of the partial regression coefficients moves closer to zero. Smaller R^2 s usually accompany

²¹ Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, *The Almanac of American Politics 1984* (Washington, DC: The National Journal, 1984), pp 781-8, at p 785.




Fig. 2. Vote and state partisanship

TABLE 5

*Regressions of the State Model With and Without the Outliers
(Nebraska and New York)*

	All 23 states $b(t)$	Minus outliers $b(t)$
Party identification	-0.315 (-2.6)	-0.111 (-1.0)
Presidential popularity	0.544 (4.5)	0.418 (4.1)
Democratic incumbency	-0.090 (-3.6)	-0.079 (-4.1)
Candidate issues	-0.018 (-3.0)	-0.011 (-2.2)
Intercept	0.546 (21.0)	0.533 (26.2)
$\bar{R}^2$	0.80	0.84
N	23	21

lower regression coefficients; here the adjusted R^2 actually increases. Additional analysis shows that most of this effect is due to Nebraska and the increased R^2 is simply due to taking out the largest residuals from the full equation.

This sensitivity to case selection led to a further experiment. The states were sequentially omitted, one at a time, and the regression rerun for the remaining twenty-two states. Only Nebraska, and to smaller extent New York, had any appreciable effect on the basic results. Although the results are quite robust, the

omission of the outliers underlines an important point: in general, aggregate studies will be more sensitive to problems of specification and outliers.

A General Model of Senate Election Outcomes

Path analysis provides a handy technique for viewing the overall effects of partisanship, as well as additional linkages of theoretical importance. Most important here is the expansion of the analysis to include indirect effects on the vote as well as the direct effects of our single-equation models above. Constructing a more complex recursive model, however, means abandoning our efforts to present parallel sets of coefficients at the individual and aggregate levels. Specifications that make sense at one level are nonsensical at the other, as demonstrated below.

The path model estimated here has three electorate-level compositional variables, each treated as exogenous. State ideology (mean state liberalism-conservatism) and state partisanship are carried forward from our analysis above. We add here the state unemployment rates for 1982. Economic performance was particularly salient due to the 1982 recession. Unemployment was likely to be a predominant factor in the voters' perceptions of how their families' financial situations have changed, which in turn are examined as an influence on state approval for Reagan's performance as President.

State partisanship and state ideology are assumed to influence attitudes toward Reagan's performance and candidates' issue stands. The obvious linkage between Democratic incumbency and state partisanship is included as well.

Incumbency can affect candidates' issue positions (and hence the candidates' issue midpoint) because incumbent senatorial candidates tend to moderate their issue stances while challengers do not.²² Thus the issue midpoint is generally expected to be to the right when Democratic incumbents are running, and further to the left when Republican incumbents are running.²³

This model is estimated as a full recursive system. Non-significant paths are omitted and the model re-estimated. The results are shown in Figure 3. Two sets of path coefficients are presented. One set is for all twenty-three states; the other set of coefficients, in parentheses, excludes the outliers Nebraska and New York.

The path presentation offers important clarification of the operation of four of the explanatory variables. Firstly, the party identification puzzle is cleared up, at least to an extent. The indirect effects of state partisanship, through presidential popularity and through incumbency, are positive. In fact, the total impact of partisanship from the reduced form equations (vote regressed on the three

²² Gerald C. Wright and Michael Berkman, 'Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), 567-88, Gerald C. Wright and Michael Berkman, 'Do US Senators Moderate Strategically?', *American Political Science Review*, 82 (1988), 242-4

²³ In this analysis we use only Democratic incumbency because Republican incumbency had no electoral payoff in 1982. Changing the variable of incumbency to reflect values for Republican incumbency (i.e., 1, 0, -1 for Republican incumbents, open seats and Democratic incumbents) does not affect the results reported.




Fig. 3. State-level model of the 1982 Senate election outcomes

exogenous variables) is 0.41 for the full set, and 0.58 with the outliers excluded. Thus, the apparently negative direct effect of party tells only a bit of the story. Overall, the effects of state partisanship are as we expect them to be.

Secondly, the central role of state presidential popularity is more clearly seen in the path analysis. The data in Table 4 showed that presidential popularity has the largest direct effect on the vote. Here it can be seen that presidential popularity is not a set of idiosyncratic reactions to Reagan's personality, but is neatly enmeshed in a system of political influences. Approval of Reagan's performance at the state level varies with state partisanship, with state ideology and with the state electorates' evaluations of their economic circumstances. Here it is comforting to see that these economic evaluations have a sound basis in economic reality: average state judgements of family financial situations are strongly related to state unemployment rates.

The path model illuminates a dynamic for a third variable, state ideology, that was completely obscured in the single-equation analysis above. Figure 3 shows that more conservative states provide higher support for Reagan, and that more conservative states produce more conservative candidates. Interestingly, these two linkages have offsetting effects on the vote. On the one hand, more conservative states prefer Reagan, and this helps the Republican candidates at the polls. On the other hand, the more conservative states produce the more conservative candidates, and more conservative candidates mean that the midpoint is further to the right, decreasing the Republican vote. The result is that the apparent, or net, effect of state ideology is small. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that state ideology is an unimportant force in Senate elections; its indirect effects are substantial, but, in these data, offsetting.

Fourthly, the path model reveals additional information about the operation

of incumbency. Most of the incumbency advantage for the Democrats is direct, indicating the incumbent's edge in experience, visibility and resources. However, a portion of the incumbency effect is indirect, operating via candidate's positions. Part of the reason that Senate incumbents do better is that they generally offer more moderate issue positions than their challengers. This is significant theoretically since it suggests some issue basis for the incumbency advantage in Senate elections.

CONCLUSION

The conventional wisdom is that micro-level data are almost always the optimal data resource for the study of electoral behaviour. Lacking micro data, one can limp along with aggregated data, if sufficient caution is demonstrated over the various pitfalls that yield misleading conclusions. Where scholars examine aggregates, or electorates, it is frequently done with apologies for the unavailability of individual-level data.

This perspective is the correct one when explaining individual voters' choice of candidates. However, the central argument of this study is that explaining voter choice is not the same thing as explaining election outcomes. If a choice must be made, understanding the dynamics of elections is arguably more important because it is the decisions of electorates, not individuals, that have political consequences.

Explanations of voters and of electorates can differ because the aggregation process is not random with respect to our explanatory variables. To the extent that an explanatory variable is highly correlated with the aggregation units, it retains its variance, and hence its ability to explain behaviour at the electoral as well as the individual level. When an independent variable is uncorrelated with the aggregation variable it will show relatively little variance after aggregation, and its explanatory influence on electoral outcomes will be substantially deflated. Hence, for a relatively simple technical reason, we can expect explanations of voting choice to change with levels of aggregation.

The candidate issues variable is an excellent example of this. At the individual level the relative liberalism-conservatism of the candidates has a very minor effect on the vote decision. Indeed, were it not for the tremendous size of the sample of voters the partial slope for candidate issue strategy in the analysis of individual voters would not reach statistical significance. In addition, the small beta in the voter analysis (-0.033) would be regarded as substantively insignificant. Thus, the researcher working with a normally-sized sample of 1,500 to 2,500 might well conclude that candidate strategy has little or no effect on voting. Such a conclusion has rather immediate damning consequences for democratic theories of accountability.

The story from the state-level analysis is quite different. Firstly, the partial slope is larger. It indicates that candidates can have an impact on the outcome of their elections. A shift of one unit in the candidate issue midpoint results in a gain or loss of over 2 per cent of the vote. Furthermore, the explanatory value of

candidates' strategy is much higher at the election level than it is for individual voters. Thus, examining the results at the macro-level of elections leads to quite different conclusions about the role of issues, and about the ability of the electorate to reward candidates who take preferred issue stances.

There is still another advantage to taking the macro-perspective. We can examine the electoral process with some of the important political variables taken as endogenous, rather than exogenous as must be the case in individual-level studies. Our path model permitted us to embed the important factors of candidate strategy and incumbency in a causal structure, with the former a function of state liberalism-conservatism and of incumbency, and the latter a function of state partisanship. In a voter-level equation these would have to be exogenous influences since we could not defend the assumption that individual voters' ideology, for example, causes candidate issue positions, whereas state ideology is reasonably seen as a cause of candidates' issue stances. And, at the level of state electorates, the path analysis reveals a strong linkage between state ideology and candidates' issue strategies.

The ability to estimate the path analysis at the macro-level provided additional insights into the role of ideology in these elections. From the single-equation estimations, whether at the individual or election level, ideology was a relatively minor influence. This seemed reasonable, given the often repeated claims of the lack of issue content in US congressional elections. However, here we see that state liberalism-conservatism is a central variable; it has important effects on two of the more proximate variables in the system, presidential popularity and candidates' issue stances. That these effects are offsetting only adds to our appreciation of the electoral process.

In summary, micro- and macro-data are not alternative resources for asking questions about voters. Rather, for understandable reasons, data examined at different levels have different characteristics, and are appropriate for answering theoretically different questions about equally important aspects of electoral behaviour. Explaining the votes after, rather than before, they are aggregated can have rather dramatic effects on views of the electoral process. The political elements of elections, including citizens' ideological preferences, candidates' issue strategies, economic performances and presidential popularity have a much clearer and politically more intelligible relationship to the vote when explaining election outcomes than when explaining voters' decisions.

Review Article: *The Changing Tide – Some Recent Studies of Thatcherism*

JAMES DOUGLAS

This Review Article deals mainly with the following works:

- Dennis Kavanagh, *Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus?* (Oxford University Press, 1987);
Jacques Leruez, ed., *Le Thatcherisme: doctrine et action* (Paris: La Documentation française, 1984);
Joel Krieger, *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1986);
William Keegan, *Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment* (London: Allen Lane, 1984);
Alan Walters, *Britain's Economic Renaissance: Margaret Thatcher's Reforms, 1979–1984* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986);
Martin Holmes, *The First Thatcher Government, 1979–1983* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1985);
Hugo Young and Anne Sloman, *The Thatcher Phenomenon* (London: BBC Publications, 1986);
Peter Jenkins, *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era* (London: Cape, 1987);
Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, eds, *The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983).

WAVES, TIDES AND RIPPLES

The popular analogy of the pendulum oversimplifies. In public opinion, there are *ripples*, short-term fluctuations in popularity; there are *waves*, that float different parties into office from time to time, and there are *tides*, cycles with a periodicity of several decades. As in the ocean, the peaks and troughs do not necessarily occur in the same place at the same time. In this context, 'place' may have its literal geographic meaning – the peak of a given tide may not reach France at the same time as Britain – or it may have a metaphoric meaning – the tide may not change for economic policy at the same time as for education policy. Of course, just as for a piece of seaweed on the seashore, it is not always easy to tell whether what we feel is a change in the tide, a wave or, even, a ripple. Yet there seems to be general agreement among political scientists no less than

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journalists that the advent of the Thatcher Administration in 1979 marked something more than the usual postwar alternation between the parties competing for office.

This impression that the 1979 general election marked some sort of unusual discontinuity in British politics is probably the reason why 'Thatcherism' has given rise to a considerable body of literature. This, in itself is unusual, as the Conservative party, despite having long been the 'natural party of government', has not, until recently, been well served by the political science literature.¹ Much of what has been written about Mrs Thatcher and 'Thatcherism' is the predictable by-product of partisan conflict – sycophantic hagiography or polemical vituperation. But there are also serious works on 'Thatcherism' that shed light on British politics generally and, by extension, on the behaviour of democratic systems more widely. They fall into roughly three categories. Some analysts are primarily concerned to describe the phenomenon: they seek to identify what distinguishes the Thatcher Administration from previous administrations – both Conservative and Labour – and contrast Thatcherism with other strands of Conservative politics. Others seek to explain. These, in turn, fall into roughly two groups: those who seek the explanation in terms of reaction against previous failure – usually economic – and those who seek a purely political explanation in terms of the dynamics of British party democracy. All go some way toward suggesting how changes in the political tides come about. These rare but periodic changes in the whole tenor of politics, here called changes in the political tide, are important in the democratic process. This review concentrates on the light these works focus on this phenomenon.

The idea that democratic systems are marked by significant discontinuities, that a particular election marks a 'watershed' and may be 'critical', is not new. The idea was first explored by V. O. Key Jr and subsequently developed by Walter Dean Burnham, James Sundquist and others.² Their explanation of the watershed hinged on a realignment in the electorate. The classic illustration comes from the 1930s, when Franklin Roosevelt broke the thirty-year old dominance of the Republicans by forming a new coalition for the Democrats. Nobody seems to suggest that an analogous realignment of party commitment within the electorate explains the rise of Thatcherism. It is true that in 1979 an unusually large proportion of working-class men voted Conservative but class voting had been on the decline for, at least, twenty years.³ In oversimplified terms, most commentators (and notably Butler and Kavanagh's Nuffield Study of the 1979 general election) seem to be agreed that Mrs Thatcher's Conservat-

¹ While the Conservative party has been well served by historians (notably Robert Blake and John Ramsden) and featured in general works on British political parties (such as Robert Mackenzie's classic but dated study), no major political scientist before Philip Norton seems to have devoted a work exclusively to the party. This is in contrast to the numerous works about the Labour party.

² V O Key Jr, 'A Theory of Critical Elections', *Journal of Politics*, 17 (1955), 3–18, James L Sundquist: *Dynamics of the Party System* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1973).

³ David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1979* (London: Macmillan, 1980), Chap. 17. Also Mark Franklin, *The Decline of Class Voting in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

ive party won the 1979 election because Mr Callaghan's Labour party had proved incapable of controlling the trade unions in the 'winter of discontent' and thus negated what had long been regarded as their greatest area of competence. There is less agreement about why she won her subsequent elections but at least one factor was surely that she proved more successful than her opponents in controlling dissension within her party.

We must look elsewhere than to the classic realignment hypothesis. The 1979 election was the result not of a realignment but of what Crewe and others have called a 'dealignment' of the electorate. Class gave structure to partisan identification but the relevance of social class had been declining ever since the war. The old working-class culture,⁴ on which traditional trade-union and Labour support was based, had long been moribund but it took a long time to die. Ironically it may well have been the traumatic split between the trade-union movement and the Labour party in the 'winter of discontent' that gave it its final dispatch.

AN INTERNATIONAL SHIFT IN THEORY NOT A CHANGE IN PARTISAN LOYALTIES

What changed was not a set of party loyalties – persistent party loyalties had been weakening for decades.⁵ Rather the generally accepted view of what constituted viable economic and political solutions changed. This was true of both parties. This is the view of Dennis Kavanagh and captured most clearly in his subtitle 'the end of consensus'.⁶ His idea of a change in the 'climate of opinion', defined as 'an outlook or set of assumptions about policy that is largely taken for granted' exactly captures the result of a change in the tide. Dicey, whom he quotes, used the term 'legislative opinion' for much the same phenomenon. Dicey saw 'legislative opinion' oscillating between individualism and collectivism. Kavanagh is manifestly right in seeing Thatcherism as a return to individualism after a long period of collectivism. Mrs Thatcher herself has described what she sought to do in virtually this way.⁷ Dicey's historical analysis intriguingly suggested that the 'tides' have a periodicity of some thirty to forty years. The movement towards collectivism lasted longer than this but we probably do not need to follow the analogy of the tide to the length of assuming cycles of constant duration.

The change of climate (or 'legislative opinion' or 'tide') was not peculiar to Britain. It was almost world-wide. In Britain, we call it 'Thatcherism', in the United States, 'Neo-Conservatism';⁸ in West Germany it led to the breakdown

⁴ As early as 1952 Ferdynand Zweig in *The British Worker* (London: Penguin Books, 1952) noted the way working-class culture was changing after the war.

⁵ Ivor Crewe, Bo Särilvik and James Alt, 'Partisan Dealignment in Britain, 1964–74', *British Journal of Political Science*, 7 (1977), 129–90

⁶ Kavanagh, *Thatcherism and British Politics*.

⁷ See Holmes, *The First Thatcher Government 1979–1983*, p. 209.

⁸ Peter Steinfels, *The Neo-Conservatives* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979)

of the SPD/FPD coalition; in France to the election (albeit short-lived) of M. Chirac. It has also had influence on governments of the left – for example, in New Zealand the Labour government has pursued policies of privatization and tax reform not unlike those of Thatcherism. Arguably we can even see the worldwide change in the political climate contributing to Mr Gorbachev's nomination in the Soviet Union and the defeat of Maoism in China.

Socialism has always been international, both in its communist and its social democratic forms. But Conservatism in its old Tory form was peculiarly British – to the point of being almost unintelligible outside these islands. As Monica Charlot put it 'British Conservatism is as difficult as cricket for a Cartesian mind to understand'.⁹ Thatcherism, however, forms part of an international New Right movement. Clearly there has been much interaction between British Thatcherism and American Neo-Conservatism – Milton Friedman and von Mises are only two of several intellectual progenitors they have in common.¹⁰

The various institutes that scouted out the path for Thatcherism – the Institute for Economic Affairs, the Centre for Policy Studies, the Adam Smith Institute, etc. – made a point of being international in their outlook. The Mont Pelerin Society is certainly the most international and probably the most influential of these organizations. Founded in 1947 by F. A. von Hayek, it brings together for its annual meeting a galaxy of Nobel laureate economists (including Friedman, Stigler and Buchanan), philosophers (including Karl Popper) and political activists of the libertarian tradition (including Lord Harris of the IEA) from all over the world.¹¹ Indirectly through its influence on advisers, it seems to have been a powerful force in both Thatcherism and Reaganomics. Aspects of Thatcherism, similarly, had a direct impact on the policies of other countries. For example, although there are considerable differences between the French and the British privatization schemes, the French government when embarking on a privatization policy in 1986, drew explicitly on British experience. Contacts were established between the French Ministry of Finance and the British Treasury. Kleinwort Benson, who had advised the British government on several sales of nationalized industries, were retained for the first French privatization. The French Minister of Finance has written 'the British experience was, without any doubt, the best example and the one that had the greatest similarities with what we wanted to do'.¹²

The way in which Thatcherism differs from previous forms of Conservatism in having an explicit ideology has been emphasized by most commentators but this

⁹ Monica Charlot, 'Doctrines et images: le thatcherisme est-il un populisme?' in Leruez, ed., *Le Thatcherisme*.

¹⁰ For a synoptic view of the intellectual origins of the New Right by one of its supporters, see David G. Green, *The New Conservatism: The Counter Revolution in Political, Economic and Social Thought* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987).

¹¹ See list of Members appended to Articles of Incorporation lodged with Secretary of State for Illinois, 6 November 1947. Also see Gunter Schmolders, 'Ludwig Erhard and the Mont Pelerin Society', *German Economic Review*, 10 (1972), 71–8.

¹² Edouard Balladur, *Je crois en l'Homme plus qu'en l'État* (Paris: Flammarion, 1987), p. 93. I am indebted to Ezra Suleman for this reference.

international aspect, although mentioned by Kavanagh and others, has received less attention. In the past, only the 'world communist conspiracy' theorists needed to concern themselves with the interaction between like-minded parties in different countries. In future, even those studying parties of the right and centre will be unable to ignore the interaction across national boundaries of like-minded parties.

THE POSTWAR POLITICAL CONSENSUS

The idea of something loosely called 'the postwar consensus' seems central to Kavanagh's thesis although he rightly maintains that 'consensus' is really the wrong word. During most of the consensus period party competition was quite as intense as now and the differences between the parties were actually more widely perceived than they are now. Moreover, there were very real differences between the policies of the two main private parties which overlapped in only a limited area. Peter Jenkins' similar sub-title 'The Ending of the Socialist Era' avoids the misuse of 'consensus' but only at the cost of misusing 'socialist'. None the less, even if it is difficult to find precisely the right word for it, the area of overlap between the policies of the main parties and the assumptions they shared about the role of the state in a capitalist society were highly significant and their reversal by Thatcherism was important.

These policies – within the area of overlap and reversed by Thatcherism – were those originally sketched out, under the Coalition government, in the closing years of the war. Beveridge classified them when, paraphrasing *Pilgrim's Progress*, he referred to 'Five Giants on the road to reconstruction' – Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. The 'Giant killing' policies were social security, the National Health Service, Butler's Education Act, town and country planning and full employment. All these have been either reversed or substantially modified by the Thatcher Administration. As befits beings with a millennial lifespan, Beveridge's Giants proved remarkably difficult to overcome. It is arguable (although probably most Thatcherites would deny it) that Thatcherism represents the abandonment of the attempt. Certainly the Five Giants' resistance to the blows struck by successive governments was one important reason for the shift away from the consensus.

Kavanagh rightly perceives that the consensus was elitist. Although he correctly recognizes an element of political self-interest in the adoption of full-employment policies, the elite consensus was, in several other ways, in his term, more 'high-minded' than popular attitudes or understanding. He gives as examples the abolition of capital punishment, 'welfare benefits for the undeserving poor', decolonization, and a relatively liberal immigration policy. Thus another reason for the abandonment of the consensus was that it never escaped elitism in either its values or its technology. Yet ironically, it was, as William Keegan points out,¹³ the abandonment of the consensus by the intellectual elite

¹³ Keegan, *Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment*.

that opened the way for the more populist movement of the New Right including Thatcherism.

In one important area the 'consensus' did not, as in Kavanagh's sub-title, 'end'. A foreign policy primarily built on the North Atlantic Alliance was an important part of the postwar consensus (or area of overlap of the policies of the parties in office) and Mrs Thatcher by no means reversed her predecessors in that respect. Much the same is true of defence policy. These exceptions are significant. For political leaders (although not the mass of the electorate), 'high politics' used to be more concerned with defence and foreign policy than with domestic issues. The 'exceptionalism' of Mrs Thatcher is thus partly the result of the more recent tendency to see domestic, economic and social policies as the keystone of party policy. The fact that Thatcherism involved no radical change in foreign and defence policies seems also to explain why these policies tend to have been neglected by writers on Thatcherism.

Although Kavanagh never himself summarizes his thesis in this way, it would seem a fair gloss of his view of the watershed marked by the advent of Thatcherism as being the replacement of an essentially collectivist climate of opinion (based primarily on Keynes and Beveridge) by an essentially individualistic climate. Starting from Kavanagh's 'change in the climate of opinion', we can easily, by applying a Downsian analysis, produce a new consensus. Indeed, there are already signs of distinctive elements of Thatcherite policy being adopted by the other parties. Once we are floating on a new tide, we can understand the forces that are moving us along. Where neither Kavanagh nor Downs helps is in identifying the factors that caused the change in the tide. For this we must either look to some exogenous factor or find within the forces an element that will ultimately produce its own reversal.

THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL DECLINE

One likely source of exogenous factors influencing changes in the climate of opinion is the international environment within which national governments have to operate. Joel Krieger traces both the rise of Thatcherism in Britain and Reagan's triumph in the United States to common features in the economic and geo-political decline of both countries.

In the United States and the United Kingdom ... the political success of mainstream postwar governments presupposed first the benefits and future expectations of economic growth and successful international competitiveness, and second a national geopolitical identity and position in the international hierarchy of nations which was consistent with the politics of the 'growth coalition' at home. By the close of the 1970s economic and geo-political realities had changed, but the domestic politics of Carter and Callaghan remained strangely out of phase with the altered circumstances.¹⁴

He sees these 'altered circumstances' favouring a more radical right-wing politics. The New Right was, thus, a common reaction to a common perception

¹⁴ Krieger, *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline*, p. 13.

of the failings of the postwar consensus. Kavanagh sees disillusion with the failings of the postwar consensus also producing on the left the radical socialist ideas of such politicians as Ken Livingstone and Michael Meacher and the Gramscian Marxism of Hall and Jacques. Kavanagh's argument is not that radical left policies represent an adjustment to the success of the New Right but rather that there is no necessary reason why the perception of failure of centrist moderate policies should provide any less opportunity for radical left than for radical right policies to make their impact. However, the right-wing successor to the 'consensus' is more easily identified than the left-wing successor of which there are too many variants for ready identification.

Krieger implicitly attributes the decline to the failures of what other authors call the 'postwar political consensus' – full employment and welfarism – and which he calls the 'growth coalition'. The difficulty with this explanation of the change lies in knowing when to place the beginning of 'decline'. Peter Jenkins traces the beginnings of the British 'decline' well back in the nineteenth century. There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that Jenkins is right at least about the decline of the British economy and, certainly in Britain, we have to date the beginnings of welfarism, as Kavanagh does, to before the First World War. If this is so, then it is difficult to see why it took so long for Thatcherism to come to the fore or how the 'consensus politics' of welfarism ever came about.

There is also a danger in accepting too glibly the Thatcherite contention that the policies of full employment and state welfare were a failure. True, they had weaknesses of which one was unaware in 1944 and ultimately they were not able to withstand the oil shocks of the 1970s. But they were remarkably successful in maintaining a high level of employment and a fairly humane economic system for well over a quarter of a century. It is far too early yet to tell whether Thatcherism and Reaganomics will prove equally successful.

BULPITT'S STATECRAFT THEORY

Before turning to a more straightforward version of the 'reaction to decline' view, I turn to an interesting dissent, entered by Jim Bulpitt, from the whole 'Thatcherite exceptionalism' thesis and 'end of consensus' theme.¹⁵ Although there are difficulties in accepting some of his arguments, his emphasis on the element of continuity from Butskellism through Thatcherism is salutary. Some element of continuity such as that suggested by Bulpitt, is necessary to explain why the Conservative party has not shattered in the same way as the Labour party. This element of continuity he terms 'statecraft', which in 'crude terms' he defines as 'the art of winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence in office'. This is an almost self-evident description of the strategic objective of any government in any system but he also shrewdly discerns that one of the objectives of Conservative statecraft 'after the mid-1880s' was to

¹⁵ Jim Bulpitt, 'The Discipline of the New Democracy. Mrs Thatcher's Statecraft', *Political Studies*, 34 (1986), 19–39.

achieve in government 'a relative autonomy for the centre', that is, both to insulate the Cabinet and the senior civil service and relieve them of the need, manifest in other democratic systems, for continuous bargaining or politicking with powerful interest groups. He contrasts this to the statecraft imposed on American parties by pluralism and on Continental parties by proportional representation. He maintains that 'in statecraft terms there is precious little difference between monetarism and the politics of Keynes' demand management'. That this desire for relative autonomy exists in the Conservative party and was a factor that helped the party accept monetarism without more turmoil is certainly credible. Keynes himself thought that demand management offered a way of protecting 'the autonomy "shells" of both business and unions'. But at least from the time of the Cripps Pay Pause and arguably (as Bulpitt's own exegesis of it shows) in the White Paper itself, it was clear that the politics of demand management to maintain full employment would always require the co-operation of the trade unions and management. Bulpitt provides an insightful explanation of why the Thatcherite policy changes were not more strongly resisted by the Conservative party but does not greatly help us to understand why those changes came about and were accepted outside the Conservative party. At a crude level of argument, it is no doubt true that the reluctance of both parties to make fundamental concessions to secure the co-operation of the trade unions in the attempt to maintain full employment by Keynesian demand management was a factor that made the abandonment of the attempt inevitable.

In emphasizing the neglected aspect of the subtle ways in which Thatcherism conforms to preceding Conservative practice, Bulpitt presumably does not wish to suggest that Thatcherism marks no break in continuity. Even a superficial glance at the policies reversed or changed by the Thatcher Administration is enough to justify the contention that its advent represents a watershed or change in the political tide.

FULL EMPLOYMENT

Of the policies abandoned by Thatcherism, the most striking was the end of the attempt to use Keynesian macro-economic management to control unemployment. And the explanation of the Thatcherite 'revolution' we derive from Alan Walters is simply that Keynesian management policies were abandoned because they failed.¹⁶ Before examining what light Walters's economic argument casts on the causes of the change in the political consensus, it is worth glancing back at the experience of Britain's postwar attempt to maintain full employment.

An unpleasant fact emerged from that experience: it is impossible to combine, simultaneously and for long, full employment, price stability and free collective bargaining. Elsewhere¹⁷ I have called this an 'impossible triad'.¹⁸ In so far as

¹⁶ Alan Walters, *Britain's Economic Renaissance Margaret Thatcher's Reforms 1979-1984*.

¹⁷ 'The Conservative Party - From Pragmatism to Ideology ... and Back', *West European Politics*, 6 (1983), 56-74.

¹⁸ I now think it might be preferable to turn the triad into a quartet by distinguishing the 'free' (or

Keynesian macro-economic management involved creating additional purchasing power to offset a failure of aggregate demand, there was always, as the 1944 White Paper itself recognized,¹⁹ a danger of the attempt being frustrated if the additional purchasing power was merely absorbed by increased labour costs per unit of output. Any institution such as a trade union, which can influence the supply and hence affect the price of labour, thus has the power to frustrate a full-employment policy – leaving the authorities with the grim alternatives of determining whether to allow the imbalance to show up as inflation or as unemployment. (If we accept the monetarist theory, the authorities do not even have this choice.)

This does not mean, under either theory, that the trade unions are the only or the most important cause of inflation and unemployment. Historically, the wage/price spiral was usually triggered by some external event, such as the shock of an increase in the price of oil, which had put up prices. Under what Sam Brittan called the postwar economic orthodoxy, the effect on unemployment of such a shock could be offset by a countervailing increase in purchasing power. Whether or not such an increase in the supply of money resulted in accelerating inflation would depend on whether or not it was absorbed in labour costs. This might mean that full employment and price stability could be restored after the shock only if real wages (i.e. the value of wages after allowing for the price increases) fell. For example, if the increase in purchasing power had been to offset a large increase in the price of oil, inflation would be bound to result from the attempt to keep real wages constant unless the shock was small enough to be absorbed elsewhere. (Under the monetarist theory, the increase in money supply would in any case be bound to result in inflation and the level of unemployment is determined by the level of real wages.) The monetarist theory clearly offers much less room for government action but under both theories the level of unemployment is ultimately determined by the level of wages.

Economists regard this as so obvious as not to need saying. Yet almost everybody else resists the notion of any connection between wage rates and unemployment. Trade-union officials across the political spectrum resist the

degree of competition in the labour market) from the 'collective' (or degree of organization of the market) in 'bargaining'. 'Collectivity' is low in the United States where a relatively low proportion of the labour-force and none of the employers are organized into unions but competition in the labour market is high. The reverse is the case in Sweden. Yet both countries over the postwar period as a whole have been more economically successful than the United Kingdom. I hope that this 'impossible triad' formulation is compatible with either a Keynesian or a monetarist analysis. Although a monetarist presumably would resist the implication that the rate of unemployment that does not accelerate inflation could be reduced by constraining competition among unions (i.e. reducing the 'free' in 'free collective bargaining'), he would hold that unions as such (i.e. the 'collective' in 'free collective bargaining') by forcing wages above the competitive equilibrium price create unemployment. Interestingly the impossibility of the triad seems to be independent of capitalism: both communism (and presumably feudalism) have no place for free collective bargaining and apparently achieve a high level of price stability and a low level of unemployment (although also a low level of economic growth).

¹⁹ *Employment Policy*, Cmnd 6527.

uncomfortable fact that a wage increase for one group may mean redundancy for another. The bulk of the population may accept that jobs can be created by public expenditure but find the concept of aggregate demand (the crux of the Keynesian argument) unintelligible.

Conciliation of the trade unions was an important but unsuccessful element in the consensus. The elite's failure to convince the mass of the electorate of the need for wage restraint to maintain full employment was one reason for this lack of success. For Thatcherites the need disappears. In economic terms, they deny that wage restraint can reduce inflation or that government can greatly influence the level of unemployment. In political terms, they maintain it to be impossible to achieve (as shown by experience) and philosophically they maintain it to be undesirable (as a restraint on freedom). This is in line with popular attitudes.

We can see from Alan Walters's book that the Friedmanite analysis adopted by Thatcherism was a good deal more sophisticated than the 'household budget' terms in which it was popularly explained. The analysis denies that, in the long term, countervailing finance can reduce unemployment, which is determined by other factors, including the degree of union militancy and other obstacles to labour mobility. High levels of unemployment can reduce union militancy (although it may not do so if unions are concerned only with the interests of their members in employment) and reducing the level of welfare benefits can increase labour mobility. But the public does not like either high levels of unemployment or reduced levels of welfare benefits any more than it likes trade unions. The ultimate electoral fate of Thatcherism is, thus, likely to depend on a quantity as yet unknown: the value of NAIRU (the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment).

The end of the postwar full-employment policy was not the only change in economic policy introduced by Thatcherism. Nor was it what Thatcherites themselves would consider the most important. From their standpoint, it was no more than the abandonment of a futile attempt grounded in false theory and inevitably doomed to failure. There is also considerable truth in Jacques Leruez's claim that the basic change was made some years earlier by Denis Healey in the 'Letter of Intent' to the IMF in 1976. For Leruez, Healey was the first monetarist 'not without knowing it but without too much saying it'.²⁰ Alan Walters substantially agrees with this view.

Walters lists four areas of economic policy reform: financial stability (primarily reducing inflation); deregulation; privatization and trade-union reform. Walters deals in considerable technical detail only with the first of these: stabilization policy. He deals both with present and past policies and with the controversies to which they gave rise. This is where Walters can speak with the greatest authority from personal experience. The book will thus be a valuable source for economists interested in the techniques of economic management – particularly as Friedmanism has probably joined Keynesianism among the historic heresies

²⁰ Jacques Leruez, 'La gestion de l'économie britannique 1979–1983', in Leruez, ed., *Le Thatcherisme*: 'non pas sans le savoir mais sans trop le dire' (p. 23).

of economics – but is less valuable for political scientists interested in the broad scope of Thatcherite policies. The argument relies heavily on the rational but perverse reactions of the private sector and for this reason may also prove useful to those Marxists who argue that capitalism cannot be made socially tolerable.

In his final sally, Walters deplores 'the persistently high rate of unemployment' and states that the most likely way to reduce it is by reducing the rate of growth of real hourly wages. This accords with the monetarist or Friedmanite position. Keynesians would not necessarily differ on this, but it is characteristic of the Friedmanite position that Walters refuses to be drawn into how this objective could be achieved.

OTHER ECONOMIC POLICIES

Of the other three areas of economic policy mentioned by Walters, *deregulation* (except in so far as privatization may be considered a form of deregulation) seems more characteristic of American Neo-Conservatism than British Thatcherism. The term does not even appear in the index to either Holmes's or Keegan's histories of the economic policies of the Thatcher Administration.²¹ Moreover, the Thatcher Administration's record on such matters as consumer protection, safety regulations and the like does not seem very different from that of its predecessors.

Trade-union reform on the other hand, is clearly a major and distinctive element in Thatcherism. It is especially interesting as it promises (as do the related policies of industrial training and retraining) to reduce the rate of unemployment required to avoid accelerating inflation. Despite the similarity of nomenclature, Thatcherite trade-union reform needs to be sharply distinguished from the 'wet' strategy of trade-union reform of the Heath Administration. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was inconsistent in many ways but the underlying strategy was to strengthen the trade-union leadership to the point where they would be able to 'deliver' on incomes policy as much as the LO in Sweden can 'deliver'. This was consistent with the 'neo-corporatist' stance generally attributed to the 'wets'. The 'dry', Thatcherite, strategy seems to be to weaken the trade unions (or, at least, the trade-union leadership) so that they offer, as in the United States, less obstacle to the labour market attaining a competitive equilibrium. The former implies centralized wage-bargaining; the latter decentralized.

Two recent studies come to very much the same conclusion about the relative merits of centralized or decentralized wage bargaining.²² Both Calmfors and Driffill and Richard Freeman show by reference to a range of economic indicators that, as it were, full-blooded collectivism or full-blooded individualism are both more successful than the intermediate positions. Different indicators

²¹ Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining: Bargaining Structure, Corporation and Macroeconomic Performance', *Economic Policy*, 6 (1988), 15–62; Keegan, *Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment*.

²² Calmfors and Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining', Richard Freeman, 'Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance', *Economic Policy*, 6 (1988), 63–80

give somewhat different rank-orderings for different countries on the collectivist to individualistic scale but in general the Scandinavian countries come near the collectivist end of the scale and the United States near the individualistic end, with Britain in a half-way position. According to Calmfors and Driffill, the logic of 'the hump-shaped distribution is related to Mancur Olson's²³ idea that organized interests may be most harmful when they are strong enough to cause major disruptions but not sufficiently encompassing to bear any significant fraction of the costs for society of their actions in their own interests'. Certainly, if we take 'union density' – the proportion of the labour force in trade unions – as our indicator, as does Freeman, there is a significant reversal that roughly coincides (probably coincidentally) with the 1979 general election. Bain and Price's figures for union density show an uneven but gradually rising trend of union membership until the late 1970s but this is reversed in the period 1979–85.²⁴

Although trade-union reform remains very much on the Thatcherite agenda, there seems to have been a shift in other Thatcherite economic policies since the 1987 general election. Keegan suggests that the fashion for monetarism reflected by economic journalists such as Samuel Brittan, Peter Jay and William Rees-Mogg acted as the intellectual precursor of Thatcherism. Today Friedmanism is seen by most economists as quite as *vieux jeu* as Keynesianism seemed to the trendy economists of the late 1960s. Unemployment has declined since the election (just as trade-union militancy has increased) and monetarism is hardly mentioned. The Medium Term Financial Strategy (a policy which Walters seems to regard as close to the Ark of the Covenant) has, effectively if not officially, been abandoned. Monetarism has shown its weaknesses. Even if the money supply should determine the level of inflation, there is no satisfactory method of measuring it. This makes it almost valueless as a guide to policy. The 'Public Sector Borrowing Requirement' is not much better as an indicator. It is probably unfair to imply, as Lord Stockton did, that the Thatcher government deliberately used the proceeds from the 'sale of the family silver' to increase public expenditure, and public sector borrowing has been reduced even after allowing for the proceeds of privatization. None the less, the effect of the money raised by privatization on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (and on what the Radcliff Committee called 'the liquidity of the system as a whole') cannot have been wholly unwelcome. On the morrow of the 1987 election, Mrs Thatcher placed the problems of the inner city at the top of the agenda.

Privatization seems to be the current standard-bearer of Thatcherite economic policy. Until 1979, denationalization had never figured prominently in Conservative policy. Iron and steel had, of course, been denationalized (and then renationalized by a Labour government), as had Thomas Cook and the Carlisle pubs, but the former had not, at the time, been fully nationalized and the latter were hardly the 'controlling heights of the economy'. The Thatcher Ad-

²³ Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982).

²⁴ G. S. Bain and Robert Price, *Profiles of Union Growth* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).

ministration similarly started modestly by denationalizing assets of relatively minor economic significance – Cable & Wireless, Associated British Ports, British Rail Hotels, etc. The privatization programme, however, built up sharply when, near the end of the 1979 Parliament, the decision was taken to sell British Telecom. It would seem that the principal reason, at the time, was to enable BT to raise capital from the market for badly needed investment without swelling the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement and free from the controls on public sector investment. The original intention seems to have been at the same time to introduce a measure of competition into the industry.²⁵ Characteristically, Thatcherism married these objectives of a distinctive new policy to an old Conservative theme, wider share-ownership or 'property-owning democracy'. In the 1983 and 1987 Parliaments the big denationalizations took place (even BT was not actually denationalized until 1984) and privatization took on its key role. However, by this time the objective of increasing competition (the only one from which theory would predict increased efficiency) had ironically been allowed to fall into second place.

Closely allied to privatization of nationalized industries (and presumably intended to be included in the term in Walters's classification) was the sale of Council houses. This, however, was not a distinctive innovation by the Thatcher Administration. It had been Conservative policy since the Heath Administration and had been introduced first by that rare bird: a Conservative-controlled Greater London Council.

POLICIES OTHER THAN ECONOMIC

Today, we think of economic policy as the centrepiece of a party's policy. Certainly, it is on economic policy that Thatcherism differs most markedly from previous Conservative postwar policy and even Thatcherite policy changes in other areas, such as education or health, tend to be dressed up in economic clothes. None the less, it would be a great mistake to think of Thatcherism exclusively as an economic policy, let alone equating it with monetarism.

It is difficult to see Mrs Thatcher, as Keegan does, 'as a simple provincial girl looking for an uncomplicated philosophy' (p. 82). None the less, it is clear from her record that economics has not been her primary interest. Although she will probably be remembered for the switch from Keynesianism to Friedmanism in British economic policy, this switch arguably occurred before her Administration was returned to office and her adoption of that switch was based less on economic than on political convictions.

Holmes (p. 209) quotes her as saying 'it isn't that I set out on economic policies; it's that I set out really to change the approach and changing the economics is the means of changing that approach'. The direction from which she wanted to change the approach is clear – it is the whole movement during the last thirty

²⁵ John Vickers and George Yarrow, *Privatization. An Economic Analysis* (Boston, MIT Press, 1988), Chap. 8; and Holmes, *The First Thatcher Government*, pp 170–1.

years towards 'the collectivist society'. The direction towards which she wishes to change the approach – 'the personal society' – may not be so clear. Yet 'the personal society' does have overtones of Benthamite individualism justifying Kavanagh in his echo of Dicey's suggestion of a regular alternation between collectivism and individualism. Obviously, she is much more interested in the political and social implications of increasing personal wealth – its effects on the liberty of individuals – than in the technical merits of attempting to control the money supply. The intriguing question is whether she is more interested in the liberty or the living standards of individuals. As Peter Jenkins argues, the paradox under the Thatcher Administration is that real living standards have strikingly improved on average (p. 320), while 'the poor have got poorer and the gap grown wider between north and south, city and suburb, town and country' (p. 157).

It also seems significant that since the 1987 election those whom (adopting Keegan's terminology) we might call the main 'theologians of economic evangelicalism' have disappeared from her Cabinet almost as completely as the remaining adherents to the postwar consensus.

LAW, LIBERTY AND ORDER

'Liberty and Order' is the motto of the Mont Pelerin Society²⁶ and it will also serve as a convenient summary of the basic principles of Thatcherism. Almost all those who have written critically about Thatcherism point to the apparent contradiction between these two principles. In its liberal (or 'negative' or 'freedom from')²⁷ sense, 'liberty' implies weak, whereas 'order' implies strong, government. At first sight, similarly, there is something paradoxical about a government that is not afraid to appear so miserly in support for the National Health Service that journalists delight in parading on our television screens the features of children who will die because the NHS cannot afford to provide a heart operation in time, and yet was prepared to spend well over a million pounds per head in a hazardous operation to defend 1,800 Falkland islanders.

Kavanagh distinguishes 'the areas of defence, law and order, and social policy – where the motive of government policy appears to be the concentration of authority to build a strong state' from 'full employment, incomes policy, industrial policy and nationalization from which the government has withdrawn to create "a free economy"' (p. 286). Developing the 'strong government' side of the distinction, Kavanagh quotes many bodies over which Thatcherism has, far from reducing the control of central government, increased it considerably. These include the local authorities (whose relative autonomy was traditionally regarded by Tories as a safeguard against our over-mighty central government),

²⁶ Schmolders, 'Ludwig Erhard and the Mont Pelerin Society', p. 78.

²⁷ Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

the University Grants Committee, Area Health Authorities, trade unions and the civil service.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

The most insightful explanation of this apparently paradoxical belief in both strong and weak governments is provided by Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing.²⁸ In effect, they argue that Thatcherism withdraws government from doubtful areas (or areas where it is unlikely to be successful) in order to concentrate authority in those areas where government needs to be strong and to be seen to be strong. Reverting to the Falklands (my illustration, not theirs, but a fair illustration of their contention), defending its citizens from foreign invasion (let alone invasion by a particularly nasty dictatorship as Argentina was at the time) is manifestly a prime responsibility of government. More arguable is the responsibility of government for correcting potentially fatal birth defects. Running the telephone system is clearly even less the business of government. Whereas no one else can dispatch an expeditionary force, there are many other people who could run a telephone system – and possibly, although this is not really central to the argument, do it better than government.

This raises the question of what are and what are not the proper roles of government. The characteristic of government action is that government can, if not uniquely, more readily than other institutions, employ compulsion. Public expenditure is, so to speak, compulsory consumption. I cannot decide how much national defence I am going to buy. What 'goods' (in the very wide sense of that term used by economists) is it proper for government to compel me to buy through the combined effects of the tax and public systems? Mrs Thatcher in her address to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh in May 1988 seems to suggest that her own answer to this question is that government can and should use its powers of compulsion to enforce a basic minimum of moral obligation – 'provide for health and education, pensions for the elderly, succour for the sick and disabled'. But it must be wary of going further for fear that it would remove personal responsibility – 'we simply cannot delegate the exercise of mercy and generosity to others'. The view of the Christian message put forward in this address seems to be based on an unmediated relationship between the individual and his God and God-enforced duties. Although, as Mrs Thatcher recognized, it is not necessarily the view held by all Christians, it is a view that has a respectable history. Weber considered it the characteristic of Protestantism on which capitalism was based. While a good deal has been written about the relationship of Reaganomics to Protestant fundamentalism, few of the writers on Thatcherism have dealt in any detail with its religious basis. This is a pity as it is arguable that Thatcherism ultimately has a great deal to do with the sort of Protestantism Weber had in mind.

²⁸ Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, 'Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party', *American Political Science Review*, 82 (1988), 361–84.

THE THATCHERITE ALLIANCE

Crewe and Searing work their argument about the distinctive Thatcherite view of the role of government into a sophisticated analysis somewhat reminiscent of V. O. Key's realignment thesis but concerned with realignment within the Conservative party rather than within the electorate.

The 'layer cake' view of Conservative belief has often been developed. Norton and Aughey describe no less than four layers of solid Toryism interspersed with two creamy layers of Whiggery.²⁹ Angus Maude develops the layer analogy in an archaeological instead of culinary context. He suggests that each layer was deposited at a different time in the party's history: thus, in the 1930s, the Conservative party's assimilation of the Liberal party (other than the Asquith family) deposits the *laissez-faire* layer exploited by Thatcherism or, from an earlier period, Disraeli's 'Young England' deposits the romantic stratum still noticeable among the Progressive Tories.

Crewe and Searing bake a plainer cake than Norton and Aughey. It has only four layers: two of Toryism – Traditional and Progressive – and two Whig layers – Liberal and Corporate. Their contention, deployed with the somewhat elaborate statistical scholarly apparatus appropriate to the *American Political Science Review*, is that 'if, throughout the postwar period, the dominant alliance in the [Conservative] party has been between Corporate Whiggery and Progressive Toryism, then Mrs Thatcher may be said to have built upon an alternative potential alliance linking Liberal Whiggery with Traditional Toryism.'

Although at first sight somewhat surprising, this contention strikes me as convincing. Crewe and Searing develop ideological bases for the cohesion of these two alliances but they can also be understood in hard-headed instrumental terms. The Progressive Tories (whose primary interest is the survival of the Conservative party) and the Corporate Whigs (whose primary interest is the survival of capitalism) both see capitalism as endangered by its failings and its injustices. They therefore seek to use the state to correct the failings of the capitalist system. The Traditional Tories (patriotic disciplinarians interested in the maintenance of law and order) and the Liberal Whigs (individualists interested in personal liberty and self-discipline) see the authority of the state as endangered by its excessive use. Therefore, they seek to use the capitalist system to relieve the pressure on the state. This can be seen clearly in the nationalization/privatization field of policy. Whatever the differences in rhetoric, nationalization after the war was used, by both Labour and Conservative governments, to try to rescue industries which, for one reason or another, capitalist enterprise had failed. Similarly and conversely, one major reason for privatization was to protect the finances of the state.

Crewe and Searing maintain, contrary to conventional wisdom, that Thatcherism was neither designed to please the Conservative party nor to move the party closer to the views of the electorate. As a statement about motives, this is

²⁹ Philip Norton and Arthur Aughey, *Conservatives and Conservatism* (London: Temple Smith, 1981).

probably correct but inadequate as an insight into the influence on the rise of Thatcherism of long-term movements of public opinion.

Crewe and Searing's argument hinges on two facts for which they provide statistical evidence. Firstly, only a relatively small proportion of the electorate support some of the positions associated with Thatcherism. Secondly, the trend in public opinion (particularly but not exclusively since 1979) has been away from the Thatcherite positions.

As to the first of these facts, the authors of *Political Change in Britain* would presumably not be surprised to find a weak correlation between Thatcherite positions on issues and the position of their supporters but would regard this as characteristic of the weak influence of position issues on voting behaviour.³⁰ As to the second, the argument that Thatcherism is in some measure a populist movement – that its effect was 'to move the Conservative Party closer to the electorate' – depends on a majority of the general public (or at least, the largest plurality) supporting the Thatcherite position *before* the 1979 election. For this, Crewe and Searing's own evidence provides considerable support: 82 per cent thought the trade unions had too much power; 60 per cent preferred curbing inflation to reducing unemployment; 74 per cent thought allowing companies to keep more of their profits a better way of tackling unemployment than using tax money to create new jobs; 50 per cent that welfare benefits had gone too far (the above from Table 7); 85 per cent favoured harsher sentences for violent crimes (from Table 6).

The cases where the Thatcherite position does *not* have majority support are interesting. They include a popular preference for extending the social services rather than cutting taxes and, particularly surprising, a preference for the 'wet' positions on immigration and equal opportunities for blacks. What Crewe and Searing's evidence does show is that in all these cases – both where Thatcherism corresponds to the majority position and where it does not – the movement of opinion has been away from the Thatcherite position since 1979. In all cases, except for suspicion of trade unions, the movement has been away from the Thatcherite position since 1970. To this there is one significant exception to which Crewe and Searing draw attention. This is privatization of nationalized industry.

The conclusion to be drawn is not, in my view, that Thatcherism did not 'move the Conservative party closer to the electorate' but, on the contrary, that the political elite in the pre-Thatcher Conservative party had departed too far from the common touch for the electorate – in Kavanagh's term, had become too 'high-minded'. Crewe, in 1982, made essentially the same point in relation to the Labour party³¹ – that the party leadership was losing touch with their traditional supporters.

Crewe and Searing's public opinion data suggest a possible mechanism for

³⁰ David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, 2nd edn (London Macmillan, 1974), Chaps 13–15

³¹ Ivor Crewe, 'The Labour Party and the Electorate' in Dennis Kavanagh, ed., *The Politics of the Labour Party* (London Allen & Unwin, 1982).

alternation in public concern about such matters as inflation, unemployment, taxation, immigration, etc. Albert Hirschman has argued that where we find a regular cyclical movement we should look for an endogeneous cause.³² In the case of preferences for goods, he suggests that this might lie in the evolution from satisfaction to satiety and hence disillusion. In the political case, a similar explanation seems likely. A party by its success in the objective for which it was returned to office would lower the salience of that objective and increase the salience of the objective sacrificed to achieve it. For example, one of the few 'position issues' that Butler and Stokes showed might have contributed to the defeat of the Conservatives in 1964 was that, contrary to party policy, the public at that time placed a lower value on reducing taxation than on increasing welfare expenditures. The reverse is likely to have been the case fourteen years earlier when the Conservatives defeated Labour and again fourteen years later. The same may be true of the unemployment/inflation trade-off. However, it is hard to see this type of explanation applying to the really long-term shifts (the 'tides' as opposed to the 'waves') such as that between collectivism and individualism.

Crewe and Searing are clearly correct in maintaining that Thatcherism, in contrast to previous postwar Conservative experience, contradicts Downsian theory.³³ Unlike Conservative policy after the 1945 defeat, Thatcherism does not seek to capture the middle ground of politics. It is confessedly ideological and radical rather than pragmatic and moderate. Moreover, Crewe and Searing produce convincing evidence that Thatcherite experience also contradicts the opposite model to that of Downs, in which public opinion follows the political leaders instead of the leaders following public opinion. Both Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues tried to influence public opinion in the Thatcherite direction but failed in all but one case, that of privatization. (Even on privatization they did not change the direction of public opinion; they merely converted a negative attitude against nationalization into a positive attitude in favour of privatizing nationalized industries.)

Downs constructed his model on the assumption of rational behaviour by politicians and voters. His criteria of rationality can be and have been challenged but Crewe and Searing leave us devoid of any model. The system seems to have behaved much as Downs suggested for the better part of a generation but ceased to do so after 1974. Crewe and Searing's evidence on this is convincing but they might have tried to answer the conundrum they had set.

THE POLITICAL SHOW

In contrast to the political science of twenty years ago – where the emphasis was on trying to identify the (rather indirect) means by which the behaviour of the voters ultimately drove the democratic engine – politics today is more often seen

³² Albert Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements* (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 1983).

³³ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Chicago. Harper & Row, 1957).

by political scientists as a game played by notables. This is, of course, what is expected of the more popular journalistic works. And while this would not be the appropriate place to review the large number of journalistic works that Mrs Thatcher and her followers have inspired, two of these more popular works seem worth including for insights or qualities we would not so readily find in more austere scientific works. The book of the television programme by Hugo Young and Anne Sloman called *The Thatcher Phenomenon* provides a wealth of evidence about Mrs Thatcher (perhaps more than about the policies with which she is associated) from taped interviews with a variety of people who have encountered her – from fellow school girls in Grantham to President Reagan.³⁴ The index reads rather like a very exclusive Top People's *Who's Who* but where else can one hear what a Permanent Secretary thought of his Minister? Most of us are not admitted to the circles in which the upper mandarinates discuss these things. Somehow the format of recorded interviews for a radio programme succeeded in breaking down some of the obsessive civil service discretion.

Peter Jenkins's *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution* is also high-class journalism but its merits are different.³⁵ There is not much evidence to be found here that is not available elsewhere. The analysis is quite similar to Kavanagh's: Thatcherism first arises, without much support within the Conservative party, as a reaction to the Butskellite policies which had proved ineffective in the context of the country's relative economic and geopolitical decline (which Jenkins argues goes back a long way). Thatcherism continues to dominate because the opposition to it is so divided. It is not that There Is No Alternative (TINA). Rather there are too many alternatives. Jenkins is particularly persuasive in his analysis of the problems and fissions within the Labour party. Indeed he seems to be more at home among the '57 varieties' of socialism than with the Labour party.

The book does not pretend to offer, as the best political science does, either a strong theoretical framework or carefully documented and statistically tested evidence. Even as contemporary history the validity of the genre of 'lobby-fact' story telling (of which this is a distinguished example) is open to question. Jenkins himself makes no undue claims. He emphasizes at the outset that some of his new evidence is from unattributable sources and a good deal of it drawn from 'the elaborate notebooks in which I record conversations and thoughts and make notes from television, the radio, newspapers and other readings'.

Politics is a very human subject. To a greater extent than most other fields of activity (other than the arts), the personality of the actors, their strengths and weaknesses, make the subject. The emphasis of much political science on abstract concepts, numerical relationship and mathematical models, valuable as these are (not least to the politician wise enough to use them), risks hiding this. Good political journalism can redress the balance.

Peter Jenkins applies the Emersonian principle that history is properly biography but does not limit himself to the personality of the principal subject. He

³⁴ Young and Sloman, *The Thatcher Phenomenon*

³⁵ Jenkins, *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era*.

populates the political stage with sharply drawn vignettes of nearly all the principal politicians of the postwar era. In rapid succession we get Crosland, Gaitskell, Macmillan, Wilson, Benn (by whom he is particularly fascinated), Heath, Callaghan and, of course, Mrs Thatcher, with Roy Jenkins, Michael Foot, Healey, Kinnock and many others limned later in the work. These are acid etchings but never really unsympathetic: 'By 1975 Benn was in the wilderness, where prophets belong'; 'For Armstrong, who had served Butler, government was the art of the possible and Mrs Thatcher could be pretty impossible'. Above all, they are portraits full of life and wit and make a recognizable picture of the political scene. Occasionally his enthusiasms for a colourful character cloud his judgement: is it really credible that in 1982 'no one – Margaret Thatcher apart – embodied the spirit of the times better than Benn' (p. 122)?

Perhaps he over-emphasizes the personal element. He regards 'Thatcherism' as no more than the style of Mrs Thatcher. In this he differs from Keegan who identifies Thatcherism much more closely with Friedmanism and occasionally (as in Chapter 2) writes almost as if Thatcherism was invented by Sir Keith Joseph.

The Thatcher Administration has to be associated not only with changes in policy but equally with changes in the machinery of government. In writing about this, Jenkins is able to draw on his experience as a lobby correspondent and the privileged access this role provided for him. It is impossible to tell how accurate is his blow by blow account of the Westland Affair but it is as enthralling as a good detective story even though he claims it does not qualify as a 'who dunnit' because everybody knows 'who dunnit'.

PRIMA INTER PRIMOS

The extent to which the Prime Minister dominates the Cabinet is the point most often raised by the press. As Douglas Wass made clear in the BBC programme (quoted in Young and Sloman), this varies a great deal both according to the personality of the incumbent and the circumstances of the time. None the less, in terms of Kavanagh's dichotomy between the centralizing and decentralizing strands in Thatcherism, the developments in the machinery of government clearly form part of the centralizing strand. Mrs Thatcher appears to have had more difficulty than most of her predecessors in getting her own way in Cabinet during the 1979 Parliament but even in that Parliament and, more obviously subsequently, the role of No. 10 was enlarged and strengthened. No. 10 may still be a far cry from a 'power house' but it is now a much more elaborate piece of machinery than the Prime Minister's office under Harold Macmillan as described by John Wyndham.³⁶

Whereas in many areas the Thatcher Administration reversed the direction of previous policy, in this area the developments seem consistent with the whole postwar trend – and possibly a trend going much further back. While, over the

³⁶ Lord Egremont, *Wyndham and Children First* (London: Macmillan, 1968).

years, the Prime Minister may have become somewhat more dominant in Cabinet, the difference from the position of an American president in *his* cabinet is still immense. The history of the Thatcher Administration offers several instances where the Prime Minister failed to carry Cabinet in what seems to have been her initial view and even as recently as May 1988 the press reported disagreements between her and the Chancellor about policy regarding the exchange value of sterling in which the Chancellor appears to have won the day. If British prime ministers are less the master (or mistress) of their own Cabinet, they are, of course, much less subject to any outside check than is an American president. The effect of this is that the disagreements are much less open and thus provide less scope for the intervention of powerful interest groups. This is one of the ways in which the English constitution helps maintain what Bulpitt calls 'the relative autonomy of the centre'.

WHAT COMES NEXT?

An issue that is rarely addressed directly but that lies not far below the surface of much that has been written about Thatcherism, is the question of what is likely to follow Thatcherism.

This is implicit in the careful and often insightful analyses of the Thatcherite phenomenon in a series of articles reproduced (with varying amounts of re-writing) from *Marxism Today*.³⁷ At first sight, it is surprising to find Stuart Hall, a Marxist, writing favourably of Thatcherism as 'reactionary common sense' and insisting that 'the headway which Thatcherism is undoubtedly making among working people, committed Labour voters' should not be attributed to 'false consciousness'. We do not need to assume some form of instinctive sympathy between fellow ideologues. The argument is logical given the esoteric Marxist analysis. Communism and Social Democracy are rivals and enemies and for Communists the leadership of the Labour party has long been tainted with democratic socialism. Keynesianism and the Labour party use the power of the state to reform conditions for working people. To those interested in power rather than welfare, this is the heresy of 'statism' that prevents the 'mobilization of democratic power at the popular level'. Thatcherism, by contrast, shows up the welfare state as a burdensome bureaucratic imposition and thus makes the people aware of the 'genuine contradictions of statism'. By doing so, it has changed the terrain for the class struggle. 'This is exactly the terrain on which the forces of opposition must organize, if we are to transform it.' In simpler and more naive terms 'she has done half our work for us, let's make the most of it'.

Just how the transition to 'democratic power at the popular level' is to take place and how Marxist forces should organize to bring it about are not spelt out. Presumably, however, no Marxist scenario will be compatible with the 'waves and tides' analogy. The analogy, in this case, would be more a *tsunami*, a tidal

³⁷ Stuart Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show' in Hall and Jacques, eds, *The Politics of Thatcherism*.

wave bringing in its wake devastation and destruction and leaving behind the ruins from which a new order can be built up.

In a critique of Hall, Jessop *et al.* argue for a less exclusive philosophy that would enable the forces opposed to Thatcherism to join forces.³⁸ It is symptomatic of the problems of the Left that their writings militate against this obviously correct objective. The impenetrable jargon of the New Left makes communication difficult with anyone outside their own group and their style of debate seems calculated to emphasize differences rather than common ground.

The strategy followed at the 1987 election – and, as far as one can see, still followed – by Neil Kinnock and his advisers, on the other hand, certainly aimed at finding the common ground of opposition to the Conservative party. This Labour strategy is, at first sight, reminiscent of the strategy followed by the Conservatives after their 1945 defeat. Although presented as no more than a change of image, it implicitly recognizes, as the Conservative party did after 1945, that the tide has changed and party policy must change with it. Then a new wave could float Labour into office if only the SDP and other irrelevancies could be got out of the way. There was in 1945 no equivalent to the SDP to complicate matters but the 1945 analogy is also misleading in two other ways. Firstly, an important and numerically significant proportion of the Conservative party had been genuinely convinced of the need for policies along the lines developed during the closing years of the Coalition Government. These included the Tory Reform Group and the One Nation Group, backbenchers as well as front-benchers, people such as Peter Thorneycroft and Lord Hinchinbrooke, who would subsequently be seen as on the right of the party as well as people such as Robert Carr who would be seen as on its left. Even if we grant that ‘Designer Socialism’ really involves policy changes, there is no evidence of comparably widespread support for it in the Labour party as there was for the Charters in the Conservative party. Secondly, the constitution of the Labour party gives much more scope for reactionary opposition than did that of the Conservative party. It is far from sure that Butler and the reformers could have carried the day if such reactionary backbenchers as Sir Waldron Smithers and Sir Herbert Williams had been given as much power by the rules of the Conservative party as Ken Livingstone and Anthony Benn are given by those of the Labour party.

Jenkins, writing after the 1987 election, also addresses the question of what comes next. He maintains, almost certainly rightly, that a fundamental change of attitude has taken place in Britain. Whether Mrs Thatcher has caused the tide to change or has merely ridden to power on it, there is no doubt that what Keith Joseph described as the ‘ratchet effect’, drawing the country ever deeper into socialism, has not only been halted but has been reversed. Although Jenkins does not draw that comparison, the change seems at least as significant as that to which the Conservatives had to adjust after the war. The tide has changed but is there any chance of a new wave floating the Labour party into office? Jenkins’s answer is worthy of the Sybils. Socialism (if taken to be a doctrine concerning

³⁸ Bob Jessop, *et al.*, ‘Authoritarian Populism, Two Nations and Thatcherism’, *New Left Review*, No. 147 (1984), 32–60.

production and ownership) is 'pretty effectively dead'. However, 'the Labour party is another matter'. *For the time being* the Labour party has been 'dished electorally' by Mrs Thatcher – 'or it has dished itself. Yet for as long as Britain's electoral system remains Labour *can* win'. A plug for electoral reform is neatly inserted before the reader can see what is coming!

We can speculate about how a Labour government would act if it won a general election by defeating the Conservatives and recapturing the ground lost to the Alliance. Jenkins advances arguments of varying persuasiveness for believing that 'there is today less prospect than at any time in the postwar period of what has been done [by the Thatcher Administration] being quickly undone'. Private ownership has been diffused to the point at which 'nationalisation (except on a casualty basis) has ceased to be practical politics for any party aspiring to election'. If not yet, it will eventually become impossible to 'reinstate [the trade-union movement] as the Fifth Estate'. Certainly 'a Labour government can no longer rely on trade union members to elect it to power'.

Jenkins leaves open the possibility that, as the Thatcherites claim, the deflationary shock and unemployment of 1980–81 has finally squeezed overmanning and avoidable inefficiency out of the economy. Walters, perhaps predictably, claimed that the productivity figures 'suggest that at last, Britain may be starting to catch up with her great European rivals and partners. They may be the first signs of a cure for the British disease and may even herald a minor "economic miracle"' (p. 172). Whether Britain's place in the economic league table can be based on average productivity figures is arguable. The future for the economies of Western Europe, Japan and the United States almost certainly depends on industries with high values added and high skill. We do not yet know precisely where and how the renewal of economic growth in Britain is taking place. We do know that even before 1979, the proportion of the age group in Britain going on to higher education was lower than in most of Britain's competitors and Thatcherism has further impoverished higher education. This is bound to be counterproductive. If the future lies in high technology the need for a highly educated labour force is obvious. If the future requires a further shift from manufacturing to service industries, the need will be for literate skills, which, perhaps even more than for technical ones, require university education. In both these respects Thatcherism, far from strengthening Britain's competitive position, has further weakened it.

Finally, Jenkins, looking to the future, suggests that the international financial system now makes it 'virtually impossible for a government to reimpose exchange controls. This effectively excludes the practice of socialism in one country and would make difficult even the practice of Keynesianism in one country'. This point is convincing but not particularly attributable to any distinctive Thatcherite policy. It is the result of the interdependence of the economies of the world. Even at Bretton Woods, Keynes recognized the limits on any one country's ability to determine in isolation the level of its aggregate demand and hence the level of unemployment it considers tolerable. Since then the economies of the world have become even more interdependent. This is

probably more important than the effects of the policies of any one party in any one country.

CONCLUSIONS

What light do these works shed on the operation of the British political system generally?

Firstly, parties do make a difference. Whether or not the shift from Keynesianism to Friedmanism occurred under the Labour Government during the Chancellorship of Denis Healey, it is unbelievable that had the Labour party won the 1979 general election, policy ten years later would be the same as it is today. It would be interesting to repeat Richard Rose's analysis of various economic series to see whether any sharp discontinuity shows up with the advent of the Thatcher Administration.³⁹ (Some 'back of envelope' calculations suggest that probably it would not.) However, what this implies is not that parties make little difference but that policies affect outcomes only slowly and gradually (and possibly less than policy analysts would like to believe!).

The crucial factor was not that the Conservative party won the 1979 general election but that a Conservative party did so led by Mrs Thatcher and committed to different values to those dominant previously. The commentators, almost without exception, emphasize the change in the dominant group (or coalition) within the party and maintain that the shift in Conservative policy brought about by the new leadership was neither deliberately designed to attract voters nor a conscious reflection of a change that indeed had taken place in public opinion. Even the unfavourable commentators to this extent accept the sincerity of Mrs Thatcher's claim to be a conviction politician.

Dennis Kavanagh, William Keegan and, in a somewhat different way, Alan Walters also emphasize the change in elite opinion – particularly in the policy-relevant academic disciplines – that had previously taken place and considerably influenced Thatcherite policy. Finally, as Crewe and Searing's figures show, public opinion had moved before the 1979 election towards a position close to that which Thatcherism subsequently adopted – for example, on the relative importance of inflation as against unemployment, on support for trade unions, etc.

Putting these elements together we begin to see a model of the operation of party government that is more subtle (as Richard Rose argues the evidence requires) than that in which parties follow and reflect public opinion or that in which the parties lead and determine public opinion. The model comprises three factors – faction within party, elite opinion and the wider public's opinion. The key factor is not so much which party wins an election but what faction or constellation of tendencies has become dominant within a party. Thereafter, whether that party wins or loses the election is not determined by a simple identity between the current views and values of the dominant faction and those of a plurality of voters. All evidence is that a majority of voters are not very aware of

³⁹ Richard Rose, *Do Parties Make a Difference?* (London: Macmillan, 1984)

party policies and positions. Instead the outcome will depend on whether the dominant faction's policies are seen both as viable by a sufficient body of elite opinion (Dicey's 'legislative opinion') and yet at the same time are compatible with the values of the wider public.

Nobody can seriously maintain that the advent of Thatcherism represented a change of regime. (In fact, the way the machinery of government has changed during the period of the Thatcher Administration is in much the same direction as before.) On the other hand, the literature shows clearly that Thatcherism represents a break with the normal pattern of incrementalism. In this sense it is a change in the tide. These changes in the political tide serve for stable democratic regimes much the same functions as regime changes in other systems. They are a safeguard against excess. As the Second Vatican Council argued, a purely collectivist view of man denies his responsibility as an individual just as a purely individualist view denies his responsibility as a member of society. Thus, leaving aside the improbable attainment of the right perfect balance, a sound system will occasionally move towards collectivism and occasionally towards individualism. This is precisely what Dennis Kavanagh, following Dicey, tells us occurred with the advent of Thatcherism.

Both these conclusions from the literature on Thatcherism seem important. Yet at the same time there are still important gaps in the literature. Although most analysts comment on the extraordinary way in which public support for Mrs Thatcher and for Thatcherism has held up, there is little analysis of the basis for their popularity.

Above all, while there are a number of subtle analyses of the phenomenon – the end of the postwar consensus, a shift from centripetal to centrifugal politics, a realignment of factions within the Conservative party – there is still no theoretical model that would explain the phenomenon. The literature both on Downsian theory and on incrementalism tell us a good deal about the way a tide once established maintains its direction but the literature on Thatcherism confines itself to establishing that it represents a change in the tide without providing any explanation of why the change took place.

One hypothesis that should be tested is that these changes in the political tides reflect changes in the basic structure of the society in which the political system operates. Despite the rhetoric in the 1960s about communitarian values, nearly all the everyday forms of collectivity have in fact weakened considerably over the last half-century: village life, neighbourhood community, social class, professional and work-place solidarity, parish involvement, even team sports. Almost the only social institution that still produces a network of interdependence is the nuclear family and the nuclear family itself has become less stable. Paradoxically, this tendency has been accentuated by the collectivist aspect of welfarism. The individual can now turn to public authorities for things on which earlier he would have been dependent on the support of relations, neighbours, workmates, etc. If the reverse trend towards individualism produces a similar paradoxical effect then we would have a model to explain the periodic changes of the tide.

Thatcherism is still relatively new. It has not yet worked through its life cycle.

Its repercussions on the other parties are only just beginning. It is probably too early for its full theoretical implications for the political system to have been worked out. However, the political scientists who have already written about it have produced sufficient challenging puzzles to give us reason to hope that their successors will significantly add to our theoretical understanding of the workings of democratic government.

Review Article: Political Change in China – Power, Policy and Process

DAVID S. G. GOODMAN

China's politics have changed dramatically during the last decade. Schram, in one of the works which have stimulated this review article,¹ has characterized the period since 1978 as one of 'Economics in Command' by way of contrast to the exhortation to put 'Politics in Command' – the slogan that dominated the last decade of Mao's life and the era of the Cultural Revolution. The drive to economic modernization has replaced 'class struggle' as the main goal of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Political reform has been an essential part of that drive, for in its analysis of the failings of the previous three decades² the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has argued that economic growth and development could not occur without political stability and institutionalization.

Subsequent changes in China have had a profound impact on the study of China's politics in the West. China's politics have become more open, both to the Chinese and to the West. In general, more information is now available, as witnessed for example, by the work of the State Statistical Bureau re-established after an absence of almost twenty years. There has been a tremendous increase in the number of newspapers, journals and books published in the PRC. Moreover, China's 'open door' policy to the West has meant that there is an element of independent assessment and verification of official sources, as (for example) by the World Bank. Academics have followed the flag and trade. Not only do Western scholars have greater access to information and sources than they did a decade ago, but it is now possible to undertake both field work and library research in China itself.

The 1980s have seen the Western social sciences established in China (for the first time since 1949) and they have even achieved some respectability. Politics was a subject of study in Chinese schools and universities before 1980 but at that time it referred to Marxism–Leninism, and effectively political education. However, in 1980 a political science that was not identical to Marxism–Leninism was recognized as a legitimate academic discipline. An Institute of Political Science

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¹ S. R. Schram, *Ideology and Policy in China since the Third Plenum, 1978–84* (London: Contemporary China Institute, 1984). The others are F. C. Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China* (London: Macmillan, 1984); P. R. Moody, *Chinese Politics after Mao* (New York: Praeger, 1983); and N. Maxwell and B. McFarlane, eds, *China's Changed Road to Development* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1984).

² The CCP's review of its post-1949 history was formulated in the *Resolution on Party History since the Foundation of the PRC* adopted by the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in June 1981.

has been established as part of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and there are some twenty-five departments of political science in Chinese universities. The surveys carried out by Chinese social scientists, and their published research are interesting sources of information in their own right.³ Moreover, the emergence of political science in China means that Western scholars can now expect a sympathetic hearing for their research plans when in China, where a decade ago their requests (had they been put) would have met with unremitting stares of non-comprehension.

During the mid-1970s restrictions on access and information meant, almost necessarily, that the Western literature on China's politics was relatively uniform in its approach, and somewhat restricted in its concerns. There was a tendency for the political system of the PRC to be regarded as *sui generis* and to be studied in isolation. It was characterized as a socialist or a communist party but as radically different from the Soviet Union because of the CCP's separate and distinct existence before 1949, Mao's vision, and the experience of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) during the years 1966–69. As part of the Third World its development was characterized, in contrast to other developing countries, in terms of equality and popular participation. The literature was dominated by three preoccupations – the 'Chinese road to socialism'; leadership factions, and particularly analysis of the 'two line' struggle within the CCP suggested during the GPCR; and discussion of policy cycles, the apparent oscillation between conservative and radical phases in the political history of the PRC after 1949.

By far the most important result of changes in China on the study of China's politics in the West has been the rejection of a considerable portion of past Western scholarship. The CCP's rejection of the politics of the Cultural Revolution and its reassessment of that period has triggered a reappraisal of earlier research, its findings and judgements, in the West. Sometimes this has occurred through the release of additional information and sources on the earlier period or events; sometimes through additional research. A simple example may help demonstrate the extent to which such reappraisals can fundamentally alter the Western vision of China. Until the late 1970s almost every book published on China's politics accepted without question that there was a relative, and increasing, equality of income in the PRC particularly amongst the peasantry, even if it were an equality of poverty. However, more recent research has detailed the extent to which inequalities persisted and even increased during the era of Mao-dominated politics. For example, Friedman cites differences of some one hundred to one in rural incomes by the late 1970s.⁴ Not surprisingly, these reversals, the denial of Mao's vision and its replacement by policies that seem to be concerned solely with economic growth, as well as the relative speed at which

³ For example B. Womack, ed., *Media and the Chinese Public* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986); and Li Fan, 'The Question of Interests in the Chinese Policy Making Process', *China Quarterly*, No. 109 (March 1987), p. 64.

⁴ E. Friedman, 'The Original Chinese Revolution Remains in Power', in B. Cumings, ed., *China from Mao to Deng* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1983), p. 23.

such changes took place all served to undermine the confidence of Western scholarship in the late 1970s.

The suspension of disbelief that characterized much of Western scholarship during the 1970s has been replaced by a far healthier scepticism. Although there is still a tendency for China's politics to be studied in isolation, explicitly comparative perspectives have been far more widely and freely employed in the 1980s. Thus, for example, recent publications have considered China in its East Asian⁵ and socialist contexts.⁶ In one of the most stimulating and lively books written in the 1980s Nathan has even compared China's most recent campaigns for democracy with both Western visions of democracy and traditional Chinese political culture.⁷

Compared to the era of the Cultural Revolution, since the late 1970s there has been considerably greater disagreement in the West about the nature and direction of the Chinese polity. Moreover, a much wider range of topics and issues has provided the focus for research. The intention here is to place these new interpretations and preoccupations in perspective. Developments in China and their impact on the study of China's politics have made breast-beating and recriminations an almost fashionable pursuit. Sometimes it appears that such recriminations have gone to a point of vituperativeness well beyond that of scholarly interest.⁸ Here, in contrast, the argument is that the study of China's politics in a general sense is a relatively new pursuit. Indeed in the narrow sense of politics as a specific activity the study of China's politics in the West has really only become academically possible since 1978. Significantly, the last decade has seen the development of the conceptual and factual basis for the study not only of China's contemporary politics but also of politics before 1978.⁹ This plea of novelty is not presented as an excuse for the failings of past research, but rather that they should be viewed in their appropriate perspective as part of a learning process.

TOTALITARIAN BLINKERS

A brief survey of its development before the late 1970s should suffice to demonstrate the extent to which the study of China's politics in the West was both new and undeveloped. Before and during the era of the Cultural Revolution lack of information, access and historical perspective resulted in a relative lack of sophistication and scope. At first sight, the events of the GPCR seem not only to

⁵ For example, P. de Beauregard, J. P. Canestan, J. L. Domenach, F. Godement, J. de Goldfien and F. Joyaux, *La Politique Asiatique de la Chine* (Paris: Fondations pour les Études de Défense Nationale, 1986).

⁶ For example, Marc Blecher, *China: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Pinter, 1986).

⁷ A. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986).

⁸ For example, L. T. Sigal, 'On the "Two Roads" and Following our Own Path: The Myth of the "Capitalist Road"', *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 7 (1982), p. 55, and the responses in the same journal, No. 8.

⁹ For example: M. Goldman, *China's Intellectuals* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and W. A. Joseph, *The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958-1981* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984).

have challenged the conventional wisdom about China's politics but also to have led to significant methodological developments. However, in retrospect the impact of the GPCR was to highlight methodological questions rather than to lead to any dramatic change.

There was little academic literature on China's politics published in the West before the GPCR, and that was largely concerned with outlining its basic contours. China's politics were described almost solely in terms of a totalitarian model. Attention focused on national leadership and policies, as well as their immediate political and ideological environments. The leadership was regarded as cohesive and united around the generation of revolutionary leaders who had first come to power in 1949. In large measure what happened in China appeared not only to revolve around but also to be determined by Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought.¹⁰

This model and its concerns were challenged through the presentation of the GPCR as a 'revolution within the revolution'. There had clearly been differences of opinion and power within the CCP's leadership not only during the GPCR but also during the early 1960s which had to be taken into account. The way in which the GPCR developed suggested that though political power was highly centralized, it also existed outside the CCP's political bureau. Moreover, the GPCR drew attention to China in a spectacular way. The general public and the academic community were attracted to China studies, creating a need and a market for more secondary literature.

The result in the 1970s was the emergence of a larger and more varied literature. Although variants on an explicit totalitarian approach were by no means abandoned,¹¹ other perspectives were adopted as, for example, the attempts to highlight what were seen as pluralistic tendencies.¹² In particular, in the wake of the GPCR the study of China's politics came to be dominated by consideration of socialism, policy cycles and factionalism. Though earlier concerns with biography, ideology and organization were not absent, the range of topics chosen for investigation expanded. Politics was no longer regarded as an activity confined to the more orthodoxly defined 'centre'. For example, studies appeared of the intermediate¹³ and basic¹⁴ levels of the political system, as well as of eco-

¹⁰ Three seminal works which together reflect the major academic preoccupations of that period are A. D. Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), S. R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1963); and H. F. Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

¹¹ For example, R. C. Thornton, *China: The Struggle for Power* (London: Indiana University Press, 1973).

¹² For example, P. Chang, *Power and Policy in China* (London: Pennsylvania University Press, 1975), and A. P. Liu, *Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist China* (Oxford: Clio Books, 1976).

¹³ For example, D. Solinger, *Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), and L. T. White, III, 'Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69', in R. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972).

¹⁴ For example, G. Bennett, *Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1978).

nomic enterprises¹⁵ and specific local areas.¹⁶ Although it could not be argued that the impact of the GPCR was to shift the major focus of attention in the literature as a whole from considerations of policy to those of power, a less one-sided emphasis certainly emerged.

Despite those developments, methodological advance was limited by the emphasis given to contemporary events, the continued influence of the totalitarian perspective, and uncertainty about what constituted politics. The start of the GPCR challenged perceived orthodoxies about China's politics, and for the most part surprised Western academic observers.¹⁷ The immediate response was a near panic that led to radically new arguments and theories, some of which were readily discounted within a short period.¹⁸ It was a pattern which was to be repeated, if less spectacularly with each 'crisis' or change in direction of China's politics: a not uncommon occurrence given China's political instability particularly in the 1970s. The study of China's politics has of course to be concerned with and take account of contemporary developments. However, to allow those developments to determine the perspectives on China's politics is to issue an open invitation to be faulted. None the less, it remains remarkable how many observers of China's politics have persisted with linear explanations,¹⁹ did not learn the lessons of the GPCR and were surprised, or even disappointed, by the change to the post-Mao era.

The methodological problem highlighted here is simple. The study of China's politics in the West has not had a good record for either prediction or explanation. Prediction in the social sciences is a notoriously hazardous, and possibly even dubious, activity. More serious is the relative poverty of explanation. For example, there were almost no accounts or interpretations of any aspect of China's politics published during the era of the Cultural Revolution which could encompass future change. Significantly, explanation seems to have been the preserve of those who viewed China from a wider and often historical perspective.²⁰ The literature of the 1970s appears more concerned with the specifics – be they personalities, policies or periods – than with longer-term explanation. In his somewhat artificial debate with Winckler about the relevance of policy cycles, Nathan argued that political phenomenon and periods in the PRC should be

¹⁵ For example, W. Brugger, *Democracy and Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

¹⁶ For example, E. Vogel, *Canton under Communism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

¹⁷ Surprise is clearly reflected in the pages of the *China Quarterly*, No. 27 (September 1966), and the following issues. For example, Joffe at that time described the GPCR as not so much the 'titanic struggle' described by the *New York Times* of 26 June 1966 as a 'titanic riddle', in 'China in Mid-1966: "Cultural Revolution" or Struggle for Power?', *China Quarterly*, No. 27 (September 1966), p. 123.

¹⁸ For example, S. R. Schram, 'The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology', *China Quarterly*, No. 38 (1967), especially p. 23, where the author discusses reactions to Mao's attack on the CCP.

¹⁹ This point is made forcefully by Winckler when, with not a little justice (and hindsight), he indicates the relative success of cyclical explanations. E. A. Winckler, 'Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Reply', *China Quarterly*, No. 68 (December 1976), p. 734.

²⁰ For example: F. Wakeman, *History and Will* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

analysed more as unique historical events.²¹ He seemed to suggest that was not the case in the 1970s. However, one consequence of the concern with the contemporary, stimulated by the GPCR and the release of information by the Red Guards and others in the cause of factional conflict, was the emphasis on data-collection almost as an end in itself. The literature on China's politics expanded greatly, but it expanded in terms of description rather than terms of explanation. The real achievement of that period was the attention to detail. Paradoxically, in the post-Mao period much of that detail proved flawed, as the unreliability of sources emanating from the GPCR and the dangers of an over-dependence on official sources both became clearer.

The GPCR stimulated to some extent the search for perspectives that would provide alternatives to the totalitarian approach to China's politics. Yet in the 1970s the results were limited particularly in contrast with the study of the politics of other specific areas. Thus, for example, even the briefest comparison with the variety of approaches to the study of Soviet politics almost two decades ago suggests the relative breadth of the latter.²² In the 1970s the study of China's politics centred largely on considerations of socialism, factions and policy cycles. Moreover, there was even less methodological change than might appear to have been the case because of the continued influence of the totalitarian perspective. Although that perspective was rarely explicit, it did underlie much of the literature both as a model and as a determinant of the choice of particular topics for investigation. Totalitarian in this context does not imply rigid adherence to the paradigm suggested by Friedrich and Brzezinski, but rather the exclusive concentration and outreach of power within a political system, and its organizational consequences. Even the new concerns with socialism, factions and policy cycles demonstrated the continued influence of the totalitarian perspective, either through shared perceptions or through intellectual origins.

The various socialist interpretations of China's politics tended to reinforce the general totalitarian perspective, and indeed came closest to the earliest formulations of the totalitarian model. Those that approved of the CCP's socialism highlighted the mobilizational power of its leadership and ideology, the regime's goals as defined by that ideology, and the absence of political mediation. To take but one example from the available literature, there are more than distant echoes of, *inter alia*, Kornhauser's account of the totalitarian polity in the following descriptions of Mao's 'revolution from above':

He set out to break down the gulf between the elite group and the masses, to spread a new outlook at the centres of decision-making, to motivate decisions differently, and to substitute for the 'invisible hand' of the price mechanism the visible bond of Mao Tse-tung's thought; Mao preaches a socialist morality, a collective selfless attitude, and a concern for world revolution, as against an individualistic, competitive morality.²³

²¹ A. Nathan, 'Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Critique', *China Quarterly*, No. 68 (December 1976), pp. 730-1

²² See, for example, F. Fleron, ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).

²³ E. L. Wheelwright and B. McFarlane, *The Chinese Road to Socialism* (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1973), p. 126

Those socialist perspectives that disapproved of the CCP's variety of socialism more obviously perpetuated the influence of the vision of the CCP as totalitarian, and on occasion used the term explicitly as description. The emphasis was on the power and nature of the ruling elite, class or strata; the CCP's ideology was regarded as flawed in its content and application; and there was criticism of the 'cult of personality', the extent of centralized state power, as well as of purges.²⁴

On the surface, the factional accounts of the 1970s with their emphasis on elite-level conflict and coalition formation might seem – as some of their authors undoubtedly thought – to present a pluralist alternative to the totalitarian perspective.²⁵ However, it is clearly misleading to regard elite-level conflict with no social base as an indication of pluralism. Indeed, in the light of the available evidence it is more likely to be a hallmark of the more authoritarian systems and those polities where the elite is less accountable to the population at large. The observation of conflict or consensus in any political system ought not to surprise the political analyst. That to some extent it did so was more a function of the pre-GPCR conventional wisdom, rather than political reality in the PCR. The fact that the majority of factional analyses described a small and homogenous elite emphasized the shared perception on the concentration and exercise of power.

Interpretations of China's politics that were concerned with policy cycles were similarly shaped by a totalitarian perspective. There were three general explanations for the appearance of such cycles prevalent in the 1970s – the interaction between ideology and environment; the inherent dynamic of Mao Zedong Thought; and elite-level conflict between two major power blocs.²⁶ Each assumes the existence of a totalitarian polity – with its characteristic concentration of power, the ability and will to mobilize – as the machinery for the generation of cyclical patterns.

One reason for both the poverty of explanation and the continued influence of a totalitarian perspective was that there was little attempt to define politics. In large measure this was an organizational as well as an intellectual problem: a function of the relative novelty of interest in China's politics and the limitations of primary sources. The study of China's politics had developed from general China studies rather than from the social sciences, and there was a consequent tendency to emphasize the collection of detail, to analyse China in isolation, and to equate 'politics' with 'contemporary China'. In part it reflected, and was reinforced by the CCP's own *Weltanschauung* at that time which declared that politics was everything. Of course there are many different valid and useful definitions of what constitutes politics. None the less, an individual study requires a relatively precise definition and focus if there is to be explanation and

²⁴ For example L. Maitan, *Party, Army and Masses in China* (London: New Left Books, 1976).

²⁵ One account that does seem to believe it is presenting a pluralist alternative is W. Ting, 'Coalitional Behavior among the Chinese Military Elite: A Nonrecursive, Simultaneous Equations, and Multiplicative Causal Model', *American Political Science Review*, 73 (1979), 478–93. One which most definitely does not is J. Domes, *The Internal Politics of China* (London: Hurst, 1973).

²⁶ Nathan, 'Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China', pp. 724–7.

not just description. The problem highlighted here appears to refer back directly to the debate of the mid-1970s about the relative academic merits of area studies as opposed to the social sciences.²⁷ However, that is misleading since the real issue results from the tension between history and the social sciences. Historical method and historical perspective are central to the social sciences, in particular political science, and both history and the social sciences are engaged in explanation. On the other hand, their kinds of explanation are of a radically different intent, and to some extent incompatible. To put it crudely, history is more concerned to understand finite events whereas the social sciences focus on continuing processes. The notion of contingent history can only at most be a tactic of historical analysis, and in practice is rarely even that. For their part the social sciences accept that they have a more contingent universe to observe, and from which to generalize.

Under such conditions the continued influence of a totalitarian perspective on China's politics was perhaps no surprise. None the less, it did limit the study of China's politics. As several writers pointed out when the study of politics in the Soviet Union was at a similar early stage in the process of its development, the totalitarian perspective restricts the area of investigation; discourages other channels of inquiry; and, to a certain extent, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.²⁸

NEW PERSPECTIVES

In terms of methodological development the late 1970s and 1980s have seen the study of China's politics in the West start to come to grips with many of the problems first highlighted by the GPCR. In particular, the totalitarian perspective no longer dominates the literature. There is now a wider range of interpretations of China's politics, which have generated new concerns for investigation. China's politics are studied less in isolation, and techniques of political analysis from other fields of inquiry have been adopted. Above all, politics has come to be regarded and definable as an activity less than the whole. One important result is that recent research has concentrated on politics as a process, as well as in terms of power and policy.

Within a very short period of time, the conditions for academic inquiry have changed dramatically. Official sources are now more numerous, more reliable, available for export, and more open to independent verification. For example, since 1978 newspapers at provincial-level and below – a major source of information, however suspect – have increasingly become available for foreign subscription, whereas there had been an almost total prohibition between 1961 and 1978. Yearbooks on a variety of topics and statistical digests were published in the 1950s. Many of those have restarted and they have been joined by new

²⁷ L. Pye, ed., *Political Science and Area Studies. Rivals or Partners?* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

²⁸ H. G. Skilling, 'Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach', *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 300–13; and R. C. Tucker, 'Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes', *American Political Science Review*, 55 (1961), 281–9.

publications.²⁹ In general, some indication of the increase in the information flow may be judged by a comparison of the numbers of books and titles openly published in 1984, compared to 1980, 1977 and 1971. Some 2,421 million copies of 7,771 new titles appeared in 1971; 3,308 million copies of 12,886 titles in 1977; 4,593 million copies of 21,621 titles in 1980; and in 1984, 6,000 million copies of 40,000 new titles.³⁰ China's purposive integration into the international community has even involved supranational agencies in research in China. For example, the United Nations was involved in China's most recent census, the World Bank in designing China's most recent economic development plan.³¹ Moreover, access to China for research has now become dependent on the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' administrative ability to deal with a large number of foreign scholars rather than a question of political sensitivity.³²

These changed circumstances are very much part of the reform era. However, the change in political direction which has emerged since 1978 has itself been a stimulus to change in the study of China's politics. The rejection of the Cultural Revolution by the CCP, the speed of change, and the realization that the previous portrayal of China was at best misleading has led to greater scepticism. The search to interpret the impact of reform on the nature and direction of the polity has not led to a relatively narrow and uniform vision such as characterized the era of the Cultural Revolution. On the contrary, it is possible to identify at least five major interpretations of the significance of the changes in China's politics.

It is perhaps significant of the new scepticism that few authors are prepared to accept the CCP's account of recent developments at anything like face value, as they might in the past. Many are prepared to accept the regime's essential premise that it has rejected the policies of the Cultural Revolution because that era failed to produce the material basis for the development of socialism.³³ Many are also prepared to accept that the earlier conceptualization of politics was dysfunctional.³⁴ For example, there can be little doubt that the lack of distinction in both theory and practice between the functions of the state administration and those of the CCP was such a manifestation of 'Politics in Command'. The CCP's tendency to interfere in the affairs of the state administration – instead of maintaining the division between policy making and policy implementation in the

²⁹ In addition to the more obvious economic and statistical yearbooks, there are those of more direct relevance to political studies, as for example, the *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzhen quhua jiance* [PRC Handbook of Administrative Areas] (Beijing: Ministry of Civil Affairs), and the *Zhongguo baike nianjian* [The China Almanac] (Beijing: The Chinese Almanac Publishing House)

³⁰ Data for 1971, 1977 and 1980 are taken from *Almanac of China's Economy, 1981* (Hong Kong: Modern Cultural Company Limited, 1982) p. 725.

³¹ The World Bank, *China: Long-Term Development Issues and Options* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985).

³² M. Yahuda, *The New Social Sciences in China* (London: Macmillan, 1986)

³³ M. Selden, 'The Logic – and Limits – of Chinese Socialist Development', in Maxwell and McFarlane, eds, *China's Changed Road to Development*, p. 1.

³⁴ T. Saich, 'Party Building since Mao – A Question of Style?', in Maxwell and McFarlane, eds, *China's Changed Road to Development*, p. 149.

hands of itself and the state administration respectively – was encouraged by Mao's anti-bureaucratism. In consequence the state administration ceased to implement policy: cadres simply lived to draw their salaries and keep out of trouble. The CCP for its part became overloaded as it attempted to carry out its tasks as well as those of the state administration. Similarly, because 'Politics' was 'in Command' workers and cadres spent so much time engaged in political campaigns that production and administration suffered.

However, the CCP's presentation of its reform programme is less readily accepted. Instead there is considerable emphasis on the dangers and difficulties inherent in promoting 'socialist democracy' and of introducing 'capitalist techniques in the short-term to the long-term benefit of socialism'. To a considerable extent both measures have been directed at restoring the CCP's legitimacy.³⁵ More specifically, the campaign to create 'socialist democracy' is designed to ensure a practical and efficient distinction between party and state. In the process it is hoped not only that 'party life' will be revived, but also that cadres in the state administration will be more dynamic and innovative in the pursuit of their duties, as well as responsive to the public at large. In the economy, a higher degree of enterprise management and the 'responsibility system' are directed at tapping initiative, creating flexibility and increased growth. The essence of the 'responsibility system' – which first started in the rural economy – is that the producer has a contract, or 'responsibility', with the state. Once that contract is fulfilled spare capacity or additional output is at the producer's disposal.³⁶ Western analysts, for their part, have not been slow to indicate the relatively clear contradictions in both politics and economics that face the CCP. It is trying to ensure higher degrees of accountability, participation and spontaneity without surrendering political control.³⁷ It is trying to mix market forces and administrative measures to stimulate economic growth.³⁸ There is also a potential contradiction between CCP's economic and political goals – as, for example, in crude terms between growth and equality. Particularly from a socialist perspective, some commentators have pointed to the inherent instability generated by current policies as the CCP tries to reconcile its aims.³⁹

From a socialist perspective, the political consequences of economic reform in a communist party state present problems of approach and analysis that are by

³⁵ D. S. G. Goodman, 'Democracy, Interest and Virtue The Search for Legitimacy in the PRC', in S. R. Schram, *Foundations and Limits of State Power in China* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1988).

³⁶ A. Watson, 'Agriculture Looks for "Shoes that Fit". The Production Responsibility System and its Implications', in Maxwell and McFarlane, eds, *China's Changed Road to Development*, p. 83.

³⁷ D. S. G. Goodman, 'The Chinese Political Order after Mao: "Socialist Democracy" and the Exercise of State Power', *Political Studies*, 33 (1985), p. 218.

³⁸ S. Ishikawa, 'China's Economic System Reform: Underlying Factors and Prospects', in Maxwell and McFarlane, eds, *China's Changed Road to Development*, p. 9; and C. Riskin, 'Market, Maoism, and Economic Reform in China', in M. Selden and V. Lippit, *The Transition to Socialism in China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1982), p. 300.

³⁹ V. Lippit, 'Socialist Development in China' in Selden and Lippit, *The Transition to Socialism in China*, p. 116, and B. McFarlane, 'Political Economy of Class Struggle and Economic Growth in China, 1950–1982', in Maxwell and McFarlane, eds, *China's Changed Road to Development*, p. 21.

no means new. Perhaps the most celebrated rehearsal of the arguments was that occasioned by the Prague Spring and presented in the pages of the *Monthly Review*.⁴⁰ To oversimplify greatly, debate polarizes between the economic and political determination of socialism. In contrast to the CCP's interpretation of reforms there are those who see developments since Mao's death and particularly since 1978 as a move towards capitalism. In such views the era of the Cultural Revolution represented either a period of socialism or transition to socialism. The current reforms are seen as they are presented, as the rejection of the era of the Cultural Revolution, and hence of socialism.

An articulate and recent version of this perspective on events since Mao's death has been produced by Chossudovsky.⁴¹ He challenges the view that the CCP is pursuing socialism through an examination of the reforms in industry, agriculture and foreign trade; class relations in China; and the PRC's integration into the international community. The essential argument is that proletarian state power was fragile after 1949 because the working class failed to replace the national bourgeoisie whose power was derived from the internationally-dominated economies of the former Treaty Ports. Compromise led to the emergence of an alliance of the state and national bourgeoisies, which Mao tried to combat in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. However, after 1976 this alliance, together with the rich peasantry, combined in their own economic interests. According to Chossudovsky, property rights have been restored; international capitalism and extra-territoriality (albeit in Special Economic Zones as opposed to Treaty Ports) have been re-introduced into China; and labour has become a commodity once again. Because reform is not controlled or supervised by the Chinese working class 'the transition cannot be towards socialism' (p. 216).

An alternative socialist perspective that rejects much of the case for capitalist restoration is powerfully put by Friedman.⁴² He argues that China's economic reforms are not capitalist in the eyes of capitalists; and that there are more social formations than simply socialism and capitalism. Moreover, he rejects the case for essential change in the revolution since 1976. This is not to deny the power of reform since Mao's death for Friedman recognizes the benefits that have accrued to various sectors of the population, and in particular the rural poor. His argument is that revolutionary process ended not in 1976 but in 1949. Thereafter there was no revolutionary movement committed to 'social and economic democracy' (p. 21).

There was factionalism within the CCP's leadership, as in the GPCR (and indeed all the political conflicts of 1955–76), but no revolution committed to widen the original revolution's social base. The revolution that came to power in 1949 institutionalized inequalities of power, status and wealth, and in the

⁴⁰ P. M. Sweezy and C. Bettelheim, *On the Transition to Socialism* (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971)

⁴¹ M. Chossudovsky, *Towards Capitalist Restoration? Chinese Socialism after Mao* (London: Macmillan, 1986).

⁴² E. Friedman, 'The Original Chinese Revolution Remains in Power', in Cumings, ed., *China from Mao to Deng*, p. 21.

process revealed its own limitations. According to Friedman, its promise was one of egalitarian materialism, but state power was wielded by a narrow social stratum who could not but act through personal relations and in their own interests. However, it was a narrow social stratum which shared the values of the widest possible social base. The heart of this revolution was the peasant army. As a result the CCP's leadership could satisfy its immediate constituency without coming into conflict for the most part with popular values. Thus, there has been a strong and consistent emphasis on traditional thought and behaviour, as for example with respect to the family, where women can be divorced on grounds of infertility and children are obligated to look after their parents in old age. Where the CCP's leadership chose not to avoid conflict, for whatever reason – as, for example, when Mao speeded up the pace of collectivization during the second half of 1955 or in launching the GPCR – then the military has reasserted the values of the 'original Chinese revolution'.

In Friedman's view it is hardly a recipe for socialist development let alone revolution – 'What is popular is catastrophic; what is necessary is unpopular' (p. 25). Certainly the lessons of the CCP's population policy are there to be learnt. After 1949 Mao in particular argued strongly against a policy on population growth, and encouraged the peasant army's demand for a wife and family. In so far as his view was clearly articulated, he seems to have justified this policy through the belief that productivity would increase with population (a traditional peasant attitude) rather than in terms of economic capacity. By the late 1970s the control of population growth was one of China's most pressing problems. For example, grain production and consumption per capita had barely risen since the mid-1950s.⁴³ Yet after a few years of relatively successful controls in the early 1980s the problems still remain. In 1986 a slight relaxation of the campaign to limit family size resulted in a near doubling of the annual population growth rate.⁴⁴

In contrast, but not in total contradiction to that view are those perspectives which emphasize the changes of the last decade in terms of the institutionalization of politics. The era of Mao-dominated politics and particularly the Cultural Revolution is seen as a period when there was an increasing uncertainty about and tension between, in Teiwes's terminology the 'normative and prudential rules' of China's politics, largely because of the high degree of personalization.⁴⁵ Mao was clearly a most important destabilizing element in China's politics – though he was not the only one – from the summer of 1955 until his death. The rejection of the Cultural Revolution has just as clearly entailed a search for stability and the restoration of rules to China's politics. However, as Teiwes points out neither depersonalization nor institutionalization is an easy or automatic process (p. 129). Personalized authority is deeply rooted in Chinese polit-

⁴³ L. Bianco, 'La politica demografica', in M. C. Gibelli and M. Weber, eds, *Una modernizzazione difficile: Economica e società in Cina dopo Mao* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1983), p. 159.

⁴⁴ Wu Cangping, 'Zero population growth is the best plan', in *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], 6 April 1987.

⁴⁵ Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China*, Part III, p. 93.

ical culture. Moreover, there is the obvious paradox that Deng Xiaoping's attempt to depersonalize China's politics rests on his personal charisma and authority.

Those authors who have examined the ideological and political changes of the last decade have been understandably wary of predicting the results of processes still under way. None the less, it is possible to identify two somewhat different perspectives to the institutionalization of politics. They are differentiated by their view of what went before. The first regards China before 1976 as a totalitarian polity, which has emerged into a post-totalitarian system. The second is less convinced that China was totalitarian before 1976 and sees the current political system as essentially authoritarian. In this context the distinction between authoritarian and post-totalitarian follows Linz.⁴⁶ Authoritarian regimes allow a limited pluralism but no political challenge to the single party or dominant elite: social elites may exercise autonomy but only in their non-political interests. In a post-totalitarian regime, the social structure remains integrated in the political system.

Moody, in his account of the extent of liberalization from Mao's death to 1983, presents the case that China has changed from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian polity.⁴⁷ He distinguishes between two dimensions of liberalization: de-politicization and democratization. In Moody's view China's post-Mao liberalization has been characterized by the former rather than the latter. De-politicization entails the dismantling of the totalitarian polity which is highly ideological, voluntarist and mobilizational. The result has been less emphasis on mass mobilization and more on administration, less ideological determination of issues and more articulation of public opinion. However, it has not led to democratization for power remains monopolized by the competing factions within the CCP leadership.

Schram, in his detailed analysis of the development of ideology and policy from the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978, which marks the start of the reform era, until 1984, describes an authoritarian rather than a post-totalitarian polity.⁴⁸ In contrast to Moody, he emphasizes the continued importance of ideology, and the new development towards an acceptable pluralism. Through tracing the ideological debates, particularly during the year from the spring of 1983 to the spring of 1984, Schram not only identifies the different strands of thought and personalities involved, he also demonstrates that in the post-Mao era ideology is not to be dismissed lightly. The battle being fought in those debates was for control of the new 'Marxist Moralism' which legitimates both the CCP and the political

⁴⁶ J. J. Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds, *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), Vol. 3, p. 175.

⁴⁷ P. R. Moody, *Chinese Politics after Mao*

⁴⁸ See Schram, *Ideology and Policy in China since the Third Plenum*. A similar argument is developed in Tang Tsou, 'Back from the Brink of Revolutionary-"Feudal" Totalitarianism', in V. Nee and D. Mozingo, eds, *State and Society in Contemporary China* (London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 53.

system. However, he does not deny that the sphere of politics has become restricted since 1978. Rather, he highlights the contradiction between, on the one hand, the need for and articulation of ideological rigidity and, on the other, the acceptance and implementation of economic diversity. The result, he concludes is that 'China seems headed, willy-nilly, for a certain degree of pluralism, not to be sure in the sense of prizing diversity for its own sake, but at least in tolerating a more complex and heterogeneous pattern of behaviour than in the past' (p. 71). Certainly, the tendency to political and social pluralism has very definite limits. They are enshrined in the CCP's oft-repeated 'Four Basic Principles' that demand support for 'The socialist road, the CCP's leadership, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought'.

POLITICAL CHANGE

The scepticism that has resulted in alternative interpretations of political change during the last decade has also been brought to bear on the history of the PRC. One example of this has been the reappraisal of previous accounts of China's politics in terms of 'two-line struggle'. During the 1970s many Western commentators reflected the practice of the PRC's media and reported political conflict in China in terms of two 'lines'. The approach was first publicized at the start of the GPCR when it was said, in China at least, that the 'Top person in authority taking the capitalist road', Liu Shaoqi, had opposed Chairman Mao's 'proletarian revolutionary line', not only in the 1960s but throughout the history of the CCP. When Lin Biao fell into disgrace this too was propagandized as a struggle between two 'lines', and indeed was presented as the tenth 'two-line struggle' in the history of the CCP.⁴⁹ 'Line' in this sense was seen not simply as a set of policies, but also as entailing an ideology and having some organizational form.

Although this perspective was not adopted wholesale by Western analysts, it was none the less common to find China's politics in the 1970s described in terms of 'ideologues' versus 'pragmatists', 'radicals' versus 'moderates'. That this was an unsatisfactory paradigm became crystal clear in 1976. When Zhou Enlai (who was labelled a 'moderate') died, he was expected to be succeeded by Deng Xiaoping (another 'moderate') as Premier. His appointment was opposed by the so-called 'radicals' – particularly Jiang Qing (Mao's wife) and her three associates from Shanghai, later to become known as the 'Gang of Four' – who when the opportunity arose removed Deng altogether from the political bureau of the CCP. A prominent role in Deng's ouster was played by Hua Guofeng, the then Minister of Public Security. As a result he became Acting Premier instead of Deng. Yet, within a month of Mao's death it was this same Hua who played a decisive role in the arrest of the 'Gang of Four'. Of course, there are several ex-

⁴⁹ For an apparent 'outside' account based on this perspective, see J. Chen, *Inside the Cultural Revolution* (London: Sheldon Press, 1975)

planations for Hua's political movements and actions during 1976. However, they are difficult to explain in terms of 'two-line struggle'.

Objections to the 'two-line' approach had in fact already been articulated by Teiwes in the mid-1970s, through an examination of its validity during the early 1960s. Teiwes's comments were not widely disseminated (because they appeared in a journal with restricted circulation), but they were widely misrepresented. Presumably for that reason and because they jarred with the prevailing orthodoxy the original article was not reprinted until almost a decade later.⁵⁰ The essence of his criticisms was that debate on policy was nowhere near as polarized as the 'two-line' perspective would suggest and that, although there was leadership conflict, Mao was not a protagonist. In Teiwes's view Mao was above the conflict: he was the pivot around whom everyone else revolved and whose support they needed and tried to obtain. (The argument has been misrepresented as depicting a 'Mao in command'.) Mao's role in the 1960s was that of the 'ideas man', who identified problems and encouraged others to find their solution. However, he was mercurial and often changed his mind. This left the leaders of the CCP frequently at a loss about how to adapt to the changing Mao (p. 40).

More thorough, and these days more acceptable, reappraisals of the 'two-line' approach have been published in the 1980s. In particular, it is now fashionable to recognize that debate within the CCP has resulted from the interaction of three, rather than two 'lines'. These perspectives on development have their origins in the mid-1950s when the CCP was trying to determine its future strategy. The alternatives facing the CCP at that time can be characterized in terms of the main mechanism each recommended for development – the market, mass mobilization and administration.⁵¹ Each was not only a basic perspective on development, but had a set of policies prepared for implementation, as well as its proponents. The strength of these three visions may be judged by their resurrection when debate became both necessary and more open after Mao's death.⁵²

These and other reassessments of the history of the PRC are not only interesting for what they reveal in their own right, but also in two wider respects. In the first place they provide the historical perspective which is an essential part of explanation. In the second they draw attention to politics as process. As a result in the late 1970s and during the 1980s the study of China's politics in the West has not only sought to interpret what has happened (and indeed to explain why), but it has also become increasingly concerned with the internal workings of politics. Thus, for example, there have been studies of the central decision-making process through its formal communications network,⁵³ of specific

⁵⁰ Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China*, Part I, p. 10.

⁵¹ D. Solinger, ed., *Three Visions of Chinese Socialism* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984). More colourfully, Friedman has referred to these as Titoism, Maoism, and Stalinism, in 'Some Origins and Consequences of the Maoist Theory of the Socialist Transition', in M. Selden and V. Lipitt, *The Transition to Socialism in China*, p. 159.

⁵² D. Solinger, 'Economic Reform via Reformulation in China', *Asian Survey*, 21 (1981), p. 947.

⁵³ K. Lieberthal, *Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 1978).

instances of policy-making;⁵⁴ and of the dynamics of factions.⁵⁵ As Schram's account of ideological formulation after 1978 admirably demonstrates this new focus is a direct result of the new and improved conditions for research.

None the less, there appears a reluctance to develop explanations of political change from such recent research. Instead the literature reflects a wariness about identifying specific trends or determinants of China's politics. Both are understandable given the evolution of the study of China's politics during the last twenty years. On the other hand, without such explanations every new development in China's politics is liable to be regarded as the signal of major systematic change. Consequently, by way of conclusion, it is perhaps appropriate to speculate about the dynamics of political change in the PRC.

A consideration of factions within the CCP leadership might seem the logical place to start an examination of political change. However, the imperatives of CCP organization as well as of traditional Chinese political culture hinder such observation. Both emphasize an outward display of conformity and unity. In addition, it is clear that no simple factional model can provide an adequate explanation of political change. There is a variety of intra-leadership groups and factions to several of which individual leaders may have affiliations. There are loyalty groups within the CCP leadership, and factions based on personal ties. Leaders are united by their attitudes to development strategy – the three 'lines' referred to before. They are also united by their attitudes on specific policy issues; and by shared experiences, as for example, their treatment during the GPCR or an earlier career posting. In short, it is difficult to relate an individual's political fate, faction and policy stance.

Some examples may help indicate the scale of the problems facing factional analysis. The current reform era is associated largely with two people – Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping. Chen's ideas have been seminal to the introduction of market forces and foreign investment in economic development. Chen first formulated those ideas in the mid-1950s. Deng Xiaoping first became associated with any such ideas in the late 1970s. He has certainly fired the popular imagination for reform, and most Chinese now regard the reform ideas as his own. However, their careers since the mid-1950s are both contrasting and confusing in terms of factional analysis. Chen was Mao's major opponent in the debates on development which occurred during the mid-1950s. In contrast, Deng appears to have been one of Mao's favoured allies in those debates. (According to Khrushchev,⁵⁶ Deng was the only person in the Chinese leadership Mao ever had a good word for.) Even more confusing is their fate in the GPCR. Deng was

⁵⁴ For example, Tsou, Blecher and Meisner, 'Policy Change at the National Summit and Institutional Transformation at the Local Level: The Case of Tachai and Hsiyang in the Post-Mao Era', in Tang Tsou, ed., *Select Papers from the Center for Far Eastern Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981), No. 4, p. 241.

⁵⁵ For example, L. Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981); and J. Domes, *Politische Soziologie der Volksrepublik China* (Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980).

⁵⁶ S. Talbot, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1977), Vol. 2, p. 301.

removed as the 'Number Two Person in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road'. Chen, on the other hand, though demoted was not purged, and maintained a position in the leadership throughout the era of the Cultural Revolution. Again, one major proponent of literary reforms in the 1980s was Zhou Yang. Yet this was the same person who during the 1950s and 1960s from within the CCP's Propaganda Department insisted on the then tight controls of style, content and distribution. It was a discipline that punished (often severely) many of those whom Zhou encouraged in the 1980s.

There may certainly be factions within the CCP's leadership. However, its intra-leadership groups would seem to be inherently more fluid than is usually associated with a definition of factionalism. Moreover, it seems more reasonable to search for an explanation of political change through an examination of the divisions within the leadership, rather than of the intra-leadership groups assumed to result from those divisions.

The experience and research of the last twenty years would seem to suggest that the CCP's leadership is divided by various factors of policy, personality, experience and ideology. These divisions are so numerous and so varied that on single issues or programmatically reaching a decision, particularly a binding decision, is difficult. As the examples of the careers of Chen, Deng and Zhou suggest, divisions within the leadership need not be constant over time, nor mutually reinforcing. Moreover, individuals may act out of mixed motives. As a result coalition building is both necessary and difficult. It is frequently easier for the leaders of the CCP to reach a negative decision – to agree what they do not want – than it is to make a positive decision. There is an inherent tendency to maintain the status quo, which is further reinforced by the danger (for the individual) of appearing on the 'wrong' side.

The Chinese political process thus appears very conservative. Real change is slow, cautious and incremental in contrast to the rhetoric that accompanies the announcement of major policy changes. There is none the less change not least because individuals have beliefs and seek power, if rarely exclusively. The policy process tends to be not only incremental but also deliberately experimental. During experimentation partial interests are necessarily involved. The leader, who can carry out an experiment in one part of the country and then use the experience of that experiment to pressure the decision-making process, is in a good position to carry the day nationally. (Of course, most of the experiments exploited in this manner are specifically created for that purpose, and almost all involve a degree of connivance between central and social leaders.) When this happens on a large scale, and it is a common feature of China's politics, then (somewhat paradoxically) the formal national proclamation of a new policy initiative only follows that policy's implementation. A recent example of that process at work is the adoption of the 'responsibility system' in agriculture, which was already in practice throughout much of China before its formal adoption as policy in 1981. Similarly under Zhao Ziyang's guidance (when he was CCP leader in Sichuan province during the late 1970s) a version of the recently adopted urban reforms were in operation on a 'trial' basis. As can be seen in the

case of Zhao Ziyang, who first became Premier and is now concurrently Acting General-Secretary of the CCP, political fortunes are closely linked to that process and its results. Obviously, that process of experimentation and the exercise of political pressure are not necessarily single-issue specific. Moreover, in the decision-making process individual leaders' support for each other may develop into cohesive leadership groups, if not coherent strategies.

The exceptions to this picture of incremental change occur when extraordinary circumstances force unity or a specific decision on the leadership. The most obvious examples of such a situation are an external threat, an economic crisis (as in 1961), or a crisis of legitimacy (as in 1978). However, during his lifetime it is clear that Mao was sometimes able to impose his policies and a general change on the rest of the leadership as a whole. The source of his authority, as Teiwes points out,⁵⁷ lay essentially in having proved himself to be right in so many ways before 1949, when others would have acted differently, and does not appear to have been transmitted to his successors. Deng has not so far acted to initiate dramatic change, though that may equally be through choice and the desire to regularize politics rather than an inability to act.

In addition, the CCP leadership has shown that it can unite to act negatively against either an individual, specific policies or a more general strategy, particularly when there appears to be a threat to the status quo. Mao's 'First Little Leap' of early 1956, the campaign against Lin Biao which started in 1971, the arrest of the 'Gang of Four' in 1976, and the rejection of the era of the Cultural Revolution in 1978 would all seem to be appropriate cases. It is at these times of internal or external threats – internal or external to the leadership that is – that the political system is most vulnerable to sudden and dramatic change, precisely because the leadership has become destabilized. Throughout the history of the PRC political mass movements and campaigns have frequently extended beyond their original terms of reference, and seemed to develop their own momentum. The GPCR is perhaps the most spectacular and vivid example of that phenomenon. However, it resulted in major changes in China's policies, organizational structures and leadership personnel on average every four or five years from 1949 through to the early 1980s.

The resignation of Hu Yaobang as General Secretary of the CCP in January 1987 provides an excellent, and recent, example both of the CCP leadership's ability to unite against an individual and its awareness of the potential dangers of destabilization. Hu is not an orthodox Marxist-Leninist. He has been impatient about the speed of reform, and outspoken in his belief that Marxism-Leninism must adapt to changing principles. He has not been particularly popular with the population as a whole; and has derived much of his political power from his personal connection with Deng Xiaoping, and from promoting colleagues who had served under him when he headed the Young Communist League before the GPCR. This was not a sound basis for mobilizing majority support within the leadership, and indeed it would seem clear that he had prob-

⁵⁷ Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy and Conflict in China*, p. 48

lems in coalition-building. For example, on several occasions at the end of 1986 it seems that the People's Liberation Army refused to accept his nomination as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (to replace Deng Xiaoping).⁵⁸

The catalyst that led to his resignation was clearly the student demonstrations at the end of 1986. In the 1980s popular demonstrations are still too reminiscent of the GPCR for the comfort of most of the CCP and its leadership. The cause of Hu's immediate problems was not the demonstrations but rather the transition to the post-Deng succession, due to be announced at the 13th Congress of the CCP in September 1987. Hu's position seemed assured, but it depended heavily on Deng and was exposed by the student demonstrations. They allowed Hu's opponents to suggest that he had created the political climate in which such events flourished. Moreover, they provided the opportunity for Hu's opponents to launch a pre-emptive strike against what they saw as his rise to supremacy and the threat to the status quo. The result was Hu's resignation as General-Secretary, but not as a member of the CCP's political bureau. Had that occurred the status quo would have been severely upset, particularly had the conflict widened with an attempt to replace Hu. It would appear that the dynamics of political change have altered little with the transition to the post-Mao era. On the other hand, one reason that CCP leaders seek to institutionalize politics is because they hope to restrict the dimensions of political change, not least in their own interests.

⁵⁸ 'Zhao's first task is to win over the PLA', *South China Morning Post*, 21 January 1987.

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
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'God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper': Hobbes, Patriarchy and Conjugal Right

CAROLE PATEMAN

There are two conflicting and equally misleading interpretations of Hobbes: either he is a patriarchalist like Filmer – but the premise of Hobbes's theory is that political right originates in maternal not paternal lordship; or he is an anti-patriarchalist – but he endorses the subjection of wives to husbands in civil society. To appreciate how Hobbes turns mother right into a specifically modern, non-paternal form of patriarchy, an understanding is required of his peculiar view of the family as a protective association of master and servants that originates in conquest (contract). Secondly, a conjectural history of the defeat of women by men in the natural condition and their incorporation into 'families' has to be provided. The overthrow of mother right enables men to enter the original contract, to create Leviathan in their own image, and to secure the fruits of their conquest by establishing patriarchal political right, exercised in large part as conjugal right.

'The decisive moment in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent.'

L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*


Most studies of Hobbes have nothing to say about the relation of his political theory to seventeenth-century patriarchalism. Writers who have thought it worthwhile to consider the question have almost all agreed that Hobbes's argument is patriarchal, although more recently the claim has been made that, for example, Hobbes's views were subversive of 'patriarchal attitudes', or that his theory is free from patriarchal assumptions.¹ More strongly, in a rational choice interpretation of Hobbes (which shares Hobbes's radical individualism) the implicit assumption is that Hobbes's theory is so far opposed to patriarchalism that his sovereign can be referred to as 'she'.² Despite such differences, political theorists are united on one point; they agree that to argue about patriarchy is to argue about the family and paternal power. Hobbes is assumed to be a patriarchal theorist in the same sense that his adversary Sir Robert Filmer is a

Department of Government, University of Sydney. This article will appear as a chapter in Mary L. Shanley and Carole Pateman, eds, *Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, forthcoming).

¹ The arguments are those, respectively, of Richard A. Chapman, 'Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family', *American Political Science Review*, 69 (1975), 76-90, at p. 77; and John Zvesper, 'Hobbes' Individualistic Analysis of the Family', *Politics* (UK), 5 (1985), 28-33 at p. 33. For references to other discussions of Hobbes and patriarchy see Chapman, 'Leviathan Writ Small', p. 76, fns 2-14.

² Jean Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

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patriarchalist; or, conversely, Hobbes is assumed to be opposed to patriarchalism because his theory is antithetical to Filmer's on some crucial issues.

The major debates about patriarchy over the past two decades have been conducted by feminists, not mainstream political theorists, but feminists have paid remarkably little attention to political theory in the controversy over the meaning and usefulness of the term 'patriarchy'. None the less, the predominant assumption among feminists, or, at least, among those engaged in the theoretically informed controversies over patriarchy, is also that patriarchal relations are familial relations and that patriarchal political right is paternal right.³ To be sure, many feminists also use 'patriarchy' to mean the power that men exercise over women more generally – what I shall call masculine right – but, notwithstanding the copious empirical evidence available to support this interpretation, the usage has not yet been given a great deal of theoretical substance. A major reason for this lack of theoretical robustness is the feminist neglect of the arguments among political theorists about patriarchy in the seventeenth century. Feminist scholars have undertaken some very revealing and exciting work on the classic texts of political theory, but little attention has been paid to Hobbes, whose writings are of fundamental importance for an understanding of patriarchy as masculine right. Hobbes is a patriarchal theorist – but the possibility that is considered by neither conventional political theorists nor feminists is that he is a patriarchalist who rejects paternal right.

Both feminism and political theory are dogged by an anachronistic, although literal, interpretation of patriarchy as father-right. Patriarchy is assumed to be about fathers and mothers. For example, Di Stephano has argued that Hobbes is a masculinist theorist, but her reading of Hobbes is that his arguments rest on a denial of the mother. His picture of natural, atomized individuals, who spring up like mushrooms – 'consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other'⁴ – denies any significance to the mother-child relationship and the dependence on the mother that provides the first intersubjective context for the development of human capacities. Di Stephano claims that there is no room for nurture within the family in Hobbes's state of nature; 'men are not born of, much less nurtured by, women, or anyone else for that matter'.⁵ Hobbes's family is certainly very peculiar, but the problem with Di Stephano's argument is that, in the state of nature, mothers, far from being denied, are enthroned. For Hobbes, political right in the natural condition is mother-right. Hobbes goes to great lengths to deny that father-right is the origin of political right, yet he is still seen as a patriarchalist in the same sense as Filmer for whom political and paternal power were one and the same. A different problem con-

³ Contemporary feminist arguments about patriarchy are discussed in Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Cambridge: Polity Press, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), chap. 2.

⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society* [the English version of *De Cive*], in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury* [hereafter *EW*] (London: John Bohn, 1841), vol. II, chap. VIII, p. 109.

⁵ Christine di Stephano, 'Masculinity as Ideology in Political Theory: Hobbesian Man Considered', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 6 (1983), 633–44, at p. 638.

fronts the writers who argue that Hobbes subverts patriarchalism, or merely tacitly assume that the terms 'men' and 'individual' in Hobbes's texts are used generically; they fail to explain why Hobbes's writings contain so many references to the rightful power of fathers – or why he endorses the subjection of wives to husbands.

Commentators on Hobbes, like almost all political theorists of the recent past, see no problems of political interest arising from the subordination of wives to husbands. Conjugal right, the right exercised by men, as husbands, over their wives, is not a matter that falls within their scholarly purview. The standard interpretations of the theoretical battle between the classic contract theorists, including Hobbes, and the patriarchalists of the seventeenth century is that the engagement concerned the political right of fathers and the natural liberty of sons. That the father was also a master, exercising jurisdiction over servants and apprentices, is acknowledged, but another inhabitant of the family is usually ignored. The father is also a husband, and as a husband is a master over his wife. In discussions of Hobbes and patriarchy, the position of the *wife* in the family is rarely mentioned. She appears, if at all, in another capacity, as a *mother*. When a problem about women is admitted to exist, it is taken to be that of maternal jurisdiction over children; patriarchy is familial and about fathers and mothers.

The failure to distinguish marriage from the family and to recognize the existence of conjugal right means that the most distinctive aspect of Hobbes's political theory is disregarded. Hobbes is the only contract theorist (and almost the only writer admitted into the 'tradition' of Western political theory) who begins from the premise that there is no natural dominion of men over women. In his natural condition female individuals are as free as, and equal to, male individuals. The remarkable starting point of his political theory is usually passed over extremely quickly. Even in discussions that focus on patriarchy no questions are asked or explanations offered about why and how it is, in the absence of sexual dominion in the state of nature, that marriage and the family take a patriarchal form. Nor is anything odd seen in the fact that Hobbes argues both that women are naturally free and always subject to men through (the marriage) contract.

There are also other problems about Hobbes, patriarchy and contract when 'patriarchy' is interpreted literally. Some commentators have noted certain tensions in Hobbes's arguments between contract and patriarchy; one earlier scholar, for instance, took the logical position that if Hobbes is interpreted as a patriarchalist then the original contract is superfluous.⁶ Another commentator has attributed a consensual form of patriarchy to Hobbes and argued that his patriarchalism is, therefore, the strongest form – and even a more typically English variety.⁷ Hobbes would not have been the only seventeenth-century writer to try to combine patriarchy (i.e. father-right) and consent, but to ride

⁶ Leslie Stephen in 1904, cited by Gordon Schochet, *Patriarchalism in Political Thought* (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1975), p. 234

⁷ R. W. K. Hinton, 'Husbands, Fathers and Conquerors', *Political Studies*, 16 (1968), 55–67, at p. 57

both horses is to perform a clever trick indeed. The trick is all the more noteworthy in Hobbes's case since he took contract much further than most other classic contract theorists and claimed that even infants could be said to have contracted themselves into subjection to mothers. Since the fundamental presupposition of Sir Robert Filmer's patriarchalism was that all political right derived from the natural procreative power of fathers and that sons were naturally subject from birth, there is, to say the least, some explanation required of why and how Hobbes constructs a consensual patriarchal theory from the premise of mother-right and infantile contracts.

To posit a contract by an infant is to reject outright any suggestion that political subjection is natural and to confirm in the most emphatic possible manner that all dominion is conventional in origin. Yet it was precisely the doctrine of the natural freedom of mankind and its corollary, contract and consent, that Sir Robert saw as the major cause of sedition and political disorder. Why, then, should a purported advocate of patriarchy as paternal right, and a writer who, in his own way, was as absolutist as his opponent, take so many pains to deny the assumptions of Filmer's theory? More generally, if political right has a natural origin in fatherhood and contract is thus superfluous – and, according to Filmer, politically dangerous – why should Hobbes argue that civil society was created through an original contract? To find answers to these questions requires that the discussion of Hobbes's theory is placed on a new footing.

To remain within the standard, patriarchal interpretation of 'patriarchy' as fatherly power is also to remain within a patriarchal reading of Hobbes's texts, a reading that ignores the subjection of women. Hobbes's patriarchalism is a new, *specifically modern* form, that is conventional, contractual and originates in conjugal right, or, more accurately, sex-right; that is, in men's right of sexual access to women, which, in its major institutional form in modern society, is exercised as conjugal right (a term also providing a polite locution in, say, a discussion of Adam and Eve). To appreciate the character of Hobbes's patriarchal theory a new reading is also required of two other aspects of his arguments. Firstly, the distinctive features of his natural condition – mother-right and the absence of natural dominion of male over female individuals – have to be taken seriously as fundamental premises of his political theory. Secondly, Hobbes's extraordinary conception of the family needs to be emphasized. Hobbes did not merely leave no room for nurture or argue that the family was conventional, a political rather than a natural social form. For Hobbes, a 'family' was solely composed of a master and servants of various kinds and had its origins in conquest.

I

Before looking in greater detail at Hobbes's arguments it is necessary to say something more about patriarchy and to look again at Filmer's patriarchalism.⁸

⁸ This section draws on Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, chap. 4.

A good deal of confusion over the term 'patriarchy' has arisen because of the failure to distinguish between three different historical forms of patriarchal theory: traditional, classic and modern. Traditional patriarchal argument assimilates all power relations to paternal rule. For centuries the family and the authority of the father at its head provided the model and metaphor for political society and political right. The traditional form is also full of stories, of conjectural histories, about the emergence or creation of political society from the family or the coming together of many families. Such stories are also to be found in the writings of the classic contract theorists, even though they defeated and eliminated the second, short-lived form of classic patriarchalism. Classic patriarchy was formulated and died in the seventeenth century and is exemplified by Sir Robert Filmer's arguments. Schochet shows in *Patriarchalism in Political Thought* that Sir Robert broke with the traditional form by insisting that paternal and political rule were not merely analogous but identical. In the 1680s and 1690s, 'the Filmerian position very nearly became the official state ideology'.⁹ The classic form was a fully developed theory of political right and political obedience and was the first of its kind; 'there was no patriarchal theory of obligation prior to 1603'.¹⁰ The standard claim in political theory is that patriarchalism was dead and buried by 1700 – but the form that passed away was Filmer's classic patriarchy.

Filmer wrote in response to the challenge posed by the doctrine of the natural freedom of mankind. If men were born free and equal then, necessarily, political right or the dominion of one man over another could be established in one way only; through an agreement (contract) between those concerned that such a relation should be brought into being. According to Filmer, acknowledgement that Adam had been granted monarchical power by God by virtue of his fatherhood cut the ground from under the feet of the contract theorists. At the birth of his first son, Adam became the first king and his political right passed to all subsequent fathers and kings, who were one and the same: all kings ruled as fathers in consequence of their procreative power, and all fathers were monarchs in their families. Sons were born into political subjection to their fathers and hence to the monarch: no such political nonsense as talk of contracts was required to justify political subjection. Filmer's account of the natural origin of political right appears straightforward enough, and no hint is given in discussions of the relation between the theories of Hobbes and Filmer that patriarchy is more complicated.

Paternal right is only one dimension of patriarchy – as Filmer himself reveals. Filmer's apparently straightforward statements obscure the original foundation of political right. Paternal power is not the origin of political right. Father-right is established only after political right has been brought into being. Another act of political genesis is required before a man can acquire the natural right of fatherhood. Sons do not spring up like mushrooms, as Filmer was quick to

⁹ Schochet, *Patriarchalism in Political Thought*, p. 193.

¹⁰ Schochet, *Patriarchalism in Political Thought*, p. 16.

remind Hobbes. Adam's political title is granted *before* he becomes a father. If he is to be a father, Eve has to become a mother. In other words, *sex-right or conjugal right must necessarily precede the right of fatherhood*. The genesis of political dominion lies in Adam's sex-right, *not* in his fatherhood.

Filmer makes clear that Adam's political right is originally established in his right as a husband over Eve: 'God gave to Adam ... the dominion over the woman', and, citing *Genesis* 3:16, 'God ordained Adam to rule over his wife, and her desires were to be subject to his'.¹¹ (*Genesis* states that Eve's 'desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee'). Adam's desire is to become a father, but in no ordinary sense of 'father'. He desires to obtain the remarkable powers of a patriarchal father. Filmer briefly mentions Adam's original, Divine grant of political right over Eve at various points, but it has a shadowy presence in his writings. In recent (patriarchal) commentaries on his texts, sex-right has completely disappeared. And, to be sure, when reading Filmer from the perspective of only one dimension of patriarchalism, conjugal right is not easy to discern under the cloak of Adam's fatherhood.

The biblical patriarchal image (here in Locke's words) is of 'nursing Fathers tender and carefull of the publick weale'.¹² The patriarchal story is about the procreative power of a father who is complete in himself, who embodies the creative power of both female and male. His procreative power both gives and animates physical life and creates and maintains political right. Filmer is able to refer to Adam's power over Eve so casually because classic patriarchalism declares women to be procreatively and politically irrelevant. The reason that Adam has dominion over 'the woman' is, according to Filmer (here following the patriarchal idea of fatherhood, which is very ancient), that 'the man ... [is] the nobler and principal agent in generation'.¹³ Women are merely empty vessels for the exercise of men's sexual and procreative power. The original political right that God gives to Adam is the right, so to speak, to fill the empty vessel. Adam, and all men, must do this if they are to become fathers. But men's generative power has a dual aspect. The genesis of new physical life belongs in their hands, not in the empty vessel. Men are the 'principal agents in generation', and 'generation' includes political creativity. Men's generative power includes the ability to create new political life, or to give birth to political right.

In view of the character of the extraordinary powers that classic patriarchalism arrogates to men, it is appropriate that the powers are contained in the

¹¹ Sir Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha, or the Natural Powers of the Kings of England Asserted and Other Political Works*, ed. Peter Laslett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949), p. 241; p. 283. *Genesis*, too, can be interpreted in more than one way, and equality of men and women in the sight of God is not incompatible with male supremacy in human affairs; e.g. Calvin argued from both the perspective of *cognitio dei* (the eternal, Divine perspective in which all things are equal) and the perspective of *cognitio hominis* (the worldly perspective in which humans are hierarchically ordered). See Mary Potter, 'Gender Equality and Gender Hierarchy in Calvin's Theology', *Signs*, 11 (1986), 725–39.

¹² John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 2nd edn, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), Bk II, 2.

¹³ Filmer, *Patriarcha*, p. 245.

name of 'father' and encompassed under the writ of 'fatherhood'. The presence of conjugal right is very faint in Filmer's writings because (although at one level he must acknowledge it) Adam's original political right is subsumed under the power of fatherhood. For instance, after stating that Eve and her desires are subject to Adam, Filmer continues in the next sentence, 'here we have the original grant of government, and the fountain of all power placed in the Father of all mankind'. Moreover, Adam is also Eve's father. In the story in the book of *Genesis*, Eve is created only after Adam and the animals have been placed on earth. God creates and names the animals and Adam but, we are told in *Genesis* 2:20, 'for Adam there was not found an help meet for him'. Eve is then created, but she is not created *ab initio* but *from* Adam, who is, in a sense, her parent, and Adam, not God, gives Eve her name. Filmer is therefore able to treat all political right as the right of a father. Eve is not only under the dominion of Adam, but he is (with God's help) the 'principal agent' in her generation. The father in classic patriarchal theory is not just one of two parents – he is *the* parent, and the being able to generate political right.

The greatest story of masculine political birth is the story of an original contract that creates civil freedom and civil society. The classic patriarchalists lost the battle over fathers and sons and the natural origin of political right. Patriarchalism, in the sense of paternal right, ceased to be politically relevant by the end of the seventeenth century. Civil society is constituted by the (ostensibly) universal, conventional bonds of contract not the particular, natural bonds of kinship and fatherhood. However, the standard account of the defeat of patriarchy ignores the fact that the contract theorists had no quarrel with classic patriarchy over the true origin of political right; they fought against paternal right but had no wish to disturb the other dimension of patriarchy, conjugal right.

The 'freedom of mankind' in contract argument means what it says, the freedom of *men*. The victory of contract doctrine over the classic form of patriarchal argument was, rather, the *transformation* of classic patriarchy into a new form. The contract theorists constructed their own, modern patriarchal argument – the third of the historical forms. Modern patriarchy is contractual not natural and embodies masculine right not the right of fatherhood. Hobbes, the most brilliant and bold of contract theorists, is a patriarchal theorist in the modern sense, but his arguments differ in some significant respects from those of his fellow contract theorists and, in the end, it was they, not Hobbes, who provided the necessary theoretical framework for patriarchal civil society.

II

On the face of it, Hobbes's writings seem unequivocally opposed to both dimensions of classic patriarchy. Hobbes's theory rests on mother-right and the absence of natural sexual dominion; how, then, does Hobbes transform natural maternal power and women's natural freedom into patriarchal right, and why have scholars been able to identify so many passages in Hobbes's writings where

he apparently falls back on the traditional form of patriarchal argument? The appropriate place to begin to consider the conjuring tricks is with Hobbes's picture of the natural condition. Hobbes's imaginative resolution of civil society into its most fundamental ('natural') parts was much more rigorous than the similar undertakings of the other contract theorists. Hobbes was willing to take the logic of individualism to its most radical conclusions in this as in other respects. When Hobbes reconstitutes natural entities in perpetual motion into something recognizably human, the result is that humans interact in a natural condition that can barely be recognized as social. Hobbes's state of nature is the famous war of all against all, and, in a statement which is rarely seen as of political significance, Hobbes writes that in the natural condition there are 'no matrimonial laws'.¹⁴ Marriage – that is to say, a long-term relation between the sexes – must be brought about in exactly the same way as any other relation between the inhabitants of the state of nature where there is no natural order of dominion, nor any politically significant difference in strength or prudence between individuals. Relations can arise in two ways only; either individuals contract themselves into a given relationship; or one, by some stratagem, is able to coerce another into the desired arrangement. This is also true of relations between a man and a woman. In the natural condition women face men as free equals; Hobbes writes that,

whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only, as being of the more excellent sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without war.¹⁵

In the state of nature there is no law to regulate marriage – and no marriage. Marriage does not exist because marriage is a long-term arrangement, and long-term sexual relationships, like other such relationships, are very difficult to establish and maintain in Hobbes's natural condition. The boundaries separating the inhabitants one from another are so tightly drawn by Hobbes that each one can judge the rest only from a subjective perspective, or from the perspective of pure self-interest. Natural individuals will, therefore, always break an agreement, or refuse to play their part in a contract, if it appears in their interest to do so. To enter a contract or to signify agreement to do so is to leave oneself open to betrayal. Hobbes's natural state suffers from an endemic problem of keeping contracts and of 'performing second'; 'If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another; ... upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: ... And ... he which performeth first, does but betray himself to his enemy'.¹⁶ The only contract that an individual, of his or her own volition, can enter into in safety is one in which agreement and performance take place at the same time. An agreement to perform an act of coitus provides an example of a contract that comes close to meeting this criterion, but an agree-

¹⁴ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, in *EW*, vol. III, chap. XX, p. 187

¹⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, pp 186–7.

¹⁶ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XIV, pp 124–5.

ment to marry, to enter into a long-term sexual relationship, would founder in the same manner as contracts to create other relations that endure over time.

The women and men in Hobbes's state of nature can engage in sexual intercourse and, therefore, children can be born. A child, however, is born a long time after any act of intercourse. As Hobbes notes, in the absence of matrimonial laws proof of fatherhood rests on the testimony of the mother. Since there is no way of establishing paternity with any certainty, the child belongs to the mother. Hobbes's argument is all the more striking since he, too, suggests that men are the 'principal agents' in generation. Echoing the classic patriarchal view of fatherhood, Hobbes writes that 'as to the generation, God hath ordained to man a helper'¹⁷ – but the female 'helper' in the state of nature becomes much more than an auxiliary once the birth takes place. Hobbes insists that no man can have two masters and so only one parent can have dominion over the child. In the natural condition the mother, not the father, enjoys this right. In direct contradiction of Sir Robert Filmer and the patriarchal doctrine that political right originates in the father's generative power, Hobbes proclaims that, 'every woman that bears children, becomes both a *mother* and a *lord*'.¹⁸ At birth, the infant is in the mother's power. She makes the decision whether to expose or to nourish the child. To have the power to preserve life is, according to Hobbes, to exercise rightful dominion, whether the subject is a newly born infant or a vanquished adult. If the mother preserves the infant, she thereby becomes a lord; 'because preservation of life being the end, for which one man [or infant] becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him [or her], in whose power it is to save, or destroy him'.¹⁹

From 1861 for a half century or more (following the publication of Sir Henry Maine's *Ancient Law* and Johann Bachofen's *Mother Right*) another controversy raged about political origins, matriarchy and patriarchy. The proponents were all reluctant to admit that matriarchy in the literal sense – rule by women as mothers – ever existed, even hypothetically.²⁰ Similarly, some contemporary theorists still find it necessary to take issue with Hobbes's logic on mother-right. The rather amusing objection has been raised that Hobbes is mistaken; a mother 'simply does not wield' the power Hobbes ascribes to her.²¹ The 'helper' herself always requires another helper. In Hobbes's day, the objection continues, the mother was attended by a midwife or male physician, and it is the latter who, at the moment of birth, has power over the child in her or his hands. Hobbes should have concluded that neither fathers nor mothers possessed an original political power in the natural condition, but then his argument against natural paternal right would have been 'more absurd still'. In his eagerness to combat Filmer, Hobbes 'overlooked the defects attached to an argument which would

¹⁷ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XX, p. 186

¹⁸ Hobbes, *Philosophical Rudiments*, chap. IX, p. 116.

¹⁹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 188.

²⁰ For an account of the controversy, see Rosalind Coward, *Patriarchal Precedents* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), chap. 2. See also Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, chap. 2.

²¹ Preston King, *The Ideology of Order* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), p. 203

transfer this power to a party – the mother – whom no one supposed ever had a proper right or even opportunity to exercise it (given the establishment of a civil society).²² Precisely; in patriarchal civil society, past or present, political theorists rarely are willing to contemplate that mothers (women) could legitimately exercise political right, even in an hypothetical state of nature or as a matter of mere logic. The other social contract theorists, unlike Hobbes, built masculine sexual dominion as a natural fact of human existence into their political theories and so demonstrated in a straightforward fashion that, for all that their arguments are couched in universal terms, equality, freedom and contract are a male privilege – although contemporary political theorists still manage to avoid noticing the fact.²³ Hobbes's logic is impeccable. In his natural condition (whatever the facts of childbirth in the seventeenth century), a pregnant woman would not give herself up as a hostage to fortune by enlisting helpers in her labours; no free, strong woman would place her right of dominion at risk with such assistance.

By nature, a mother is a lord who can do as she wills with her infant. If she decides to 'breed him', the condition on which she does so, Hobbes states, is that, 'being grown to full age he become not her enemy'.²⁴ That is to say, the infant must contract to obey her. The mother's political right over her child originates in contract, and gives her absolute power. A woman can contract away her right over her child to the father, but, when the premise of Hobbes's argument is that women naturally stand as equals to men, there is no reason why a woman should do this, and, least of all, why she should *always* do so. To argue that a tiny infant can contract, or should be regarded as if it had contracted, with its mother is, as Filmer insisted, anthropological nonsense. In terms of Hobbes's understanding of 'contract', however, this agreement is as convincing an example of a contract as any other in Hobbes's writings. Scholars have drawn attention to Hobbes's claim that the reasons and circumstances under which agreement is given are irrelevant to the validity of the contract; for Hobbes, it makes no difference whether a contract is entered into after due deliberation or with the conqueror's sword at one's breast. Submission to overwhelming power in return for protection, whether the power is that of the conqueror's sword or the mother's power over her newly born infant, is always a valid sign of agreement for Hobbes. Hobbes's assimilation of conquest to contract, enforced sub-

²² King, *The Ideology of Order*, p. 206; p. 205. Hobbes's most recent biographer suggests that his argument about mother-right derives from his own experience as a child. Hobbes's views perhaps 'owed much to that occasion during those years when the curate [Hobbes's father], possibly long before his disappearance, was forced by his character and circumstances to yield the government to Hobbes' mother' (Arnold A. Rogow, *Thomas Hobbes. Radical in the Service of Reaction* (New York and London. W.W. Norton and Co., 1986), p. 132). Hobbes's father, rather fond of drink and neglectful of his parish, fled after being accused of assaulting a rector of a neighbouring parish. Ironically Rogow was unable to find any new information about Hobbes's mother. Even her maiden name remains uncertain.

²³ The other classic contract theorists are discussed in Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, chaps 3 and 4.

²⁴ Hobbes, *Philosophical Rudiments*, chap. IX, p. 116.

mission to consent, is often remarked upon, but the political significance of his peculiar notion of contract for the origin of the family in the state of nature and for the making of the original pact is less often appreciated.

III

The logical conclusion of Hobbes's resolution of civil society into its natural parts of rational entities in motion, and his reconstitution of the natural condition, is that the sexes come together only fleetingly and that the original political right is mother-right. Yet Hobbes also writes in a passage (cited by Chapman and Schochet, for example), 'that the beginning of all dominion amongst men was in families. In which, . . . the father of the family by the law of nature was absolute lord of his wife and children: [and] made what laws amongst them he pleased'.²⁵ And he also refers to familial government or a 'patrimonial kingdom' in which the family,

if it grows by multiplication of children, either by generation, or adoption, or of servants, either by generation, conquest, or voluntary submission, to be so great and numerous, as in probability it may protect itself, then is that family called a *patrimonial kingdom*, or monarchy by acquisition, wherein the sovereignty is in one man, as it is in a monarch made by *political institution*. So that whatsoever rights be in the one, the same also be in the other.²⁶

Moreover, Hobbes also makes statements such as 'cities and kingdoms . . . are but greater families',²⁷ and 'a great family is a kingdom, and a little kingdom a family'.²⁸ He also remarks that Germany, like other countries 'in their beginnings', was divided between a number of masters of families, all at war with each other.²⁹ Such statements have been treated as evidence that Hobbes was a patriarchalist like Filmer and that his natural condition was composed of families not individuals. Such an interpretation leaves unanswered the questions of how the transformation comes about from mother-right to the patriarchal family in the state of nature and how the family is generated.

Chapman has stressed that Hobbes's family is an artificial, political institution rather than a natural social form, but its extraordinary character consists in more than a conventional, political origin. No attention is paid to the most bizarre aspect of Hobbes's account of the family because conjugal right and the position of a wife are ignored. Indeed, the scholars involved in the debate about Hobbes and the family have not paused to wonder how there can be wives in the state of nature where there is no law of matrimony. Nor have they asked how

²⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England*, *EW*, vol. VI, p. 147.

²⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *De Corpore Politico, or The Elements of Law*, *EW*, vol. IV, chap. IV, pp. 158–9.

²⁷ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XVII, p. 154.

²⁸ Hobbes, *Philosophical Rudiments*, chap. VIII, p. 108.

²⁹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. X, p. 82.

families can come into existence when marriage does not exist and yet marriage is the 'origin' of the family. Hobbes's 'family' is very curious and has nothing in common with the families of Filmer's pages, the family as found in the writings of the other classic social contract theorists, or as popularly understood today. Consider Hobbes's definitions: in *Leviathan* he states that a family 'consist[s] of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together; wherein the father or master is the sovereign'.³⁰ In *De Cive* we find, 'a *father* with his *sons* and *servants*, grown into a civil person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction, is called a *family*'.³¹ What has happened to the wife and mother? Only in *Elements of Law* does he write that 'the father or mother of the family is sovereign of the same'.³² But the sovereign cannot be the mother, given the conjectural history of the origin of the family implicit in Hobbes's argument.

The 'natural' characteristics postulated by Hobbes mean that long-term relationships are very unlikely in his state of nature. However, Hobbes states in *Leviathan* that, in the war of all against all, 'there is no man who can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himself from destruction, without the help of confederates'.³³ But how can such a protective confederation be formed in the natural condition when there is an acute problem of keeping agreements? The answer is that confederations are formed by conquest. If one male individual manages to conquer another in the state of nature the conqueror will have obtained a servant. Hobbes assumes that no one would wilfully give up his life, so, faced with the conqueror's sword, the defeated man will make a (valid) contract to obey his victor. Hobbes defines dominion or political right acquired through force as 'the dominion of the master over his servant'.³⁴ Conqueror and conquered then constitute 'a little body politic, which consisteth of two persons, the one sovereign, which is called the *master*, or lord; the other subject, which is called the *servant*'.³⁵ Hobbes distinguishes a servant from a slave, but his definition of a servant makes it hard to maintain the distinction: 'the master of the servant, is master also of all he hath: and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit'.³⁶

The master and his slave-servant form the little body politic of a defensive confederation against the rest of the inhabitants of the state of nature. That is to say, according to Hobbes's definition of a 'family', the master and his servant form a family. For Hobbes, the origin of the family is entirely conventional. A 'family' is created not through procreation but by conquest, and a family consists of a master and his servants, i.e. all those, whatever their age or sex who fall

³⁰ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XX, p. 191.

³¹ Hobbes, *Philosophical Rudiments*, chap. IX, p. 121.

³² Hobbes, *De Corpore Politico*, chap. IV, p. 158.

³³ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XV, p. 133.

³⁴ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XX, p. 189.

³⁵ Hobbes, *De Corpore Politico*, chap. III, pp. 149–50.

³⁶ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XX, p. 190.

under his absolute jurisdiction. A 'family' composed only of a master and his male servants is a singular institution and it becomes more singular still if this male household contains children. Hobbes remarks at one point that sovereignty can be established 'by natural force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government'.³⁷ Children have again sprung up like mushrooms, ready to submit to (contract with) their fathers. And what of their mothers; how are they included in the 'family'? In the natural condition there are two ways only in which sexual relations between free, equal women and men can take place. Either a woman freely contracts to engage in intercourse or she is outwitted and taken by force. There is no reason why a woman should contract of her own free will to enter into a long-term sexual relationship and become a 'wife', that is, to be in servitude to – to become the servant (slave) of – a man. In the state of nature a woman is as able as a man to defend herself or to conquer another to form a protective confederation of master and servant. Why then does Hobbes assume that only men become masters of servants?

The answer is that, by the time the original contract is entered into, *all* the women in the natural condition have been conquered by men and become servants. Hobbes is explicit that 'dominion amongst men' begins in the defensive confederation or small body politic he calls a family, but he does not spell out that men also gain dominion over women by creating 'families'. A conjectural history of how this comes about might run as follows: at first, women, who are as strong and capable as men, are able to ensure that sexual relations are consensual. When a woman becomes a mother and decides to become a lord and raise her child, her position changes; she is put at a slight disadvantage against men, since now she has her infant to defend too. Conversely, a man obtains a slight advantage over her and is then able to defeat the woman he had initially to treat with as an equal. Mothers are lords in Hobbes's state of nature, but, paradoxically, for a woman to become a mother and a lord is her downfall. She then has given an opening for a male enemy to outwit and vanquish her in the ceaseless natural conflict. Mother-right can never be more than fleeting.

The original political dominion of maternal lordship is quickly overcome and replaced by masculine right. Each man can obtain a 'family' of a woman servant and her child. Thus mother-right is overturned and the state of nature becomes filled with patriarchal 'families'. All the women in the natural condition are forcibly incorporated (which for Hobbes, is to say contract themselves) into 'families' and become the permanent servants of male masters. The 'help' given by women to men in procreation then becomes the unending help of domestic servitude. The 'wife' is relegated to the status of a helper too politically insignificant to be worthy of listing as a member of this peculiar protective association. A story along these lines is necessary to explain the existence of patriarchal 'families' in the state of nature, and also to explain why a patriarchal law of matrimony is instituted through the original contract.

³⁷ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XVII, p. 159

But it is hard to tell a consistent and convincing story about women's subjection when beginning from the postulate of natural freedom and equality between women and men.³⁸ The conquest of women would surely take more than one generation. Some women, either by choice or the accident of nature, would be childless and so would remain free. Indeed, once childless women saw the fate of women who decided to exercise maternal lordship they would, as rational beings, choose to remain childless and conserve their natural freedom. Free women would, however, be found only in the first generation in the natural condition. Childless women would die, and all subsequent generations of women would be born into servitude (and so, according to Hobbes's definition of servitude, would be under the jurisdiction of the master). The problem with this version of the conjectural history is that, if there are free childless women in the first generation in the natural condition, there is no reason why they should not form protective confederations of their own by conquering men, or each other, and so obtaining servants. Women and men would then wage the war of all against all as masters of 'families' – and who knows who might win in the end? But, in Hobbes's theory we do know who wins, and thus there is only one story that can be told. Women must all be conquered in the first generation; there can be no female masters in the state of nature or there will be no original contract and no law of matrimony.

IV

The method through which Hobbes constructed his picture of the state of nature meant that, as a ruthlessly consistent theorist, he had to begin from the logical but shocking premise of an absence of sexual dominion and original mother-right. But Hobbes was well aware, as indicated in the passages that I cited above, that, historically, paternal right and the subjection of wives was the established custom. In the *logical* beginning, all political right is maternal right. In the *historical* beginning, masculine or 'paternal' right holds sway. The story of the defeat of women in the state of nature explains how patriarchal 'families', incorporating all the women, are formed through conquest and ruled by 'fathers'. This stage of the history of the natural condition must be reached if men are to enter the original contract, exercise their political creativity and create a new phase of history in the form of modern patriarchal society. Commentators on contract theory generally take it for granted that there are no problems in referring to 'individuals' entering into the original contract, so implying that any or all of the inhabitants of the state of nature can participate. Some commentators are more careful, and Schochet, for example, notes that in the seventeenth century fathers of families were assumed to have sealed the original pact. He argues that Hobbes shared this assumption. Despite Hobbes's use of traditional patriarchal language, his 'families' are not ruled by men as fathers but by men as

³⁸ I am grateful to Peter Morriss for raising the question of generations and for other helpful criticisms

masters. Masters of families rule by virtue of contract (conquest) not their paternal, procreative capacity. Men as masters – or as free and equal men – enter into the original contract that constitutes civil society. Women, now in subjection, no longer have the necessary standing (they are no longer free and equal or 'individuals') to take part in creating a new civil society.

The civil law of matrimony, which upholds conjugal right, is created through the original pact. Political theorists consistently omit to mention one of the most remarkable features of Hobbes's political theory. Hobbes makes it quite clear that conjugal right is not natural. Conjugal right is created through the original contract and so is a *political* right. The right is deliberately created by the men who bring civil society into being. The other classic contract theorists presuppose that the institution of marriage exists naturally and that conjugal relations are non-political relations, carried over into civil society. In Hobbes's theory, the law of matrimony is created as part of the civil law. Contemporary political theorists, too, take for granted that the structure of the institution of marriage is non-political and so they pay no attention to conjugal right. Hobbes's political theory makes clear what the other classic contract stories, and contemporary commentaries on contract theory, leave implicit: that the original contract is not only a *social* contract that constitutes the civil law and political right in the sense of (state) government; it is also a *sexual* contract that institutes political right in the form of patriarchal – masculine – power, or government by men, a power exercised in large part as conjugal right.

Hobbes states that in civil society the husband has dominion 'because for the most part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of families'.³⁹ Or again, 'in all cities ... constituted of *fathers*, not *mothers* governing their families, the domestical command belongs to the man; and such a contract, if it be made according to the civil laws, is called matrimony'.⁴⁰ If free and equal women could enter the original contract there is no reason whatsoever why they would agree to create a civil law that secures their permanent subjection as wives. Matrimonial law takes a patriarchal form because *men* have made the original contract. The fact that the law of matrimony is part of the civil law provides another reason for self-interested individual men to make a collective agreement. In addition to securing their natural liberty, *men as a sex* have an interest in a political mechanism which secures for them collectively the fruits of the conquests made severally by each man in the natural condition. Through the civil institution of marriage they can all lawfully obtain the familiar 'helpmeet' and gain the sexual and domestic services of a wife, whose permanent servitude is now guaranteed by the law and sword of Leviathan.

Hobbes had no wish to challenge the law of matrimony of his own day, embodied in the common law doctrine of coverture. The law of coverture was given classic expression by Sir William Blackstone in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England* in the eighteenth century. Under coverture, a wife had no

³⁹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XV, p. 187.

⁴⁰ Hobbes, *Philosophical Rudiments*, chap. IX, p. 118

independent juridical existence; she was a civilly dead being, absorbed into the person of her husband. No one, it would seem, could fail to be struck by the legal powers given to husbands, whether in Blackstone's gloss on the law or in marital practice – powers that can only be compared, as they were regularly compared by feminists in the nineteenth century, to those of slave-masters.⁴¹ Yet patriarchy runs so deeply in the contemporary theoretical consciousness that Chapman comments (echoing Blackstone) that 'the most striking feature of the common law family is the liabilities attached to the man, particularly regarding the acts of his wife and servants'.⁴² Now, if women had made the original contract, civil law might well reflect the fact and attach all manner of 'liabilities' to men. But we did not make it, and could not have made it, and so 'the most striking feature' of coverture is the juridical non-existence of a wife (just as she disappears in Hobbes's definition of the 'family' in the state of nature). The liabilities of the husband that impress Chapman are the other side of the wife's subjection. 'Liabilities' are the price the husband pays for being a master, that is, a protector. The most fundamental premise of Hobbes's political theory is that no individual will give up the right of self-protection.⁴³ In the state of nature women too have this right, but in civil society women as wives have given up (been forced to give up) this right in favour of the 'protection' of their husband – and husbands are now protected by the sword of Leviathan.

Students of Hobbes do not usually make a connection between the original overthrow of mother-right and the establishment of Leviathan. The crucial political significance of the conquest of women in the natural condition is that, unless the defeat occurs, Leviathan is impossible to envisage. The conjuror Hobbes is far too clever a wizard for his patriarchal successors and the trick is never remarked upon in discussions of his theory. If women took part in the original contract the awesome figure of the mortal god Leviathan could not be created. Leviathan can be brought into being only if participation in his generation is confined to men. The creation of civil society is an act of masculine political birth; men have no need of a 'helper' in *political* generation. In the state of nature, individuals are differentiated only by their sex; that is to say, by their bodily form (in strength, rationality and prudence there is no politically significant difference between individuals with female bodies and individuals with male bodies). Hobbes's account of the institution of Leviathan makes sense only if the participants in the original contract all have the same bodily form.

The creation of Leviathan, Hobbes tells us, involves 'more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person'.⁴⁴ When men cease to be a mere natural multitude and transform themselves through the act

⁴¹ On the implications of coverture, see Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, chaps 5 and 6.

⁴² Chapman, 'Leviathan Writ Small', p. 84, fn. 90.

⁴³ Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*, pp. 197–207, argues that his deduction of absolute sovereignty fails precisely because Hobbes makes self-protection an absolute right. But because she takes no account of Hobbes's patriarchy, she fails to mention that, if the argument about sovereignty in the state is correct, then conjugal sovereignty fails too.

⁴⁴ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XVII, p. 158.

of contract into a unified body, or body politic, bound together through the conventional bonds of contract and civil law, their unity is represented in a very literal sense by the person of their (absolute) master and ruler, Leviathan. They create him 'to bear their person', and, Hobbes states, 'it is the *unity* of the representer, not the *unity* of the represented, that maketh the person *one*'.⁴⁵ No such unity would be possible if both sexes took part in the constitution of Leviathan – there could be no representative figure who could represent the 'person', the bodily form, of both sexes. Men must be represented and their civil unity given literal symbolic personification by one of their own kind. Similarly, 'private bodies' are also represented by one person, and Hobbes uses the example of 'all families, in which the father, or master ordereth the whole family'. Husband and wife cannot govern jointly in the family; there can be one master only, and the husband is the necessary 'one person representative' of the family in civil society.⁴⁶ An act of masculine political birth creates civil beings and their sovereign in the image of their makers (only Adam, the first man, through the hand of God, could generate a woman). If the representer is to be unified, he must be *he*. To attempt to represent both sexes within the figure of one master would be to dissolve his unity and oneness and to shatter political order.

V

Hobbes turned classic into modern patriarchy but several features of his argument worked against him becoming a founding father of modern patriarchal theory. For example, Hobbes negated Filmer's arguments but that was not sufficient to create the theory required for civil patriarchy. Hobbes turned Filmer's social bonds into their opposite. Filmer saw families and kingdoms as homologous and bound together through the natural, procreative power of the father. Hobbes saw families and kingdoms as homologous, but as bound together through the conventional tie of contract, or, what for Hobbes is the same thing, the force of the sword. Hobbes also agreed with Filmer that sovereignty must be absolute – but sovereignty in the state, not in private bodies. Civil fathers and masters are not miniature Leviathans. Their powers run only so far as permitted by Leviathan's laws and his sword. Leviathan thus enabled Hobbes to offer a solution to the problem that dogged Filmer's classic patriarchalism. Hinton has noted that if fathers were kings then there could be no king with true monarchical power.⁴⁷ Hobbes's civil masters cannot detract from the absolute mastery of Leviathan. Hobbes's solution, however, retained absolutism in the state, the form of political right that, as Locke argued, had to be replaced by limited, constitutional government in a properly *civil* order.

⁴⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XVI, p. 151

⁴⁶ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. XXII, pp. 221–2.

⁴⁷ R. W. K. Hinton, 'Husbands, Fathers and Conquerors', *Political Studies*, 15 (1967), 291–300 at pp. 294, 299.

The absolute power of Leviathan's sword was not the only problem with Hobbes's patriarchalism. Hobbes was too revealing about civil society. The political character of conjugal right was expertly concealed in Locke's separation of what he called 'paternal' power from political power and, ever since, most political theorists, whatever their views about other forms of subordination, have accepted that the powers of husbands derive from nature and, hence, are not political. Not only are a range of important questions about domination and subjection in our own society thus suppressed, but some other important questions about the 'origin' of civil society are also neatly avoided. In the past two decades, individualism of a radical, Hobbesian kind has become very influential, although the absolutist conclusions that Hobbes drew from his individualist premises are rejected in favour of a view of the state as a minimal, protective association.⁴⁸ The association is held to have a legitimate origin in voluntary transactions between individuals in the state of nature. In the final chapter of *Leviathan*, Hobbes writes that, 'there is scarce a commonwealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified'.⁴⁹ Hobbes's 'beginning' of the original contract between men can only be justified if, as he believed, political order depended upon the erection of Leviathan. Without Leviathan, and from Hobbes's starting point of free and equal women and men, a voluntary beginning might be possible. Such a story could not be told by political theorists who acknowledge only half the original contract (the social contract) and thus endorse patriarchal right. The origin of the patriarchal protective state in Hobbes's theory lies in the conquest and servitude of women in the state of nature and in their civil subjection and domestication as wives.

Hobbes's theory is an early version of the argument, presented in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in elaborate detail and with reference to much ethnographic data, that civilization and political society resulted from the overthrow of mother-right and the triumph of patriarchy. The silences and omissions of contemporary political theory and the standard readings of Hobbes's texts do nothing to question that argument. Scholars do not mention the problems about women and the civil order arising from Hobbes's theory and the subsequent development of contract theory: for example, why has conjugal right never been seen as political when every other form of power has been subjected to the closest scrutiny and judgement? Why is women's exclusion from the original pact not mentioned in most discussions of contract theory? If women can take no part in the original contract what is their status as parties to the marriage contract? Has Hobbes's identification of enforced submission with consent (contract) any relevance to present-day sexual relations? By the beginning of the eighteenth century, when, according to political theorists today,

⁴⁸ For an argument that absolutist conclusions are ultimately unavoidable, see Carole Pateman, *The Problem of Political Obligation*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), chap. 3. Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*, interprets Hobbes's commonwealth as a union of slaves within the will of a master.

⁴⁹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part IV, p. 706.

patriarchalism had come to an end, Mary Astell asked, 'if *all Men are born Free*, how is it that all Women are born Slaves?'⁵⁰ Most political theorists have yet to recognize the existence or relevance of Astell's question – or the political significance of the fact that Hobbes did not think that we were so born.

⁵⁰ Mary Astell, *Some Reflections Upon Marriage*, 4th edn (New York: Source Book Press, 1970; originally published 1730), p. 107.

On Culture and Politics in America: A Perspective from Structural Anthropology

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This article proposes a structuralist alternative to mainstream behavioural studies of political culture in the United States. After first describing the deficiencies in the mainstream approach, the article suggests that political culture as attitudes and values should be seen as surface elements of a deep cultural structure. The structuralist alternative is presented in some detail, with emphasis upon cultural narratives. Building upon structuralist theory, American political culture emerges as 'mythologized individualism', the ramifications of which are described in terms of American ideological cognition and in terms of American capacities to use culture as a means of realizing democratic ideals. In these latter respects, mythologized individualism is found wanting

I. THE POLITICAL CULTURE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF CULTURE AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

Since the early 1960s the concept of political culture has dominated the study of culture and politics in the United States. It was Almond and Verba who first derived this concept from the study of culture in functionalist anthropology, and then extracted from this broad concept a sub-set of political qualities. As a source of orientation 'political culture' possesses many virtues. For example, in Almond and Verba's recent respecification the concept is satisfying in its theoretical breadth. Almond and Verba subdivided political culture into a large number of substantive orientations (i.e. attitudes towards the political regime, the political community, and the authorities; political participation; attitudes towards the self in politics; and finally, attitudes towards policy outputs). Almond and Verba also subdivided dispositions towards these components into cognitions, affects and evaluations.¹

Moreover, the political culture approach contains a methodological feature usually considered advantageous, namely, its concentration on the expressed attitudes of individuals responding to reliable survey questions. This feature permits the operationalization of hypotheses for testing, and facilitates sophisticated, accurate description and quantification. It is easy to see why the tandem of conceptual breadth and methodological refinement has made the political culture approach by far the most popular tool for investigating the nexus between culture and politics.

But despite these attractive qualities the political culture approach has yet to deliver its full portion of riches. As a result, recent years have witnessed few

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¹ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p. 27-8.

attempts to synthesize its findings. Indeed, in the same volume in which Almond and Verba's conceptualization of political culture appeared, Alan Abramowitz undertook a description of American political culture which fell far short of Almond and Verba's own guidelines.² Abramowitz ignored political tolerance, orientations towards equality and even the nature of political ideology in America. He also overlooked American orientations towards religion and economic well-being, two topics which earlier analysts of culture and politics in America, such as de Tocqueville (whom Almond and Verba cite positively), accorded a central political role.

What is the problem in standard political culture approaches such as that of Abramowitz? Is the difficulty simply a matter of incomplete coverage? Perhaps. Certainly many useful studies of the aspects of political culture ignored by Abramowitz *do* exist. But then why do investigators not undertake the task of synthesis which the political culture approach demands? One possible answer is that even the findings which investigators *have* examined are now increasingly difficult to assess, and yield so few firm conclusions as to discourage further, more comprehensive undertakings.

Indeed, the fact is that as regards virtually every attitudinal component of American political culture there now exist sharp differences of opinion not only about the interpretation of facts, but also about what the facts themselves are. While such differences sometimes testify to the continuing vigour of a research tradition, they may also indicate a serious weakness and a need for fresh perspectives. In the case of political culture the range and depth of disagreement does in fact compromise central concepts, and suggests the need for new approaches.

Consider, for example, the question of ideological conceptualization in the mass public. Does the American political culture contain sizeable percentages of ideologues whose issue opinions encompass many domains, cohere predictably on a single left-right dimension, and resist change over time? 'Yes', according to some observers, such as Verba, Nie, and Petrocik;³ 'no' say others, such as John Sullivan and his associates.⁴ Most observers hedge their bets, directing us to consider particular issue clusters. On questions related to capitalism, for example, one encounters a considerable amount of ideology.⁵ And on issues where charged group relations predominate, (e.g., race), strong feelings anchor well-integrated belief systems.⁶ But as to the question of American ideology in

² Alan Abramowitz, 'The United States: Political Culture Under Stress', in Almond and Verba, eds, *The Civic Culture Revisited*, pp. 177-212.

³ Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and John Petrocik, *The New American Electorate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

⁴ John Sullivan *et al.*, 'Ideological Constraint in the Mass Public. A Methodological Critique and Some New Findings', *American Journal of Political Science*, 22 (1978), 233-49.

⁵ Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, *The American Ethos* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).

⁶ E. G. Carmines and James Stimson, 'Racial Issues and the Structure of Mass Belief Systems', *Journal of Politics*, 44 (1982), 2-20.

general, political culture researchers are as divided in their assessments as are the people they purport to describe.

Perhaps political ideology is too demanding cognitively ever to be a major and secure component of political culture in America. How about partisanship? After all, partisanship lacks ideology's intellectually complex features. Moreover, American political parties are organizationally distinct and historically stable. The two major parties in the United States have dominated the political terrain in unbroken fashion for 120 years, a record unmatched in Western democracies. From the standpoint of cognitive simplicity, historical centrality and institutional crystallization, widespread partisan allegiance must surely qualify as an important component of American political culture.

But many observers now question the role of partisanship in American political culture. Just how partisan are Americans? Not very, according to Wattenberg and Dennis;⁷ in fact, in a recent study Moore *et al.* report that partisanship has become only a minor component of political learning in America.⁸ If so, an insidious question makes its appearance: is it sensible to discuss American political culture when so many of the concept's putative components recede upon investigation? After all, would we take the idea of a human body seriously if we could not isolate the body's organs?

There is even doubt about those few secure partisan attachments which observers agree do exist. Early evidence indicated that many people developed partisan attachments in childhood, kept them through the life cycle, and employed them to evaluate issues and make electoral choices.⁹ But is this still true? Not necessarily. Many Americans now jettison the partisan affiliations they earlier exhibited, while others discover their issue opinions are not much influenced by the links they see between parties and issues.¹⁰

Moreover, partisan allegiance does not prevent large numbers of Americans from behaving independently and unpredictably at the polls.¹¹ Thus, if we apply appropriate criteria, such as cognitive coherence, durability and breadth, even partisanship – hitherto an apparently secure component of American political culture – shows signs of decay. Again we are led to ask the question: is the concept of American political culture worth exploring in its present form?

It is understandably attractive to abandon this confused landscape in search of more promising terrain. Perhaps the problem with ideology and partisanship is that they are conflictual. Parties and ideologies divide people against each

⁷ Martin Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952–1980* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Jack Dennis, 'Public Support for the Party System: 1964–1984', paper delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 1986.

⁸ Stanley Moore *et al.*, *The Child's Political World* (New York: Praeger, 1985)

⁹ Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

¹⁰ Charles Franklin, 'Issue Preferences, Socialization, and the Evolution of Party Identification', *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1984), 459–78; Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981)

¹¹ Robert Axelrod, 'Presidential Election Coalitions in 1984', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), 281–4

other; to many observers, however, the unique quality of American politics resides in its harmonizing norm of *tolerance*, which the Bill of Rights hallows, political rhetoric embeds, American education enshrines and publications as different from each other as *The Progressive* and *Hustler* exuberantly exploit. Surely studies of tolerance reveal consistent, widely shared, durable attitudes which actually shape political behaviour. But again we encounter disagreement. To McClosky and Brill the case for tolerance as a central component of American political culture is strong.¹² These investigators discover tolerance to be widespread, learned through the process of education (particularly legal education), and regularly and reliably manifested in action. However, McClosky and Brill admit that political tolerance is stratified, with certain elites (especially lawyers) serving as its guardians.¹³ But can a set of beliefs so narrowly held qualify as a major element of political culture? By analogy, would we take seriously the argument that witchcraft is a central component of Azande culture if it is mainly the witchdoctors who avow the beliefs in question? Why not apply the same criterion to McClosky and Brill?

Even McClosky and Brill's modest defence of tolerance has come under attack. Jackman and Muha argue that norms of tolerance among the educated are mainly lipservice.¹⁴ Sullivan goes further, claiming that not only is political *intolerance* the norm in American politics, but also that the comparatively few tolerant Americans become so not because of the benign effects of education, but because of certain personality characteristics.¹⁵ Can a society one of whose major vehicles for the dissemination of political tolerance – the public school – so regularly fails in its task actually be said to manifest securely the cultural norm in question? Again by analogy, would we not wonder about the central values of paternalism and imperialism in Victorian Britain if the elite British public schools failed to transmit such norms?¹⁶ Why not apply the same criterion to studies of American political tolerance?

Some political attitudes do meet reasonable criteria for inclusion as secure components of American political culture. For example, American attitudes towards equality appear to be consistent, durable and cohesive. Several recent studies – ranging from sample surveys to depth interview inquiries – have converged in their conclusions about the way Americans regard equality.¹⁷ More-

¹² Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, *Dimensions of Tolerance* (New York: Russell Sage, 1983).

¹³ McClosky and Brill, *Dimensions of Tolerance*.

¹⁴ Mary Jackman and Michael Muha, 'Separate, Therefore Unequal', *American Sociological Review*, 32 (1984), 751–70.

¹⁵ John L. Sullivan, James Piereson and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

¹⁶ Rupert Wilkinson, *Governing Elites. Studies in Training and Selection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

¹⁷ McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos*; Sidney Verba and Gary Orren, *Equality in America: The View From the Top* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Jennifer Hochschild, *What's Fair?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Paul Sniderman and Philip Tetlock, 'Interrelationship of Political Ideology and Public Opinion', in Margaret G. Hermann, ed., *Political Psychology* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986), pp. 62–97.

over, as befits true cultural norms, sociologists and child psychologists have tracked these attitudes to their appearance in the course of early socialization.¹⁸ This efflorescence of convergent research is heartening, for equality has a long and noble pedigree among students of American political culture. It is almost superfluous to recall the centrality with which de Tocqueville himself endowed it.¹⁹

Yet research into egalitarian attitudes is not entirely favourable to the political culture approach. The problem is that the concept of equality fragments when Americans attempt to situate it in their political culture. More precisely, Americans modify their attitudes towards equality in deference to other, competing values, such as fairness, need, entitlement, efficiency and obligation. As a result, there is no single 'place' for equality in American political culture. Equality simply slips in and out of view.²⁰

The elusiveness of the egalitarian norm stems from the fact that Americans differentiate sharply between economic equality and equality in the domain of socialization.²¹ Americans sternly reject the former and strongly endorse the latter.²² The situation is actually more complex, for these two forms of equality remain connected in the public mind. Americans apparently believe that the political system can somehow balance equality in the sphere of socialization against economic inequality, thereby creating a moderately inegalitarian but still wholly legitimate cultural system. So equality is *three-dimensional* in American political culture: political, social and economic, each of which contains its particular definitions, arguments and evaluations. What then have we learned about *the* role of equality in American political culture? A great deal, but nothing definitive enough to hang a theory of political culture upon.

Of course, these findings do not prevent our describing American political culture as a perhaps fuzzy, yet nevertheless real pattern of attitudinal orientations. Yet the nature of this 'pattern' is nowhere revealed by the data alone. Instead, our very willingness to call a particular arrangement of attitudes a 'pattern' – rather than simply a collection of unrelated orientations – depends upon a conception of cultural *form* which the political culture approach itself never discusses.

A fortiori, the same argument applies to all political cultures, even cultures in which political orientations are more coherent and durable than in the United States. The analyst of culture and politics must seek the cultural *principles* which create either patterned coherence and durability or patterns of incoherence and fluidity. Neither sort of principle emerges from the political culture approach.

¹⁸ Robert Leahy, 'Development of the Conception of Economic Inequality: II. Explanations, Justifications, and Concepts of Social Mobility and Change', *Developmental Psychology* (1983), 111–25; Joseph Forgas, *et al.* 'Lay Explanations of Wealth: Attributions for Economic Success', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 13 (1983), 381–7.

¹⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Phillips Bradley (New York: Vintage, 1969).

²⁰ See also Aaron Wildavsky, 'Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation', *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1987), 3–21.

²¹ Hochschild, *What's Fair?*

²² See also Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).

To summarize: despite its reliance on survey analysis and sophisticated quantitative techniques, the study of American political culture has yielded few conclusions for the investigator of culture and politics. Many candidates for inclusion in American political culture fail reasonable tests. Initially appealing candidates lack durability, integration with other beliefs, internal consistency, logical cohesion, or secure relationship to behaviour. Given these difficulties, it is hardly surprising that so many political scientists interested in culture and politics have renounced the political culture approach.²³

In pursuing a different approach, this article takes up suggestions that Dittmer, Elkins and Simeon, and Wildavsky have previously offered for the analysis of culture and politics. Although all three articles recommend structural anthropology as a way to improve political culture research, only Wildavsky has developed the anthropological aspects of his argument into a full theoretical discussion. But Wildavsky implies that an anthropological approach wholly vitiates much of the research conducted within the mainstream political culture paradigm. In fact, Wildavsky claims that true cultural explanations supersede explanations of political culture based on such attitudinal constructs as ideologies and schemas.²⁴ I disagree. Instead, this article argues that traditional political culture research into attitudes is a necessary – though not sufficient – part of an anthropological approach to culture and politics. Attitudes are to culture as – to take a risky example – an analyst's free associations are to the analyst's therapeutic interpretations. The two are inextricably linked parts of the same investigative enterprise. The present effort proceeds in three steps: first, the article contrasts an anthropological approach to the study of culture and politics with the mainstream political culture approach. Secondly, the article shows how political culture in America takes on new shapes when considered through the lens of recent anthropology. Thirdly, the article speculates from an anthropological perspective about major puzzles in American political culture.

II. A STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CULTURE AND POLITICS

Culture is the focus of anthropology. Therefore, if political scientists are to continue to talk about 'political culture' – much less about the relationship between culture and politics – they should attend to contemporary anthropology, not out of some bogus impulse to mask the familiar with the esoteric, but out of an indispensable theoretical necessity.

A common mistake in undertaking interdisciplinary inquiries is to imagine that the discipline to which one is drawn is more coherent theoretically than the

²³ Lowell Dittmer, 'Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis', *World Politics*, 29 (1976–7), 552–83; David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, 'A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?', *Comparative Politics*, 11 (1979), 127–46; Loran B. Szalay, Rita M. Kelly and Won T. Moon, 'Ideology: Its Meaning and Measurement', *Comparative Political Studies*, 5 (1972), 151–74, Wildavsky, 'Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions', pp. 3–21.

²⁴ Wildavsky, 'Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions'.

discipline from which one has embarked. Closer acquaintance reveals however, that contemporary anthropology is no more unified than is the study of political culture. Anthropologists are divided into schools of phenomenologists, structuralists, post-structuralists, functionalists and materialists.²⁵ However, without doing too much violence to the complexity of the subject, it is possible to classify anthropologists into two groups: those who proceed from idealist assumptions and those who proceed from materialist assumptions. The latter argue that economic and ecological factors ultimately account for culture,²⁶ the former argue that culture constitutes a set of cognitive maps which can never be reduced to material imperatives.²⁷

Inevitably, this article must choose between these approaches. It relies principally on the idealist approach, particularly in the 1960–82 structuralist vision of culture as a system of communication.²⁸ Some of the principal writers in this tradition are Durkheim, Victor Turner, Edmund Leach, Marshall Sahlins, Gustav Jahoda and – to a lesser degree – Levi-Strauss, Mary Douglas and Clifford Geertz.²⁹ The article adopts the structuralist approach for essentially three reasons: firstly, because structuralism's subjectivism fits better than its materialist competitor does into an analysis of political culture; secondly, because structuralism captures the cultures of advanced industrial societies more effectively than materialism does; and thirdly, because the structural approach creatively reinterprets some apparently straightforward, materialistic features of modern societies. Let me elaborate.

As traditionally studied, political culture consists principally of cognitive phenomena – ideologies, beliefs, attitudes and opinions. Of actual behaviour only political participation typically finds its way into most accounts.³⁰ Structural

²⁵ Louis A. Sass, 'Anthropology's Native Problems', *Harper's*, May 1986, 49–58

²⁶ Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism* (New York: Random House, 1979).

²⁷ Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

²⁸ I use the terms 'structuralism' and 'structural anthropology' as synonyms. My usage should be distinguished from Marxist structuralism, as it appears most prominently in the work of Althusser. The chief distinction here is that my usage of structuralism focuses neither upon 'objective' social formations – chiefly those of social class – nor on particular political or social institutions. These latter usages assimilate structuralism to materialism; I identify structuralism with idealism.

²⁹ Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Form of the Religious Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1965 (first edn 1912)); Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, *Primitive Classification*, ed. Rodney Needham (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), Claude Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason*; Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Victor Turner, *The Forest of Symbols* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols* (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1970); Michael Thompson, 'A Three-Dimensional Model', in Mary Douglas, ed., *Essays in the Sociology of Perception* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 31–64; Gustav Jahoda, *Psychology and Anthropology* (London: Academic Press, 1982).

³⁰ Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Richard Brody, 'The Puzzle of Political Participation in America', in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 287–325.

anthropology too directs itself to an understanding of cognitive phenomena. Its cognitive emphasis therefore makes it a more promising anthropological approach to political culture than does the materialist alternative.

In addition, the structural approach is especially useful in the study of advanced industrial society. Even contemporary Marxists now argue that the 'material base' of late capitalist societies supports considerable diversity and variety in forms of legitimation.³¹ Moreover, in advanced industrial societies it becomes more and more of a problem to trace the content of culture back to any particular economic base.

Finally, the structural approach reinterprets certain practices in modern societies that for too long have been assumed to be unambiguously materialistic in origin and function. Take for example, the phenomenon of economic exchange. Neo-classical economics treats exchange as a struggle for advantage among self-interested parties motivated solely by the promise of profits. By contrast, structural anthropology depicts economic exchange as a way of binding self-interested parties together in a symbolic community.³² Just as elaborate rules once governed the exchange of women – thereby bonding together designated persons as kin while separating designated others³³ – so today do economic markets draw particular buyers and sellers together for the exchange of goods, not persons.³⁴ And just as the exchange of women in primitive societies tied social segments together, so also does modern economic exchange bring otherwise anonymous persons together, thereby promoting social intercourse that may eventually turn cold commerce into nascent community.³⁵ In both cases a pattern of association and communication emerges which imparts to society stability, predictability and cohesion.³⁶ The result in both cases is cultural co-operation amid economic competition.

As the above example suggests, structural anthropology reconceptualizes fundamental aspects of contemporary social life. Before utilizing it for this purpose, however, structuralism must be compared with the political culture approach in seven principal respects: (1) differences about the *form* of culture; (2) differences about the *structure of cognition*; (3) differences about *cultural processes*; (4) differences about the place of *individual persons* in culture; (5) differences about the *content* of culture; (6) differences about the place of *agencies* in cultural analysis; and (7) differences about the *strategy of cultural explanation*.

³¹ Stanley Aronowitz, *The Crisis of Historical Materialism* (New York: Praeger, 1981); Raymond Williams, *The Sociology of Culture* (New York: Schocken, 1981); Jeffrey Goldfarb, *On Cultural Freedom: An Exploration of Public Life in Poland and the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

³² Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*.

³³ Simon Clarke, *The Foundations of Structuralism* (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester, 1981), p. 51.

³⁴ C. A. Gregory, *Gifts and Commodities* (London: Academic Press, 1982).

³⁵ For an example, see Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), Chap. 10.

³⁶ But see Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979).

1. Cultural Form

Structuralists argue that culture is constituted by sets of concepts whose elements are in psychological tension with each other. Levi-Strauss is most insistent on this point. He conceptualizes these sets along the lines of the binary logic familiar to students of cybernetics.³⁷ Although bi-polarity is not required in the structural perspective, some form of opposition between set constituents is. Sociologically, sets represent elaborations of the most elemental distinction people make: the distinction between nature and society.³⁸ Structuralists argue that initially people divide their cognitive worlds into two sets, one composed of natural, unrefined objects, the other composed of civilized, refined objects. They then attribute further qualities to this initial distinction, depending upon the social realm to which such attributions apply. Thus, for example, foods are either 'natural' (if not 'treated' by milling or cooking) or prepared (if altered in some fashion prior to consumption).³⁹ A society's most important social classifications – kinship groups, economic classes, religious communities, even political movements⁴⁰ – can be visualized as transformations of the underlying nature–culture distinction. A further example may prove helpful: as Alan Jenkins shows, Levi-Strauss treats all totemic insignia as binary systems of classification which represent clan groups either as 'natural' or as 'civilized'.⁴¹

This principle of structured tension implies that sharp cognitive distinctions help people make sense of their worlds. Meaning emerges from and depends upon cognitive oppositions. Black 'makes sense' because it contrasts sharply with white. Citizenship makes sense because it is distinguished from alienage or 'foreignness'.⁴² Our friends are precious to us because their helpfulness contrasts starkly with the enmity of our enemies. Although few structural anthropologists draw extensively upon social psychology to support their arguments, all could profitably do so, since Gestaltist, cognitive dissonance researchers, and such social identity theorists as Henri Tajfel provide ample experimental support for the postulate of structural opposition in social cognition.⁴³

The principle of structural opposition refers to perceptions, intentions and social cognitions, not to material 'reality'. Structuralism argues that groups of

³⁷ Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*.

³⁸ Douglas, *Purity and Danger*

³⁹ Mary Douglas, ed., *Food and Culture* (New York: Russell Sage, 1984)

⁴⁰ Jean Laponce, *Left & Right. The Topography of Political Perceptions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981)

⁴¹ Alan Jenkins, *The Social Theory of Claude Levi-Strauss* (London: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 98–9.

⁴² Alfred Schutz, 'The Stranger', *American Journal of Sociology*, 50 (1944), 499–508.

⁴³ Henri Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Henri Tajfel, ed., *Differentiation Between Social Groups* (London: Academic Press, 1978); Willem Doise, *Groups and Individuals. Explanations in Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), Andrew Lock, 'Universals in Human Conception', in Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock, eds, *Indigenous Psychologies The Anthropology of the Self* (London: Academic Press, 1981), pp. 19–39; John T. Lanzetta and Scott Orr, 'Excitatory Strength and Expressive Fear Effects of Happy and Fear Expression and Context on the Extinction of a Conditional Fear Response', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50 (1986), 190–4

persons create their own psychological worlds, casting such worlds into oppositionally composed sets. However, the form oppositions assume varies, depending upon social, political and economic conditions. Moreover, there is room for several complex oppositions among a number of loosely related phenomena, as well as for a single bi-polar opposition. There is also room for legitimate hierarchy, with dominant concepts conceived to be morally superior to subordinate concepts.⁴⁴ And there is even room for fuzziness at the boundary which separates classifications from each other. Still, even grey makes sense only because of its relation to the contrast between black and white.

There is a clear division between the expectation of opposition in the structuralist position and the expectation of consensus in analysis of American political culture. Students of American political culture have generally argued that there must be agreement on certain 'rules of the game' (e.g., political tolerance) if a liberal democratic political culture is to flourish.⁴⁵ As a result, the political culture approach has reduced many substantive issues of culture and politics to methodological debates about how *much* agreement there must be on rules of the game before we can say a consensus – and, thus, presumably, a liberal democratic political culture – exists.⁴⁶ By thus subordinating fundamental conflict to the search for shared values, the political culture approach implies that culturally generated struggle usually threatens liberal democratic politics. Structuralists, however, see such struggles as indispensable and welcome stimulants to the emergence of democratic debate and participation.

2. *The Structure of Cognition*

Structural anthropologists argue that cognitions emerge from cultural 'deep structures', which, though resistant to direct observation, can be inferred and reconstructed through linguistic, mathematical or symbolic analysis. Structural analysis strives to reveal the deep structural connections which link together substantively different conceptions or whole cognitive spheres. In this regard, structuralists set forth a postulate of equivalence between cognitive spheres. For example, the cognitive deep structure of eating habits in a society will parallel the cognitive deep structure of social class. This is so because the cognitive construction of eating and of social class both originate in a culture's particular distinction between nature and civilization – between the wild and untamed, on the one hand, and the refined and domesticated, on the other.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Louis Dumont, *Essays on Individualism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Barry Schwartz, *Vertical Classification. A Study in Structuralism and the Sociology of Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

⁴⁵ See also Goldfarb, *On Cultural Freedom*.

⁴⁶ For critiques, see Michael Mann, 'The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy', *American Sociological Review*, 35 (1970), 422–39; James Wright, *The Dissent of the Governed* (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

⁴⁷ Schwartz, *Vertical Classification*; Jack Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

Deep structures consist in part of the particular formal rules which generate meaningful social classifications within a culture. Just as there exists a set of underlying linguistic rules which permit specific speech utterances to be comprehensible, so also there is a corresponding set of underlying cultural rules, which, for example, distinguish in various ways between conservatives and liberals in a society. Although mainstream political culture analysis can reveal statistical associations among individual-level attitudes related to the liberal-conservative dimension, it cannot reveal the deep structural rules that accord to that distinction a particular *meaning* for the members of a culture. Put differently, political culture analysis tells us only what particular rules of classification people apply to liberals and conservatives. However, structural analysis traces people's decisions in this regard directly to the generation of rules themselves, which confers upon such political classifications distinctive degrees of *importance*, *clarity* and *centrality*, and which therefore cues either sharp or blurred ideological classifications.

Does the search for deep structures of culture relegate the study of attitudes and values to a secondary position? Not at all. Rather, the relationship between deep cultural structures and various surface attitudes and values is analogous to the linguistic distinction between grammar and speech act. Just as grammar permits a constrained variety of meaningful sentences, so does every deep structure of culture permit a constrained variety of attitudinal configurations. Ultimately, these configurations crystallize into a unique political culture.⁴⁸

This formulation possesses several applications, of which perhaps the most important for our purpose involves the question of ideological thinking among Americans. Immersed in the analysis of attitudes, students of American political culture often disparage, lament or condemn the ideological incoherence their investigations so often reveal. After all, ideological incoherence seems anomalous in a society with high levels of formal education and a long tradition of democratic citizenship.

By contrast, the structuralist considers ideological incoherence to be a normal expression of American culture's deep structure. The structuralist distinguishes between a culture's 'grammatical rules' (embodied in its deep structures) and its 'linguistic content' (embodied in the public's attitudinal patterns). One of these rules specifies the acceptable forms for expressing political ideas; in America ideology is but one of these forms. Viewed through the structuralist lens, what becomes politically interesting is that American culture permits even educated people to remain politically innocent and uninvolved without forfeiting their position in society as a whole.⁴⁹ Viewed through the lens of political culture, this observation is unlikely to occur at all.

Nevertheless, understanding the relationship between an underlying cultural grammar and the political expression of this grammar is by no means simple.

⁴⁸ Charles W. Lidz, 'Toward a Deep Structural Analysis of Moral Action', in Ino Rossi, ed., *Structural Sociology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 229-56.

⁴⁹ Herve Varenne, *Americans Together* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1977)

Like political culture analysis, structuralism affords no royal road to the political unconscious. Structuralism merely allows us to ask different questions. Indeed, three problems of structural analysis deserve particular discussion. The first involves inference: how in fact can we infer from surface indications, such as political attitudes and beliefs, the particular deep structures which underlie political culture? Because deep structures are not directly accessible, 'structuralists must be particularly sensitive to the possibility that the structures they posit have no basis in fact'.⁵⁰ Grafstein adds, 'One wonders to what extent structural analysis is empirically unconstrained projection onto the work in the manner of Disney nature stories.'⁵¹

Moreover, if deep structures are general within a culture, how can we explain subgroup variations in political attitudes? It is elementary that a constant cannot explain a variable. Structuralists must create a theory of sociological choice among 'candidates' for attitudinal configurations, and then connect the actual configurations which emerge to the deep structures which they express.⁵²

Efforts to this end, however, encounter a third problem. Maurice Godelier argues that structuralism cannot explain any particular deep-structure/political attitude configuration without introducing non-structuralist theories.⁵³ If culture is a system of ideas, then the institutions which specialize in the transmission of this system – institutions such as schools and the mass media – are crucially important. But Godelier argues, structuralist analysis cannot effectively comprehend institutional interests; therefore, structuralism leaves 'unposed the question of how different forms of discourse come to be materially produced and maintained as authoritative systems'.⁵⁴

Although formidable, these objections are not insurmountable. Meaningful empirical tests of structural propositions are possible. Moreover, such tests can take into account variations in political attitudes and institutional interests. For example, if we surmise that the deep structure of a culture is hostile to hierarchical classifications and favours egalitarian classifications, then we would expect political movements and institutions which arise in the culture to eschew authoritarian structures internally. Moreover, such movements' and institutions' members would also favour egalitarian relationships with each other. Finally, any institutional interests would be expressed in egalitarian language – a language which over time might delegitimize the power ambitions of institutional leaders. In short, an egalitarian deep structure will promote broadly egalitarian

⁵⁰ Robert Grafstein, 'Structure and Structuralism', *Social Science Quarterly*, 63 (1982), 617–33, p. 620.

⁵¹ Grafstein, 'Structure and Structuralism'.

⁵² Emil Oestereicher, 'Form and Praxis: A Contribution to the Theory of Cultural Forces', *Social Research*, 47 (1982), 668–89.

⁵³ Maurice Godelier, 'Myths, Infrastructures and History in Levi-Strauss', in Ino Rossi and Contributors, *The Logic of Culture. Advances in Structural Theory and Methods* (South Hadley, Mass.: J. F. Bergin, 1982), pp. 232–61.

⁵⁴ T. Asad, 'Anthropology and the Analysis of Ideology', *Man*, 14 (1979), 607–27, p. 619.

tarian political movements and institutions. All these hypotheses are empirically testable.

Indeed Douglas and Wildavsky⁵⁵ have already made a start towards connecting institutional structures to cultural formation. The present approach differs from theirs, however. Specifically, Wildavsky conceives of 'countries or groups as compounds of cultures',⁵⁶ and argues that 'preferences regarding risk are a consequence, not a cause, of cultural identification'.⁵⁷ Wildavsky traces preferences to specific features of institutional structure. By contrast, this article argues that whole countries embody particular cultures in the form of deep structures, and that these deep structures of culture predispose individuals to shape institutions and movements of a particular kind. Thus, the deep structures of national culture incline institutions and movements towards particular forms, even as institutions and movements attempt to control the preferences of their members.

3. Cultural Process

By itself, a culture's classificational structure is essentially static. But a culture is more than a set of classifications, and is therefore *dynamic*, not static. Classifications are the moulds that shape political cognition, but moulds are only forms, and form by itself is lifeless. The question is how such forms gain vitality, or, more directly, how the elements of culture are combined into deep structural processes. Cultures are constituted *both* by metaphor (a system of formal homologies within deep structure) and metonymy (sequences of interaction among the elements of the deep structure). We have seen that deep structures contain metaphors (e.g., the class system is equivalent to food habits), but what about metonymy and process?

Processes within a culture's deep structure consist of frequently deployed narratives which recount and dramatize in story form appropriate interactions between the contrasting elements within any cultural set (e.g., good against evil; black against white; North against South; Republican against Democrat). Such narratives appear in myths, rituals,⁵⁸ popular culture, ceremonies or even institutionalized behaviour in which exemplary persons (heroes, villains, etc.) or designated players (bank managers, Presidential candidates, capitalists) depict components of the sets themselves. In effect, such persons 'act out', 'display' and 'exercise' the culture.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Douglas and Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture*, Thompson, 'A Three-Dimensional Model'; Wildavsky, 'Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions'; Aaron Wildavsky, 'Three Cultures. Explaining Anomalies in the American Welfare State', *The Public Interest*, Fall (1982), 45–58.

⁵⁶ Aaron Wildavsky, 'Reply to Laitin', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1988), 593.

⁵⁷ Wildavsky, 'Reply to Laitin'.

⁵⁸ David I. Kertzer, *Rituals, Politics, and Power* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988).

⁵⁹ Richard M. Merelman, 'Cultural Displays. An Illustration from American Immigration', *Qualitative Sociology*, 11 (1988), 335–55.

To illustrate: one such narrative consists of the actions of family members at the end of televised debates between American presidential candidates. The appearance of 'familial behaviour' (hugs, kisses, exchanges of greeting between the debaters now reconstituted as family members) blurs the boundary between family life and political life. This narrative is a story about how familial virtues of compromise and conciliation overcome enduring political divisions and conflicts. As such, the narrative enacts a cultural rule which states that political classifications – no matter how opposed on interest grounds – should never subordinate universal 'habits of the heart' which unite all families – even the families of political opponents – with each other.

But not all such narratives are equally predictable. Occasionally, political crises which disrupt the normal course of political action (e.g., political kidnappings) may become especially dramatic occasions for the enactment of cultural narratives.⁶⁰

Take as another example an important narrative of Christian culture. Leach argues that for Christians the story of Jesus makes sense in part because of the opposed, yet complementary story of John the Baptist.⁶¹ Jesus begins life as a secular 'King of the Jews', and ascends to supernatural status at death; *per contra*, John begins life as God's spokesman (a hermit prophet) and ends his life as a martyred king. The two stories are interlocked narratives of role reversals, in which the protagonists play out their culture's polarities, and in so doing highlight both the static elements of which the culture consists (e.g., King, prophet, martyr, hermit, secular, sacred) and the normatively recommended means of moving between elements (e.g., from hermit to martyr via illumination).

Victor Turner has provided the most complete analyses of cultural narratives. To Turner the 'root paradigms' of culture lies in a basic tension between the category of *structure* (civilization, hierarchy, delimited roles) and the category of *communitas* (nature, equality, diffuse roles).⁶² During periods of *structure* people experience each other indirectly and partially through the medium of specialized social positions and delimited functions. During periods of *communitas* people experience each other directly and holistically through the medium of shared, often ecstatic or extreme, experiences. Cultures can be comprehended in part as oscillations between these two types of human connection. Passages from one phase to another often take place through ritualized ceremonies, which are narratives in which exemplary persons take leave of a structured position, are symbolically stripped of their status insignia, and temporarily made alike. These persons then engage in direct, egalitarian communion for a prescribed period (an intermediate phase of liminality and *communitas*). Finally, they either

⁶⁰ Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici, *The Moro Morality Play* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

⁶¹ Edmund Leach, 'Structuralism in Social Anthropology', in David Robey, ed., *Structuralism: An Introduction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 37–57, at p. 55.

⁶² Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process. Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), Chaps 3–5.

return to the position from which they departed or enter a new position (as in the rites of initiation). Other such passages take place via journeys (e.g., pilgrimages, retreats) or through rituals of degradation, both of which dramatize deep structural oppositions, and which themselves create the currency of renewed myth and legend.⁶³

The analyst of culture and politics seeks those cultural narratives which dramatize the contrasting elements of politics most powerfully. Where many such narratives exist – or where a few constantly and forcefully recur – we may describe the political culture as ‘mythologized’. To anticipate somewhat, American political culture qualifies as mythologized, for its deep structure is embodied in many powerful and recurrent narratives.

To the structuralist, political culture changes fundamentally when there is a significant alteration in the relationship of deep structural elements to each other – perhaps a tightening or loosening of the tension between the poles of nature and civilization. Under these new conditions fresh narratives will emerge to signalize and stabilize the shift. But new narratives themselves do not change deep structure; rather, deep structural changes generate new narratives. By contrast, mainstream students of political culture believe that political culture changes when the surface distribution of political attitudes and opinions significantly alters. The difficulty with this view, according to the structuralist, is that changed attitude distributions may not indicate a change in basic cultural forms. Until such changed distributions attain narrative power through new legends, rituals or heroes (in short, through new myths), they should not be mistaken for a profound shift in political culture.

To illustrate, consider the question of abortion. Abortion may be seen as an ‘unnatural’ act in which through artificial means the natural workings of pregnancy are disrupted. Alternatively, abortion may be an act in which a mother’s ‘natural’ rights are rightfully extended to pregnancy. A shift in the classification of abortion as between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ will fundamentally change a society’s culture, and will therefore be signalled by the appearance of new and dramatically powerful narratives of abortion, often in the form of legal decisions⁶⁴ or ritualized and eventually legendary popular protests.

4. *The Place of Individual Persons in Culture*

Students of political culture aggregate the expressed opinions of individual persons into frequency distributions. From these they draw inferences about political culture. Structural anthropologists find this procedure incomplete and misleading. Following Durkheim, structuralists insist that cultures are *collective*

⁶³ Victor Turner and Edith Turner, *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Geertz, *Local Knowledge*

⁶⁴ James Boyd White, *Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law* (Madison, Wis. University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

representations, and these the study of individual attitudes cannot identify.⁶⁵ At best, the 'entities' social scientists construct *via* the aggregation of individual attitudes are pale shadows of collective representations. At worst, they are arbitrary impositions upon a reality that traditional social science method simply cannot reach.

On this issue the differences between structuralists and political culture researchers are essentially philosophical. Again, following Durkheim, structuralists assert that culture cannot be reduced to individualistically-based entities, not so much because culture possesses an *emergent* property (a position political culture analysts readily accept), but because culture possesses an *a priori* quality. After all, particular persons and even whole groups come and go without having the slightest impact on culture.⁶⁶ Individuals are carriers, not generators, of culture.

Of course, individuals vary in how they bear the burden of culture. Some become disaffected, and, insofar as they can, extricate themselves from the collective representations their culture foists upon them. Others carry the culture forward with zeal. Variations between cultures in these regards are politically important; moreover, philosophically speaking, such variations indicate the existence of individual choice. But choice – even the choice to resist culture – always takes place against the central normative tendencies of culture itself. Put differently, the relationship between individuals and culture is dialectical; if individuals are not simply passive receptacles of culture, neither are they culture's autonomous generators.

As collective representations cultures comprehend images of society as a whole, not just orientations towards particular groups or issues. No person is so centrally located as to be able to envisage clearly society as a whole; instead, people are unevenly dispersed around their society's cultural core.⁶⁷ People therefore have at best partial, distorted views of society's inner workings. Aggregating people's views is no solution to this problem; partiality and distortion added to partiality and distortion only yields a more complex pattern of partiality and distortion.

Finally, structuralists argue that the political culture approach lacks a crucial regulative component. Culture is not people's most *popular* set of cognitive classifications, narratives or images of collectivities, open to change upon a whim. Rather culture is the particular set which people feel bound to *respect*, and are generally prone to obey. And individuals do not invent this regulative set. Durkheim reasoned that individuals could not impose regulative norms on themselves, for what individuals originate they can as easily forswear.⁶⁸ But culture in its regulative guise is relentless; it never lets people escape. Consider an analogy: a person who wishes to communicate with English speakers in an English-speaking community becomes both pragmatically and morally disposed to use

⁶⁵ Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*.

⁶⁶ Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of the Sociological Method* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).

⁶⁷ Edward Shils, *Centre and Periphery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

⁶⁸ Emile Durkheim, *Montesquieu and Rousseau*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960).

English whether or not he or she initially likes it; this disposition springs from the expectations and sanctions of the community, not from one's own will.

If individuals are not the origin of culture, what is? Durkheim argued that the collective generates and imposes culture. Culture persists because individuals are vulnerable to the power of the collectivity.⁶⁹ It follows, therefore, that those who study culture must not only investigate the individual's images of *collectivities*, but the collectivity's images of *individuals*. In fact, the norm of 'individualism' is itself one such collective image.

5. *The Content of Culture – Communication*

Upon what should the analyst focus in order to describe culture successfully? The answer is the system of self-referential messages that all societies generate. Because culture consists of narratives which dramatize the deep structure of collective representations, we must deal first and foremost with communication, for communication consists largely of these narratives.⁷⁰

Students of traditional societies have long relied upon studies of communication in order to uncover narratives about collective representations. Such stylized communication media as myths, rituals, and folklore are filled with narratives about the collective representations of traditional societies.⁷¹ The scarce economic resources and absence of media diversity in traditional societies have made it comparatively simple for scholars to identify the particular communications in which culturally-significant collective representations appear.

The research problem is more complex in affluent societies, where there is great diversity among communication channels, and where media enjoy freedom from centralized direction or accountability. Modern communication systems are no less subject to the division of labour than are other spheres of contemporary society; consider just one new medium: cable television, which in the United States runs the gamut from music videos to quality drama. Moreover, in modern societies government itself has become an important communicator, disseminating narratively powerful collective representations in the form of advertising campaigns, popular pamphlets and, of course, policy pronouncements. Finally, in their effort to be 'good citizens', private corporations produce numerous house organs, mass market publications and public interest advertisements.⁷² These too contain culturally significant narratives.

⁶⁹ Christel Lane, *The Rites of Rulers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); B. E. Aguirre, 'The Conventionalization of Collective Behavior in Cuba', *American Journal of Sociology*, 89 (1984), 541–67.

⁷⁰ Edmund Leach, *Culture and Communication* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

⁷¹ Edmund Leach and D. Alan Aycock, eds, *Structuralist Interpretations of Biblical Myth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton, Conn.: Princeton University Press, 1981), Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, trans., John and Doreen Weightman (London: Cape, 1973).

⁷² Richard M. Merelman, 'Sitcoms and Citicorp. On the Cultural Foundations of American Liberalism', *Journal of American Culture*, (1987), 41–57; David Nye, *Image Worlds* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986).

Engulfed by this flood of communication, the student of culture and politics in the United States confronts formidable research problems. How can he or she be sure that the cultural pluralism just described contains a common pattern? What deep structure, if any, unites the rock lyric, the civics textbook, the popular magazine, the corporate house organ and the dystopian novel?⁷³ All these media contain narratives about collective representations; none can be ignored. Yet the content of each one seems quite distinct. What scheme of analysis can comprehend them as complementary parts of a single cultural system?

Nevertheless, intimidating though it may be, the structuralist's task is very different from that of the political culture researcher. The latter typically confines himself or herself to the effects of communication on audience perception. Whether it be the older 'hypodermic' or selective perception approaches to media content, or the newer information processing or 'schema' approaches, the focus of attention remains on the reader or the viewer.⁷⁴ By contrast, the structural approach does not depend for its account of culture and politics on audience reaction. Its first question is the nature of collective representations themselves; only later does it concern itself with the effects of such representations.

6. *The Analytic Role of Culture Formation Agencies*

Students of political culture usually attempt to connect survey respondents' opinions to such presumably formative agencies as social class, religion, family and school. When group differences along these lines reveal themselves in the sample and withstand statistical controls, the analyst concludes that he or she has isolated the influence of cultural agencies.⁷⁵

The structuralist considers such a strategy to be misleading. Because the group classifications developed in the analysis are initially only based on responses to the questions the investigator poses (respondents placing themselves in a preformed scheme of social class, for example), the putative 'agencies' are at best artificial constructs, at worst reifications. Indeed, the problem is two-fold. Not only is the respondent forced to construe the world in ways required by the question, but the investigator must also match these responses to his or her own theory of, say, social class. The result is a further reconstruction of the object of investigation in ways which resemble myth-making more than science.

The argument may be put differently: the odds against any two respondents in a national survey actually interacting with each other are formidable. Therefore, the 'social class' of any political culture analysis is in no sense a self-conscious, cohesive collectivity which generates or disseminates its own collective representations. It is an analytic convenience, not a social fact. It becomes real only

⁷³ Arthur Marwick, *Class* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980)

⁷⁴ Doris Graber, *Processing the News* (New York: Longman, 1984); Peter Clarke, ed., *New Models for Mass Communication Research* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973).

⁷⁵ See, for example, Jackman and Muha, 'Separate, Therefore Unequal', pp. 751-70.

because the analyst constructs it and writes about it. In no other sense does it exist at all.

Moreover, accounts of this 'social class' rarely describes the collective representations which pass among its members. True, investigators sometimes ask respondents about the *frequency* of class-relevant conversations, but rarely do such questions reveal any images of the collectivity as a whole. Therefore, neither the class's own collective representations nor the generation of such representations enters the analysis. It devolves upon the investigator – and the investigator alone – to invent a plausible account of how the artifact he or she has created resembles a true social class.

Two lessons emerge from these observations. First all accounts of culture and politics should include descriptions of collective representations (as opposed to the attitudinal residues of such representations).⁷⁶ Secondly, all collective representations should be traced to their origins in culture-creating institutions.⁷⁷ For example, if our aim is to understand the attitudes of working-class people, not only must we describe the attitudes themselves, but we must also locate these attitudes in collective representations of the working class – in media such as the 'penny dreadfuls' of Hoggart's turn-of-the-century British working class or the rock-music lyrics of contemporary working-class American teenagers.⁷⁸ In short, we must seek out *correspondence* between attitudes and collective representations.⁷⁹

7. *Studying Cultures as Wholes*

As we have seen, mainstream investigators normally attempt to distinguish between political culture and the study of culture generally. Structuralists reject this distinction, holding that the culture of politics makes sense only when connected to collective representations outside politics. For example, the structuralist asserts that the moderately egalitarian political position Americans assume becomes comprehensible only when placed in relation to two non-political positions – one highly inegalitarian (as regards economics), one highly egalitarian (as regards socialization). Political equality mediates the opposition between economic inequality and social equality; alone, however, the political version of equality lacks a sensible cultural logic.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ See, for a model, W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966)

⁷⁷ John Cawelti, *The Six-Gun Mystique*, 2nd edn (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Press, 1984), Todd Gitlin, *Inside Prime Time* (New York: Pantheon, 1983), Roland Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream. Making Way for Modernity, 1920–1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)

⁷⁸ Raymond Williams, *The Long Revolution* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1961)

⁷⁹ Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, *The Spiral of Silence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981)

⁸⁰ For a relevant comparative study, see Fred Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, *Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1970)

Thus structuralists are cultural holists. Their holism partakes of two assumptions. The first returns us to the principle of contrast within deep structures. Just as the deep structure of an individual's cognition becomes meaningful only because of contrast, so also does the deep structure of any institution's culture – including that of political institutions – make sense only when juxtaposed against that of other institutions. In consequence, the exact cultural shape which any particular institution assumes can be identified only by locating it within a larger cultural configuration.

Secondly, the collective representations of any particular institution persist because they are echoed elsewhere. To structuralists metaphor is a powerful mechanism of cultural reproduction; by metaphor is meant the subjective transformation of cultural form from one institution to another, so that substantively different narratives, stories or practices embody the same deep structure.⁸¹ Substantive contrast *between* institutions and equivalence of deep structure *within* institutions, this is the configuration cultures tend to develop.

Consider, for example the cultural norm of compromise, which embodies a deep structure that attempts to minimize the principle of contrast. Structuralists expect that the norm of compromise which characterizes two competitive political parties in pluralist political systems will reappear in market negotiations between buyer and seller, and in family dialogues between parent and child. This reproduction occurs because compromise expresses the culture's deep structure of minimum contrast. Of course, the polity, the economy and the family are all different from each other in important substantive respects; moreover, each institution reproduces the norm in its own particular way. But a common deep structure somewhat counterbalances substantive diversity, and, in so doing, gives society coherence.

III. A RECONSIDERATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE

Does structuralism offer us any new perspectives on American political culture? Or is structuralism simply an exercise in abstract theory at best of passing interest to students of American politics? To address this question let us now consider American political culture from a structuralist perspective.

As suggested earlier, in order to interpret a culture structuralists look to media narratives involving collective representations. The present brief characterization therefore relies on a large sample of contemporary American television situation comedies, corporate house organs, social studies and history texts, and magazine advertisements. Each of these media of communication presents in narrative form widely viewed collective representations of particular institutions: the family (situation comedies); the corporation (corporate house organs); the polity (social studies and history texts); and the world of consumerism (the magazine advertisement). Each also depicts four major social roles: the family member (sitcoms); the corporate manager (corporate house organs); the

⁸¹ Schwartz, *Vertical Classification*.

citizen (social studies and history texts); and the consumer (magazine advertising). I analysed over eighty American situation comedies from the top ten series of the last three seasons; approximately thirty corporate house organs published by the ten largest American corporations; fifteen of the most widely used American high school government and history texts; and every product advertisement in forty issues of the eight most popular American magazines.

Collective representations in these four forms illuminate two basic polarities of liberal democratic politics: the polarity between public and private, and the polarity between individual welfare and collective well-being. As to the first polarity, social studies texts and corporate publications are heavily utilized collective representations of two public institutions – the polity and the corporation. By contrast, popular situation comedies and magazine advertisements depict to large audiences the private sphere in the form of families and consumers. As to the second polarity, corporations and individual consumers mainly pursue self-interest either in the form of profits or in the form of purely personal preferences. By contrast, families and politics pursue collective aims either in the form of family solidarity or government policies. Collective representations of these two polarities are not only central to the operation of liberal democratic cultures, but are also amenable to structural analysis of the sort outlined earlier.

In this brief reconstruction of the narratives and collective representations embedded in these media I provide only a few salient conclusions. This article intends only to illustrate the structuralist approach to this material, and to see if such an approach yields new insights into culture and politics in the United States. Given this limited objective, the argument proceeds in broad strokes, ignoring important sub-themes in the material. All the article *does* contend is that the cultural pattern it describes is the dominant one in these particular American popular media and that the dominance of this pattern can be traced to salient aspects of American history. But this effort is a sketch, not a full portrait.

Based on these media narratives, American political culture may be conceptualized primarily as a culture of *mythologized individualism*. *Individualism* refers to the deep structural classification form of these narratives. *Mythologized individualism* indicates the fact that media narratives of individualism are powerful and recurrent.

To understand the sense in which the term 'individualism' applies to these collective representations, consider the work of Mary Douglas. Douglas proposes that all institutions can be described by reference to two dimensions: the 'rules of admission to a group' (the grid dimension), and the 'extent of regulation within a group' (the group dimension).⁸²

The resulting four-fold typology of institutions can be adapted to describe a society's deep structure of culture. Indeed, the typology incorporates the structuralist's principle of contrast, for although moderate positions on both grid and

⁸² Douglas and Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture*, p. 3.



group dimensions are possible,⁸³ such positions become intelligible only by reference to sharp differences between separated groups, and to broad spans of legitimate hierarchical authority over group members.

Douglas calls institutions with easily penetrable boundaries and limited legitimate hierarchical power 'individualistic'. American political culture as portrayed in the media this article examines typifies individualism. In such depictions Americans reject hard and fast distinctions along both grid and group dimensions. In fully polarized cultures distinctions between leaders and led, between sharply opposed groups, and between spheres of life (e.g. the family and the polity) become rigid and stable, supported by rituals of legitimation and periodic conflicts which reproduce the polarities over time. By contrast American political culture as reflected in these media radiates distrust of centralized power, dislike of politicians and suspicion of any fixed social boundaries. Rituals of leadership legitimation compete with what Garfinkel has called rituals of degradation⁸⁴ – trials for malfeasance in office, for example, or destruction of Mafia bosses by heroic cops. Social mobility for individuals in pursuit of personal success is more esteemed than submission to primordial group pressures. Indeed, the conventional political culture literature reviewed earlier also revealed this pattern of individualism. This literature demonstrates that Americans prefer permeable boundaries between ideas (e.g., political ideologies) and groups (e.g., political parties). Americans also object to large gaps between leaders and led, and refuse to be bound by consistent adherence to any particular level of tolerance or equality. These phenomena are symptoms of an individualistic political culture.

Although the data do not reveal this as a fact, we may suspect that the individualistic political culture of the United States can be traced very largely to the uncontested influence of liberal political philosophy on American life.⁸⁵ The basic tension in American liberal thought is the struggle between the individual and the state. Lockean theory, which lies at the heart of American liberalism, construes the individual as naturally free, untrammelled and good, and confronts this individual with a government or a society that is centralized, constraining, potentially repressive and sometimes evil. The deep structure of liberalism classifies the individual and nature as good and classifies the state and society as a necessary evil. From this elementary liberal polarity American culture has developed multiple individualist forms, most of which contain weak group boundaries, few sharp group tensions, ease of individual mobility between groups, and limited legitimate power differentials between leader and led.

⁸³ Thompson, 'A Three-Dimensional Model'.

⁸⁴ Harold Garfinkel, 'Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies', *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (1956), 420–4.

⁸⁵ Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955); Louis Hartz with others, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964); William Alton Kelso, *American Democratic Theory* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978); Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973); Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

A powerful narrative which mythologizes individualism in American political culture is the civil religion. Bellah first applied Rousseau's concept of the civil religion to the United States, arguing that Americans conceived their history to be the secular unfolding of a transcendent predestined sacred truth.⁸⁶ In Bellah's view American civil religion mythologizes and legitimizes the American polity by conveying to the political process a progressive, teleological, foreordained, transcendent purpose. Huntington's recent analysis of American political culture builds a similar argument, although Huntington sees cycles rather than progress in American civil religion.⁸⁷ Most important, the civil religion dramatizes the individual's heroic escape from illegitimate group constraints. In so doing the civil religion dramatizes the deep structure of American political culture.

We need not search far to discover aspects of civil religion in American politics. After all, Americans venerate the Revolutionary period, some apparently seeing in it a veritable Golden Age before the Fall of Political Man. For many Americans the writings of the Founders are akin to the Bible for Christians. How else to explain the stubborn adherence of American statesmen to the actual wording of the Constitution, the reluctance with which Americans have undertaken the process of constitutional amendment, and the national celebration and ritualization of the Constitution's bicentennial? Moreover, there are many parallels between biblical and American stories of national sacrifice and redemption.⁸⁸ Both stories contain sequences of repression and escape followed by renewed falls from grace (black slavery in America, the Golden Calf in the Old Testament); the subsequent purging of evil (the Civil War, the Civil Rights Movement, the Hebrews' Sojourn in the Wilderness); the martyrdom of great leaders (Moses, Christ, Kennedy, Martin Luther King); and the entry into the Promised Land (the crossing over Jordan, Manifest Destiny, the New Deal).

A plethora of rituals condenses the civil religion into dramatically powerful tableaux. Although the institutional apparatus for developing political rituals is comparatively decentralized in America, some traditional ceremonies – e.g., Inauguration Days and Memorial Days – possess evocative qualities.⁸⁹ During the 1960s the funerals of martyred leaders provided unexpected opportunities for Americans to rededicate themselves to a suddenly expanded civil religion. Recently, television has developed 'para-social' or vicarious rituals, such as the Statue of Liberty extravaganza, which, with its emphasis upon 'Lady Liberty' as a maternal force, construed immigration as a myth of national generation. Finally, newly created ceremonies – such as the Kennedy Center Awards – provide public opportunities for national leaders to celebrate deserving creators of artistic culture. Ironically, some of these artists have at times sharply criticized

⁸⁶ Robert P. Bellah, 'Civil Religion in American', *Daedalus*, 96 (1967), 1–21.

⁸⁷ Samuel Huntington, *American Politics The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

⁸⁸ John Diggins, *The Lost Soul of American Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

⁸⁹ William Lloyd Warner, *The Living and the Dead* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959).

aspects of American life. But by ignoring this fact, awards ceremonies domesticate dissidents; the creators of culture thus themselves become cultural creations, cranky outsiders metamorphosed into fellow communicants.

The civil religion mythologizes individualism by providing both an argument for and examples of individuals overcoming illegitimate group pressures. American civil religion follows Calvinist Protestantism in accepting both the doctrine of predestination and the doctrine of free will.⁹⁰ Like Calvinist saints, the American people are destined to triumph over evil. However, following Calvinism, salvation can only be demonstrated and triumph accomplished by individual Americans freely choosing to act rightly. People are free either to embrace the good or to succumb to illegitimate group pressures. To be good is to choose freely the right, and, in so doing, to act in conformity with a benign nature. To be evil is to succumb to power, and thereby to become mired in a corrupt society. The hero is the individualist who, through an act of will, makes the passage from corrupt society to personal responsibility, to natural justice and to freedom. Most important, the civil religion argues that unless enough Americans make such conscientious choices, the nation as a *whole* will not triumph. We can see that the civil religion's paradoxical combination of predestination and free will follows Calvinism in making the fate of society contingent on the choices of individuals.

The civil religion tells dramatic stories of American heroes who have successfully negotiated the deep structural passage from group-based constraint to individual freedom. The Founding Fathers chose freedom as against conformity to the British Crown or class prejudice. Andrew Jackson rose from humble beginnings to become a great President of all the people. Abraham Lincoln surmounted the pro-slavery views of his forebears to lead Americans through the wilderness of Civil War into a new society where former slaves joined whites who already possessed freedom of choice. Franklin Roosevelt overcame the prejudices of his social class to produce a New Deal which extended 'equal opportunity' to working Americans. Martin Luther King overcame the fears and hatreds bred by years of black subordination in order to lead his people to a freer American future. These stories all depict a deep structure which poses group repression in an unjust society against individual freedom in a just, naturally sound society. The means of passage are will-power, self-reliance, and courage – in short, the individual mythologized.

One indication that the civil religion mythologizes American culture's deep structure is the way in which the civil religion is continually extended to new circumstances. A case in point is the widely cited instance of John F. Kennedy's confrontation with poverty during his West Virginia campaign for the Democratic nomination in 1960. Kennedy's experience in West Virginia allegedly 'converted' him from being a rich man's complacent son into becoming a crusader for the poor, a classic example of how an act of personal will-power,

⁹⁰ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner, 1958).

courage, and commitment can free the individual from the dead hand of class constraints.⁹¹

Assuming this description of American political culture to be accurate, structuralism next encourages us to search for collective representations of mythologized individualism in communication media. Let me describe several such representations as they appear in my sample of television sitcoms, magazines, advertising, social studies texts and corporate house organs. The pervasiveness of these representations statistically in my data demonstrates that observations of popular culture not only generate hypotheses about culture and politics, but also test such hypotheses.

According to Dolgin and Magdoff, American nationality is founded on the belief in consent to authority among free and equal persons. Moreover, 'the concept of the national collectivity of consenting, free people joined together as a nation depends, in turn, upon the reification of the autonomous individual. Or in other words, the nation is a metaphor for the individual.'⁹² One form of communication which conveys this message of autonomous consent is the advertisement which implies that by choosing a particular product the consumer not only satisfies an immediate personal 'need', but may also transform his or her character. In advertisements the consumption of goods alters persons, whereas in production persons create goods. Michael Schudson's analysis of the ways cigarette advertising helped restructure women's self-image provides a classic example of this phenomenon.⁹³ In advertisements consumer choice serves as a metaphor for the construction of social roles outside traditional group constraints. It is therefore no surprise that the United States leads the world in advertising volume; nor is it a surprise that American advertising usually depicts consumers in purely private settings, rather than in public settings where group norms could restrict their behaviour.

A second collective representation of mythologized individualism is the 'growth metaphor', which suffuses corporate publications.⁹⁴ Corporate house organs frequently portray the corporation not as a place where groups of employees earn their daily bread, but as a place where creative individuals develop their unique talents. The growth metaphor promises that an egalitarian economic organization need not be egalitarian culturally; instead, every employee – even the one who does not rise in the corporate hierarchy – can nevertheless use the corporation to become a 'better' person. Personal growth thus compensates for economic inequality.

A third collective representation of mythologized individualism is role flexibility. Many American television situation comedies tell stories about families

⁹¹ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John Kennedy in the White House* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Books, 1965), p. 158.

⁹² Janet L. Dolgin and Jo Ann Magdoff, 'The Invisible Event', in Janet Dolgin *et al.*, eds, *Symbolic Anthropology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp 351–63, at p. 353

⁹³ Michael Schudson, *Advertising: The Uneasy Persuasion* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp 178–209.

⁹⁴ Merelman, 'Sitcoms and Citicorp'

which have become painfully confining to some of their members. The culturally preferred solution to this problem is role flexibility, which permits the family to survive because family members can create and adjust to new roles.⁹⁵ For example, in one episode of *Family Ties*, when the adolescent daughter demands that her father behave towards her more like a peer and less like a parent, he quickly responds without losing face. In stark contrast to traditional family structures, the American family survives precisely because it contains few fixed role norms. Malleable roles permit the family to subordinate itself to the changing identities of its members.

Finally, American mass media regularly disparage sharp distinctions between leaders and led, particularly in the political realm. This message appears in three ways. Firstly, some media simply avoid the subject of power distinctions entirely. Corporate publications, for example, regularly shy away from political stories. Rarely do such publications describe the corporation as a powerful lobbyist, a major contributor to electoral campaigns or an influential participant in the making of public policies. Instead, corporations pretend to lack an external political life, a stance which protects them from embarrassing questions about the culturally illegitimate power they may wield over a vulnerable citizenry.

Secondly, television programmes commonly portray political leaders as certainly no cleverer than other people, and often more stupid. For example, one episode of *Highway to Heaven*, a popular programme from the 1985–6 season, describes the troubled relationship between a short-sighted Russian political leader and his mother. The trouble stems in part from the Russian's unwillingness to share his mother's well-founded trust of American leaders. Here political rivalries interfere with the healthy development of family life, causing otherwise loving family members to become estranged.

Thirdly, television programmes argue that political logic succeeds only when it incorporates unifying private emotions. Consider the previous example: the Russian leader has come to America to negotiate nuclear force reductions. But because he is anxious to protect Russian national security he takes a politically unproductive 'hard line'. However, his dying mother – precisely because she is untutored politically – 'knows' instinctively that if he would act on his instinctively correct personal inclinations to trust the Americans, rather than on his misleading political calculations, a mutually beneficial arms control agreement could be reached. He eventually succumbs to her urgings, and, of course, succeeds both personally and politically. Paradoxically, leaders become statesmen only when they behave like everyone else; they must never allow their specialized roles to isolate them from the common urgings of the human heart.

Structural anthropology has directed the analysis we have pursued in this section. Structuralism helped us to identify the classificational form and narrative dynamics of mythologized individualism in American civil religion. Structuralism pointed us towards popular culture as a set of collective representations.

⁹⁵ Merelman, 'Sitcoms and Citicorp'.

Structuralism helped identify the public-private and collective-individual polarities as stimulants to the generation of collective representations in liberal democracies. Most important, although forms of analysis other than structuralism might also have identified these three types of analysis individually, structuralism alone united the three in a single ensemble. Thus, for example, while Hochschild⁹⁶ identified a dichotomy between perceptions of economic inequality and perceptions of familial equality in American political culture, structural analysis traces this dichotomy to the collective representations of public and private which depict and help manage this dichotomy.

IV. CONCLUSION

Mythologized individualism as the deep structure of American political culture is not without costs. For one thing, the heavy burden which it places on the individual ensures that much of the time most Americans cannot realize their cultural ideals in action. They must therefore labour under the threat of culturally imposed guilt. Mythologized individualism also avoids the material inequalities that divide American social groups against each other – blacks against whites, the poor against the rich, labour against capital, women against men. Mythologized individualism culturally converts these economically generated group differences into the apparently eradicable consequences of poor personal choices.⁹⁷

Indeed, avoidance may itself become culturally legitimate. Michael Billig argues that people learn to live comfortably and guiltlessly with the cultural 'contradictions' capitalism creates. Many persons become 'ambivalent trimmers', more adept at seeing all sides of any issue than at choosing one. Billig traces the concept of ambivalent trimming to Pareto, who observed 'how easily people accept exceptions to general rules. A general principle which everyone accepts is laid down; then all the necessary exemptions are made, thanks to which the general principle is no longer general except in appearance.'⁹⁸

To Billig all deep cultural structures, including mythologized individualism, are indefinite, flexible, open, subject to endless exception and constantly under seige. He writes, 'If principles are by nature open ended, and are recognized to be such, then ordinary people ... will develop strategies to categorize violations of principles as loopholes.'⁹⁹ Eventually these strategies become not just grudgingly accepted, but actually embedded in the culture; indeed, their practitioners actually welcome exceptions which they rationalize by reference to the norm of 'individualism' itself. Why, they ask, should the individual be 'hamstrung' by principles? Soon mythologized individualism degenerates to pious rhetoric or callous hypocrisy.

⁹⁶ Hochschild, *What's Fair?*

⁹⁷ Richard M Merelman, *Making Something of Ourselves. On Culture and Politics in the United States* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

⁹⁸ Michael Billig, *Ideology and Social Science* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), p. 217

⁹⁹ Billig, *Ideology and Social Science*, p. 223.

Although there is much in Billig's view, exceptions to a culture's deep structure cannot escape some limit. After all, if exceptions were to become endless, the very concepts of exception and norm would eventually become meaningless. Indeed, performance exceptions 'become' exceptions only because a cultural deep structure provides the cognitive ground against which exceptions flash as transient figures. The indefinite proliferation of exceptions ends up as cognitive chaos, and, in Jahoda's words, 'There is no evidence of any people who regard the world as chaotic, . . . [A] tendency to seek for order, meaning, and if possible, control (or at least the illusion of control) is probably a fundamental human attribute, performing an adaptive function.'¹⁰⁰ This article, therefore, concludes by speculating about three ways mythologized individualism in America interacts with the inadequacies it creates, and, in so doing, alters the surface characteristics of American political culture.

Because the ideas of choice, development and growth are central components of mythologized individualism, Americans are prone to distinguish sharply between societies where they believe individual choice flourishes and societies where they believe it does not. Indeed, the idea of individual choice helps Americans to distinguish between the United States (the 'home' of choice) and other societies. Only a small cognitive displacement is necessary for Americans to perceive multiple and sometimes exaggerated distinctions between themselves and 'less free' societies, such as the Soviet Union. This reaction may be called 'cultural displacement'.

But what about group constraint within American society? Many Americans do recognize that stubborn economic and social inequalities prevent some of their fellow citizens from exercising meaningful personal choice.¹⁰¹ But Americans often explain this culturally dissonant phenomenon by distinguishing between a 'real world' of necessary economic inequality that motivates 'practical people' to produce efficiently, and an 'ideal world' of relaxed equality in which domestic relations and friendship flower.¹⁰² The real thus takes leave of the ideal; Americans become simultaneously the most pragmatic and the most romantic of peoples, a paradox which baffles foreigners only slightly more than it baffles Americans themselves. This reaction may be called 'cultural bifurcation'.

Finally, the strain between the real and the ideal occasionally becomes unbearable, creating reform movements which attempt to extend the range of free choice. But there are limits to such efforts, for the movements which undertake reform not only engender opposition but also must first ensure free choice and the right to dissent in their own ranks. Soon intra-group fragmentation and inter-group conflict develop; as a result, culturally conditioned reform efforts always fall short of their targets. This reaction may be called 'incomplete reform'.¹⁰³

We can speculate that these three reactions form irregular cycles in American

¹⁰⁰ Gustav Jahoda, *Psychology and Anthropology* (London: Academic Press, 1982), p. 171.

¹⁰¹ Daniel Moynihan, *Family and Nation* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1986).

¹⁰² Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

¹⁰³ Huntington, *American Politics*.

history, altering the surface contours of American political culture. Periods of cultural bifurcation (e.g., the 1870s–80s; the 1920s; the late 1950s; the 1980s) generate moral revulsion, and the desire among many to extend the ideal to the real, thus eradicating ‘unfair’ inequalities. This impulse produces periods of incomplete reform (e.g., the Populist-Progressive era of 1890–1910; the New Deal; the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s). But fragmentation within and opposition from outside eventually destroy these movements, leaving their adherents bitter and their opponents suspicious. Fear and suspicion motivate bursts of cultural displacement, often associated with foreign wars (e.g., the First World War and the ‘crusade for democracy’, the anti-fascist Second World War, followed by the Cold War of the late 1940s and early 1950s). The Civil War and Reconstruction also constituted a phase of cultural displacement in expunging slavery from the South, following an incomplete reform period of Abolitionist agitation beginning in the 1840s. This phase itself followed a period of cultural bifurcation and economic expansion from the late 1830s until the late 1840s. Most important, military episodes discharge the reform-generated pressures of bitterness and fear, preparing the way for a return to cultural bifurcation and the beginning of a new cycle.

Of course, all three culturally conditioned reactions exist to varying degrees within American society at any moment. The hypothesized cycles reflect only the dominance of particular reactions at specific historical junctures. More important than the question of cycles, however, is the recognition that surface manifestations of American political culture may be deeply influenced by the vicissitudes of mythologized individualism itself. In periods of cultural bifurcation, such as the late 1950s, we should expect little ideological coherence among the mass public, whereas in the 1960s incomplete reform efforts tightened ideological structures.¹⁰⁴ Thus, structural anthropology again helps us to hypothesize about some recurrent dynamics of American political culture.

Ultimately, mythologized individualism’s unique distinctions between the real and ideal, the possible and the desirable, the free individual and the confining group, the general principle and the exempted practice, help to reproduce the main features of both capitalist economics and pluralist politics in the United States. Mythologized individualism simultaneously ensures capitalism’s reproduction of inequality, and pluralism’s imperfect, but still real, amelioration of inequality.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, mythologized individualism helps crystallize major features of the American political landscape. Moreover, in so doing, mythologized individualism invites Americans to question all impositions of group power, including the social imposition of culture itself. But rather than being a declaration of cultural suicide, this invitation becomes instead a signal example of American culture at work, and thus assists mythologized individualism to reproduce itself, assuring it renewed vitality at the heart of American political life.

¹⁰⁴ Verba, Nie and Petrocik, *The New American Electorate*.

¹⁰⁵ Stephen J. Elkin, ‘Pluralism in its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy’, in Robert Benjamin and Stephen Elkin, eds, *The Democratic State* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1985), pp. 169–213.

Looking Forward and Looking Backward: Prospective and Retrospective Voting in the 1980 Federal Elections in Canada

ERIC M. USLANER

Theories of voting have distinguished between prospective and retrospective evaluations of political parties. However, not only may both factors be at work in an election, but they may also be complementary. The 1980 Canadian federal elections were, according to most accounts, both a retrospective and a prospective referendum on the energy issue. However, previous examinations of this election have failed to show any mandate emerging from the contest. This re-analysis of election data from that contest, shows that both prospective and retrospective evaluations mattered, above and beyond the quality of leadership in the country. Moreover, the pattern of voting strongly suggests an elite-led pattern of issue concerns akin to that suggested by the 'two-step flow of communications'. Those with the strongest pattern of issue concerns voted prospectively, while less committed partisans cast their ballots retrospectively.

When citizens cast their ballots on the basis of government policy, do they look forward or backward? Looking forward involves comparing the policy proposals of alternative parties and estimating which party will maximize the voter's net benefits. There is at least a modicum of sophistication required of such issue, or prospective, voters. They must place the parties (as well as themselves) somewhere in an issue space and be able to make some type of calculations about future expectations. On the other hand, looking backward – or voting retrospectively – makes far fewer demands on the citizen. All one has to do is to answer the straightforward question posed by Ronald Reagan in 1980: 'Are you better off now than you were four years ago?'

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The critical distinction is that only prospective voting is posited to produce policy mandates. Citizens who are disaffected with current government performance may disagree strongly among themselves about what the ideal policies ought to be. There is considerable evidence that this distinction between prospective and retrospective evaluations has not only analytical power but also empirical referents.¹

However, before we accept this disjunction as central to our understanding about how voters behave, we need to consider the theoretical underpinnings for this dichotomy. Fiorina posits two types of evaluations that voters make and these correspond to looking forward and looking backward. The former he attributes to the spatial modelling approach of Downs, the latter to a study by Key. Yet, the frameworks of both Downs and Key contain elements of *both* retrospective and prospective evaluations.²

Downs puts forward a spatial model of elections that seems fundamentally prospective. However, because parties have incentives to make their policy stands ambiguous, voters may have few alternatives than to cast ballots on the basis of promises broken or kept. Indeed, Downs maintains that citizens who make their voting decisions on the basis of issues will find 'the records of each party... more important to their decisions than party promises about the future'.³ While Key proposes a basically retrospective way of looking at elections, the survey questions he examines for his thesis include many prospective items. In short, the authors whose work formed the basis for the forward-backward distinction apparently did not intend to make such a separation.

This bit of sociology of knowledge is important because it calls our attention to a central point: retrospective and prospective evaluations can occur at the same time. While no one has claimed that the two types of evaluations are mutually exclusive, no conceptual linkage between the two has been articulated. Retrospective voting helps to restore some modicum of rationality to an electorate that otherwise is not strongly interested in the great issues of politics. Yet, by what mechanisms are even these retrospective evaluations framed? Public opinion is not static. It must be energized, as recognized almost four decades ago in the notion of the 'two-step flow of communications'.

The 'two-step flow' framework assumes that perceptions flow from the media to opinion leaders and then to the less interested segment of the electorate. Such

¹ On spatial voting and its relationship to prospective voting, see Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, *The Spatial Theory of Voting* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), esp pp 8-9. On the distinction between retrospective and prospective voting, see Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting*; and Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, 'Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1980', *American Political Science Review*, 79 (1985), 359-72.

² Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting*, Chap. 1; Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Chaps. 3, 7, and p. 298; and V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

³ Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 298.

elite-led issue voting has played a prominent role in recent accounts of how realignments occur in American politics.⁴ Downs also posits a group of more informed citizens who may seek to persuade others; such people are more likely to have clearer expectations of what to expect if either party is chosen to govern the nation. These opinion leaders might also help to transmit the views of a forward-looking elite to a backward-looking mass electorate.⁵

When an election campaign focuses on a central issue that sharply divides the major parties, retrospective evaluations of the performance of the incumbent party are likely to be shaped by the prospective expectations of those voters whose opinions have crystallized. Attitudes on government policies, then, 'trickle down' from the policy-making elites to the opinion leaders to the mass public. At each stage, some specificity is lost as we move from detailed concerns about alternative policies to a more general regard for the direction of future decisions to a more diffuse referendum on the policies of the incumbent administration. When the major parties do not offer voters clear alternatives, the more traditional model of retrospective voting seems to be more appropriate, together with its disjunction between looking forward and looking backward.

THE CANADIAN ELECTION OF 1980

The 1980 federal elections in Canada appear to offer an ideal test for the presence of issue effects, both prospective and retrospective, in voting. The minority Progressive Conservative government of the Prime Minister, Joe Clark, fell in December 1979 (after less than a year in office), when the small New Democratic party withdrew its support over the government's budget and the even smaller Social Credit party also defected. This forced what became known as 'the 18-cent election', after the gasoline tax in the budget that led to the government's demise. The opposition Liberal party won a majority in the contest and eight months later put forth the National Energy Programme (NEP), a wide-ranging policy that completely reversed the movement toward world prices and a free market. Rarely in North American politics have voters been presented with such a stark contrast in policy views between two major parties.

The conventional wisdom supported the view that the 1980 contest was indeed a referendum on the energy issue. The Progressive Conservatives (PCs) were identified with a position favourable to energy producers in their quest for pricing in accord with world levels. The Liberals, on the other hand, stressed protection of consumers through 'made in Canada' prices that were substantially below world levels. The two parties also differed on which level of government should control energy resources. The PCs supported what they held was

⁴ On the two-step flow, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1948), pp. 151–2. The re-alignment studies are: Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, 'On the Structure and Sequence of Issue Evolution', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), 901–20; and Stuart Elaine Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, 'The Dynamics of Structural Realignment', *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1987), 775–96.

⁵ Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Chap. 6.

the traditional constitutional guarantee of provincial control over natural resources, while the Liberals asserted (using different sections of the often-contradictory British North America Act of 1867) the right of the federal government to regulate natural resources.

Table 1 presents summaries of opinion polls on the importance of the energy issue.⁶ Except for the Gallup survey, the energy issue ranks at least second for every poll included in the table. In the National Election Study it was cited virtually as frequently as party leadership as the reason for the vote. This is a sharp increase in the salience of the issue in just one year.⁷ It is the perverse thesis of this article that, in spite of seemingly disconfirming evidence, the 'conventional wisdom' was correct after all. Some voters were motivated by the energy issue and others followed their lead by casting (largely negative) retrospective evaluations of the PC's energy policy.

In contrast to the 'conventional wisdom', the major study of the 1980 federal election found little advantage accruing to the Liberals on energy in a voting scenario that produced an 'absent mandate'.⁸ Such results point to a key paradox in Canadian politics. On the one hand, Canadian parties are highly cohesive in Parliamentary voting. On the other hand, this intra-party unity does not indicate programmatic orientations. Rather, Canadian parties are widely perceived to be 'brokerage' institutions characterized by 'an unusually large variety of politically important cleavages'. They are ideological pot-pourris that are particularly weak at policy formation. It is even unclear whether we might expect *indirect* effects of issues on elections through retrospective evaluations. While there is strong evidence that partisan identification depends on citizens' issue preferences, the nexus among issue positions, the state of the economy, and evaluations of party performance is weak.⁹

⁶ The data in the first two columns of Table 1 are reported in Lawrence LeDuc and J. Alex Murray, 'A Resurgence of Canadian Nationalism', in Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke, eds., *Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), pp. 270–90, at p. 289. Data in the third column are reported in William Irvine, 'Epilogue: The 1980 Election', in Howard R. Penniman, ed., *Canada at the Polls, 1979 and 1980* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 337–98, at p. 374. Data for the fourth column are reported in Gordon H. G. McDougall and Gerald Keller, *Energy: Canadians' Attitudes and Reactions (1975–1980)* (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada), p. 17. Data for the final column are reported in Jon H. Pammett, 'Elections', in Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, eds., *Canadian Politics in the 1980s*, 2nd edn (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), pp. 271–86, at p. 273.

⁷ The percentage of respondents who mentioned energy as the most important issue in 1980 rose by a factor of 3.3 from 1979. See Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon H. Pammett, *Absent Mandate. The Politics of Discontent in Canada* (Toronto: Gage, 1984), p. 81, Table 4–1.

⁸ Clarke et al., *Absent Mandate*.

⁹ On Canadian parties as brokerage institutions, see Clarke et al., *Absent Mandate*, pp. 11, 13–15; on the link between partisanship and issue preferences, see Clarke and Marianne Stewart, 'Short-Term Forces and Partisan Change in Canada: 1974–1980', *Electoral Studies*, 4 (1985), 15–35. For diverse findings on the impact of retrospective factors on party evaluations, see Harold D. Clarke and Gary Zuk, 'The Politics of Party Popularity', *Comparative Politics*, 19 (1987), 299–315; Harold D. Clark, Marianne Stewart and Gary Zuk, 'The Political Economy of Party Support in Canada, 1980–

TABLE 1 *Public Concerns on Election Issues, Various Polls, 1980*

Issue	Gallup: most important*	Total mentions	Toronto Star: most important*	Government Survey: how serious?†	Election Study: reason for vote‡
Inflation	50	83	36	95	8
Unemployment	18	65	18	82	5
Environment/pollu- tion	11	33	—	72	—
Energy	8	42	27	—	29
(Cost of energy)	—	—	—	82	—
(Energy shortage)	—	—	—	66	—
Provincial-federal relations/national unity	7	38	—	71	11
Budget	—	—	5	—	15
Leaders, leadership	—	—	—	—	30
Political parties	—	—	—	—	23
General economic issues	—	—	—	—	15

* Most important problem facing country

† Perception of problem as serious or very serious

‡ Reason for vote choice in 1980

What helps anchor voters? If not issues or party performance on the macro-economy, then perhaps party identification plays the key role. Yet, differing patterns of identification at the federal and provincial levels have historically weakened the impact of partisanship among the electorate. Nor do Canadians fit into the patterns of cleavage found in most other polities, especially those with parliamentary systems. The electorate does not generally cast ballots along most of the traditional demographic cleavages such as religion, sex, occupation or class. Instead, the dominant factor in Canadian elections, according to the most sophisticated analyses of the 1980 and previous contests, is the evaluation of party leaders. The 1980 contest pitted the former Liberal Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, against the incumbent PC leader, Joe Clark. By 1980 Clark had become an object of derision throughout the country, even in his native West.¹⁰

1984', *European Journal of Political Economy*, 2 (1986), 25-45; and Kristen Monroe and Lynda Erickson, 'The Economy and Political Support: The Canadian Case', *Journal of Politics*, 48 (1986), 616-47.

¹⁰ The simple correlation between the feeling thermometer for Clarke and a dummy variable for region was just 0.12. For studies on the effects of key variables on vote choice, see Clarke *et al.*, *Absent Mandate*; Harold D. Clarke *et al.*, *Political Choice in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978); Lawrence LeDuc, 'Canada: The Politics of Stable Dealignment', in Russell J. Dalton *et al.*, eds, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 404-24; and Jon H. Pammett, 'Class Voting and Class Consciousness in Canada', *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 24 (1987), 269-90.

Other variables that are important determinants of vote choice in Canadian elections, and that reflect larger conflicts within the society, are religion (especially the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy) and language (English-French).

It is the thesis here that the conventional wisdom about Canadian politics in 1980 was indeed correct: the energy issue *mattered*, in both a prospective and a retrospective sense. Along the way to demonstrating this, a method for resolving measurement problems will be introduced. But the question of central importance – and the ultimate pay-off from such an analysis – is why the energy issue mattered. In a political system marked by two major political parties that generally do not take sharply contrasting views on policies, energy stood out as a notable exception. It encapsulated conflicts that run deep in Canadian society: West versus East, whether the federal government or the provinces should control natural resources, and, more generally, the very idea of Canadian nationality. The Liberal party espoused the view that Canada should be one nation, and this implied federal control over the society's resources. The Progressive Conservatives emphasized that Canada was a 'community of communities', with provinces forming the basic political (and social) units. The two party leaders in 1980 reflected these basic conflicts. The incumbent Prime Minister, a Westerner, strongly endorsed the provincialist view. His Liberal opponent, Trudeau, had based his entire career upon forging a single national identity, and to that end proposed both a national energy policy and the repatriation of the Constitution (with a Charter of Rights) from Great Britain.

The conflict over nationality was also reinforced by the sharp producer-consumer cleavage on energy that emerged during both the 1973 and 1979 energy crises. There was a notable lack of cross-cutting cleavages from groups such as environmentalists, farmers, etc.¹¹ The post-election conflict over the Liberals' National Energy Policy was not just a regional battle between Alberta and the federal government dominated by Central Canada (Ontario and Quebec). It was also a partisan confrontation between the two major parties, and one that had long historical roots. The Liberals had for almost three decades been shut out in Western Canada, a symbol of that region's alienation from Central Canada and the party that had governed the country for most of the years since the Second World War. Brady argued that a key condition for responsible party government is a strong correlation between constituency traits and party representation in government.¹² In 1980, the Liberals held just one of seventy-seven Western seats in the federal Parliament and only one of 259 seats in provincial Legislative Assemblies.

¹¹ Glyn R. Berry, 'The Oil Lobby and the Energy Crisis', *Canadian Public Administration*, 17 (1974), 600–35; and Glen Toner and G. Bruce Doern, 'The Two Energy Crises and Canadian Oil and Gas Interest Groups', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 19 (1986), 467–93.

¹² David W. Brady, 'Critical Elections, Congressional Parties and Clusters of Policy Change', *British Journal of Political Science*, 8 (1978), 79–100.

In order for this *potential* for party government to be realized, voters must be able to perceive clear differences between the parties *on the issue that gives rise to the partisan alignment*. If parties do not differ on issues, as Canadian parties generally do not, then the linkage Brady proposed (as he himself argues) is unlikely to be realized. In 1980, energy performed precisely this role. If the contention that the energy issue was salient in the 1980 federal elections is correct – and the data analysis below supports this interpretation – then the critical question becomes *how* policy differences between parties are translated into voting choices.

The demise of the Clark government on what was at least in part an energy issue suggests that much retrospective voting would be likely. But retrospective voting does not provide any policy mandate. It does not depend upon an electorate that is clearly polarized on an issue in partisan terms. Such a scenario is more typical of prospective or issue-based voting. In 1980 *both* types of voting behaviour took place. As we shall see, an 'issue elite' did vote prospectively, taking its cues from the sharp divisions between the two parties on the issue that dominated public debate. Other, less interested voters took their cues from the 'issue elite' in a pattern reminiscent of the 'two-step flow of communication' and cast retrospective ballots according to their approval or disapproval of the question that brought the government down.

CITIZENS AND ISSUE EVALUATIONS

What motivated vote choices in the 1980 federal elections? Following common practice, two measures of vote choice in 1980 will be examined. The first is a dichotomous measure of voting for the Liberals versus any other party and the second is a similar index for the PCs. To understand the role of issues in an election, it is even more useful to consider the impact of such forces on people who switched their votes between 1979 and 1980. Looking at the full sample tells us what made people vote the way they did – an interesting question in its own right. Examining switchers, however, tells us more about the role of issues (and other variables) in the Liberals' replacement of the PCs in 1980.¹³ Fortuitously, the 1974–79–80 Canadian National Election Study was a panel, permitting valid inferences on vote switching between the latter two years.

Was the energy issue sufficiently salient to the electorate to lead to prospective voting? Given the centrality of energy to the debate over Canadian identity, it is possible that the rather stringent conditions for 'issue voting' might be met. Yet, since the Liberals offered no specific energy programme (much less the NEP) in the 1980 elections, voters had little specific guidance in determining the spatial location of the opposition – other than knowing it was likely to be at some distance from the PCs. In the aggregate, Clarke *et al.* find that between 1979 and

¹³ See Eric M. Uslaner and Margaret Conway, 'The Responsible Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974', *American Political Science Review*, 79 (1985), 788–803.

1980 the Liberal edge over the PCs on resource issues increased by just 5 per cent and on economic issues (including the budget) it actually fell by 1 per cent. None the less, by 1980 the Liberals had a barely measurable two percentage point advantage over the PCs on resource issues.¹⁴

A model of vote choice in the 1980 elections should incorporate the key features of the campaign. The Canadian National Election Study included questions on both retrospective and prospective issue voting as well as evaluations of party leaders. The 'energy salience' variable taps prospective evaluations. It is a summary index of: (1) whether the voter considered energy to be the most important or second most important issue in the campaign; (2) how important the issue was to the voter; and (3) the partisan direction of the voter's issue preference.¹⁵ Separate measures were computed for Liberals and PCs, in keeping with the measurement of the dependent variables for vote choice.

The retrospective measure is an index of disapproval of the Progressive Conservative budget, the proposal that led to the fall of the Clark government. Citizens who disapproved of the budget are assumed to vote against the PCs. Since the retrospective evaluations should affect the governing party more than the opposition, the impact of budget disapproval should be greater for the equation for Progressive Conservative voting than for Liberal voting. There is, however, one key difficulty with this retrospective measure. Attitudes to the budget were asked of only half of the sample, leaving just 449 (weighted) cases for analysis after cases with missing values on any predictor have been deleted. While this sample size may suffice to establish some important results, comparability with other studies of the 1980 Canadian election that have reached different conclusions is limited.

A method of estimating scores for budget disapproval for those respondents who were not asked their opinions on this issue was therefore sought. This was an instrumental variable technique, estimating an equation for the observed

¹⁴ Clarke *et al.*, *Absent Mandate*, p. 90. Irvine, 'Epilogue', reports a *Toronto Star* poll which gave the Liberals a 3-2 advantage on energy issues.

¹⁵ The index was computed as follows. For both the most important and second most important issue in the election, a dummy variable was created for voters who cited the energy issue (coded '1') and those who did not (coded '0'). Citizens who were scored '1' were weighted by how important they said the issue was in their voting decisions (by three for those who said very important, by two for those who said somewhat important, and by one for those who said not very important). Respondents who did not give one of these responses were recoded as zero. These scores (ranging from one to three) were weighted by the party preferred on the issue. For the Liberal analysis, citizens preferring the Liberals were weighted by +1 and those preferring other parties were weighted by -1 (again with those who had no party preference re-coded to zero). A similar weighting was done for the Progressive Conservatives (+1 if the PCs were preferred, -1 if some other party was preferred). Finally, the scores for each respondent on the two most important issues were summed, producing a range of -6 to +6 for each measure. The direct summation yielded superior results to alternative weighting schemes for the two most important issues Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting*, p. 70, also employs the most important issue as a measure of prospective voting. Such a measure is prospective in that voters have preferences about policy areas and can state the party with which they most agree on an issue. Such voters thus fulfil the key conditions for spatial voting, which is posited to be prospective, by Downs in *An Economic Theory*.

values of budget disapproval by a battery of mostly demographic variables. The equation for the cases for which there were observations on budget disapproval was used to estimate values for those cases with no responses to this variable (but with responses to the demographic variables). As expected, the standard errors for the estimated instrumental variable in vote choice equations are somewhat greater than those for the measured attitudes.¹⁶ The effect is that the coefficients for budget disapproval in models of vote choice will be conservatively estimated. Only energy will be considered as a possible issue effect in the 1980 elections. While Table 1 indicates that voters were concerned with inflation and unemployment as well, these issues did not constitute significant reasons for vote choice (see the final column) and no measures of voter concern for either (apart from the most important issue) appear in the survey.

The measures of partisan affiliation were based on the constructs of the dependent variable, vote choice. Liberal identification is scored from +4 to -4 with the positive values representing very strong, strong and not very strong identifiers and non-identifiers who lean to the Liberals. Negative scores represent identifiers of varying degrees of strength (and leaners) with *all other parties*; scores of zero are reserved for non-identifiers. A similar measure is constructed for PC identification.

Evaluations of party leaders are measured by the difference in scores on feeling thermometers for Trudeau and Clark. For voters who base their decisions on the party leaders, it simply makes sense to compare Trudeau and Clark. Additionally, in preliminary analyses of the data, the *difference* in thermometer ratings was consistently more strongly related to vote choice than either leader's evaluation was by itself.

Canada has a weak sense of nationhood and many citizens have stronger affect for their provinces than for the country. The conflict over the energy issue reflected the debate over issues of equity and constitutional control over resources.¹⁷ The Progressive Conservatives backed the demands of the producing provinces (primarily Alberta) to control their natural resources; the Liberals sought to assert federal control over resources as part of a larger plan to reduce

¹⁶ Technically, the problem is that instrumental variable estimators are neither unbiased nor efficient. However, they are consistent and asymptotically efficient. Thus, it is hardly surprising that there would be some difference in mean scores and that the standard errors would be larger than for the measured variables. For the 'full sample' analysed below ($N = 1,051$), the measured attitudes were employed for the first half sample and the estimated attitudes were employed for the second half sample. A critical test of the instrumental variable technique, but not the only one performed, compared the probit coefficients for the vote choice model for two half-samples (one with measured attitudes and the other with estimated attitudes on budget disapproval). For the Liberal vote choice equations, the probit coefficients estimated were 0.472 and 0.498 respectively. For the Progressive Conservative vote choice equations, the coefficients were -0.751 and -0.741 respectively. Clearly these results are more than satisfactory. The probit R^2 for the instrumental variable estimation was 0.405. For a similar approach, see John E. Jackson, 'Issues and Party Alignment', in L. Maisel and P. M. Sacks, eds, *The Future of Political Parties* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 101-21. A more detailed appendix on the methodology employed is available from the author.

¹⁷ See G. Bruce Doern, 'The Mega-Project Episode and the Formulation of Canadian Economic Development Policy', *Canadian Public Administration*, 26 (1983), 191-238, p. 223.

provincial power and to impose a sense of nationhood on Canada. An index of 'pro-Canada sentiments' was constructed by subtracting the feeling thermometer rating for a respondent's home province from the thermometer evaluation for Canada.

There is a strong regional pattern of voting in Canadian elections. Hence, a dummy variable for region (0 = East, 1 = West) was created.¹⁸ Similarly, because Quebec has been the Liberal stronghold throughout Canada, a dummy variable for Quebec residence was created. Western residence should be negatively related to Liberal vote choice (and positively related to voting for the PCs), while the opposite relationships should hold for Quebec citizens. Quebec's status as the heartland of the Liberal party's vote dictates that a separate dummy variable for residence in that province be included. Finally, two demographic variables have demonstrated relationships to vote choice in previous analyses: age and education. As each increases, so should the likelihood of voting for the PCs, which is in line with a more general argument that both increased age and more education are associated with greater conservatism. As noted above, religion and language are also important determinants of vote choice. However, preliminary analyses indicated that both variables had insignificant relationships to vote choice controlling for the other predictors in the analysis. Hence, these variables were omitted from the final models.¹⁹

I estimate an identical model for switchers, here coded as '1' if they switched to the Liberals from 1979 to 1980, and as '0' if they switched to the PCs. Because of the construction of this variable, the Liberal measures of party identification and energy salience are adopted in the switcher equations. Because the dependent variables (vote choice) are dichotomies, the appropriate technique for estimating the equations is probit analysis.²⁰ Probit equations will be presented below. However, probit coefficients cannot be interpreted analogously to regression coefficients. We can transform the predicted values for each case into probabilities and thus assess the marginal impact of a particular predictor by: (1) holding that variable 'constant' at its highest and lowest values while permitting the other variables to vary freely; and (2) subtracting the probability of voting Liberal (PC) at the lowest value of the predictor from the probability obtained at the highest value.²¹

¹⁸ By the West, I include all four Western provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan). Removing British Columbia from the West does not affect the results.

¹⁹ Both variables, of course, are highly correlated with the Quebec dummy (since Quebec has most of the French-speaking voters in Canada and is the most heavily Catholic province). The modest impact of Quebec residence in most of the equations to follow, however, provides further evidence that in these models of prospective and retrospective vote choice, the effects of language and religion are very modest.

²⁰ See Richard D. McKelvey and William Zavoina, 'A Statistical Analysis of Ordinal Level Dependent Variables', *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 4 (1975), 103-30.

²¹ Specifically, the predicted values for the dependent variable in a probit analysis are z (standardized) scores. Thus, each score can be placed on the cumulative normal distribution and associated with a probability value. The technique operates by assigning to the predictor in question its minimum value and estimating a mean probability for the sample from an equation in which all

THE DATA ANALYSIS

The results of the probit analyses for Liberal voters, PC voters and switchers are presented in Table 2. The models are extremely successful in predicting vote choice, whether one uses the criterion of the estimated R^2 or the percentage predicted correctly. The Liberal and PC equations have R^2 values greater than 0.80. Each predicts over 90 per cent of the 1,051 cases correctly, compared to baseline predictions from the 'null model' (in which *all* voters are posited to vote *against* the Liberals and PCs, respectively) of 54.7 per cent and 63.7 per cent. Thus, the models represent proportionate reductions in error over null models of 69 and 47 per cent respectively.

TABLE 2 *Probit Estimates of Vote Choice in 1980 Federal Elections*

	Liberal voters	PC voters	Switchers
Party identification	0.433*** (15.750)	0.359*** (11.604)	0.122* (2.194)
Thermometer difference	0.011*** (5.325)	-0.016*** (-6.760)	0.019*** (4.238)
Energy salience	0.245*** (4.124)	0.253*** (3.932)	0.159 (1.541)
Budget disapproval	0.307*** (3.332)	-0.553*** (-4.697)	0.704*** (3.424)
Pro-Canada sentiments	0.178 (0.478)	0.246 (0.591)	-0.746 (-0.922)
Region	-0.491** (-2.459)	0.389* (2.082)	-0.796*** (-2.284)
Quebec residence	0.225 (1.232)	0.028 (0.135)	-0.398 (-1.163)
Education	-0.053** (-2.449)	0.032 (1.410)	-0.059 (-1.419)
Age	-0.004 (-0.946)	0.012** (2.456)	0.299 (0.320)
Constant	-0.270 (-0.559)	0.113 (0.217)	-0.754 (-0.795)
Estimated R^2	0.823	0.832	0.692
-2 Log likelihood ratio	1034.7213	1007.1056	130.3936
% correctly predicted			
Probit	92.6	93.6	86.7
Null	54.7	63.7	59.5
N	1,051	1,051	195

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

other variables vary freely. Then the same procedure is followed for the maximum value taken by that predictor. The mean probability for the variable at its minimum is subtracted from that for the predictor's maximum to give the marginal impact of the variable. The procedure is discussed in Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), and the specific algorithm for computing the probabilities was graciously provided by Steven J. Rosenstone.

The probit results in Table 2 provide strong support for the argument that the energy issue did indeed matter in the 1980 elections. Both the energy salience measure and budget disapproval were strongly related to vote choice, reaching statistical significance at beyond the 0.001 level.²² Only the thermometer difference and, particularly, the party identification measures had greater ratios of the maximum likelihood estimates to their standard errors.²³ Region was related to Liberal and PC voting in the expected direction. Education had a significant negative coefficient in the Liberal equation and age was positively related to PC voting. On the other hand, neither Quebec residence nor pro-Canada sentiments had significant relationships to either Liberal or PC voting.

Switchers were less well predicted than either Liberal or PC voters. The estimated R^2 is 0.692, although 86.7 per cent of the 195 switchers are predicted correctly, compared to a baseline expectation that 59.5 per cent would be properly classified under a null model. The proportionate reduction in error is 46 per cent, similar to what we found for the PCs.²⁴ The lower R^2 is hardly unexpected, since these voters have fewer strong attachments to the party system, which plays a key role in structuring the vote.²⁵ Indeed, party identification is only significant for these voters at the 0.05 level. The Liberals picked up votes in Eastern and Central Canada, while the PCs gained in the West. Candidate evaluations appeared to move the switchers, confirming the analysis of Clarke *et al.*²⁶ But so did attitudes towards the budget. On the other hand, energy salience did not affect switching.

Before attempting to find an overall pattern in these results, we should assess the effects in a more directly interpretable manner. Table 3 presents the results of probability estimates for the maximum and minimum values of each predictor as well as the difference in these two probabilities: this measure of the 'marginal' impact is shown by the italicized numbers. What we notice first are the powerful effects, except for switchers, for party identification. A very strong Liberal identifier is 64 per cent more likely to cast a ballot for his/her party than a voter who strongly identifies with another party. The corresponding figure for PC voting is 69.3 per cent.

²² All tests of significance reported herein are one-tailed. The addition of these prospective and retrospective variables does make a statistically significant difference for both the Liberal and PC equations. I also estimated probit equations for these two dependent variables without either energy-related variable. To test whether the addition of these variables is statistically significant, one simply subtracts $-2 \text{ Log Likelihood Ratio}$ for the restricted model (with seven predictors) from that for the full model (with nine predictors). The resulting figure is distributed as χ^2 with two degrees of freedom. For the PC equation, the difference in $-2 \text{ Log Likelihood Ratios}$ is 50.08; for the Liberals, the figure is 32.49. The critical value of χ^2 at the 0.001 level is 13.82.

²³ In regression analysis, this is the familiar *t*-ratio.

²⁴ For a similar proportionate reduction in error measure, see Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith and Oran R. Young, 'A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality', *American Political Science Review*, 72 (1978), 178-97.

²⁵ For similar findings in American Congressional elections, see Uslaner and Conway, 'The Responsible Congressional Electorate'.

²⁶ Clarke *et al.*, *Absent Mandate*, Chap. 5.

TABLE 3 *Probability Estimates for Vote Choice Predictors**

Predictor	Liberal voters	PC voters	Switchers
Party identification	0.709/0.069/0.640	0.841/0.148/0.693	0.658/0.428/0.229
Thermometer difference	0.594/0.275/0.319	0.159/0.624/-0.465	0.920/0.169/0.750
Energy salience (adjusted)	0.578/0.256/0.322	0.576/0.258/0.318	0.666/0.466/0.200
Budget disapproval	0.507/0.400/0.107	0.257/0.456/-0.200	0.809/0.315/0.494
Energy salience (adjusted) + Budget disapproval	0.614/0.284/0.330	0.159/0.619/-0.460	0.891/0.198/0.694
Pro-Canada sentiments	0.467/0.437/0.031	0.379/0.340/0.038	0.475/0.673/-0.198
Region	0.407/0.463/-0.055	0.394/0.354/0.040	0.476/0.598/-0.173
Quebec residence	0.474/0.449/0.025	0.364/0.362/0.003	0.540/0.616/-0.077
Education	0.391/0.527/-0.136	0.397/0.324/0.073	0.438/0.683/-0.245
Age	0.430/0.446/-0.036	0.426/0.332/0.094	0.594/0.556/0.038

* Entries are estimated probabilities of voting Liberal, voting AC, and switching to the Liberals. First entries are evaluated at the maximum value of the predictor, the second at the minimum values. The third entries (which are italicized) are differences between the maximum and minimum values

The region/provincial variables have weak effects on vote choice. Western residence leads to a decline of only 5.5 per cent in Liberal voting and an increase in PC voting of just 4 per cent. The effects for Quebec residence are much smaller than that, effectively nil. High levels of education lead to a sizeable decrease in voting for the Liberals, but a smaller increment for the PCs – reflecting findings from previous research that voters with college education are somewhat more likely to vote for the New Democrats than those with lower levels of education.²⁷ On the other hand, the PCs gain more among older voters than the Liberals lose.

What, then, can we make of the countervailing effects of party leaders versus issue effects? The results in Table 3 suggest that these impacts are complementary. The thermometer difference measure has an impact of 32 per cent on Liberal voting and 47 per cent on PC electors. The 1980 contest was clearly a leadership referendum. But there are strong effects for both prospective and retrospective energy evaluations as well. The former measure, energy salience, leads to an impact on Liberal vote choice of approximately the same magnitude as party leadership evaluations when the coefficients are evaluated at adjusted maximum and minimum values.²⁸ Prospective voting had effects of similar

²⁷ Clarke *et al.*, *Political Choice in Canada*, p. 81.

²⁸ In each case there were very few voters at the extreme (+6, -6) values for energy salience. The boundaries were thus adjusted to reflect cases with more than just one or two voters at these extremes. The relevant boundaries become (-6, 4) for the Liberals, (-4, 6) for the PCs, and (-3, 3) for switchers. For estimating the joint effects of both energy salience and budget disapproval, the boundaries (-3, 3) were employed.

magnitudes on the PCs, although leadership evaluations were even more important on PC vote choice.

The Liberals appeared to gain relatively little on the retrospective measure of budget disapproval, compared with how much the PCs lost.²⁹ Moving from strong approval to strong disapproval of the budget leads to only a gain of 10.7 per cent in Liberal support, but a loss of 20 per cent for the PCs.³⁰ The joint effects of the prospective and retrospective variables indicate that Liberals gained little from the attitudes towards the budget, above and beyond the effects of prospective evaluations. The overall correlation between budget disapproval and energy salience for the Liberals is a modest 0.236. On the other hand, the two types of issue voting did interact to the PCs' disadvantage: the combined effect of these issue variables was of approximately the same magnitude on vote choice as party leader evaluations. The zero-order correlation between the retrospective measure and the PC prospective index was somewhat higher at -0.341 .

Effects for Switchers

We find a somewhat different pattern of effects for the switchers. As noted above, the impact of party identification is approximately one-third that of voters in the full sample. On the other hand, the dominant concern for these voters, who are not as strongly anchored in the political system, was party leader evaluations, with a marginal impact of 0.75. The prospective energy concern gave an advantage to the Liberals, but of only two-thirds the magnitude of the estimated results for Liberal and PC voters. On the other hand, the retrospective budget disapproval measure had pronounced effects on switchers. The average switcher had a probability of voting Liberal of 0.595; one who strongly disapproved of the budget had such a probability of 0.809 and a vehement supporter of the budget had a probability of just 0.315. The marginal impact was thus 0.494. Voters in Eastern and Central Canada were most likely to move towards the Liberals, those in the West towards the PCs (marginal impact = -0.245). This is precisely what we would expect given the regional impact of the PC's energy budget. More educated and older voters were likely to shift to the PCs. Somewhat surprisingly, the PCs fared well among switchers in Quebec and among

²⁹ Many observers believed that the activist bent of the NEP was designed by the Liberals to attract NDP supporters. See, *inter alia*, Bruce G. Doern and Glen Toner, *The Politics of Energy* (Toronto: Methuen, 1985), p. 33.

³⁰ Is the budget-disapproval measure a valid one? The National Election Study asked voters what the budget meant to them. Only 12 per cent of the 725 respondents who gave answers to this question specifically mentioned something related to energy. When more general responses about effects on prices, business and low-income people are considered, the figure rises only to 23.1 per cent. However, virtually *all* other answers are general comments in favour of, or opposed to, the budget. No other specific comments were made in response to this question. Thus, budget evaluations do relate largely to the anticipated effects of the 18 cent tax to the extent that they reflect anything of substance. To the extent that the responses *do not* provide specific responses, the problem may lie more with the question asked than with voters' lack of knowledge about the 18 cent tax. The question about budget meaning was particularly vague.

those who had more favourable orientations towards Canada than towards their home provinces. (Note, however, that neither variable had significant probit coefficients.) Finally, the joint effect of the two issue variables was very powerful. Voters who both disapproved of the budget *and* favoured the Liberals on energy policy were almost 70 per cent more likely to vote for that party than were citizens who liked the budget and preferred some other party on energy.

WHITHER ISSUE EFFECTS?

Once we have established that issues did matter in the 1980 Canadian federal elections, two questions remain. Firstly, how did the energy issue translate into votes against the PCs and for the Liberals? Secondly, under what conditions do issues matter? The data analysis presented above indicates that both prospective and retrospective concerns motivated the electorate. Yet these two variables affected vote choice very differently, as the analysis for switchers in comparison with all voters suggests.

The energy issue mobilized strong supporters of each party above and beyond the effects of party identification and party leader evaluations. The correlations between each party's measure of energy salience and partisan identification were approximately 0.40 for all voters, compared to 0.30 for switchers. Since correlation measures partly depend on sample size, the lower values for switchers compared to all voters are particularly interesting (since there are considerably fewer switchers). The greater impact of the prospective measure for all voters compared to switchers further suggests that it was the *more* stable voters who cast ballots on the basis of issue concerns.

All signs point to such a conclusion, including the findings of Clarke *et al.* that issues did affect vote choice if not the outcome of the election.³¹ In contrast, switchers appear to be motivated more by retrospective issue concerns. The marginal impact for budget disapproval for switchers was almost two and a half times that for PC voters and almost five times that for Liberal supporters. The correlations between budget disapproval and Liberal party identification were almost identical (about 0.39) for all voters and switchers.³²

The top elites were divided along very clear partisan/regional lines over the energy issue. It would be truly remarkable if the strongest partisans did not reflect these cleavages. And given the central role of the energy issue in the election – there would have been no contest had the 18 cent gasoline tax not been proposed – those voters who were not so strongly attached to parties took their cues from the strong partisans who acted as 'opinion leaders'. PC and Liberal partisans rallied behind their respective party leaders to reinforce predispositions toward free-market and government-directed energy policies respectively.

³¹ Clarke *et al.*, *Absent Mandate*, Chap. 6

³² While the correlation was considerably stronger for PC party identification for all voters (–0.60), this is not surprising. As noted above, retrospective evaluations tend to punish the governing party more than they reward the party out of power.

Voting by Opinion Leaders

To test this idea that the energy issue 'trickled down' from opinion leaders to the mass public, an analysis was conducted on the vote choice of the 338 voters who said that they follow politics either very or fairly closely, perhaps the best available surrogate for opinion leaders.³³ For these 'opinion leaders' the equation for PC voting indicates that *both* the prospective and retrospective energy variables achieved statistical significance at the 0.05 level or better. Energy salience was more strongly related to vote choice than budget disapproval. The differences in probabilities were 0.198 and -0.137 respectively, indicating somewhat more powerful effects for the prospective measure. In the equation for Liberal voting, people who follow politics closely cast prospective but *not* retrospective votes. Budget disapproval had the wrong sign (but with a MLE/SE of just -0.180), while energy salience was statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The net impacts of these two variables were -0.009 and 0.177 respectively. The elite, then, did vote more prospectively than retrospectively.

WHAT TYPE OF MANDATE?

Did the energy issue lead to the PC's defeat in 1980? Clarke *et al.* find a very small advantage for Liberals on resource issues in 1980: of the 417 respondents who cited such concerns as their most important issue, 36 per cent preferred the Liberals and 34 per cent the Progressive Conservatives.³⁴ The measures of energy salience developed here suggest an even more restrictive role for the energy issue. Overall, just 14.3 per cent of the 1,051 voters analysed had positive (pro-party) scores for the Liberals compared to 13.5 per cent who had positive scores on the PC measure. This translates into a Liberal advantage of 42 to 40 per cent among voters who considered the issue to be one of the two most important, who favoured a particular party, and who found the issue to be of some importance in their electoral choice. Switchers, furthermore, were considerably less likely than all voters to be affected by party preferences on the energy issue. None of these figures provide much comfort to analysts seeking to explain the Liberal rebound in 1980.

If prospective voting did not lead to the defeat of the incumbent administration, perhaps retrospective evaluations did. Yet the Liberals did not gain because the budget was widely perceived as unpopular. In fact, 54.4 per cent of the sample *supported* the budget. However, the effects of approval and disapproval were asymmetric.³⁵ Over 90 per cent of voters who strongly approved of the budget cast PC ballots; a similar percentage of ardent opponents voted for opposition parties. Yet, while 94 per cent of moderate opponents also supported

³³ Clarke *et al.*, *Political Choice in Canada*, esp. Chap. 7, also examine the role of political interest, but in a very different context from that employed here.

³⁴ Clarke *et al.*, *Absent Mandate*, p. 90.

³⁵ For an important statement of such results in an American context, see Samuel Kernell, 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting', *American Political Science Review*, 71 (1977), 44-66.

the opposition, just 55 per cent of lukewarm supporters backed the PCs. The opposition parties were more effective in mobilizing voters opposed to the government's energy policy than the PCs were with respect to supporters.³⁶

Overall, 33.8 per cent of the sample both approved of the budget and voted for the PCs, while 43.2 per cent disapproved of the budget and voted for opposition parties. These figures indicate a substantial impact for retrospective judgements on the energy issue. But the Liberals were not the sole beneficiaries of anti-budget sentiment; indeed, fewer people (31.5 per cent of the sample) opposed the budget and supported the Liberals than favoured the plan and backed the PCs. The Progressive Conservatives lost because voters who opposed the budget cast ballots *en bloc* either for the Liberals or the New Democrats. There was, then, a mandate for rejecting the PC's energy policy but not necessarily for an as yet unstated Liberal alternative programme. These data do suggest that there was a retrospective policy mandate on energy in 1980, but that the Liberals may have won the elections because of the geography of the election and the plurality electoral system that penalizes minor parties. Given this pattern of voting, it is not surprising that the policy that the new Liberal government proposed was in many ways closer to the preferred position of New Democratic socialists than to the more traditionally capitalist Liberals.³⁷


Canadian voters were given clear-cut signals. The zero-order correlations between vote choice and budget disapproval, for example, were 0.422 for the Liberals and -0.590 for the PCs. A critical condition for a follow-the-leader type of issue voting, as noted in the Introduction, is that the major parties present sharply different alternatives to the voters. Opinion leadership is enhanced by convergent patterns of partisan and constituency interests. However, that is not the entire story. For the less interested voters to be able to discern clear-cut cues it is equally important for opinion leaders to be clearly divided into opposing camps. The cues provided by the opinion leaders were readily received by the electorate. The images of party leaders reinforced rather than competed with issue concerns. And, critically, if all of these conditions are to have any consequences for electoral politics, they must be salient to the voters. In 1980, 24.7 per cent of respondents cited energy as the most important issue in the election and an additional 9.1 per cent selected it as the second most important issue.³⁸

The convergence of constituency and partisan interests clearly interacts with the structure of conflict among opinion leaders. When there is a strong correlation between partisan representation and constituency traits, the key condition for party government holds and opinion leaders will straightforwardly respond

³⁶ In contrast, both parties mobilized virtually all of their supporters on the energy salience measures

³⁷ Doern and Toner, *The Politics of Energy*, p. 33

³⁸ Of the total of 33.8 per cent, 0.9 per cent cited energy responses as *both* the first and second most important issues. Virtually identical percentages of the voters analysed above and of the full weighted sample of 1,770 (24.4, 9.2 per cent) cited energy as the first and second most important issue.



to majority opinion within their constituencies. When the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney displaced the Liberals in 1984, it effectively dismantled the NEP – precisely what we would expect in a system of strong partisan representation on the energy issue. If an issue is so clearly structured, citizens have an easier time fixing responsibility for policy choices, and thus a crucial condition for issue voting is met.

Retrospective voting has traditionally been viewed as an alternative to issue-based voting. When there are no clear-cut policy distinctions between two (or more) major parties, voters can cut their decision costs simply by punishing the in-party without having to calculate what the out-party might do. If the linkage between issue position and party affiliation is straightforward, then issue voting (whether prospective or retrospective) should be complementary to voting by party identification and leadership evaluations.

This 'trickle-down' model of issue concerns characterizes realignment politics in the United States. Furthermore, two American presidential elections from 1952 to 1980 were marked by substantial prospective policy voting and strong retrospective evaluation components.³⁹ The contests of 1964 and 1980 were also marked by very strong ideological distinctions between the candidates. When issues are joined so as to go to the heart of the constituencies of the major parties, both prospective and retrospective voting are likely to occur – although not necessarily by the same electors.

Such a perspective on how issues get translated into votes shows us why the 'conventional wisdom' on what drives elections is not often likely to be too far from the mark. For such 'wisdom' is perpetrated by the very opinion leaders who are attempting to structure the outcome of the elections. By the time such attempts become 'conventional wisdom', the number of opinion leaders converging on a particular issue is likely to have become large enough to have a distinct impact on political discourse across multiple levels of citizen interest. Such appears to have been the case with respect to energy in the 1980 federal elections in Canada. What is ironic is that any mandate on the energy issue that might have occurred in the 1980 elections did not come from where we would ordinarily expect to find it, from the issue voters – who largely cancelled each other out (as previous analyses also found). Rather, it came (if it did) from the very retrospective voters who have been held incapable of producing such a directive in a world where retrospective and prospective concerns are disjoint.⁴⁰

It is hardly novel to argue that politicians may perceive mandates from retrospective voting, even when the electorate does not send clear signals on what its policy preferences are. However, the 1980 federal elections in Canada suggest that retrospective evaluations can have a policy component *if they have some basis in underlying salient conflicts between the parties*. The energy issue touched a raw nerve in Canadian politics, much as the questions that engender realignments do more generally. It is not being argued that the 1980 election marked a

³⁹ Miller and Wattenberg, 'Throwing the Rascals Out', p. 370

⁴⁰ Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting*, pp. 5–6.

new political alignment in Canada. However, there are similarities. A single major issue energized the election. Retrospective evaluations did seem to have policy content, as ordinary citizens appeared to take cues from an 'issue elite'. They could do so because parties *mattered* in a manner that diverged from the norm in a brokerage system.

Review Article: The Decline of the French Communist Party

DAVID BELL AND BYRON CRIDDLE

The most significant development in French politics during the 1980s has been the decline of the Communist Party; significant, for without it there would, arguably, have been no Mitterrand victory and *alternance* between Right and Left in 1981, and thus no proper legitimizing of a regime in which the Right had monopolized power since the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958.

The decline of the PCF has led to a reassessment of the French Communist phenomenon and cast retrospective doubt on much of the analysis of the party's postwar history. No consensus exists as to the nature of Communist decline, its date of origin or its causes. The debate is also somewhat bedevilled by a lack of 'hard' data: while electoral statistics may be clear, membership figures, the size of the CGT and circulation figures of party newspapers are much less so.

The rise or fall of a political party – or 'party change' – has been attributed by Frank Wilson to five sources: socio-economic change, change in political culture, change in political institutions, change in the terms of party competition, and the impact of party leaders.¹ The first, socio-economic change, comprises changes in social structure and class identity, the diminished political salience of religion, the growth of economic affluence, demographic shifts, and so on. The second – change in the political culture – involves political attitudes and values; Wilson notes the 'impressionistic' nature of conclusions drawn about French 'political culture', but cites as evidence of change 'the purported emergence of a broad-based consensus on political and socio-economic issues' and a decline in polarization on once-divisive issues. The third sort of change – institutional – involves essentially, in the French case, the reallocation of power from legislature to executive, with the personalization of the latter – in short, presidentialization. The fourth source of change, the terms of party competition, comprises, via presidentialism and bipolarizing electoral laws, a move to electoral competition strategies of a Downsian, catch-all type. New rules and styles of electoral competition offer fresh opportunities if parties are willing and able to adapt. Thus to the fifth source of party change: the impact of party leaders. How parties respond to changed circumstances – whether they fashion catch-all strategies and personalized presidential campaigning styles – depends on leadership. Some parties adapt more readily than others, with ideology often a brake on change.

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¹ F. L. Wilson, 'Sources of Party Transformation – the Case of France', in Merkl, ed., *Western European Party Systems*. Full details of this work and all others referred to in the text will be found in the List of Books and the List of Articles which follow this review

According to Wilson the key factor is the action of party leaders: 'Parties change primarily because their leaders and members see the need to change and make efforts to change' (Wilson in Merkl, p. 544).

Having listed these five agents of party change, Wilson inverts the order and emphasizes the greater immediate impact of party leaders and of changes in the terms of competition – changes themselves deriving from altered institutional rules and procedures. Socio-economic and political cultural changes are seen as furthest removed from actual party change, merely – though importantly – setting the scene, by providing an environment congenial to party transformation. 'Party transformation', Wilson writes, 'is manipulative, in the sense of being the product of conscious efforts of leaders to reform their parties rather than of automatic evolution due to socio-economic or attitudinal changes. Socio-economic and cultural influences on French party transformation seem indirect in that they make possible, but do not dictate, party transformation.'

Applied to the French Communist case, Wilson's model of party change would therefore attribute decline mainly to Georges Marchais's leadership, secondly to the bipolarizing system of competition, with institutional, cultural and socio-economic forces – in this case, presumably, the contraction and 'de-radicalization' of the working class – as more passive sources of decline. Reserving judgement on a model based on what appears to be *political* determinism, Wilson's work is cited merely for its provision of a conceptual framework.

THE STATISTICS OF DECLINE

For almost forty years from the Liberation until the early 1980s, the French Communist Party was seen as a permanent feature of the landscape, with a political space comprising at least 20 per cent of the vote and with control of the largest trade-union federation. But the unanticipated collapse of the party in the 1981 presidential election led observers to reinterpret the data. It is now even doubted that the party was ever as significant as believed and this in turn has affected the way statistics are interpreted. The voting figures, for example, can be read as a stepped decline (1951/1958/1981), or as a steady decline, or even as a sudden collapse (1981). Georges Lavau (1981) claims the rot set in as early as 1946; Jean Ranger (1986) dates decline from 1968, and François Platone (1985: 'Les adhérents de l'apogée') notes the loss of a quarter of the Communist electorate in the 1979 European Assembly elections – a loss distinguished by low turn-out and the success in rural areas of popular fellow-travellers such as the businessman-farmer Maffre-Baugé in the Midi.

The facts of Communist electoral decline are simply stated and are set out in Table 1. By the late 1980s the party had lost two-thirds of its postwar electorate and in the ten years after 1978 its vote was halved. From its high point of 28.6 per cent (5.5 million) in 1946, through a 1960s plateau of 22 per cent, it fell to 15 per cent (Marchais's presidential vote) and 16 per cent (legislative vote) in 1981, to 9.8 per cent (legislative elections) in 1986 and to 6.8 per cent (Lajoinie's presidential vote) and 11.4 per cent (legislative elections) in 1988. The last figure in

TABLE 1 *Communist Vote in Legislative and Other National Elections*

		Percentage % of poll	Percentage % of electorate
<i>IV Republic</i>			
Legislative	1945	26.1	20.3
Legislative	1946 (June)	25.9	20.7
Legislative	1946 (Nov.)	28.6	21.9
Legislative	1951	26.9	20.6
Legislative	1956	25.7	20.6
<i>Vth Republic</i>			
Legislative	1958	19.2	14.3
Legislative	1962	21.8	14.5
Legislative	1967	22.5	17.8
Legislative	1968	20.0	15.7
Presidential	1969	21.5	16.6
Legislative	1973	21.4	17.0
Legislative	1978	20.7	16.9
European	1979	20.6	11.9
Presidential	1981	15.4	12.4
Legislative	1981	16.1	11.2
European	1984	11.1	6.1
Legislative	1986	9.6	7.2
Presidential	1988	6.8	5.4*
Legislative	1988	11.4	7.3

* If Juquin's vote is included, 7.2 per cent.

that sequence might appear to suggest a reversal of the downward trajectory, but the rise in support from Lajoinie's presidential vote in April 1988 – the lowest national vote for the party since its inception – to the party's legislative vote of 11.4 per cent in June, did not in fact constitute a Communist recovery of significance. The vote of 11.4 per cent was under the mean (11.7 per cent) for the party in the six national elections (two presidential, three legislative and one European) of the 1980s; moreover, allowing for variable rates of abstention, the second column of Table 1 reveals a *consistently* low Communist vote in all four elections since 1981. Moreover, unlike the rest of the electorate, the Communists were highly mobilized in the legislative election and virtually untouched by abstention in a historically low turn-out. The difference between Lajoinie's 'low' vote of 2 million in April and the 'higher' legislative vote of 2.8 million in June is also attributable to the absence in June of rival Communist and other left candidates (such as Juquin and Laguillier), who had drawn off votes from Lajoinie in the April presidential poll, and to the unprecedented predominance of Communist mayor-deputies, who boost the party's appeal in legislative, as distinct from presidential, elections. Thus, however the decline is measured, persistent decline it is.

There are, however, other measures of decline than the purely electoral, such as membership. But the figures for membership, derived from party sources, are particularly difficult to interpret: few observers take them at their face value, although they are repeated uncritically in numerous places (see Adereth, p. 291). Party figures could refer to the membership cards 'distributed' to federations (i.e. almost the same as the print run) but their relationship to 'real' members is uncertain. The party refers to *cartes placées*, which is an ambiguous wording and gives no guide as to whether these numbers represent members who are 'active' or how active they are. The Communist ceremony of stamping membership cards gave way in the mid-1970s to activists signing up members at demonstrations, meetings and party fêtes. What happened to the 'members' thus recruited is another matter; but the commitment, to say the least, is not what it was. Between 1972 and 1978 the party claims to have increased its membership from 390,000 to 702,864, and between 1978 and 1981 from 702,864 to 710,000; but it also stated in 1986 that its membership had fallen to 600,000. If this latter figure were correct it would mean (given a vote of 2.6 million in 1986), that almost one in five Communist voters was a party member, a figure out of line with all other Western political parties; but the party's dissident 'renovators' claimed in 1987 that membership was 'under 300,000' (*Le Monde*, 20 February 1987). Phillipe Buton estimates that in 1984 the party had a maximum of 380,000 members and that its highpoint was in 1978 when it may have had as many as 520,000. Other analysts have put the numbers much lower and found the decline to be much steeper; for example, Jean Ranger calculated membership to have been 450,000 in 1978 (at the high point of the recruitment drive of the 1970s). Since that time recruitment has slackened while the party lost half its vote – even though it was claiming to be recruiting in February 1987 at the same rate as in February 1986.

While the Communist party, in common with other extreme left-wing parties, experiences a high turnover in membership, as a Communist party, the essential element is its permanent apparatus – the party functionaries. It could be that the party is now reduced to those who are, in one way or another, on the payroll. But this group (possibly 40,000 to 50,000) has suffered decline too, and the dimensions of it are now, as in the past, difficult to estimate (but see Spire, 1980).

The debate about membership and *apparatchik* numbers is important in a party which traditionally claims an existence over and above that of mere electioneering. After the March 1986 elections *L'Humanité* dismissed the party's worst electoral performance in fifty years by making just that point. Yet it is a moot point how much remained even of *L'Humanité's* large postwar readership, half a million strong in 1945. The decline of *L'Humanité* is a further dimension of Communist decline. The paper, along with regional dailies, such as *L'Echo du Centre*, *La Marseillaise* and *Liberté*, is all that remains of a press empire once comprising sixteen dailies (four of which were national). The failure of both the Socialist daily *Combat* and the short-lived Spanish Communist daily, *Mundo Obrero*, show that keeping a partisan press afloat is no easy task, and *L'Humanité* has suffered. A broadsheet since the Second World War, *L'Humanité* converted to a tabloid format in October 1985 and is largely unreadable except by

the devoted activist (see Goldring and Quilès). The real circulation (i.e. over-the-counter sales) of *L'Humanité* may have dropped to about 32,000 by 1982 (according to Buton), although the national distribution agency states that 58,000 were dispatched in 1982 (many of which are, of course, unsold); the OJD, which publishes circulation figures for advertisers, gives figures of 149,901 for 1978 and 130,414 for 1982. OJD figures, estimated by the papers themselves, are no longer available for Communist publications. The circulation of *L'Humanité-Dimanche* which was over half a million in 1957, may be down to something in the region of 140,000. It is sold by activists rather than from news stands.

In what is the most interesting book on the Communist press, Goldring and Quilès attribute the decline in Communist newspapers to a direct political control that results in unreadability; they stress that the party's U-turn in 1977 to attack the Socialists, and its aggressive support for the Soviet Union, made journalists afraid to innovate and ended the marginal experiments in journalism exemplified by *La Nouvelle Critique*, which was suppressed in the late 1970s. The distorting of news by the political control of the Communist press is also illustrated in Jean-Noël Darde's *Le Ministère de la Vérité*, which analyses *L'Humanité's* views on the genocide in Cambodia, and illustrates the Orwellian use of 'wooden language' (as the French say, *langue de bois*). This analysis of the party press failure is exemplified by the position in Marseilles, where the daily *La Marseillaise* was relaunched as a restyled tabloid, but in so doing the paper ceased to be an activist newspaper, and its editor, despite improved circulation, was forced to resign. Whether the new-format *Marseillaise* would have been a success is not clear (the experience of new launches tends to involve an immediate burst of sales followed by a tailing off), but the experiment was quickly ended, and in mid-1987 the paper was declared bankrupt and reissued by a new holding company. For much the same reason, because it escaped party control, the Lorraine steel-workers radio (LCA) was shut down by the party although it too enjoyed an initial success. The precise nature of the link between direct political control and falling circulation, however, is unclear. Control has normally been rigid, and yet circulation has in the past (as at the Liberation and after) been large. Moreover the party's vote in the 1950s (before 1958) held up well, regardless of the performance of its press.

As with the press, so with the trade unions. For a Communist party which looks beyond the ballot box, its control of the Confédération Général du Travail (CGT), it is an important *prise* on the working class even if only some 15 per cent of the French work-force is unionized (as compared to 60 per cent in Sweden or 42 per cent in the United Kingdom). Figures are again difficult to interpret because, like British unions, they have started including retired members in the overall count. Despite statistical recalculating, since 1976 membership has been regularly falling (in all sectors and by 9 per cent in the manual workers section). The CGT is strongest in the 'historically doomed sectors': metalworking; building, ports, printing, lower civil servants and in the nationalized industries of rail, post and electricity. At the 43rd CGT Congress in 1987 membership figures of 1,030,843 were claimed – well below those for 1972

(2,318,120) and 1980 (1,918,583). The Union des Industries Métallurgiques reckoned that between 1975 and 1984 the CGT had lost half its membership and in 1985 stood at 835,000 members. The CGT was still, even so, bigger than the other two main union federations although these had not suffered such serious losses: Force Ouvrière had 720,000 members and the CFDT some 681,000. Moreover, as Table 2 shows, the vote for CGT candidates in works' council elections has steadily declined from 50.8 per cent in 1966 to 29.3 per cent in 1984.

TABLE 2 *Votes for the CGT in Works' Council Elections*

Year	Percentage of poll	Year	Percentage of poll
1966	50.8	1976	41.5
1968	47.9	1978	38.5
1970	46.0	1980	36.5
1972	44.1	1982	32.3
1974	42.7	1984	29.3

Source J. Ranger, 'Le déclin du Parti communiste français', *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 36 (1986), 46-62.

These elections are as good an indicator as any of the influence of Communist-run unions on the working class in general when in competition with other trade unions and with independent candidates. A further sign of the PCF's decline is the dissension within the CGT itself, most of which revolves around criticism by 'renovators' of the hard-line leadership. The decline of the CGT is damaging for the party less because of the weakness it engenders on the shop floor (where French unionism has always been tame by North European standards) than for the impact on the party's machine. Communist cadres are recruited from the ranks of the CGT, and thus a falling-off in union strength has a knock-on effect for the party's organizational power.

Communist influence in other sectors of society is also in decline, its capacity to mobilize having waned. In 1982 the party tried to use the 'anti-Euromissile' issue to revive its flagging fortunes, but this had none of the success of the campaigns in the early 1950s, such as the 'Stockholm appeal' and the *Ridgway la peste* campaign (see Mortimer), nor of similar campaigns in other Western European countries. Similarly, front organizations such as the Korean Friendship Society have virtually disappeared. The Communist 'Peace Movement' went so far as to express its 'legitimate disquiet' at the Russian invasion of Afghanistan (*Combat pour la Paix*, January-February 1980) but this was not the PCF's line. The Peace Movement's display of autonomy may have led the party to launch the *Appel des cent* rather than use the traditional institution in the 'peace offensive' of 1981. Entries to the *fête de L'Humanité* may also be declining (see Buton), although the fête is a much less directly political occasion.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SOURCES OF DECLINE

The debate about the nature and scope of decline is also one about its causes, whether social, cultural or political. 'Modernization' – socio-economic change – has reduced the role the Communist party can play. As in other European countries the manual working class has declined, as has the peasantry, and society as a whole has become richer. The Communist party, and its unions, are strongest in the areas and sections which are in long-term decline all over Western Europe – heavy industry and small farming – and they are weak in the industries using new technology and in the growing sectors. To some extent the party itself accepts this analysis and is prepared to admit that there has been backwardness (*retards*) in responding to changes in French society since 1956 (see Kesselman's perceptive analysis in Cerny and Schain).

Those classified as 'working class' in the French census moved up slightly from 33.8 per cent in 1954 to 37.7 per cent in 1975, but at the same time living standards improved beyond recognition. Yet a washing machine is a washing machine, and similar changes have not necessarily undermined support for left-wing (social democratic) parties in northern Europe, Spain or Portugal. There is no reason why rising standards of living and consumer goods *in themselves* should hasten the decline of the PCF; and these socio-economic changes did not occur suddenly in 1981. François Goguel had pointed out in the mid-1960s that Communist strongholds were in the declining sectors of the economy and this explanation is taken up by Tony Judt, who gives the party's attachments to the most archaic parts of France as one of its two enduring weaknesses (the other, for Judt, being its 'Stalinist culture'). Judt, echoing Goguel, notes that, 'within any given department, the PCF strength in cantons of industrial decay and demographic decline is unmistakable' (pp. 292–3). Some of the party's redoubts were, and still are, in rural areas (especially around the Massif central) but its decline in the prosperous Paris region has been more rapid and more significant. The party's careful cultivation of its working-class image is out of tune with contemporary France (a point made in A. Guede and S. A. Rozenblum) and Judt notes how the party has tried but failed to act as a 'catch-all' party like the successful Socialists (p. 288).

An aspect of the party's archaism is its unwillingness to adapt its ideological appeal. Unlike the Communist parties in Italy or Spain the PCF has not made any concessions to 'post-industrial' society: it retains a vision of a society of exploited manual workers. This is not just a matter of language; the doctrine of the PCF remains that of the Leninist vanguard mapping out the route for the working class, a deeply rooted tradition in French Communism (see Fiszbin). In 1956 Thorez was insisting, against all evidence, that the working class was being impoverished (in absolute not relative terms) and in 1978 the party was still campaigning on the slogan of 'make the rich pay'. The party's so-called '*ouvriérisme*' (workerism) was diluted only to the extent of permitting the 'exploited *strata*' (not classes) to join the coalition directed against monopoly capital by the working class. The party has suffered from the form of myopia to which most

Marxist parties in the capitalist democracies are prey; a rigid commitment to the pauperization thesis, regardless of all the evidence of working-class affluence or, failing that, of working-class complacency and indifference. The party's failure to acknowledge the reality of working-class integration in contemporary society stems primarily from the ideological conservatism of the apparatus.

It is often argued that the Communist party was one of the means whereby immigrants and migrants to the towns were integrated into French society in the 1930s. Much like the political machines in the big American cities in the early part of the century, the PCF's City Halls of the 1930s provided valuable help to unskilled or semi-skilled workers from foreign cultures as well as those from rural France (see Foucault 1986, *Hérodote*, and Brunet 1986). The PCF machine was run very much by immigrant workers and their children but after the Second World War this integrative function became less imperative and the grandchildren of immigrant workers, who may have continued to vote Communist, had no further need of the 'machine' and had, in any case, become integrated into French society as well as socially mobile. The feeling of belonging to a class declined (from 68 per cent to 56 per cent between 1976 and 1983 (*Le Monde*, 11 August 1987). Three-quarters of French workers who designated their class membership identified themselves as being 'working-class' in 1976; by 1983 the percentage had fallen to two-thirds (Kesselman 1985). A party whose self-image is that of a class-conscious workers' party is lost if class-conscious workers are in short supply.

The traditional, closed, world of the worker, which reinforced an identification with the PCF, has slowly dissolved (see *Hérodote*). The society of the small working-class community, which had very few contacts with the outside world and which was largely turned in on itself, gave way to the new high-rise, anonymous units in which the family, personal space and 'modern' communications (principally television) – in a word 'individualism' – usurped the place of the locality and the party (see Stéphane Courtois, *Le Monde*, 11–12 September 1988). People ceased to see themselves as 'workers' and certainly not in the 'heroic mode' (as Marc Lazar says). In this new society close defensive links with the CGT and the party ceased to be quite so important and as memories of the Resistance faded so did attachments to leading Communist personalities. In other words the modernization of French society in the 1950s and 1960s dissolved the intimate local societies and replaced them with more prosperous and more impersonal conurbations: the PCF's workèrism had little appeal to new social strata which did not identify with the PCF's 'exploited and impoverished workers'. The 'socialization' of the working class into Kriegel's Communist 'counter-society' began to disappear, with only older workers retaining a loyalty to the PCF. In 1978 the Communist vote was not drawn from the young working class but from those of 40 years and older – the generation whose loyalty to the PCF was strongest. The elections of the 1980s confirmed the marked loss of support among the youngest voting groups, whose loyalty had been conditional on Communist support for the Union of the Left – a strategy scuppered by the party after 1977.

Another aspect of this debate is the analysis of the Communist party's setback in the local government elections of 1983, when it lost nine big cities (over 30,000 inhabitants) where it had been in power for twelve years and ten others that it had won in 1977. This discussion, mostly within the geographical discipline (see *Hérodote*, special issue), has concentrated on the factors (other than the censure of the Left Government's policies) that account for the losses, citing unemployment, migration and immigration. It is a complex phenomenon resulting also from the disintegration of local hegemony, and expressed in abstention as well as a rising extreme-right vote. Part of the problem is that Communists have presided locally, and between 1981 and 1984 nationally, over de-industrialization, unemployment, high-rise estates and increasing crime, for which they are now held responsible. Although high-rise estates are still likely to be Communist strongholds, the deterioration, lack of amenities and problems of maintenance make them difficult to run – a factor complicated by the party's unresponsiveness and lack of imagination.

It has also been noted that insecurity (theft, attacks and burglary) is a feature of the suburbs and that as French workers have moved out so immigrant workers have moved in. Not only do immigrants not vote but they also cause a 'xenophobic reaction' (*Hérodote*). There is a correlation between the 1986 and 1988 National Front vote and former Communist strongholds, notably in the Parisian 'red belt'. The incursions made by the National Front into Communist working-class fiefs points to another problem for the party, namely the loss – accelerated by its unpopular period in office carrying the can for Socialist austerity – of its traditional tribune role. Thus, even in those areas where workers retain an electoral interest in parties seeking to 'defend' them or to 'protest' on their behalf, there now exists, in the form of Le Pen's party, a plausible alternative to the PCF. The rise of the National Front certainly coincided with Communist participation in the unpopular Mauroy government (1981–84). Moreover, the FN is much less hamstrung than the Communists in articulating xenophobic sentiment (the affair involving action taken to evict immigrants from a hostel in the PCF municipality of Vitry notwithstanding).² The prospect of a contracting, 'deradicalizing' working class, looking, when rattled, to an uncompromised protest party of the nationalistic Right, is not a reassuring one for the Communists.

POLITICAL CULTURAL CHANGE

There has been an assumption that in France (and perhaps in all 'Latin' countries) there is a radical left-wing revolutionary culture which somehow engenders communism. This assumption was used to explain the persistence of communism in France, but it has been taken up by the dissident communists in a different form. Leading 'renovators' like Pierre Juquin, for example, argue that

² At Vitry, in the Parisian red belt, on Christmas Eve 1980 officials of the Communist-run municipality blocked the entrance to a hostel to stop immigrants gaining access to it. For Marchais's defence of the Party's action see *L'Humanité*, 7 January 1981.

the 'revolutionary' culture still exists but that the party has ceased satisfactorily to represent the Communist 'people'. For Juquin, as for Fiszbin, Hincker and others, a potential Communist vote, from the 'revolutionary' current in France, can still be brought out because 'reformist social democracy' cannot tap it and the present PCF is lamentably failing to do so.

Juquin (in *Autocritiques*) rejects socio-economic explanations of decline and finds the cause in the party's lack of adaptation, and not in society. For Juquin the party's *ouvriérisme*, its promotion of the traditional manual working class (Marchais's, 'je suis un ouvrier moà'), is not fitted to 1980s France, and has left the ground to other social forces – notably the Socialists, but also SOS Racism, Band Aid and feminist movements, which are not Communist (and it is difficult, given their decentralized nature, to see how they could be). Juquin seems to be harking back to the days of the heroic struggles against *Ridgway la peste* and the colonial wars, when the party did seem capable of mobilizing around issues of real concern to people. Juquin, ousted from the Politbureau in 1985 and the Central Committee in 1987, and expelled from the party after declaring his independent presidential candidacy in October 1987, is implicitly blaming the leadership both for its lack of vision as well as for its apocalyptic attitude to the 'crisis of capitalism'.

Judt rightly draws attention to an important feature of French 'political culture' absent from Britain, America and Scandinavia: Marxism. But it also argued that Marxist culture in French has suffered a crisis too. For most of this century Marxism has been intellectually dominant in French literary and philosophical circles in a way unknown in 'Anglo-Saxon' countries; after the Second World War the Leninist variety became preponderant. Judt (p. 183), talks of the 'serpentine fascination' exercised by the PCF over the radical intelligentsia: there was no rival representation of the tradition of mass revolutionary mobilization. But by the 1950s the favourable image of the party was cracking as 'the heroes of Stalingrad and the martyrs of St Valérien' had to make way for Thorez's decrying of Khrushchev's 1956 speech, support for the invasion of Hungary, the rejection of the libertarian spirits of May 1968, and backing for 'normalization' in Czechoslovakia (Judt, p. 191). Many intellectuals left the party in response to these events.

Marxism in France was not just a 'political culture' but also an academic culture and it was the amalgam of the academic and the political into a 'scientific' theory of society which was so powerful. Verdès-Leroux points out in an accomplished, detailed and perceptive study of the party and French intellectuals, that the PCF's grip on intellectual life should not be exaggerated. Verdès-Leroux (1983) states that very few first-rank intellectuals stayed in the party. The principal exception, Aragon, is explained by his privilege of running the party's cultural empire. Communist intellectuals were, according to Verdès-Leroux, Weber's 'intellectual pariahs', those who rose from relatively modest milieux, whose work (surveyed by Verdès-Leroux with persistence) is mediocre, but who in other societies and at other times were the force behind religious sects.

Yet the party and Marxism enjoyed a prestige in France not found elsewhere. This survived Stalin, Lyssenko, Zhdanov and the condemnations of abstract art, of Joyce, Kafka, psychoanalysis and quantum theory, only to succumb in the late 1970s. Why Marxist culture should have been so easily undermined in the late 1970s is an interesting question, particularly given its dominance in intellectual life. Judt addresses this question in what is the most illuminating chapter in *Marxism and the French Left* and François Furet, in the French edition of Judt's book (Hachette, 1987, p. xv) puts it like this: 'Par ces feux d'artifices autour de rien, les intellectuels marxistes français ont fini révéler le rien de ce rien et ont conduit au premier rang, sans le savoir, le convoi du PCF. Faute de parvenir à le penser, ils ont fini par l'enterrer.' (See also here Verdès-Leroux, 1987, on the decline of intellectual support for the PCF.)

Part of the answer lies in the 'revelations' about Soviet labour camps and treatment of dissidents in the mid-1970s – the 'Solzhenitsyn effect'. Over the period 1972–86 the percentage of those with a 'good opinion' of the Soviet Union fell from 28 per cent to 11 per cent and those with a 'bad opinion' rose from 47 per cent to 75 per cent (Sofres, 1987). Another poll (in *Le Monde*, 19 November 1985) found that the working class was as sceptical as public opinion in general about the Soviet Union. According to an internal Communist party poll (conducted by Sofres) one out of two Communist voters would prefer to live in a capitalist country rather than in the Soviet Union (quoted by Juquin, p. 178). This, however, only pushes the question one stage further back because these things were well known about Russia before the 1970s and the imprisonment of dissidents was not a novelty of the Brezhnev era. As Judt points out, the party's Marxist intellectuals – notably Althusser – were apologists for Stalin. In his *Réponse à John Lewis*, Althusser claims that it is impossible to speak 'scientifically' of a 'Stalinist deviation'; to do so was merely to endorse a form of post-humous revenge on behalf of the (Social Democratic) Second International and 'a resurgence of its principal tendency [economism]' (pp. 89 and 93).

The party's appreciation of East European regimes has found no echo in public opinion: once having opened up the Stalin question the party seems to have hurried to close it down again and its own writings on Stalinism do not bear comparison with 'bourgeois' analyses. Even Elleinstein cordons off Stalinism from 'socialism' by attributing the 'deviation' to the 'errors and crimes' of one man. Elleinstein reduces Stalinism to a 'special and temporal' phenomenon (limited in extent) and dissociated from socialism, arguing that Stalinism was a product of Russian history, and this in a book which is above all *descriptive*. The party's 'most daring' book (Adler *et al.*) fails for similar reasons; it also seeks to minimize the relevance of Stalin to 'real' socialism and drive a wedge between the two. The book is very coy about the dimensions of the terror and tries to play down the extent of the 'crimes' by emphasizing 'impersonal historical forces' as an explanation; Adler contends that 'the people did not feel themselves victims of mass repression by the authorities' (p. 71). Althusser, in *Réponse à John Lewis*, praises Stalin (p. 95) as the 'builder of Socialism' (p. 67) and pours scorn on 'bourgeois criticisms' based on 'human rights' (this is also the Russian

argument – see C. E. Ambartsumov in *New Times*, No. 52, December 1978). In a France where the conditions of a life in Eastern Europe are well known, and after the additional revelations about Mao's cultural revolution and Pol Pot's Cambodia, these exercises in damage limitation lacked credibility. Martelli (1984, p. 237), the party historian, partly recognizes this when he says that the party's 'moderate position' on Poland (i.e. support for the suppression of Solidarity) was interpreted as 'une marque d'allégeance envers Moscou'. Clearly, Duhamel and Parodi's 'Kabul effect' has much to do with the rise in the party's negative rating with the voters from 47 per cent (1974) to 73 per cent (1986) (see Table 3).

TABLE 3 *Evolution of Opinion about the French Communist Party*

	Percentage holding a bad opinion	Percentage holding a good opinion
1973	48	33
1974	47	37
1975	54	30
1976	50	31
1977	55	30
1978	58	29
1979	58	28
1980	63	23
1981	62	25
1982	64	24
1983	66	21
1984	70	18
1985	73	14
1986	73	15

Source Ranger, 'Le déclin du Parti communiste français'.

Also significant was the philosophical movement in France, as in other Western countries, away from state-interventionism and towards *laissez-faire*. This intellectual trend was marked between 1981 and 1986 and is acknowledged by the PCF as a factor in its decline, although it places the blame for the 'slide to the right' and 'recul de la conscience de classe' (Marchais in *L'Humanité*, 16 March 1987) on the Socialist party (*Le Monde*, 9 September 1986). The intellectual climate has for other reasons as well turned decisively against the old-fashioned Bolshevism currently in practice. Juquin sees the party's retention of the 'Soviet model' as part of the cause of its decline and looks to an Italianate party offering a 'third way' between 'social-democracy' and 'Americanism' as the solution to the change in popular mood. The Italian party did not, however, lead the way in the 1970s–1980s liberalization of Italian society, and its *terza via* is more a slogan than a 'model' and it, too, is in electoral decline.

POLITICAL SOURCES OF DECLINE

The political explanations for the decline of the party are diverse. The party leadership itself lays great blame on the presidential and electoral systems (notably the latter) as factors (see Marchais, 1982, p. 14). There is much in this argument. Once the executive became presidentialized, the party could not win the competition for the office – because all the other parties' voters would combine to prevent a Communist victory. Evidence of the impact of *presidential* elections on Communist credibility is strong (see Table 1): the largest drops in the Communist vote have occurred in the presidential elections of 1981 and 1988. In 1981 the party suffered a loss of 25 per cent of its previous (1978) legislative vote (falling from 20.7 per cent to 15.4 per cent); in 1988 the loss was nearer a third from the previous (1986) legislative election (from 9.6 per cent to 6.8 per cent). The same was not, admittedly, true of Duclos's presidential performance in 1969, but that was in very different, exceptional circumstances (see below). There is little or no electoral credibility in a party with as much ideological baggage as the PCF pretending to the sort of cross-class national appeal to the 16 million or so voters needed to win the French presidency. The attempt to pose a dull and orthodox André Lajoinie nonchallantly in casual clothes for a photo-call during the 1988 contest was as futile as it was bizarre. That the presidential factor did not bite on the PCF until the 1980s – after twenty years of the presidentialized Fifth Republic (presidential power and bipolarized elections) – is linked to the matter of party competition. Until the Socialists under Mitterrand emerged from the shadows, the Communists (namely, Duclos in 1969) could pretend to a political hegemony which sustained them well into the 1970s, virtually until 1978 when the party was at last overtaken by the revamped Socialists. It was the disunity in the 1960s amongst the politicians of the Socialist Left over strategy, and the quite unique appeal during the same period of President de Gaulle to voters who were in the 1980s to fall in behind Mitterrand's Socialists, that made it take so long for an electable left party to out-strip an unelectable one. By 1981, without de Gaulle, with Mitterrand, and with a Right divided between Giscard d'Estaing and Chirac, a presidentially-credible Left was available, and once elected, pushed the Communists further to the margins. In office between 1981 and 1986 the Socialists' ready accommodation, as opposed to the promised 'break', with capitalism swept away the illusion about and, importantly, the fear of the Left. The Mauroy Government's austerity policy served as the Socialists' Bad Godesberg. With the Marxist tradition too recently dominant on the French Left, it may seem sweeping to talk of the 'social democratization' of the Left, but that in effect is what has substantially occurred.

Communist attempts to match the appeal of the Socialists, whether by mimicry or resistance, have failed Judt (p. 294) notes that:

reforms of the Communist Party undercut the fear of Communism and upset many PCF stalwarts; but all this meant was that voters trooped into the Socialist camp, no longer fearing that the Socialist Party was a mere stalking horse. Either way the PCF was blocked in its advance. It did not dare to return to all-out doctrinaire isolation, for all

that this would have been to the taste of some of its leaders and many of its militants. But it has no other role to play, a truth severely underlined by its inability to influence Socialist policy from within the government.

Experience elsewhere suggests that wherever a social democratic party establishes itself as hegemonic, as in northern Europe and post-Franco Spain, the Communists have few opportunities, least of all where a governing role (1981–84) compromises a protest role. The more the left electorate in the 1980s became polarized around a pragmatic social democratic party, the more the Communists were marginalized by the ‘wasted vote’ argument. Martelli (1984) cites the ‘Chirac effect’ in 1981, when alarmed at pollsters’ predictions, Communists voted tactically for Mitterrand in order to ensure that he, and not Chirac, got through to the second ballot for the run-off against Giscard d’Estaing. After the single-ballot legislative election of 1986, *L’Humanité* denounced the ‘blackmail’ of the ‘useful vote’ argument.

THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP

A further *political* source of decline is the nature and style of Communist leadership, in two words: democratic centralism. Juquin, Hincker, Naudy and others underline the party’s inability to pick up and express real movements of opinion in society and they attribute this to its functioning. Naudy portrays the party as claiming to be the maker of history and Marchais as believing that the ‘masses’ do not make history; in good Leninist style they do what they are made to do (p. 160). Democratic centralism is seen (in a long intellectual tradition) as the way in which the leadership appropriates the political capital of the ‘Communist people’ and distorts and wastes it. This view has become a genre of its own – *libérez les communistes* (see, for example, Cardoze, Naudy, Hincker and others). Precisely what Communism could be without its Leninist apparatus is outlined by Hincker (1981) as well as by Juquin, but any possibilities are doomed since, as the Communists say, the party is not ‘a talking shop’ or a debating society: as Laurent said to Fiszbin, head of the dissident Paris Federation, ‘vous ne ferez pas la loi à la direction du parti’ (Fiszbin, p. 128).

Ronald Tiersky’s book comparing democratic centralism in the French and Italian Communist parties shows how the Italian version has diverged markedly from the original Leninist model, to the extent of resembling a social democratic party while the French version remains true to the original. Thus, while the Italian Communist Party was able to be more flexible in its response to social change and in particular to make use of its intellectual capital, the PCF was not. In the French party democratic centralism did not come in for criticism while the party was hegemonic on the Left in the 1950s and 1960s or when a more intellectually adventurous form of communism was being undertaken in the mid-1970s, but since then it is almost invariably cited as a factor in decline. The paradox is that democratic centralism can be dismantled when the party is successful and consequently when activist support is forthcoming, and the leader-

ship is not under threat, but it cannot be challenged when the party is in decline and when opinion is hostile to the leadership.

It is extraordinary how badly those in the party understood the working of democratic centralism. Intellectuals like Althusser, outsiders like Jenson and Ross (1984), as well as insiders like Fiszbin, do not seem to have understood what hit them when the party line changed in 1977–78 (see also Barak, p. 55). Fiszbin, in particular, who joined the party in 1945 and became a functionary in 1957, talks of the PCF as a 'democratic party', which 'guarantees rights and liberties', and he even voted for the report that condemned him and dissolved his Federation (Fiszbin, p. 51). As the crisis in the party developed (starting with the wave of 'intellectual' dissidence after the 1978 election defeat), the opposition has become more manifest. The leadership is historically correct to refer to this as 'liquidationist'. This term was first used by Lenin in 1908 in response to Zasloulitch, who wanted to democratize the centralism of the party apparatus in order 'to liquidate it' (Colas, p. 58). While the party was in the ascendant this feature of party democracy was not seen as a disadvantage – quite the reverse, it was held to be peculiarly adapted to French conditions – but challengers to the leadership have drawn attention to this factor. Various writers, notably Cardoze, Elleinstein (*Ils vous trompent, camarades!*), Fiszbin and Gaudard, all in their different ways, see a 'Communist people' put upon by an incompetent and crass leadership and unable to express itself because of democratic centralism. Fiszbin's group, *Rencontres Communistes*, claims to speak on behalf of this 'disenfranchised' constituency from outside the party, as does the review *M* and as do the 'reconstructers' from inside. For these people, therefore, and for many Communist voters, the party structure is seen as a major cause of its failure.

Equally important in the recent decline of the party is the nature and style of the *current* leadership of Georges Marchais (see Naudy, p. 145, and Le Gall, 1985). For those outside the party, ex-Communists and sympathizers, as well as for the 'reconstructers' within the party, the current leadership is responsible for a number of 'wrong turnings': the aborted 'Eurocommunist liberalization' (started in 1976 at the 22nd Congress and ended in 1977); the ending of the alliance with the Socialists around the joint Common Programme; the endorsing of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and support for the suppression of Solidarity in Poland; the Marchais presidential candidacy of 1981; the decision to leave government in 1984 and the attacks on the Socialists from 1984 onwards. These, according to party sympathizers, are tactical misjudgements which betrayed the real Communist cause in France.

In his report to the Central Committee of 24–5 June 1981, after the loss of a quarter of the PCF electorate had reduced it to its 1936 position (15 per cent), Marchais admitted that the party had suffered a serious set-back. The report was an attempt to head off a further wave of internal dissidence and provide a reassuring posture for the party. The main weight of explanation was placed on the erroneous twenty-five year strategy of alliance with the Socialist party (culminating in the Common Programme, signed in 1972), and the Socialists' desire to grind down the Communist party. Never forgotten was Mitterrand's famous

statement to the Socialist International in 1972 about taking 3 million of the Communists' 5 million votes: or as *L'Humanité* (17 April 1986) put it, the 'formidable entreprise de débauche des électeurs communistes par les dirigeants socialistes'. Marchais's explanation, that it was all Thorez's fault for starting the strategy of alliance with the Socialists, was combined with an appeal for 'mass organizations' to combat the social-democratic temptation which was the inherent weakness of the working class.

However, as the 1980s progressed, the leadership has found the notion of decline so difficult to handle that it has at times verged on denying the very reality of decline. After the 1986 elections, the headline of *L'Humanité* (18 April 1986) read that the Communist vote had gone up ('560,000 voix de plus qu'au européennes') and in the middle of the wave of dissidence inside the party led by the 'renovators' in 1987, Marchais denied that there was a crisis (*Le Monde*, 27 February 1987). The appendix to Naudy's *Le PCF: le suicide* contains the report by Politbureau member Claude Poperen to the Central Committee of 26–7 June 1984 on the European elections. Poperen, who had until then been considered a hard-liner, somewhat timidly set out to analyse the causes of the electoral setback. Acknowledging the party's loss of half its vote (2,195,000) since the presidential elections of 1981, he asserted that the principal reason was abstention and not a transfer of votes to (unnamed) 'other parties' (p. 194). Several other contributory factors are noted including the old standby of the media, the Socialist party's bipolarization of politics and the Communists' participation in government. These themes were repeated in 1986 by *L'Humanité*, which emphasized the 'revolting' anti-communism of the media (e.g. of the *presse d'argent*, 4 April) and the Socialist party, which 'delivered the country to the rape of the Right' (21 April). For Poperen, the PCF's half-in, half-out attitude to government was a problem, as was the Left government's austerity policy. However, he admits the loss of support amongst workers ('c'est l'électorat ouvrier qui nous a boudés le plus', p. 195), although this was combined with the observation that workers did not think the party strong enough – 'Vous pouvez pas grande-chose, vous grognez mais vous votez' (p. 196). Probably the most significant point (p. 203) was that Poperen criticized the 'centralized' nature of the party.

Poperen rejected any sociological or historical reason for the PCF's decline but it would appear that opening out the subject was seen as dangerous, because the report was suppressed. It is difficult, from within the Leninist perspective – in which the party is always correct – to come to terms with the party's failure but Poperen's report (while emphasizing the responsibility of external forces) is, as far as can be gathered, the nearest the party has come to analysing its decline. Poperen, along with Damette, Juquin and Rigout, moved over to open criticism of the leadership and was sacked from the Politbureau. Critical interventions were made thereafter in the Central Committee and these were, in themselves, symptomatic of the party's decline. As the veteran Fajon said of Fiszbin's earlier answering back: 'In 30 years on the Political Bureau I have never heard of such a thing' (Fiszbin, p. 102).

It must be noted that the electoral decline of French Communism in the 1980s

is not just a French phenomenon. All West European Communist parties suffered declines, some greater than others, although some were declining from very small bases. Even the Italian party, usually evoked as a success, suffered a setback in 1987. Other parties have declined catastrophically or even split: the Spanish party, once the 'Eurocommunist' pacemaker, split at least four ways and its vote was down to 3.8 per cent in 1986; the powerful Finnish party has split and its vote has fallen to 14 per cent; the Portuguese party fell to 15.5 per cent in the 1985 elections and at the 1986 presidential elections its candidate polled a humiliating 7.4 per cent. The minuscule CPGB has split and the Icelandic and Cypriot parties, both relatively large, have also declined electorally.

By realigning on Soviet positions – allegedly, though debatably, in response to Soviet pressure (Fabien, 1985) – the French Communist Party has escaped the pro-Soviet characteristic of other Western CPs. Most Communist splits were caused by the end of *détente* and the Soviet hard-line foreign policy which stopped the 1970s experiments in Western parties; and there has been a general electoral decline which the PCF has not escaped. This suggests that France shares with other Western countries the factors underlying the decline of Communism: the distrust of the Soviet Union, a lack of faith in East European Socialism as a solution to contemporary problems, and a conservatism associated with the onset of recession. The contemporary Western political environment is unconducive to Communists making the running (as in the 1930s or the wartime period of anti-fascist resistance) and the fear of a nuclear war in Europe has been generally to the profit of the 'idealistic' Greens rather than 'self-interested' Communists (though not in France, where the ecological cause is very weak). For Judt (p. 294), the PCF's rise to prominence 'was the result of a fortunate combination of a major role in the Resistance and the good fortune of an electoral stranglehold upon the capital city of the world's most centripetal political culture' (i.e. Paris as political *and* financial *and* administrative *and* cultural hub of France). But the rise of the Socialists ought to have sealed the Communists' fate. The two presidencies of Mitterrand should serve finally to reconcile the Left to the country and the country to the Left. Once suspected of anti-militarism and anti-national postures in foreign policy (Judt, p. 295), the Left now stands for patriotic, sound defence; once rhetorically shackled to a promise of ending the capitalist system, the Left now stands for a Blumian role of capitalist caretaker. With the Left no longer excluded, there should be no more than a minimal vote for a party appealing to the excluded, still less when such a party has sufficient vested interests of its own (such as municipal power) to make a radical stance a risky strategy.

We may conclude that French Communism is in long-term decline, as is Communism throughout Western Europe, where it struggles to find a space in a theoretically 'open' market. In a Western society manifesting some of the attributes of 'mass society' with substantial vertical integration, we may acknowledge Communist complaints that the market is less than open and that the media are biased. We may conclude also that in common with other class-based parties of the Left which came to prominence in time of war and postwar emergency, such

as Labour in Britain, the decline of the class for which the party spoke and of the wartime generation point equally to the party's own decline. That the PCF's decline has been more precipitous than Labour's gradual forty-year (1966-excluded) slide, may be attributed to the changes in institutional rules and terms of competition introduced in France in the 1960s. We may also agree that the Communist party has been badly led, even if a certain self-preservative rationale is evident in a leadership that judges one social democratic party (Mitterrand's) to be sufficient. On the other hand, a less rigidly orthodox and pro-Soviet line could well have enabled a *more substantial* Communist tail to wag, occasionally, the Socialist dog.

One Communist hope – an anticipated fragmentation of a post-Mitterrand Socialist party (Kesselman, 1985) – is less a straw in the wind than a will o' the wisp. The social, cultural and political forces that have dismantled French Communism have correspondingly built the Socialist party into a contemporary French version of social democracy that will outlast François Mitterrand.

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Notes and Comments

Official and Reported Turnout in the British General Election of 1987

KEVIN SWADDLE AND ANTHONY HEATH

This Note looks afresh at the question of turnout in British general elections, using data gathered in the 1987 British General Election Study, together with information on the electoral behaviour of the sample, collected independently of the BGES survey.¹ The official rate of turnout for Great Britain in 1987 (the number of votes cast over the number of entries on the electoral register) was around 75 per cent; that is to say, according to official figures, about one in four registered electors did not vote.² In common with earlier surveys, the BGES indicates a much higher turnout figure than the official one; 86 per cent of respondents to the survey reported that they had voted.

The aims of this Note are, firstly, to explore this discrepancy between the official and the survey-based estimates of turnout; secondly, to assess how representative the survey respondents are of voters and of non-voters, and, thirdly, to reassess survey-based research on the determinants of non-voting

SOURCES OF DATA

In our analysis of turnout we have drawn on data from the 1987 BGES post-election survey. The BGES issued sample comprised 6,000 names and addresses of persons known to be over the age of 18 on polling day, drawn from the electoral registers of one polling district in each of 250 constituencies in England, Scotland and Wales. The achieved sample

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¹ The British General Election Study is a collaborative venture between Oxford University and Social and Community Planning Research and is directed by Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Julia Field and Sharon Witherspoon. We are particularly grateful to Denise Lievesley, Sharon Witherspoon and Kate Melvin at SCPR for their help with this study, and to David Butler, Peter Cozens, Ivor Crewe and Byron Shafer for their comments on our earlier drafts.

The BGES is funded jointly by the Sainsbury Trusts, the ESRC and Pergamon Press. It continues the series of election studies conducted by Butler and Stokes in 1964, 1966 and 1970, by Crewe, Särilvik, Alt and Robertson in 1974 and 1979 and by Heath, Jowell, Curtice and Field in 1983. The 1987 study consists of a nationally representative probability sample interviewed in the weeks following the 1987 general election.

² Different published sources give rather different figures for turnout in 1987. We have preferred the figures given in the official publication, *Return of Election Expenses* (London: HMSO, 1988), p. 9. This shows that 74.8 per cent of the registered electorate in Great Britain turned out to vote. In addition to the non-voters that are accounted for here, there are of course many people who do not vote but are not counted in the official figures for turnout because they are not even registered as electors. Because the sample on which this research is based is drawn from the electoral register, we are unable to add anything about them here. See Jean Todd and Jack Eldridge, *Improving Electoral Registration* (London: HMSO, 1987); Michael and Shelley Pinto-Duschinsky, *Voter Registration: Problems and Solutions* (London: Constitutional Reform Centre, 1987).

contained 3,826 respondents. While the turnout reported by the achieved sample was about ten points higher than the official record, the distribution of the vote was within sampling error of the actual result: 44 per cent reported voting Conservative, 31 per cent Labour, 24 per cent the Alliance and 1 per cent the other parties. It should be noted that the last of the fieldwork was not completed until September, some three months after the general election.

Because we believed that the nature of the subject made it less than completely accessible by survey methods alone, we also sought information about the sample's turnout that would be more reliable than simply accepting the respondent's reports to our interviewers. This came from the official records showing which electors voted, compiled by the presiding officer at every polling station. These records are held for one year after every parliamentary election in the keeping of the Clerk of the Crown, and they are open to public inspection during this period.³ They can tell us one of three things: that someone polled in respect of a particular register entry, that no one polled in respect of that entry, or that a postal vote was issued.

We must emphasize that the official records cannot tell us definitively whether members of the issued sample voted, only whether or not they voted *in respect of the register entry* from which their name was drawn. It is always possible that because of double entries in the electoral registers, some members of the issued sample voted in respect of a *different* address from that issued to our interviewers. We had, however, no way of determining this from the official records. In the case of postal voters, as well, there is unfortunately no way of knowing whether the postal vote was returned, although we do know that about 86 per cent of all postal ballot papers that are issued are indeed returned.⁴

We believe that the official records represent a valuable and much-neglected source, and to our knowledge this is the first time they have been used in conjunction with a major post-election survey in Britain.⁵ In particular, the official records allow us to talk more authoritatively about the non-respondents in our sample, who are the people we normally know least about.

The official records were successfully checked for 5,847 (all but 153) members of the BGES *issued* sample, and then added to our survey data.⁶ According to the official records, 74 per cent of the issued sample voted in respect of the issued addresses and 2 per

³ We are very grateful to Enid Smith, Jill Adam and Anthea Peries of the Lord Chancellor's Department for their efficiency and good humour in the mammoth task of locating the records that we wished to see, and we are also grateful to Debs Ghate of Nuffield College for her assistance in checking through them.

⁴ *Return of Election Expenses* (London: HMSO, 1988), p. 9

⁵ The only other British study that we know used turnout data in combination with survey material was conducted by Catherine Marsh during the 1983 election. The sample of the pre-election poll conducted in Cambridge was checked against the official record of voting in order to test, amongst other things, the validity of the propensity to vote question as a predictor of turnout. See Marsh, 'Predictions of Voting Behaviour from a Pre-election Survey', *Political Studies*, 33 (1985), 642-8. In the United States various scholars have used official records similar to our own to check the validity of respondents' reports of their turnout. See Michael W. Traugott and John P. Katosh, 'Response Validity in Surveys of Voting Behavior', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 42 (1979), 359-77, Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, 'Measurement and Mismeasurement of the Validity of the Self-Reported Vote', *American Journal of Political Science*, 30 (1986), 771-85.

⁶ Some of the missing cases were due to the illegibility of the records, but most were due to the fact that the records for some half dozen whole constituencies were not available

cent received postal ballots. Whatever assumption one chooses to make about the proportion of postal voters returning their ballots, the turnout of our issued sample would appear to accord closely with the 75 per cent figure for Britain as a whole.

THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OFFICIAL AND SURVEY ESTIMATES

The first problem on which we are able to shed some light is the difference between the official turnout figure of 75 per cent and the figure of 86 per cent obtained in the BGES in answer to the question, 'Did you manage to vote in the general election?' This discrepancy has been observed in sample surveys many times in the past.⁷

There are four main reasons that can be given for this discrepancy: misreporting by survey respondents, response bias, failure to trace all movers, and redundancy in the electoral register. We consider each of these in turn.

Firstly, survey respondents may misreport their turnout; in particular, some respondents may not admit to the interviewers that they did not vote, perhaps out of embarrassment at failing in their civic obligations or perhaps genuinely misremembering whether or not they had voted.

Of the 6,000 electors named in the issued sample, 3,826 were located and interviewed. Official turnout records were available for all but 97 of these respondents, leaving 3,729 respondents for whom we have both their reports of turnout and the official records.

TABLE 1 *Official and Reported Turnout of Survey Respondents*

	Reported voted	Reported did not vote
Officially voted	2,987	28
Officially did not vote	159	480
Officially voted by post	69	6

Table 1 describes the relationship between the two measures. We see from it that misreporting generally takes the form of respondents claiming to have voted while the official records show that they did not. Twenty-eight respondents wrongly claimed not to have voted, while there were 159 respondents who wrongly claimed that they had voted. The latter amount to no less than a quarter of all the 'true' non-voters in the achieved sample.

These misreports explain about a quarter of the eleven-point discrepancy between the survey and the official estimates of turnout. Thus 86 per cent of the respondents in Table 1 claimed to have voted, whereas (if we take the reports of the respondents issued with postal ballots to be correct) 83 per cent actually did so. The extent of misreporting among respondents is thus substantially less than that found by Traugott and Katosh in the United States. Seventy-two per cent of their respondents claimed to have voted in the 1976 presidential election, whereas the official records showed that only 61 per cent of the respondents had voted.⁸

⁷ See Ivor Crewe, Tony Fox and Jim Alt, 'Non-voting in British General Elections, 1966–October 1974' in Colin Crouch, ed., *British Political Sociology Yearbook, Volume 3 Participation in Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 46. In 1983, 83 per cent of BGES respondents claimed to have voted, compared with the official figure of about 73 per cent.

⁸ See Traugott and Katosh, 'Response Validity and Voting Behavior', p. 364.

Secondly, response bias may help to explain the discrepancy between the survey and the official estimates of turnout; people who do not agree to be interviewed may be somewhat different in their turnout from those who do agree. They may, for example, be less interested in, or less knowledgeable about, politics and therefore be unwilling to spend time going to the polls or being interviewed about politics.

In 1,608 cases our interviewers were able to locate the elector named in the issued sample, but for various reasons an interview was not achieved. For example, in 127 of these cases the named elector was too ill or too incapacitated to be interviewed, 77 were reported to be away during the interview period, 136 were repeatedly not at home, 72 broke their appointments with the interviewer, 966 personally refused to be interviewed, and in 135 cases someone refused for them.

TABLE 2 *Turnout of Located Individuals*

	Located non-respondents %	Located respondents %	All located individuals %
Officially voted	72	81	78
Officially did not vote	25	17	20
Officially voted by post	3	2	2
Total	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(1,608)	(3,729)	(5,337)

Table 2 compares the official turnout of the located non-respondents with that of the respondents. If we include postal voters along with those who voted in person, we find that 75 per cent of the located non-respondents voted compared with 83 per cent of the respondents, confirming the hypothesis of response bias. As might be expected, the bias was greatest in the case of people who were too ill or senile to be interviewed, only 42 per cent of whom actually voted, and was rather less in the case of people who personally refused to be interviewed, of whom 77 per cent voted.

We can estimate the impact of this response bias on the gap between the official and the survey estimates of turnout by adding the located non-respondents to the actual respondents to give the turnout figure for all located members of the issued sample. This is done in the third column of Table 2. If postal voters are again included with those who voted in person, it shows that 80 per cent of located members of the issued sample voted, which suggests that response bias could explain a further three points of the eleven point gap between the official and the reported turnout measures.

A third source of the discrepancy is that movers are in general under-represented in surveys, but are also disproportionately likely not to exercise their right to vote. Some 234 electors who moved locally were traced while a further 75 were traced to another part of the country. But as well as the movers we managed to find, there were some 510 members of the issued sample whom we could not locate: 24 were reported to have emigrated, 301 were reported to have moved to an unknown address and could not therefore be traced, 66 were reported to have died, and there were 115 people 'not known at this address' who may have been movers, but who could not be pursued any further. These non-located non-respondents have rather low levels of turnout, as can be seen from Table 3.

Their absence from our survey has the effect of raising the figure for reported turnout artificially.⁹ The highest turnout among the unlocated non-respondents was found among those who were reported 'not known at this address', but we should be cautious here, for it seems rather improbable that all of those who voted in person in respect of the issued address were *really* movers who had returned to exercise their right to vote in the constituency. It might be wise to assume that in some cases a covert refusal to be interviewed was being made either by or on behalf of the respondent

TABLE 3 *Turnout of Unlocated Individuals*

	Emigrated %	Moved to unknown address %	'Not known at this address' %	All %
Officially voted	13	28	42	29
Officially did not vote	83	68	56	67
Officially voted by post	4	4	2	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(24)	(301)	(115)	(510)

We cannot, however, definitively disentangle the untraced non-respondents from our fourth reason for the discrepancy between the official and the survey estimates of turnout, namely redundancy in the electoral register. Some of the movers may have left the issued addresses before the 10 October qualifying date for the new register, but may none the less have had their names carried over by the Electoral Registration Officer, and it is possible that others were legitimately registered elsewhere, and thus eligible both to vote and to be sampled in respect of their other address.

Even when it is new, then, the electoral register contains a lot of redundant or duplicate names. Comparing the 1981 census with the electoral register for that year, Todd and Butcher estimated that by April/May (the time of their study) between 10.4 and 13.5 per cent of names on the register belong to people who no longer live at their registered address. Todd and Butcher further estimated that 3.8 per cent of registered electors move in the six months between the qualifying date and April/May. Making a further allowance for deaths since the qualifying date, they concluded that between 6.1 and 9.4 per cent of names on the register were redundant at the qualifying date.¹⁰

Our data are broadly in line with Todd and Butcher's. In all, there were 819 (14 per cent) of individuals who were not known to be resident at the issued address at the time of the interviews (which were conducted at a rather later date in the year than Todd and Butcher's). This is a maximum estimate; we suspect that the true figure is rather lower because of the problem of covert refusals discussed above. Of these 819 people, 314 voted in person and 31 were issued with postal ballots. If we assume that these people were all entitled to vote, that is that they were indeed resident at the issued address at the qualifying

⁹ As Crewe, Fox and Alt remind us, 'the official turnout level is expressed as a percentage of all those listed as eligible voters in the electoral register [whilst] survey figures ... are calculated as a percentage of those interviewed' See 'Non-voting in British General Elections', p. 108.

¹⁰ See Jean Todd and B. Butcher, *Electoral Registration in 1981* (London: OPCS, 1982)

date, our maximum estimate for redundancy in the register at the qualifying date becomes 474 names, 8 per cent of the total.¹¹ Since the true figure is likely to be rather lower (some people will have been resident at the qualifying date but died before the election, for example), we therefore incline towards the lower of Todd and Butcher's estimates, which is no more than 6 per cent redundancy.

If we take 6 per cent as the true redundancy in the electoral register, the true turnout of individuals rises from 75 to 80 per cent, thus closing the remaining gap between the official and the survey reports of turnout. At first sight, this suggests that the failure to trace some movers can be disregarded as a component of the gap. However, we should note that traced movers were included when we analysed misreporting and response bias. Some of these traced movers may have been redundant names on the electoral register, and there may thus be a small element of double counting. The estimates of response bias and misreporting should therefore perhaps be reduced somewhat.

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE ACHIEVED SAMPLE

We turn now to consider the representativeness of the sample. Table 4 offers us a first look at this question. Of the 4,316 members of the issued sample who, according to official records, voted in person, 70 per cent were interviewed. Of the 140 to whom postal votes were issued, 54 per cent were interviewed. And of the 1,391 who did not vote, only 46 per cent were interviewed. However, a proportion of the non-voters will have been redundant names on the electoral register. If 6 per cent of names on the register were in fact redundant (that is, the lower of Todd and Butcher's estimates), then the number of 'true' non-voters in the issued sample is reduced to around 1,030 and of these some 62 per cent would have been interviewed.

TABLE 4 *Percentage of Voters and Non-voters Interviewed*

	Voted %	Did not vote %	Postal vote %
Non-respondents	30 (1,301)	54 (752)	46 (65)
Respondents	70 (3,015)	46 (639)	54 (75)
Total sample	100% (4,316)	100% (1,391)	100% (140)

Because our interviewers were asked to record a number of facts about all the members of the issued sample they managed to locate, regardless of whether an interview was achieved or not, we know a certain amount about our located non-respondents. We know first why it was we failed to get an interview with them, and interviewers were in most cases able to ascertain the named elector's sex and to make an estimate of his or her age. This gives us some further clues about sample representativeness.

¹¹ The assumption that all people who voted in respect of a given address were resident there at the qualifying date may not be wholly correct. Among the 129 respondents that were traced from the issued address to a new one, but who voted in respect of the issued address, no fewer than 18 said that they had been resident at their new address for a year or more, and thus could not have been resident at the issued address on the qualifying date. But it is not impossible, of course, that this puzzling result is due to coding errors.

TABLE 5 *Percentage of Sample Interviewed, by Age and Turnout*

	Voted	Did not vote	Postal vote
Under 35	78% (1,063)	67% (416)	68% (22)
35-64	77% (2,109)	63% (408)	74% (31)
Over 65	66% (815)	44% (214)	54% (67)

Table 5 reveals some of the bias that is present in the BGES achieved sample with regard to age and turnout. Each cell shows the percentage of interviews achieved in each of nine age and turnout cross-categories; that is to say, the number of respondents over the number of located sample members in each class. The figure in brackets is the percentage base. The table suggests that older non-voters are particularly under-represented in the sample. Interviews were achieved with little more than 44 per cent of these respondents

A 70 per cent response rate is usually regarded as acceptable in survey research (although one suspects that this level is chosen more on pragmatic than theoretical grounds). Table 5 suggests that, with the exception of the older postal voters and non-voters, this target was quite closely approached, and, in three cells of the table, comfortably exceeded.

THE DETERMINANTS OF TURNOUT

The evidence we have reviewed so far must clearly raise a question mark against previous survey-based research on the determinants of non-voting (or more strictly of the characteristics of non-voters). On the one hand, we have seen that the achieved sample under-represents non-voters, particularly older ones; and on the other hand, many of the non-voters who actually are in the achieved sample failed to admit that they did not vote.

We can, however, make some progress on previous research, first by exploring our data on non-respondents and secondly, in the case of respondents, by using official turnout data in place of the respondents' reports

In their survey-based study of turnout in 1977, Crewe and his colleagues advanced four major hypotheses:¹²

- (1) that a significant proportion of those not voting in any one election fail to do so because the 'costs' of voting rise above a certain 'threshold';
- (2) that since increases in voting costs of this kind are often temporary (e.g. illness, holidays, short-term posting abroad, move of house), non-voting is usually temporary too;
- (3) that differences between voters and non-voters in social background and political attitudes will be negligible especially between 'once-only' non-voters and regular voters;
- (4) that persistent abstainers will consist of either (a) those most isolated from cultural and social pressures to vote, or (b) those who deliberately reject such pressures and spurn the opportunity to vote, i.e. who reject the act of voting out of alienation from the British political system, or an important aspect of it.

¹² Crewe, Fox and Alt, 'Non-voting in British General Elections', p. 46.

We consider the first three of these in turn, but our data are not such as to shed new light on Crewe and his colleagues' fourth hypothesis.

Let us begin then with the costs of voting. As we noted above, we do know something about located non-respondents and the reasons why interviews did not take place. This source of information about the determinants of turnout broadly confirms the hypothesis that turnout is related to the costs of voting. The official turnout of non-respondents, divided according to the reasons for non-response, was as follows:

Too ill or senile to be interviewed	42%	(127)
Away during interview period	61%	(77)
Appointment broken	71%	(72)
Not seen, not at home	71%	(136)
Someone refused for them	74%	(135)
Personally refused	77%	(966)

Illness and absence appear to be major causes of non-voting. Availability and/or the ease with which electors can get out to vote are clearly, and not surprisingly, important in determining the rate at which they actually do turn out. Those electors it was hardest for our interviewers to track down voted in smaller numbers than those they were able to reach and talk to easily.

Rather encouragingly, the same conclusions emerge from an analysis of the self-confessed non-voters in the survey. Respondents who reported that they had not voted were asked why, and their answers were distributed as follows:

Deliberately abstained	4%
Not interested	13%
Could not decide who to vote for	5%
Said voting wouldn't affect outcome	5%
Prevented by work	10%
Prevented by sickness	9%
Away on polling day	26%
Prevented by other commitments	7%
Because they had moved	8%
Other reasons	12%

The most striking thing about these figures is how few electors claim either to have deliberately abstained or to have failed to vote because they were not interested in the election. Whether their reasons for not voting are genuine or not, a substantial majority of the 480 self-confessed non-voters offered us what might be termed a 'circumstantial' explanation for their behaviour.

It would seem, then, that voting is so much a part of acceptable civic behaviour that most people are ashamed to admit not having done it without having some good cause. For the respondents, at least, we are able to draw the conclusion that a large proportion of non-voters have a 'circumstantial' reason for not voting, and, by implication, that most would have voted if this reason were removed.

Crewe and his colleagues' second hypothesis follows naturally from the first. If non-voting in a particular election is for 'circumstantial' reasons, we would expect that it is not always the same people who are unavailable to vote, and that from one election to the next the non-voters are a shifting population; we would also expect to find that the hard core of persistent non-voters is a relatively small proportion of our respondents.

Taking our official record of respondents' behaviour in 1987, together with their

recalled behaviour in the 1983 and 1979 elections, we are able to produce a measure of turnout regularity. Note, however, that the following percentages are just of those respondents eligible to have voted at each of the last three general elections ¹³

Voted three times	2,093	74%
Voted twice	468	16%
Voted once	168	6%
Did not vote	106	4%

These figures would appear to confirm our expectations about the link between availability and turnout. Although about one respondent in five failed to vote in 1987, non-voting is for most people a temporary thing, related to rises in the cost of voting, such as sickness, holidays or a change of address, which are also usually of a temporary nature. Less than one respondent in ten reported failing to vote in at least two of the last three general elections, and less than one in 25 reported that they did not vote in any of them.

These findings are broadly in line with the assumptions made by Crewe, Fox and Alt in their 1977 paper on turnout. Voting, they said, is both culturally valued, and is usually a relatively costless act. Although the act confers no tangible rewards, and the chance of any one individual's vote affecting the outcome of the election is infinitesimally small, a very large proportion of electors will vote if the costs of voting remain low. That is to say, most electors will vote so long as they are available to vote, have nothing better to do with the time it will take, are well enough for voting not to impair their health, and mobile enough to get to the polling station easily. Once the cost of voting rises beyond a certain threshold, however, cost-benefit calculations come into play, and at each election a significant minority of electors fails to vote because the costs of voting are too high.

We move on now to consider Crewe, Fox and Alt's third hypothesis, which was that 'differences between voters and non-voters in social background and political attitudes will be negligible, especially between "once-only" non-voters and regular voters'. This hypothesis was broadly supported by their analysis of the reports made by respondents in the 1974 British Election study, although they did find a greater attitudinal difference between voters and non-voters than they had expected.¹⁴

We do not feel that our data allow us to add anything useful to what Crewe and his colleagues have said about persistent non-voting, in which analysis they used panel respondents' claims to produce their measure of turnout regularity over the four general elections between 1966 and October 1974. It is of some interest, however, to check their other findings using the official records of turnout in place of respondents' reports. In line with their expectations, they found that 'the common belief that those in the highest income and status brackets participate most in politics does not apply to general elections in Britain'.¹⁵ But they did find some significant discriminators. The strongest that they

¹³ We would urge some caution in using turnout regularity as an analytical tool, however. Firstly, our check on electoral behaviour in 1987 indicates that even for the most recent election, respondents' reports are often incorrect, and, when several elections are being looked at, errors will accumulate. Secondly, because it only takes account of electors eligible to vote on every occasion, the measure excludes a significant number of respondents, especially the young. And thirdly, if a panel is not used, it forces us to rely on respondents' recollections of their past behaviour, which we know from other studies is also often unreliable. For instance, see H. T. Himmelweit, J. Biberman and J. Stockdale, 'Memory for Past Vote: Implications of a Study of Bias in Recall', *British Journal of Political Science*, 8 (1978), 365-75.

¹⁴ Crewe, Fox and Alt, 'Non-voting in British General Elections', p. 64

¹⁵ Crewe, Fox and Alt, 'Non-voting in British General Elections', p. 59

found in the single election of October 1974 were length of residence, housing tenure and age; the only other variable that they found to have a significant relationship with turnout, once controls for age were included, was marital status. We shall consider each of these variables individually, using both official and reported turnout data, before bringing them together in a multivariate analysis

Table 6, below, shows the turnout of our respondents according to the length of time they have lived at their present address. When Crewe and his colleagues looked at this variable they found a significant difference, with respect to turnout, between respondents who had lived at their present address for more than and for less than three years. The longer respondents had lived at their present address, the higher their turnout seemed to be, and they postulated an explanation for this phenomenon in terms of community ties and social networks.¹⁶ Table 6, however, shows that the main difference is between those people who have lived at their present address for less than one year and those who have lived there for one or more years. This is true regardless of whether we use respondents' reported turnout or the official records.

TABLE 6 *Reported and Official Turnout by Length of Time at Present Address*

	Under one year %	One year %	Two years %	Three years %	Four years %	Five to ten years %	Over years %	All %
Reported voted	74	87	89	86	89	86	87	86
Reported did not vote	26	13	11	14	11	14	13	14
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Officially voted	61	81	82	82	81	82	83	81
Officially did not vote	35	18	17	17	17	15	14	17
Officially voted by post	4	1	1	1	2	1	3	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	297	234	275	240	201	830	1,611	3,729

We categorized the 297 respondents who had been at their present address for less than a year, according to where our interviewers found them living; either at the address for which they were registered, at another local address they had moved to, or at a new address in another part of the country. One hundred and nine were found resident at the address for which they were registered, 145 had moved locally, and 43 had moved to another part of the country. Assuming postal voters to have returned their ballot papers, their official rates of turnout were 70 per cent, 68 per cent, and 47 per cent respectively. It is interesting that new residents who were at their present address in October 1986 (when the register was compiled) seem only a little more likely to vote than more recent local movers.

¹⁶ Crewe, Fox and Alt, 'Non-voting in British General Elections', p. 63.

TABLE 7 *Reported and Official Turnout by Age*

	18-24 %	25-44 %	45-64 %	Over 65 %
Reported voted	77	85	91	87
Reported did not vote	24	15	9	13
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Officially voted	64	81	88	81
Officially did not vote	34	18	11	14
Officially voted by post	2	1	1	5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	472	1,394	1,160	672

Table 7 shows the reported and official turnout of our respondents by age. Of the four variables considered, age was the one that Crewe and his colleagues found to be most important, and there does indeed seem to be a very marked relationship between youth and non-voting. Moreover, younger respondents seem much more likely to mis-report about their failure to vote than older respondents, with the result that the relationship between age and turnout is much more pronounced when we use the official records instead of the interview data.

Table 8 shows the reported and official turnout of our respondents according to the nature of their housing. When Crewe and his colleagues looked at this variable, they found no significant difference between the turnout of owner occupiers and local authority tenants; the difference they did find was between private tenants and the rest. When housing is looked at on its own, our data also show the turnout of private tenants to be less than that of other groups, but the turnout of local authority tenants also seems to be significantly less than that of the owner occupiers – especially using the official data. The low turnout of private tenants may in part be an attribute of age, but, as we note below, all effects of housing type disappear when controls for social class are introduced.

TABLE 8 *Reported and Official Turnout by Housing*

	Owner occupier %	Local authority %	Private tenant %
Reported voted	88	83	82
Reported did not vote	12	17	18
Total	100%	100%	100%
Officially voted	83	77	73
Officially did not vote	15	21	23
Officially voted by post	2	2	4
Total	100%	100%	100%
(N)	2,617	779	257




TABLE 9 *Reported and Official Turnout by Marital Status*

	Married %	As if married %	Widowed %	Divorced %	Not married %
Reported voted	89	74	84	83	79
Reported did not vote	11	26	16	17	21
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Officially voted	85	66	75	81	70
Officially did not vote	13	34	18	19	27
Officially voted by post	1	—	7	—	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	2,433	105	340	182	667

The reported and official turnout of our respondents according to their marital status is shown in Table 9. Crewe and his colleagues found that when they controlled for age there was a significant relationship between marital status and turnout *regularity*. It may just be a consequence of the fact that unmarried people are more likely to be young, but looking at all age groups in the one election of 1987, there does indeed appear to be a relationship between non-voting and the state of being unmarried. The relationship is especially marked when we use the official turnout data. When we control for age, we find that the voting behaviour of young respondents who are married is more similar to that of older respondents than it is to that of young unmarried respondents.

TABLE 10 *Logit Model including Age, Length of Residence, Marital Status and Tenure*

	Official	Reported
Constant	0.54 (0.04)	0.72 (0.04)
18-24	-0.25 (0.04)	-0.17 (0.05)
25-44	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)
45-64	0.26 (0.03)	0.21 (0.04)
New resident	-0.17 (0.04)	-0.14 (0.04)
Married	0.11 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)
Owner	0.08 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Local authority tenant	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Other tenure	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)

the results when a multivariate analysis is carried out using the four of residence, housing tenure and marital status. Since our dependent y, we have used logit models rather than linear regression for the

multivariate analysis.¹⁷ The assumptions on which linear regression is based are not met when the dependent variable is binary, and the violations are particularly serious when the variable is highly skewed, as is the case with turnout. In particular, there are likely to be 'floor' and 'ceiling' effects: successive increments in the independent variable will tend to have smaller and smaller effects as the dependent variable approaches the ceiling of 100 per cent turnout, for example. We thus need to postulate a non-linear rather than a linear relationship between independent and dependent variable, and this is what logit analysis offers (the relationship it assumes being a logistic one). However, the broad interpretation of logit analysis is similar to that of multiple regression: each parameter shows the strength of association between the dependent and the independent variable in question, net of the other relationships specified in the model, and a parameter needs to be twice its standard error to be significant.¹⁸ In both Tables 10 and 11 the figures in brackets are the standard errors.

The first column of Table 10 shows the parameters (and their standard errors) when the dependent variable is official turnout; the second column gives the parameters when reported turnout is the dependent variable. Following our earlier findings given in Table 5 about the representativeness of the sample, we have restricted our analysis to respondents aged under 65.

TABLE 11 *Logit Model Including Age, Length of Residence, Marital Status, Social Class and Income*

	Official	Reported
Constant	0.51 (0.05)	0.73 (0.05)
18-24	-0.25 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.06)
25-44	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.04)
45-64	0.30 (0.05)	0.26 (0.05)
New resident	-0.18 (0.04)	-0.17 (0.04)
Married	0.12 (0.03)	0.13 (0.03)
White collar	0.18 (0.04)	0.13 (0.05)
Petty bourgeois	-0.17 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)
Blue collar	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)
Income under £8,000	-0.07 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.03)

¹⁷ Our dependent variable thus becomes the log odds of voting or not voting. We therefore fit the following model, which uses the notation of Fienberg. See S. E. Fienberg, *The Analysis of Cross-Classified Data*, 2nd edn (Boston, Mass: MIT Press, 1987), chap. 6

$$\ln(m_{ijkl1}/m_{ijkl2}) = w + w_{A(i)} + w_{R(j)} + w_{M(k)} + w_{T(l)}$$

A represents age (three categories), *R* represents length of residence (a binary variable scored 1 if the respondent had been resident at the address for less than one year, 2 otherwise), *M* represents marital status (a binary variable scored 1 if the respondent was married, 2 otherwise) and *T* represents housing tenure (three categories). We use the SPSSx parameterization in which the parameters for the categories of a given variable sum to zero. When the dependent variable is official turnout, the model yields a satisfactory fit (maximum likelihood chi square = 24.3, 27 degrees of freedom, $p = 0.612$), the fit is less satisfactory when reported turnout is the dependent variable (chi square = 46.8, 27 df, $p = 0.01$).

¹⁸ See J. H. Aldrich and F. D. Nelson, *Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models* (Beverly Hills, Calif. Sage, 1984)

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As we can see, both analyses confirm the conclusions reached by Crewe and his colleagues. Turnout, whether measured by the official records or by respondents' reports, does have statistically significant relationships with age, marital status, length of residence and housing tenure. In general, however, relationships are rather weaker when respondents' reports of their turnout are the dependent variable. As our next step we added variables to the model which Crewe and his colleagues had found not to have significant relationships with regularity of turnout, namely sex, class and income. Our analysis confirms theirs with respect to sex but not with respect to class and income. Both class and income have significant relationships with turnout (net of the other variables in the model). Furthermore, when they are included, the net effect of tenure becomes non-significant. The common belief 'that those in the highest income and status brackets participate most in politics' is thus shown to be true after all, at least for voting in the 1987 general election.¹⁹

Of course, there are several reasons why our results might be different in this respect from those of Crewe and his colleagues. Firstly, electors' behaviour may have changed between 1974 and 1987. Secondly, we have a larger sample which makes it easier to find statistically significant results. Thirdly, our classification of the independent variables is slightly different. Fourthly, our dependent variable is different. And fifthly, we have excluded respondents aged 65 and over from the analysis because of doubts about their representativeness.

CONCLUSIONS

However, it must be emphasized how similar our results are to those of Crewe and his colleagues based on data obtained thirteen years earlier than ours. We wish to endorse their general conclusions that turnout appears to be quite high in almost all social groups and that a substantial majority of registered electors will turn out to vote if the costs of voting are not too high.

Although the use of official turnout records generally confirmed those of Crewe and his colleagues using respondents' reports, with the exceptions noted above, it is worth noting that the relationships between turnout and the various independent variables (age, length of residence and so on) are generally rather stronger when the official records are used. This can be seen both from the parameters in Tables 10 and 11 and from the cross-tabulations in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9. In effect, the groups with the lowest turnout are the ones who are most likely to exaggerate their turnout.

This finding could be due to the presence of 'ceiling' effects: there is less room for groups with high turnout to exaggerate. However, the logit analysis takes account of the ceiling effects, but continues to show stronger relationships with officially recorded turnout. One possible explanation is that the groups with low turnout may be ones for whom the 'circumstantial' reasons described above particularly apply. The costs of getting to the polls may be particularly high for them; for example, young or unmarried people may be particularly likely to be away from home on polling day whereas older or married people may lead a more settled existence. And people who are prevented by circumstantial

¹⁹ Table 11 gives the results of our final logit model, which drops tenure and adds respondent's class (three categories – a collapsed version of that used by Heath, Jowell and Curtice) and household income (two categories). The fit is acceptable both when official turnout is the dependent variable (chi square = 71.8, 56 df, $p = 0.08$) and when reported turnout is the dependent variable (chi square = 64.8, 56 df, $p = 0.20$).

reasons from voting may be particularly likely to misremember their turnout. Paradoxically, then, it may be that the survey-based estimates of turnout give a better indication than the official ones of the desire to conform with the civic obligation to participate

Overall, then, our results are rather comforting, both to the survey researcher and to the political theorist. We have found that misrepresenting of turnout by our survey respondents is relatively low, certainly by American standards, and that our survey has reasonable coverage both of voters and of non-voters, apart from the elderly. We have generally confirmed the conclusions of previous research on the determinants of turnout, and have shown that when better quality data are used (namely the official records of turnout) stronger relationships are found, not different relationships. For the survey researcher, who must always be concerned about the validity of data, these are comforting findings.

Our data have also tended to indicate that the level of redundancy in the electoral register is towards the lower of Todd and Butcher's estimates and yields an estimate of 80 per cent for the 'true' level of turnout. This is likely to be still some way short of the record turnout recorded in 1950; official turnout then was 84 per cent, and while the redundancy in the register was also probably somewhat lower then, the true turnout was probably around 87 per cent.²⁰ However, once one takes account of the extension of the franchise to 18-year-olds in 1969, the increased redundancy in the register, and the age of the register at the time of the election, it is unlikely that there has been much decline in turnout over the last quarter century. This suggests that alarmist fears about the collapse of the political culture, increasing alienation from the political system and so on, are rather wide of the mark

²⁰ Todd and Butcher, *Electoral Registration in 1981*. While there have been earlier studies of electoral registration, their focus has been on under-registration rather than on the redundancy in the register. See, for instance, P. G. Gray, T. Corlett and P. Frankland, *The Register of Electors as a Sampling Frame* (London: Central Office of Information, 1950). It appears from these sources that under-registration was rather lower in 1950 than it is today, and we have therefore assumed that registration was more efficient then with respect to redundancy too.

National Elections and Political Attitudes: The Case of Political Efficacy

HAROLD D. CLARKE AND ALAN C. ACOCK

Elections constitute a principal avenue of citizen involvement in political life, and knowledge of their effects on public attitudes towards the polity and the role of the individual therein has important implications for theories of democratic governance. One such attitude is political efficacy, 'the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process'.¹ Although many studies have documented that

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¹ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954)

political efficacy is positively associated with electoral participation,² the causal mechanisms involved are not well understood. Most researchers have simply assumed that the 'causal arrow' runs from efficacy to participation, i.e. from the attitude to the behaviour.³ Investigations of the hypothesis that the behaviour (participation) affects the attitude (efficacy) are rare.⁴ Rarer still are enquiries focusing on the impact of election outcomes on efficacy, and studies that examine both effects are virtually non-existent. In this Note covariance structure analysis is used to investigate the effects of voting, campaign activity and the outcomes of the 1984 national elections on political efficacy in the American electorate.

EFFICACY, ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND ELECTION OUTCOMES

Since the late 1950s two types of political efficacy, *internal* and *external*, have been distinguished.⁵ Internal efficacy is the perception that one has the requisite skills and resources to influence the political system. External efficacy is the perception that government institutions and elites are responsive to one's attempts to exert political influence. A number of studies support this conceptual distinction,⁶ with recent work indicating that Lane was correct to argue that the two forms of efficacy are strongly related.⁷

Several hypotheses may be advanced about the impact of elections on political efficacy. The first states that voting and campaign activity have positive effects on external efficacy. Explanations of these *pure participation* effects are related to arguments about how elections mobilize regime support.⁸ Individuals who participate in elections, either as voters or campaign activists, are more likely than non-participants to become psycho-

² Lester Milbrath and M. L. Goel, *Political Participation*, 2nd edn (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), pp. 57–74.

³ However, the proposition that participation bolsters efficacy has been a staple of critiques of liberal democracies and accompanying pleas for increased citizen participation. See Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

⁴ Relevant studies include, *inter alia*, Susan Welch and Cal Clark, 'Determinants of Change in Political Efficacy. A Test of Two Hypotheses', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 3 (1975), 207–17; Benjamin Ginsberg and Robert Weissberg, 'Elections and the Mobilization of Popular Support', *American Journal of Political Science*, 22 (1978), 31–55; Steven E. Finkel, 'Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis', *American Journal of Political Science*, 29 (1985), 891–913; Stephen E. Finkel, 'The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support', *Journal of Politics*, 49 (1987), 441–64. More generally, a substantial body of theory and research suggests that behaviour and attitudes have reciprocal causal linkages. See D. J. Bem, 'Self Perception Theory', in L. Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (New York: Academic Press, 1972); E. E. Jones et al., *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972); Herbert C. Kelman, 'Attitudes Are Alive and Well and Gainfully Employed in the Sphere of Action', *American Psychologist*, 29 (1974), 310–24.

⁵ Robert Lane, *Political Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 149.

⁶ See the works cited in Alan Acock, Harold D. Clarke and Marianne C. Stewart, 'A New Model for Old Measures: A Covariance Structure Analysis of Political Efficacy', *Journal of Politics*, 47 (1985), 1062–84.

⁷ Lane, *Political Life*, p. 149; Acock, Clarke and Stewart, 'A New Model', pp. 1075–7; Alan Acock and Harold D. Clarke, 'Alternative Measures of Political Efficacy: Models and Means', revised version of paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1986.

⁸ Ginsberg and Weissberg, 'Elections and the Mobilization of Popular Support', *passim*.

logically implicated as supporters of the regime and to accept the core beliefs that undergird it. Cognitive theories contend that one must justify one's behaviour to oneself.⁹ The belief that voting or campaign activity is meaningless or ineffective is dissonant with performing such acts. Thus, those who vote or engage in campaign activities will justify their behaviour by strengthening their belief that the political system responds to citizen involvement.

A second, *outcome-contingent*, hypothesis maintains that election effects on efficacy are a product of both participation *and* outcomes. People who participate either by 'voting for winners' or by actively campaigning on behalf of such candidates ('working for winners') will manifest increased internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy will increase because those who voted for or campaigned for winning candidates will tend to conclude that they can influence the political process. External efficacy will increase because of the belief that elected officials are predisposed to attend to the needs and demands of those who assisted their candidacies. Similarly, both types of efficacy will decrease among those supporting losing candidates.

A third, *pure outcomes*, hypothesis focuses on election results. People who support winning candidates will experience increased external and internal efficacy regardless of whether they actually participated in the election. The rationale for this hypothesis is similar to that for the outcome-contingent hypothesis except that it does not require behavioural involvement in the electoral process. External efficacy will increase because of the aforementioned belief that winners are likely to be particularly responsive to their support groups, i.e., the partisan and socio-demographic groups with which an individual identifies. Internal efficacy will increase because the election outcome has demonstrated that 'people like them', i.e., groups with which they identify, can influence the political process. Again, internal and external efficacy will decrease among those who support losing candidates.

The outcome-contingent and pure outcomes hypotheses rest on the assumption that changes in political efficacy result from knowing about election outcomes. Uninformed people will not change. Although the opportunity costs associated with acquiring such knowledge are minimal, the cognitive basis for outcome-contingent or pure outcomes effects can be expected to vary across the electorate. Relatedly, outcome-contingent and pure outcome effects on efficacy should vary in magnitude across electoral arenas. In American national politics such effects should operate in both presidential and congressional elections. Presidential elections have enormous salience and virtually everyone is aware of their outcome. Congressional elections receive less publicity, but their results also are widely reported. Additionally, most congressional districts are relatively small, both geographically and demographically. This may encourage voters to believe that their involvement 'made a difference', and that opportunities to express demands are greater at the congressional than at the presidential level.

Also, conceptions of internal and external efficacy suggest that if outcome-contingent or pure outcome processes are operative, their impact should be stronger for external than internal efficacy. Since internal efficacy is a self-perception, it presumably is anchored by relatively stable personality traits such as ego strength and self-esteem¹⁰ and, thus, should not fluctuate markedly in reaction to ongoing political events such as elections. External efficacy, in contrast, concerns perceptions of government responsiveness that should be quite sensitive to such events.

⁹ See, for example, Kelman, 'Attitudes are Alive and Well', *passim*

¹⁰ Lane, *Political Life*, pp. 147-62; Milbrath and Goel, *Political Participation*, p. 61.

Finally, it can be assumed that feelings of political efficacy are not generated afresh at successive elections. Net of other causes, levels of pre-election internal and external efficacy should affect post-election values of these variables.

To summarize:

- H1: Electoral participation (voting and campaign activity) increase external political efficacy;
- H2: Among voters, support for winning candidates increases external efficacy;
- H3: Among voters, support for winning candidates increases internal efficacy;
- H4: Regardless of participation, preferences for winning candidates increases external efficacy;
- H5: Regardless of participation, preferences for winning candidates increases internal efficacy;
- H6: Effects described in hypotheses 1–5 operate in presidential and congressional electoral contexts;
- H7: Effects described in hypotheses 2–5 require knowledge of presidential and congressional election outcomes;
- H8: Effects described in hypotheses 2–5 will be stronger for external than internal efficacy;
- H9: Internal efficacy is more stable than external;
- H10: Internal efficacy has positive effects on external efficacy;
- H11: External efficacy has positive effects on internal efficacy.

METHODS AND MEASURES

Testing the hypotheses requires measuring efficacy both before and after an election. Although three of the CPS national election surveys (1968, 1972, 1984) measure efficacy in the pre- and post-election periods, in 1968 the two sets of efficacy statements were worded differently, thereby raising doubts about their comparability.¹¹ Also, neither the 1968 nor the 1972 surveys contain measures of presidential and congressional candidate preferences among both voters and non-voters, and 1968 does not include a vote validation variable. This is important for analysing the effects of actual electoral *behaviour* on political attitudes because the recalled vote question produces substantially inflated estimates of turnout.¹² Vote validation data for 1972 are inadequate because many pertinent records were unavailable.¹³ The 1984 study in contrast, includes a full set of candidate support and political participation measures, as well as a usable vote validation variable.

Four items from the 1984 survey¹⁴ are used to measure internal and external efficacy:

- (X1) People like me don't have any say about what the government does.

¹¹ Herbert Asher, 'The Reliability of the Political Efficacy Items', *Political Methodology*, 1 (1974), 45–72.

¹² Lee Sigelman, 'The Nonvoting Voter in Voting Research', *American Journal of Political Science*, 26 (1982), 47–56.

¹³ Center for Political Studies, *The American National Series: 1972, 1974 and 1976*, Vol. 1 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1979), p. XLIV.

¹⁴ The *N* for the post-election wave is smaller than that for the pre-election wave – 969 v. 2257. This is a result of the CPS's decision to omit the efficacy items from an experimental telephone version of the post-election interview administered to a random half-sample of post-election respondents. See Center for Political Studies, *American National Election Study, 1984*, Vol. 1 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1986), pp. IV–V.

- (X2) I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.
 (X3) How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what people think...?
 (X4) Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what people think when it decides what to do...?

The first two items are used to tap internal efficacy, and the latter two, external efficacy.¹⁵ The two-factor measurement model is tested using confirmatory factor analysis, as operationalized by LISREL VI.¹⁶ For the pre-election wave $\chi^2_1 = 3.66$, $p = 0.056$, and for the post-election wave, $\chi^2_1 = 0.05$, $p = 0.829$.¹⁷ All factor loadings (λ s) in both analyses are large and statistically significant. LISREL comparison tests for important groups in the electorate (i.e., educational, gender and racial groups) reveal that the model is applicable to each, and that factor loadings and inter-factor correlations (ϕ s) are invariant.¹⁸ Additionally, the model fits earlier (1964–80) CPS data, the mean χ^2_1 being only 2.98. Finally, construct validity tests show that the two efficacy factors manifest a theoretically anticipated pattern of correlations with two widely used criterion variables, i.e., political trust and general personal competence.¹⁹

Several items measure political participation and candidate support. Voting turnout is the standard CPS recall question (respondents whose self-reported behaviour is not corroborated by the vote validation screening variable are omitted).²⁰ Four dichotomous

¹⁵ Some analysts use X2 to measure external efficacy but do not present validation analyses to substantiate this classification. See, for example, Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller and Edward J. Schneider, *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952–1978* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). Using the statement to tap internal efficacy reflects both face validity considerations, i.e., the reference to 'people like me', and the results of extensive validation tests. See Acock and Clarke, 'Alternative Measures of Political Efficacy'. Re X3 and X4, these have been used in several CPS surveys to measure 'governmental responsiveness'. Since there is broad agreement that such perceptions constitute the core meaning of external political efficacy, X3 and X4 would seem to be useful indicators of this concept.

¹⁶ Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) differs from conventional exploratory factor analysis (EFA). CFA enables one to perform statistical tests of the goodness-of-fit of a measurement model in which the number of factors and patterns of factor loadings for the indicator variables are hypothesized *a priori*. Also, unique factors may be hypothesized to be inter-correlated, and correlations between common factors are parameter estimates rather than arbitrary values as, for example, with oblique rotations of exploratory factor solutions (J. Scott Long, *Confirmatory Factor Analysis. A Preface to LISREL* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983), Karl J. Joreskog and Dag Sorbom, *LISREL VI User's Guide*, 3rd ed (Mooresville, Ind.: Scientific Software Inc., 1984)).

¹⁷ This is in sharp contrast to a single-construct measurement model that does not distinguish between internal and external efficacy. For the pre- and post-election waves of the 1984 survey the single-construct model yields χ^2_1 s of 203.13, $p < 0.001$ and 126.99, $p < 0.001$, respectively.

¹⁸ Such comparisons are important for establishing the general applicability of a measurement model. The fit of a measurement model for various groups cannot be assumed, but must be established empirically, with groups being selected in terms of theoretical or substantive rationales relating to particular political contexts. In the United States, comparisons of racial, gender and educational groups are arguably important, although others would be appropriate as well.

¹⁹ The utility of personal competence and political trust in construct validity tests is substantiated by analyses of the CPS efficacy measures. See Acock and Clarke, 'Alternative Measures of Political Efficacy'.

²⁰ The 106 respondents who claim to have voted and three who claimed not to have voted are eliminated. See Center for Political Studies, *American National Election Study, 1984*, 2nd ICPSR edn, Vol. 1 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1986), pp. 579–80. Regarding the properties of the resulting sample, men, blacks, 22–35 year olds,

(0–1) indicators tap campaign activity: wearing campaign buttons or displaying bumper stickers, attending political meetings or rallies, working for parties or candidates, and donating money.²¹ Support for presidential candidates is directly available, and support for winning and losing congressional candidates is measured using reported candidate preference and information about election outcomes in the congressional districts.²² All candidate support variables are 0–1 dichotomies.

FINDINGS

The first analysis assesses the impact of voting and campaign activity on efficacy (H1), as well as the effects of pre-election internal and external efficacy on their post-election counterparts (H9, H10, H11). A preliminary analysis of this model²³ (Figure 1) yields a $\chi^2_{53} = 98.70$, $p = < 0.001$, Adjusted Goodness to Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.967. Modification indices reveal that the fit may be improved by correlating the error terms for the pre- and post-election 'people like me' and 'elections' indicators. Such correlated error terms are common when questions are repeated in panel surveys.²⁴ The fit with correlated errors is good, $\chi^2_{51} = 69.22$, $p = 0.046$, AGFI = 0.986, and LISREL diagnostics are acceptable.

Three findings are noteworthy. Firstly, neither voting turnout nor campaign participation (H1) significantly affects post-election internal or external efficacy (Table 1A). Secondly, although pre-election internal efficacy influences post-election external efficacy

persons with university educations at the bachelor's level and weak Democrats are all *slightly* more likely than others not to have their self-reports substantiated. A probit analysis confirms the weakness of these correlates – $R^2 = 0.08$, and only party identification is statistically significant – weak Democrats are less likely to be in the validated group ($t = -2.13$). Also, there are only very small differences between the validated and non-validated voters' responses to the eight pre- and post-election efficacy items. A probit analysis of the validated vote screening variable using the eight efficacy variables as predictors produces an $R^2 = 0.03$ and none of the predictors are statistically significant. This finding differs from those reported in an analysis of the 1964, 1976 and 1980 data. See Brian Silver, Barbara A. Anderson and Paul R. Abramson, 'Who Overreports Voting', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (1986), 613–24.

²¹ Voting turnout and campaign activity constitute separate factors. In an initial CFA of the participation items a two-factor model fits the data reasonably well – $\chi^2_5 = 12.86$, $p = 0.025$, AGFI = 0.979. Modification indices indicated that the fit could be improved if θ_{5s} for two of the campaign activity items, 'display button or sticker' and 'work for candidate or party' were correlated. This produces an excellent fit – $\chi^2_4 = 6.08$, $p = 0.193$, AGFI = 0.988, and these θ_{5s} are correlated in all the analyses reported below.

²² Alan Ehrenhalt, ed., *Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and at Home* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985).

²³ To permit error terms for indicators in the pre- and post-election waves of interviewing to be correlated, the latent exogenous variables, i.e., pre-election internal efficacy, voting and campaign activity, are treated as endogenous variables in the LISREL specification. Accordingly, these constructs and the coefficients for the causal linkages between them and post-election internal and external efficacy are labelled as η_s and β_s , respectively. Since pre-election internal and external efficacy, voting and campaign activity are conceptually exogenous, causal linkages between them are not specified. These variables are allowed to be correlated by freeing elements in the Ψ matrix. Similarly, no causal linkage is specified between post-election internal and external efficacy and, accordingly, the appropriate element in this matrix is freed. Also, since the candidate support constructs in the LISREL models are measured as single indicators, their variance in the Ψ matrix is fixed at the value of the variance of their indicators.

²⁴ Long, *Confirmatory Factor Analysis*, p. 29.




Fig. 1 Structural model of pre- and post-election political efficacy, voting turnout and campaign participation

TABLE 1 *Validated Voters and Non-voters: Parameter Estimates for Structural Model of Pre- and Post-Election Political Efficacy, Voting Turnout and Campaign Participation*

Predictor variables	Post-election political efficacy			
	Internal efficacy		External efficacy	
	β	Beta†	β	Beta†
<i>Panel A</i>				
Pre-election internal efficacy	0.921*	0.791	0.413*	0.274
Pre-election external efficacy	−0.094	−0.106	0.478*	0.417
Voting turnout	x	x	−0.003	−0.003
Campaign participation	x	x	−0.158	−0.057
$R^2 =$	0.537		0.375	
$\chi^2_{53} = 70.34, p = 0.056, AGFI = 0.986, N = 757$				
<i>Panel B</i>				
Pre-election internal efficacy	0.819*	0.711	0.385*	0.257
Pre-election external efficacy	x	x	0.508*	0.444
Voting turnout	x	x	−0.006	−0.005
Campaign participation	x	x	−0.161	−0.058
$R^2 =$	0.506		0.382	
$\chi^2_{54} = 72.22, p = 0.049, AGFI = 0.986, N = 757$				

* $p \leq 0.05$, † standardized solution; x not included in model.

(H10), pre-election external efficacy does not influence internal efficacy (H11). If this latter linkage is omitted, the model's fit is not significantly worse (the difference in $\chi^2_1 = 1.88$, $p = 0.170$), and again neither voting nor campaign participation influences post-election external efficacy (Table 1b).²⁵ Thirdly, the results support the hypothesis (H9) that internal efficacy is more stable than external efficacy, the β s being 0.71 and 0.44, respectively. When the model is re-estimated constraining these two coefficients to be equal, the fit deteriorates – the difference in χ^2_1 being 6.17 ($p = 0.013$).

We next consider the outcome-contingent hypotheses (H2, H3), i.e., elections affect external and internal political efficacy according to voter's patterns of candidate support. Since these hypotheses specify the importance of electoral participation, they are tested by examining the influence of presidential and congressional balloting on post-election efficacy among validated voters. Also included in the model are pre-election internal and external efficacy and campaign participation (Figure 2). The model has a good fit, i.e., $\chi^2_{61} = 70.72$, $p = 0.185$, AGFI = 0.970 (Table 2), and LISREL diagnostics are again acceptable.

Both voting variables are statistically significant, with persons who supported winning candidates manifesting increased levels of internal and external efficacy (Table 2). The importance of congressional as well as presidential effects is suggested by the fact that the β s for the two voting variables are similar in magnitude. Constraining these coefficients to be equal reinforces this conclusion (difference in $\chi^2_2 = 0.24$, $p = 0.887$). Contrary to expectations (H8), however, voting for winning candidates does not have stronger effects on external than internal efficacy. Imposition of equality constraints on the relevant β s




Fig. 2. Structural model of pre- and post-election political efficacy, presidential and congressional voting and campaign participation

²⁵ Including linkages between voting and campaign activity, on the one hand, and internal efficacy, on the other, does not effect the results i.e., $\chi^2_{53} = 69.01$, $p = 0.057$, AGFI = 0.986. The voting-internal efficacy and campaign activity – internal efficacy coefficients are not statistically significant, and the significance of other coefficients in the model remains unaltered.

TABLE 2 *Validated Voters: Parameter Estimates for Structural Model of Pre- and Post-Election Political Efficacy, Voting Choice and Campaign Participation*

Predictor variables	Post-election political efficacy			
	Internal efficacy		External efficacy	
	β	Beta†	β	Beta†
Pre-election internal efficacy	0.818*	0.672	0.329*	0.214
Pre-election external efficacy	x	x	0.499*	0.478
Vote, winning congressional candidate	0.098*	0.114	0.120*	0.110
Campaign participation	0.066	0.032	-0.074	-0.029
Vote, winning presidential candidate	0.097*	0.116	0.150*	0.144
$R^2 =$	0.494		0.428	
$\chi^2_{61} = 70.72, p = 0.185, AGFI = 0.970, N = 551$				

* $p \leq 0.05$, † standardized solution; x not included in model.

worsens the fit only marginally (differences in $\chi^2_1 = 0.017$, $p = 0.680$ and $\chi^2_1 = 0.533$, $p = 0.467$, respectively).

These results suggest that patterns of candidate support affect efficacy levels. The act of voting may not be important, however. According to the pure outcomes hypotheses (H4, H5), what matters is the fate of preferred candidates. Internal and external efficacy increase or decrease depending upon whether the citizen's preferred candidates win or lose regardless of whether the citizen voted for them. These latter hypotheses can be investigated by analysing the impact of presidential and congressional candidate preferences on post-election political efficacy among *non-voters*. If candidate preferences are sufficient to alter efficacy, a preference for a winning candidate should have positive effects for non-voters as well as for voters. The model is, with one exception, unchanged. Since very few non-voters are active campaigners there is insufficient variance to include campaign activity. The fit is excellent – $\chi^2_{26} = 18.29$, $p = 0.865$, AGFI = 0.983 (Table 3). Presidential but not congressional candidate preferences have significant positive effects on post-election external and internal efficacy. The impact of presidential preferences among non-voters suggests that election results rather than actually voting for particular candidates is the crucial factor in the process by which elections affect efficacy.

One may ask why congressional candidate preferences are insignificant for non-voters. To answer this question recall that H7 asserts that candidate preference effects on efficacy require knowledge of election outcomes. Since political information among non-voters is low,²⁶ it may be assumed that many of them lack a cognitive basis for congressional preferences to influence post-election efficacy. If this explanation is correct, it follows that congressional candidate support patterns should not affect efficacy among *low information voters*. Since virtually the entire electorate knows the presidential winner, however,

²⁶ Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980).

TABLE 3 *Non-Voters: Parameter Estimates for Structural Model of Pre- and Post-Election Political Efficacy and Congressional and Presidential Candidate Preference*

Predictor variables	Post-election political efficacy			
	Internal efficacy		External efficacy	
	β	Beta†	β	Beta†
Pre-election internal efficacy	0.645*	0.646	0.275*	0.198
Pre-election external efficacy	x	x	0.631*	0.467
Congressional candidate preference	−0.044	−0.070	−0.061	−0.070
Presidential candidate preference	0.111*	0.262	0.187*	0.317
$R^2 =$	0.503		0.432	
$\chi^2_{26} = 18.29, p = 0.865, AGFI = 0.983, N = 206$				

* $p \leq 0.05$, † standardized solution; x not included in model.TABLE 4 *Low Information Voters: Parameter Estimates for Structural Model of Pre- and Post-Election Political Efficacy, Voting Choice and Campaign Participation*

Predictor variables	Post-election political efficacy			
	Internal efficacy		External efficacy	
	β	Beta†	β	Beta†
Pre-election internal efficacy	0.846*	0.656	0.453*	0.340
Pre-election external efficacy	x	x	0.363*	0.378
Vote, winning congressional candidate	−0.000	−0.001	−0.022	−0.025
Campaign participation	0.393	0.120	0.017	0.005
Vote, winning presidential candidate	0.102	0.117	0.232*	0.258
$R^2 =$	0.492		0.474	
$\chi^2_{61} = 64.26, p = 0.363, AGFI = 0.925, N = 196$				

* $p \leq 0.05$; † standardized solution; x not included in model.

the effects of voting for the victorious presidential candidate on efficacy should remain significant for such people.

To test these expectations, low information voters are defined as persons who did not recall the names of candidates in their congressional district and did not know which was the majority party in the House of Representatives after the election. The model for the low information group has a good fit - $\chi^2_{61} = 64.26, p = 0.363, AGFI = 0.925$ (Table 4). Voting for a winning congressional candidate does not affect post-election external or in-

ternal efficacy, but presidential voting does influence external efficacy, and barely fails ($t = 1.60$) for internal efficacy. Finally, and again consonant with earlier findings, campaign participation does not affect either type of efficacy.

DISCUSSION

One of the best known hypotheses in democratic theory asserts that participation *per se* enhances political efficacy. Analyses indicate that neither voting nor campaign activity in the most recent American national elections had such an effect. However, voting for *winning candidates* is associated with increased internal and external efficacy. One explanation of these effects is that they represent an outcome contingent or 'voting for winners/losers' phenomenon. Further investigation suggests that the *act* of voting is not crucial. Information about election outcomes, rather than campaign activity or patterns of voting behaviour, is all that is required for elections to influence political efficacy. Thus, congressional candidate preference does not affect efficacy among non-voters, while presidential preference does. Many non-voters lack the information needed for congressional candidate preferences to influence efficacy. The impact of presidential preferences on efficacy among non-voters, in contrast, reflects the salience of the presidential contest and nearly ubiquitous knowledge of its outcome. The conclusion that information about election outcomes is what matters is bolstered by the finding that support for the winning presidential but not the winning congressional candidate is positively associated with post-election efficacy among voters with impoverished knowledge of congressional elections.

These findings indicate that elections, not electoral participation, influence political efficacy. However, since the analyses are based on data gathered in a single system for one set of elections, additional inquiry is required to test the generality of the findings. Variations in political context may condition how elections and participation therein influence public political attitudes. It is possible, for example, that some circumstances may be conducive to pure participation effects on efficacy. When a group (such as American blacks before and during the Civil Rights era) is strongly discouraged from participating, the very act of doing so may increase internal political efficacy and enhance more general feelings of personal competence and self-esteem.

Variations in party systems and party-society relationships should also be relevant. Levels of inter-party competition will influence the proportions of voters who support winning and losing candidates and, hence, the proportions whose efficacy will increase or decrease as a result of the election outcome. In systems such as the United States where incumbents are seen to enjoy marked competitive advantages, the impact of candidate support on efficacy should be greater in those contests where incumbents are defeated or not seeking re-election. When partisan divisions parallel salient social cleavages, election outcome effects on internal and external efficacy should be stronger than when such relationships are less obvious. Strong links between parties and social groups should facilitate perceptions of the representational consequences of election outcomes and enhance the likelihood that voters will believe that 'people like them' can influence the political process.

Additional inquiry is also required to determine how campaign activity influences political attitudes. Given the psychological involvement that often accompanies campaign activism, it seems reasonable to expect a 'working for winners/losers' effect, its size being proportional to that involvement. Campaign activity effects should also vary according to the fit between motivations for participation and perceived rewards of doing

so. Studies of local party activists have demonstrated the complexity of these motivations and perceptions, but their influence on political attitudes and attitude change is largely unknown.

Finally, future studies should test the 'staying power' of election-related influences on efficacy and other political attitudes. The impact of candidate preferences on efficacy may often be transient, with the heightened efficacy of those favouring 'winners' being eroded by negative evaluations of winning candidates' (or their party's) behaviour in office.

Testing these hypotheses will require changing the designs typically employed in national election studies to include panel surveys conducted between elections, as well as the over-sampling of particular groups such as politically salient minorities and campaign activists. Such innovations should be seriously entertained. They would not inhibit the traditional aims of such studies, namely the analysis of determinants of voting choice, and they would markedly enhance our ability to understand how elections influence the dynamics of public political attitudes.

The Structure of Attitudinal Tolerance in the United States

JAMES L. GIBSON

In recent years there has been a resurgence in interest in the cross-national study of public opinion. A significant component of this rekindling of attention has been the specific area of public support for the fundamental values of democracy. John Sullivan and his various colleagues have reported on political tolerance in the United States,¹ Israel,² New Zealand³ and the United Kingdom.⁴ In conjunction with a smattering of more limited

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¹ John L. Sullivan, James Piereson and George E. Marcus, 'A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases, 1950s–1970s', *American Political Science Review*, 73 (1979), 781–94, John L. Sullivan, James Piereson and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

² Michal Shamir and John L. Sullivan, 'The Political Context of Tolerance: The United States and Israel', *American Political Science Review*, 77 (1983), 911–28, John L. Sullivan, Michal Shamir, Patrick Walsh and Nigel S. Roberts, *Political Tolerance in Context. Support for Unpopular Political Minorities in Israel, New Zealand, and the United States* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985); see also Rita J. Simon and Kenneth Mann, 'Public Support for Civil Liberties in Israel', *Social Science Quarterly*, 58 (1977), 283–92.

³ Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance in Context*.

⁴ David G. Barnum and John L. Sullivan, 'Attitudinal Tolerance and Political Freedom in Britain', *British Journal of Political Science*, 19 (1989), 136–46.

cross-national studies,⁵ and newly-completed studies that are just now emerging,⁶ a wealth of comparative data is now available.⁷

Concern has been piqued in part by the highly innovative conceptual, theoretical and methodological positions recently suggested by Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus.⁸ Their 'theory of pluralistic intolerance' begins by conceptualizing political tolerance as 'putting up with' that with which one disagrees. Tolerance only makes sense in the context of one's political opponents: one cannot 'tolerate' that which is agreeable. Their methodological innovation is that, prior to asking about tolerance, each subject is allowed to name a political group he or she dislikes the most. The respondents are then asked a series of questions about support for the civil liberties of the 'least-liked' group, thereby insuring that all subjects are responding to a disagreeable political stimulus. Thus, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus were the first to conceptualize and operationalize political tolerance as requiring responses towards greatly disliked political minorities.

Their theoretical innovation has to do with the hypothesized linkages between intolerant public opinion and repressive public policy. They suggested that intolerant opinion affects policy when there is a consensus on the appropriate targets of intolerance. For instance, in the United States in the 1950s, political intolerance was highly focused on the political left, and on Communists in particular. The result was the widespread political repression that is typically dubbed 'McCarthyism'. By the late 1970s, opinion had become 'pluralistically' distributed. That is, rather than being focused on a consensual target, intolerance was directed across a panoply of groups representing a multitude of ideological positions. As a consequence, there were no concerted demands for repression. As Barnum and Sullivan note: 'the consequence of high levels of intolerance may be mitigated by the extent to which the antipathy of citizens – and consequently the intolerance of at least some of those citizens – is dispersed among an ideologically heterogeneous set of groups.'⁹ The degree to which intolerance is focused on particular groups is thus thought to be important for the mobilization of opinion into demands for repressive public policy. To the extent that there is little agreement on which groups ought to be subjected to political repression, the intolerance of the mass public is less menacing for democracy.

As compelling as this theory may seem, there are still some unanswered questions. In particular, it is not clear that the intolerance of individuals is focused on only a limited number of unpopular political minorities. The empirical support for the theoretical presumption is based on surveys that ask tolerance questions about one political group only. It is possible that even if intolerance of the single most disliked group is pluralistically distributed, intolerance in general is not. Although citizens may differ in the political group they dislike the most, they may none the less agree that many groups, even those *not*

⁵ See, for example, Dan Caspi and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica', *Comparative Political Studies*, 15 (1983), 385–404.

⁶ See, for example, Joseph F. Fletcher, 'Mass and Elite Attitudes About Wiretapping in Canada: Implications for Democratic Theory and Politics' (unpublished paper, University of Toronto)

⁷ Note also that single-nation longitudinal analyses should also be treated as comparative analysis. For a longitudinal analysis in the United States, see John Mueller, 'Trends in Political Tolerance', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 52 (1988), 1–25 (see also the rebuttal, John L. Sullivan and George E. Marcus, 'A Note on "Trends in Political Tolerance"', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 52 (1988), 26–32), and James L. Gibson, 'The Evolution of Intolerance in the United States' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987).

⁸ Sullivan *et al.*, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*

⁹ Barnum and Sullivan, 'Attitudinal Tolerance and Political Freedom in Britain', p. 607.

named as among the very most disliked, are worthy of repression. In order to ascertain whether there is widespread agreement on the desirability of repressing different groups (or even different segments of the ideological continuum), it is necessary to question people about a range of unpopular political minorities. That is the strategy of my research.

Thus, my purpose in this Note is to shed some additional light on this theory of pluralistic intolerance. Beyond describing the *level* of intolerance in the United States, I will also report data relevant to the question of the *breadth* of political intolerance. How is intolerance distributed across the ideological continuum? To what degree is it ideologically focused? These are all questions that ultimately bear on the ability of relative democratic regimes to maintain democracy.

PLURALISTIC INTOLERANCE IN THE UNITED STATES⁷

Table 1 reports the distribution of 'least-liked' groups in 1987 in the United States.¹⁰ The most disliked group in the United States is the Ku Klux Klan, followed by Communists, advocates of military government, atheists and Nazis. Nearly 80 per cent of the Americans rank the KKK as among their four most disliked groups, while large percentages dislike Nazis, Communists, atheists and advocates of military government. There is a fairly even division between dislike of left-wing and right-wing groups, with nearly four in ten naming a left-wing group as most disliked, with the other half right-wing groups.¹¹ Though opinion on the most disliked group seems to be pluralistically distributed (i.e., ranges widely across the ideological continuum), there is a fair degree of agreement in antipathy towards Klansmen, Nazis and Communists.

I also employed a second way of assessing the distribution of group affect. The subjects were asked to rate the degree to which thirteen groups were liked or disliked. A scale ranging from 1 (like) to 11 (dislike) was used. The groups were preselected to represent various points along the ideological distribution of groups active in US politics. The responses are shown in Table 2.

Firstly, it is clear that I was successful at asking about groups that are in fact disliked. It is difficult to imagine getting a higher mean score than that observed for Nazis, advocates of military government and the Ku Klux Klan. Secondly, there is a fairly broad distribution of dislikes – on average, the respondents rated five groups as intensely disliked (10–

¹⁰ This analysis is based on a survey of a national sample of public opinion in the United States (a two-wave panel), conducted in 1987. This survey was an extension of the 1987 General Social Survey (GSS), a full national probability sample conducted with in-person interviews. The 1987 GSS was conducted in the spring, with a response rate of approximately 75 per cent. In June and July, an attempt was made to reinterview 1,459 of the original subjects. This subsample was selected randomly, within gender strata. Approximately 87 per cent of these subjects were reinterviewed. Most of these were in-person interviews, although because some subjects had moved since the earlier interview, a small percentage of the reinterviews were conducted by telephone. Additional details on the sample are available from the author.

¹¹ It may seem a little surprising that the right-wing groups are so commonly mentioned as 'most disliked' in 1987, in that many perceive the United States to have become a more conservative country over the last decade or so. Several explanations are possible. Perhaps the greater conservatism of the country has made the right-wing fringe more threatening. As fairly strong conservatives have moved into positions of power in the United States, liberals may have become more fearful that extreme right-wingers could achieve some degree of influence. There has also been an increase in right-wing political violence in the United States that might account for this finding.

TABLE 1 *Distribution of Disliked Political Groups, United States, 1987*

Group	Distribution of Opinion				
	Most disliked	2nd most disliked	3rd most disliked	4th most disliked	Among most disliked
<i>Left-wing groups</i>					
Communist Party	23.6	15.5	16.3	12.5	67.9
Atheists	10.8	12.5	14.1	16.1	53.5
Homosexuals	5.8	5.4	4.9	8.4	24.5
Feminists	0.0	0.4	0.3	1.0	1.7
Liberals	0.2	0.0	0.9	1.0	2.1
Other left-wing	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.1	1.2
Subtotal	40.8	34.2	37.0	39.2	—
<i>Right-wing groups</i>					
Ku Klux Klan	32.4	21.3	16.3	9.1	79.1
Those who advocate doing away with elections and letting the military run the country	11.3	8.4	13.2	19.3	52.2
Nazis	10.3	26.9	21.1	15.3	73.6
Religious fundamentalists	1.1	2.1	3.5	5.2	11.9
Conservatives	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.9	1.4
Other right-wing	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.7	1.1
Subtotal	55.1	59.2	54.5	50.5	—
<i>Uncertain/mixed</i>					
Pro-abortionists	2.8	4.7	4.9	4.6	17.0
Anti-abortionists	0.8	1.2	1.8	3.6	7.4
Society for a New America*	0.2	0.1	1.0	1.1	2.4
Other uncertain	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.0	2.7
Subtotal	4.2	6.6	8.5	10.3	—

Source: The survey of the US population was conducted for the author by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in the summer of 1987. Approximate Ns are 1,210.

* The Society for a New America is a fictitious group.

11). Thirdly, groups on both the left and on the right are greatly disliked. Certainly there is no ideologically unidirectional distribution of dislikes. If we take *only* scores of '11' (the most intense point available on the dislike scale), and if we exclude those who are for or against abortion, then we find that 2.3 per cent of the subjects intensely dislike *only left-wing groups*, 17.2 intensely dislike *only right-wing groups*, 5.7 per cent intensely dislike no groups, and fully 74.8 per cent of the subjects intensely dislike *both a left-wing and a right-wing group*. This is an ideologically broad distribution of dislikes, with groups falling outside the moderate centre being subject to widespread opprobrium.

TABLE 2 *Distribution of Affect for Unpopular Political Minorities, United States, 1987*

Group	Like	Neutral	Moderate dislike	Intense dislike	Mean
US Nazis	0.9	5.4	9.1	84.6	10.3
Advocates of military government	1.9	3.1	10.7	84.3	10.3
Ku Klux Klan	2.0	6.2	9.7	82.3	10.2
US Communists	3.1	10.1	17.7	69.1	9.7
Atheists	2.4	13.4	17.6	66.6	9.6
Homosexuals	6.3	29.2	16.7	47.8	8.5
Religious fundamentalists	22.4	32.2	28.0	17.3	6.8
Pro-abortionists	30.9	30.5	14.5	24.1	6.6
Anti-abortionists	28.3	28.6	23.8	19.3	6.4
Society for a New America*	16.6	57.1	13.5	12.8	6.5
Liberals	32.9	43.6	17.5	6.0	5.8
Feminists	38.0	35.4	18.7	7.9	5.8
Conservatives	47.3	35.8	13.8	3.1	5.1

Source: NORC, survey of the US population, 1987. *N* ranges from 834 to 1,213.

* The Society for a New America is a fictitious group

An interesting pattern emerges when we correlate ideological self-identification with ratings of these various groups. As might be expected, there is some correlation between self-identifications and affect towards conservatives ($r = -0.35$) and towards liberals ($r = 0.35$), although the relationships are not particularly strong. However, the correlations of liberalism-conservatism with attitudes towards Communists is quite weak ($r = 0.13$), as is the correlation with attitudes towards the KKK ($r = -0.03$), Nazis ($r = -0.01$), advocates of military government ($r = 0.05$), and the other groups.¹² Generally, self-identified liberals hold attitudes towards Communists, Nazis, Klansmen, etc., that are just as negative as the attitudes of self-identified conservatives.¹³ Indeed, given the paucity of extreme liberals and extreme conservatives (they comprise only 5.5 per cent of the sample), it is fair to conclude that the structure of group antipathy in the United States is one of moderates opposing both those who are too far to the left and those who are too far to the right. This is not a pattern of pluralistic antipathy.

The strongest negative relationship observed in these data is between affect towards supporters and opponents of the right to abortion ($r = -0.50$). Those who feel positively towards pro-abortionists tend to feel negatively towards anti-abortionists. This is not a surprising finding. However, attitudes towards the groups on the opposite ends of the left-right continuum are generally positively, not negatively, correlated. For instance, the correlation between affect towards American Communists and American Nazis is

¹² The only correlations that exceed 0.20 are between ideology and affect towards feminists ($r = 0.25$) and homosexuals ($r = 0.20$)

¹³ Nor are the relationships between party identification and affect towards these groups any stronger.

TABLE 3 *Levels of Tolerance, United States, 1987*

Activity	Group Affect			
	Most disliked	Second most disliked	Third most disliked	Fourth most disliked
Allowed to run for office	26.6*	31.2	34.1	35.7
Not to be outlawed	31.5	36.7	37.6	42.1
Allowed to make a speech	49.5	48.2	48.3	50.3
Allowed to hold public rallies	32.6	34.5	36.3	39.6
Allowed to teach in schools	18.3	21.1	—	—
Not to have telephones tapped	63.4	61.1	—	—
Tolerate all activities	6.3	8.0	18.3	13.3

Source: NORC, survey of the US population, 1987

* Entries are percentage tolerant. Approximate *N*s are: most and second most disliked, 1,205; third most disliked, 1,065; and fourth most disliked 655. The last two items in the table were not asked of the third and fourth most disliked groups.

+ 0.41, indicating that those who dislike this far-left group also tend to dislike the far-right group. Negative feelings towards political minorities in the United States do not seem to be unidirectionally focused, which raises the spectre of united efforts to deprive these groups of their political liberties.

Table 3 reports willingness to tolerate the four most disliked groups. A majority of Americans would not allow the group they dislike the most to run for office, to hold public rallies or to teach in public schools. Indeed, most would completely outlaw the group. Only half would extend freedom of speech to the group, and, much as the American people generally dislike telephone tapping,¹⁴ only a simple majority would protect the group from government telephone taps. Political tolerance is a scarce commodity in the United States, at least when the target group considered is the most disliked group. Indeed, in the American data *only 6.3 per cent of the respondents would allow their most disliked group to engage in all of these activities*. It is difficult to imagine that tolerance could dip any lower.

THE BREADTH OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

As disconcerting as these findings seem for those who value democracy, it is perhaps useful to give them a 'sober second thought'. It would not be surprising to learn that nearly everyone, when pushed, can name a group to which he or she would deny civil liberties. But is this the pivotal question for understanding the distribution of intolerance in different societies? Perhaps not. In our earlier research on Dutch and American students we

¹⁴ For instance, the GSS in 1986 revealed that 77 per cent of Americans disapproved of wiretapping in general.

came to the startling conclusion that Dutch students are just as intolerant as students living in the American South.¹⁵ Should we conclude, therefore, that the structure of intolerance in the United States and the Netherlands is isomorphic? Such a conclusion is, at a minimum, counter-intuitive.

Perhaps it is necessary to know something more about people than that they can find some group they would oppress. We need to know – at both the individual and societal levels – whether intolerance is narrowly focused on a handful of fringe groups or whether it is broadly distributed across the ideological continuum. We need to know about the *ideological breadth* of political intolerance.¹⁶

Let us return to Table 3 to begin consideration of the breadth of intolerance. Table 3 reports intolerance of the four groups that the subjects ranked as the most disliked. The data reveal that intolerance does in fact decrease as the degree of dislike decreases. The largest effect is seen on the most extreme form of repression – banning the group altogether. At the same time, however, the effect of variation in degrees of antipathy towards the group is less than overwhelming. Indeed, on the question of whether the group should be allowed freedom of speech, the effect is miniscule. On three of the four items asked of all four groups, a majority of the American people is willing to support the repression of the group they ranked as *fourth* most disliked. This suggests that intolerance is fairly broad in the sense that it is not limited to only a group or two. It is probably true that nearly everyone can identify a group he or she would not tolerate. Most Americans, however, can identify a number of groups, probably spanning a considerable range on the ideological continuum, that they would not tolerate. This is a more menacing form of intolerance.

These findings suggest that it is important to query respondents on political minorities other than the single most disliked group. It is important to determine whether intolerance is limited to the group that is most disliked, and to determine just how much dislike is necessary to generate intolerance. It seems unlikely that intolerance materializes only when a group is greatly disliked. Rather, people are willing not to tolerate a variety of groups, and extreme dislike is not a necessary requisite to intolerance.

These data suggest that political intolerance is not limited to a single extremely disliked group. But to what degree are choices of unpopular political minorities idiosyncratic to the individual, and to what degree do they reflect ideological considerations? My working hypothesis is that intolerance is not simply directed against those on the opposite ends of the ideological continuum, but rather that it is directed at any group, left or right, that falls outside the range of perceived legitimate political competition. This suggests that for most, political intolerance will include groups on the far left and on the far right.

To what degree are Americans simultaneously willing to support the repression of groups on the left and the right? The subjects were asked these questions, using highly salient and disliked right-wing and left-wing groups: on the left, the Communists; on the right, the Ku Klux Klan. Since all subjects were asked four tolerance questions about these groups (i.e., irrespective of whether the groups were named in the list of the four most disliked), we can assess the degree to which intolerance is bi-directionally focused.

¹⁵ James L. Gibson and Peter van Koppen, 'Political Tolerance in The Netherlands and the United States' (paper presented at the Law and Society Association Convention, Chicago, 1986).

¹⁶ To reiterate, the theory of pluralistic intolerance assumes that at the individual level intolerance is idiosyncratically and narrowly focused, resulting in a dispersed pluralistic distribution at the societal level.

TABLE 4 *Intolerance of Communists and Klansmen, United States, 1987*

Activity	Percentage intolerant of*			
	Communist only	Communist and Klansmen	Klansmen only	Neither
Not allowed to run for office	7.5	54.3	7.3	20.9
Outlaw the group	6.6	40.7	12.4	20.0
Not allowed to make a speech	6.0	33.4	8.4	37.5
Not allowed to hold public rallies	4.3	47.4	7.5	24.7
Not allow some activity	5.0	64.6	13.3	17.2

Source: NORC, survey of the US population, 1987.

* Rows total to less than 100 per cent, because they omit respondents who are uncertain.

To the extent that intolerance is not unidirectionally focused it has a greater potential for mischief. Table 4 reports data relevant to this issue.

The overwhelming conclusion to be drawn from Table 4 is that few Americans discriminate between Communists and Klansmen. Those who are willing to tolerate one of the groups will very probably tolerate the other. Those who are intolerant of one are intolerant of the other. Only small percentages of respondents differentiate between the two groups. This suggests that people are *not* basing their tolerance decisions on a simple calculus of ideological distance.¹⁷ If that is the case, intolerance in the United States may be much broader than heretofore thought.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

This analysis has demonstrated that the Americans are remarkably intolerant of political minorities they do not like. Commitments to basic democratic liberties for all citizens are weak indeed. At the same time, a variety of active political minorities draws the opprobrium of most American people. Most can identify groups at both ends of the political continuum that they dislike fairly intensely. In the case of the United States we have seen that this broadly-distributed antipathy is associated with a broadly-distributed intolerance. Intolerance is not directed exclusively at a few extremist groups, but instead pertains to a variety of groups on both the far left and the far right. Nor is this process one that is dominated by ideological considerations. For most Americans, who generally locate themselves near the centre of the ideological continuum, intolerance is directed at political competitors perceived to fall outside this narrow region of acceptable centrist politics.

¹⁷ It should be noted that the subjects had considerable difficulty in locating the groups on a continuum of liberalism and conservatism. Over 27 per cent rated the KKK as left of centre (another 7 per cent considered the Klan to be moderate), while nearly one-third placed Communists on the right wing (9 per cent consider Communists to be moderates). The subjects do somewhat better in locating Democrats and Republicans, though there is still an extraordinary degree of uncertainty about the meaning of the terms 'liberal' and 'conservative'.

Whether political intolerance is widespread and whether it is focused may have some important implications for the allocation of liberty through the political system. Yet any theory of the origins of political repression must move beyond the distribution of mass (or even elite) opinions to consider other variables and processes as well. In no area of politics do we expect that public preferences directly translate into public policy. Political intolerance and political repression should not stand as an exception. In the United States, a variety of institutional barriers impede the translation of intolerant opinion into repressive public policy. The constitution, in the hands of a federal judiciary that is politically non-accountable, is just one institution that can upset the repressive consequences of mass intolerance. It is more likely that these processes are responsible for whatever freedom may be enjoyed, rather than any pluralistic distribution of intolerant opinion in the United States.

None the less, the importance of mass political intolerance may be not so much that it directs public policy, but instead that it creates a climate of conformity that penalizes everyone by stifling the free and open exchange of ideas. To the extent that political intolerance is widespread in the political culture, many of the political differences that might usually create a repressive public policy response are, in a sense, pre-empted at their roots. The truly pernicious effect of mass intolerance, from the democratic point of view, is not to be found in its linkage to public policy, but in the political hearts and minds of the citizens.¹⁸

¹⁸ For an elaboration of these ideas see James L. Gibson, 'The Psychology of Political Freedom' (paper presented at the Western Political Science Association Convention, San Francisco, 1988).

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
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